Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
CHARLES CLARKE
MP
13 SEPTEMBER 2005
Chairman: Good morning,
everyone. Home Secretary, thank you very much indeed for appearing
as our first witness this morning. I hope you will bear with me
for one moment because I do need to make an important statement
before the Committee begins about our proceedings today. At today's
hearing, we will be discussing issues relating to counter-terrorism
and community relations in the aftermath of the London bombings.
I should make it clear to the press and the public that there
are some restrictions on our questioning which arise from the
House's sub judice rule. This rule prevents discussion
in Parliament on cases which are active before the courts, including
coroners' courts. The aim of the rule is to safeguard the right
to a fair trial and fair consideration of events at an inquest.
It is also important that Parliament and the courts give mutual
recognition to their respective roles and do not interfere in
each other's affairs. We have taken advice from the Attorney General
on cases which are currently active. It is clear that all the
principal events of 7 July and 21 July, and the shooting of Mr
Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July, are sub judice. It
follows that there should be no discussion of those events. It
is particularly important that nothing should be said in this
hearing, either by members of the Committee or the witnesses,
which might be deemed prejudicial in any forthcoming criminal
proceedings. The House authorities have given guidance to us and
to our witnesses on what can and cannot be discussed today; and
I will intervene if necessary to ensure that the sub judice
rule is not broken. I should add I am sure we will find that this
will leave plenty of scope for questions which are in order in
today's hearing. Home Secretary, thank you very much for bearing
with us while I made that statement. Home Secretary, thank you
for joining us this morning; it is the first opportunity Members
of Parliament have had to examine where we are after the events
of July. Could I start at the beginning, if not just before those
events? Just before the bombings the Joint Terrorism Analysis
Centre decided there was no single terrorist group "with
both the current intent and the capability to attack the UK".
That assessment proved to be wrong as I am sure you will agree.
Q1 Chairman: Can I ask
what assessment you have made about why the intelligence assessment
was flawed; what has been done about it; and, perhaps crucially,
how long it will be before the intelligence you receive is satisfactory?
Mr Clarke: Certainly.
Chairman, could I just make one initial remark in saying how much
I appreciate the invitation to come before this Committee. I think
the issues around the events on 7 July and 21 July need a very
wide public debate and, on my part, I am keen to work with this
Committee on facilitating that. I have given evidence on the issues
you asked me to do, but I should just say on the issues around
the Independent Police Complaints Committee investigation, as
I say in paragraph 24 of my evidence to you, I do not intend to
say a great deal on that (a) for the sub judice reasons
you have mentioned but (b) because I am very keen indeed not to
undermine the independence of the IPCC. I should also say that
it is my intention later this week to write to the main opposition
spokesman to this Committee with draft legislation on counter-terrorism,
which I believe I am coming to give evidence to you on 10 October
to discuss. On your particular question, I want to make a general
remark about intelligence and then a specific answer. The point
about intelligence—and I think this is not anything like
well enough understood in the country as a whole—is that
intelligence is not knowledge. Intelligence is an effort to try
and understand what the threats are that we face in a variety
of different areas based on a variety of different techniques,
a variety of different sources of information, and then to weigh
those assessments and to come to a view. It is not based, as many
seem to think, that somehow we know what is out there. We do not
know; we try and acquire the best possible knowledge that we can.
I would commend to the Committee I think an excellent speech by
the Head of the Security Service, Eliza Manningham-Buller, which
she gave in Holland recently and which is now on her website,
which sets out some of these considerations. One of the bases
of seeing where we go is that the aim of the Joint Terrorism Analysis
Centre assessment, the aim of the overall country threat level,
is to quantify the threat as they see it in the current or near
term. The assessments are set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis
Centre and reflect a judgment on the available intelligence and
are therefore not published. They are not intended to be a public
alert system. That is one of the misunderstandings which have
arisen. The reduction in the threat level, to which you refer
in your question which is contained in the quarterly review, reflected
their view that an absence of intelligence of a current credible
plot and the disruption successfully of two plots in 2004 (both
of which I should say are sub judice, so I cannot comment
on the specifics of those plots) indicated that the reduction
could be made. However, the judgment did still indicate a high
level of threat and the possibility of an attack being mounted
without warning. It did not suggest the threat was removed, but
simply made an assessment that it was lower than had previously
been thought. The change was promulgated in a detailed report
to security planners which was subsequently leaked to the New
York Times and by them to the BBC. Reporting was selective,
perhaps understandably, and did not obviously reflect the detailed
analysis in the report. I should say that the Intelligence and
Security Committee will be conducting an inquiry, I understand,
into the intelligence aspects of July's events, and it is likely
to cover the classified report we are talking about there. I should
make clear that the threat level is separate to the system of
alert states which applies to the Government Estate and to critical
national infrastructure. Alert states deal with the practical
measures which should be put in place to mitigate any risk. While
the alert state is heavily influenced by the threat level, it
is JTAC which sets the threat level independently and is not responsible
for deciding on what mitigating action should be employed. Hence
the reduction in threat level was not directly connected to the
alert state and was for local planners to determine. There was
therefore no significant diminution to specific protective measures.
The whole intelligence issue, as you imply in your questions,
means we have to analyse very carefully how this works in the
future.
Q2 Chairman: Home Secretary,
I think the Committee understands the difference between knowledge
and intelligence, and you set that out very clearly; but the fact
is we did not know that this was in the pipeline. The question
is: what measures have been taken? I understand you talked confidentially
to the other committee, but what measures are being put in place
to improve our intelligence; and when do you think we will get
to the situation where you are more confident about the quality
of the intelligence advice you are getting?
Mr Clarke: The measures are as
follows: firstly, there has been a significant extra resource
and, as a result, very large extra recruitment of extra capacity
for the security services directly; secondly, we have strengthened
our partnerships with overseas intelligence networks to be able
better to understand what is happening and raised the level of
dialogue in relation to that; thirdly, the actual inquiries into
the 7 July and 21 July events have set out a whole series of forensic-based
and also telecommunications data based analyses of what the linkages
have been in leading to these particular events. At the end of
the day, it depends on resource, who we recruit, how we recruit
them and our capacity to relate to the communities concerned.
Those all have been put in process. I have to say, none of them
were new after 7 July. For example, the resource increase had
gone in following 9/11 and the number of people of capacity working
in these areas was already increasing significantly. That will
continue to go ahead in the way I have described.
Q3 Chairman: The IRA campaign
may be coming to an end after about 30 years in its current form;
is it fair to assume we will face terrorism of the nature we have
recently seen for 30 years or so?
Mr Clarke: I would not like to
put a time period on it. The fact is that the nihilist terrorist
threat that we address here is something that will only be beaten
by demonstrating that it cannot succeed in weakening the capacity
of ourselves to defend the democratic institutions and structures
where we are. I believe that has been already manifested very
strongly in our response to these particular events. Unlike the
IRA and some other terrorist organisations, where there was a
specific political ambition related to the terrorism, I believe
we are facing a different kind of threat and, therefore, it is
difficult to give the time assessments that you ask for. I do
believe we will get to a state of affairs where we have demonstrated
that we are simply not going to be shifted from defending our
societies. I may say, I think this is important internationally
as well as domestically. That is why the European Union initiatives
and the United Nations Security Council Declarations on this matter
are so important.
Q4 Chairman: History suggests
these things are solved in the longer term and not the shorter
term?
Mr Clarke: Quite so; that is definitely
the case. You are right to imply, as you do, that it is not something
which is here today, gone tomorrow; it is absolutely not. The
length of time we are talking about depends both on our political
determination to say that this form of seeking to change public
life is completely unacceptable; and the extent to which that
is shared right across; the types of measures we have in place,
but also the type of society and community we build here, that
is very important as well.
Q5 Mr Winnick: On 28 February
the Prime Minister said he thought there were "several hundred
people plotting" a terrorist attack in Britain. In the light
of what occurred in July, would you stand by those figures?
Mr Clarke: There are certainly
hundreds of individuals who we have been watching very closely
and continue to watch extremely closely, and that is what we do.
The word "plotting" is an interesting word in that particular
context. There are certainly hundreds of people who we believe
need to be very closely surveilled because of the threat which
they offer.
Q6 Mr Winnick: One of
the undoubted points which arose from recent events was the question
of any international link between British and foreign terrorists.
There was a feeling some two months ago that the foreign link
should be minimised. Does that remain your view, in view of certain
things which have come to pass—video tapes or what-have-you?
Mr Clarke: I certainly think the
foreign link is a very important element to look at. I think there
is no doubt there were a whole series of international relationships
that were engaged in. The nature of those relationships—the
extent to which it was an association, the extent to which it
was some kind of command-and-control—is a matter which we
do not know the answer to at the moment and that is precisely
what we are exploring. I think it is undoubted that there were
international links in this. The difficult problem in the question
you put to me, Mr Winnick, is to define precisely what the nature
of that relationship is, and how those relationships operated.
Q7 Mr Winnick: Would the
security services be more of the view that there undoubtedly were
foreign links in the attacks which took place in London than,
say, two months ago?
Mr Clarke: I understand why you
are asking the question and how you are asking the question, but
I would not like to put it in the sense of "more or less"
over those two months. The international relationships were right
on the agenda as an issue for investigation at the moment of 7
July, and they have been part of the investigation all the way
through. As you imply, events like the video tape, which you referred
to in your question, are being looked at very carefully from that
point of view as well. I think throughout there has been a thought
that international links might be part of what we are talking
about; but the extent of it and the nature of it is something
we are very actively investigating. The implication of your question
is: has there been a change of opinion over time—for example,
promoted by the video tape you are referring to? I suppose marginally;
but I would only emphasise the marginality. There has been a slight
shift of opinion towards there being international links and weighing
the balance of issues being there.
Q8 Mr Winnick: Because
of the video tape?
Mr Clarke: No, I would not say
particularly because of the video tape. I think the video tape
is another factor in the situation. I would not say because of
the video tape. I think the nature of how that tape was produced,
where it was produced, who produced it, how it was disseminated
and how it was put together remains to be fully established. The
tape is there, of course, and it has been shown and people have
seen it, but the extent to which it was used by others and so
on is something that is actively being investigated.
Q9 Mr Winnick: For reasons
which the Chairman explained I cannot go further on that particular
question. Home Secretary, in considering recruitment to terrorism,
what roles do you believe are played by madrassas overseas (particularly
the way in which apparently so many seem to inspire terrorism),
mosques in Britain and other venues in the United Kingdom?
Mr Clarke: I think it is
very important to emphasise that both madrassas overseas and mosques
in Britain are, for the main part, the place for entirely legitimate
worship, discussion within particular faiths, education and development,
and that is the case. I believe there are some madrassas, and
occasionally some mosques, where there are people who have the
kind of ideological approach which leads to terrorist activity,
who are active. The question is to find out where that is actually
happening and to address it wherever we can. As we do so—and
it is the reason why I want to do it very, very much working with
the mainstream Muslim community—I think it is very, very
important that we do not caricature all madrassas, all mosques,
as places where terrorism is fomented. I think that is absolutely
not the case, and the overall majority of madrassas and mosques
are places where people are operating in a perfectly legitimate
and correct way. The question is to identify where that is not
the case.
Q10 Mr Winnick: Most people,
Home Secretary, would not question that about mosques in Britain,
and prayers in churches, synagogues and temples; but I would imagine
they are pretty concerned (and more so, if I may say so, with
what you have just said) about some of the madrassas in Pakistan.
I am wondering how far the British Government is making strong
representation to the Pakistan authorities of some of those madrassas
that certainly seem (but would not seem so from your answer, if
I may say so) to inspire people to carry out terrorist acts in
the West?
Mr Clarke: If I may say
so, Mr Winnick, I think you put the question in the correct way.
You used the phrase "some of the madrassas" and that
is, in my opinion, the right way to address it. What I said in
my answer to your earlier question was that I do not think there
is an issue in the generality, but there is an issue in the case
of some (to use your words) madrassas and mosques. There is no
doubt, I think, that that is the case. In terms of discussions
with the Pakistanis, there have been very substantial discussions
with the Pakistani Government at all levels—operational,
political and so on—precisely to work together to identify
the places where this is taking place and to take whatever action
is appropriate to deal with it. My own view is that there has
been a significant increase in the amounts of joint work and joint
operation in these matters over recent months, and that is positive
and is precisely to identify those places where terrorism is fomented
in whatever way.
Q11 Mr Malik: I would
like to speak about the central elements of the Government's current
approach to combating terrorism and, in particular, whether the
Government will proceed with all the proposals that have been
set out on 5 August in the 12-point plan by the Prime Minister;
and, if so, what the priorities are within that plan?
Mr Clarke: Broadly the answer
to your question is, yes, we will. There are a number of priorities,
and let me quickly run through them. Firstly, new legislation
to deal with counter-terrorism to create new offences in line
with the Council of Europe recommendations that came in relation
to terrorism; that was pre-figures, in fact before the Election
and certainly before July 7. We will be publishing the wording
of our proposed offences on that later this week, as I said earlier
on, and I anticipate that being a matter for discussion in this
Committee and elsewhere in due course when we go through that.
Attached to that there are a series of other measures in the legislation
(I think relatively non-controversial although of course they
may give rise to controversy) about strengthening our capacity
in those areas. The second element referred to in the Prime Minister's
statement is strengthening our ability to deport those people
who are fomenting terrorism in the way I describe. The way I approached
that was to make a statement to the House of Commons on 20 July
about the need to develop a list of unacceptable behaviours, to
commit to publishing such a list in draft form, which I did in
August, and then consulting on it with individuals and finalising
(I think on 24 August, speaking from memory) the actual list,
and then taking action against the people who were abusing our
position in relation to that. I have done that in a number of
cases; but that leads to the second step, which is the actual
removal of an individual concerned to the country concerned where
there are, as the Committee well understands, important issues
under the European Convention of Human Rights, in particular Article
3, which need to be dealt with. We are approaching that by establishing
memoranda of understanding with different countries interested
to do that: we have successfully done that with Jordan and we
are actively doing it with others to provide the ability to ensure
we can make the deportation in the way we wish to. Reinforcing
that, the Foreign Office has been adding to what we call our "warnings
index", the list of individuals who might seek to come here
from other countries to foment terrorism which I would have the
power to exclude in those circumstances. Indeed, I have already
used that power in some cases. The third area is in relation to
the development of Control Orders in relation to British citizens,
and British citizens who, by definition, we are not talking about
deporting to any country or anything of that kind; and, where
they are conducting unacceptable behaviours, using Control Orders
to deal with those. I have already approved a Control Order against
a British citizen and we are closely examining the possibility
of doing that in relation to others. We are also looking at widening
the definitions, as the Prime Minister said in his statement,
for proscribed organisations, to go through a clearer indication
of how we might proscribe organisations in those circumstances.
I think the final thing to refer to is the need to speed up the
criminal justice system, for example, in relation to extraditions
which the Prime Minister referred to in his statement, and we
are taking steps in relation to those areas. I have perhaps gone
into more detail, Mr Malik, than you would have wanted but the
broad answer to the question is, yes.
Q12 Mr Malik: On point
10 of the plan, for example, it speaks about integration and some
kind of body perhaps being set up. I also appreciate that some
task groups have been set up for the Muslim community to start
to tackle some of these issues. Obviously there are resource implications
and the Muslim community seems keen to deal with some of these
issues. I am wondering, is the Home Office prepared to meet whatever
resource implications there are?
Mr Clarke: I never commit to the
phrase "whatever resource implications there are" from
whomever the request comes! You are quite right, we see this as
a very important mainstream part of our work. I was discussing
this very issue this morning with ministerial colleagues, because
the implications run right across many departments of government
to work together. We have a meeting on 22 September at which we
will seek to clarify precisely what is the best way to move forward.
The implication of the question, that we need to work much more
strongly with the Muslim community in the mainstream, is right.
That it will require resourcing is also correct. I can commit
to providing resourcing, but it is not a blank cheque. I should
perhaps just make one other observation. A lot of people focus
on the relationship with the Muslim community, and that is a very
important part of the debate but, as I know you acknowledge, it
is also important to talk about the role of faiths of all types
within our society—whether it is Christianity, Muslim, Jewish,
Hindu, whatever it might be. I think there are very important
steps we have to take right across the whole range to ensure that
people of all faiths feel they are able to pursue their faith
and be respected for their faith in our society. It is not simply
a question of relations with the Muslim community, but of relations
with faiths generally in society which I am keen to promote.
Q13 Nick Harvey: The Government
decided to ban two controversial but currently legal organisations,
does this mean that the Government believes that the bombings
would have been significantly less likely to occur, or that future
bombings are significantly less likely to occur if these organisations
are banned?
Mr Clarke: Those organisations
are contained in the answer I gave to Mr Malik in terms of looking
at the wider bases of proscription. The key answer to your question
is I do not believe that there is any particular measure and that
is why I made the remark I did about ID cards at the time of the
bombings. In relation to your question, I would not say, "If
X had been in place these events would not have happened".
I do not think there is a magic wand where that could have been
achieved. Do I think that a set of measures—whether it is
proscribing certain organisations and certain prosecutions, whether
it is different anti-terrorist approaches, whether it is ID cards
or whatever, these combinations of measures—would make those
events less likely? I think they would make those events less
likely, but I would not make the particular connection you ask
me to between a particular measure and the particular event of
7 July or 21 July.
Q14 Nick Harvey: Were
you not specifically warned against banning these two organisations
in the Home Office/FCO memo?
Mr Clarke: There is always an
issue, and different people have got different views about this,
on the balance of advantage between proscribing a given organisation
and not doing do. I was responsible as a junior minister for dealing
with these issues in the Terrorism Bill 2000 and the list of organisations
we proscribed on national security firms at that time had a relationship
to each of these organisations. There was an issue about whether
it was wise or not to proscribe because of the concerns that could
arise. They are not easy judgments; they are not straightforward.
In the case of the organisations you are talking about here there
is similarly a balance of view as to what is the best way to proceed.
The way I have decided to proceed is to ask Parliament to look
again at the whole basis upon which we do proscribe organisations
and to take decisions in the particular cases on the basis of
that consideration.
Q15 Chairman: The Home
Office's own paper which you supplied to us, attached to the current
Office paper from last year, said in relation to the two organisations
which you now want to ban: "We need to guard against focusing
on these high profile, vocal and highly visible organisations
because there is much concern from a counter-terrorist perspective
of those groups which are not formally organised". What changed
between the Home Office's view last summer, that you should not
focus on these organisations, and your decision now to ban them?
Mr Clarke: As I said, the decision
in relation to those will be taken on the basis of the new definition
of proscription that we are about. What has changed is the balance
of opinion in relation to the events of 7 July and 21 July, and
that is a very significant change. I think, Chairman, you would
agree (perhaps you would not) that in the debates we have had
on terrorism, for example, in this House before the Election there
was a set of arguments around the likelihood of a terrorist attack
on this country; and some people were very sceptical about the
likelihood of a terrorist attack on this country and made that
argument publicly. That was not the case of ministers. Ministers
said there was a serious risk of a terrorist attack which is why
we needed the measures. Of course, we then had the terrorist attack
tragically and that does change opinions in relation to all these
questions.
Q16 Nick Harvey: Why did
the Government break with its approach of consulting the other
parties over counter-terrorism measures when the Prime Minister
made his announcement on 5 August?
Mr Clarke: I think there was not
a break from that approach, but let me just sum up what exactly
happened. The Prime Minister had a meeting with the Leader of
the Opposition on these matters and I gather there was a set of
efforts to communicate with the Leader of the Liberal Democrats
as well which went wrong, which I regret—there should not
have been the communications failures which there were at that
time. I am certainly working on the basis of working with the
main parties; in fact I have a meeting later this morning with
the spokesman for the Liberal Democrats on these matters to discuss
precisely these areas. There was a communications error in the
lead-up to 5 August, which I have discussed with some of the politicians
concerned, and I regret that is the case. There is no desire on
our part to break from a broadly consensual approach. On the contrary,
I think one of the things the country as a whole has welcomed
throughout this has been, in general, the common approach which
all parties have taken on this matter. Of course, everybody will
decide their own position in the light of that; nobody can be
bound into a particular set of propositions and policies; and
all parties have made it clear that the fact they generally wish
to work in a consensual way does not commit them to voting for
a particular proposition in this House when it comes through,
and perfectly understand that. Our desire is to work consensually,
and I believe that is also the desire of the other main parties
as well.
Q17 Colin Burgon: In your
public pronouncements you quite correctly identified the need
to balance civil liberties and public safety and have been quite
measured in many of the statements you have made. Moving on from
that, because it is going to be a big debate, how would you assess
the effectiveness of ID cards in combating terrorism?
Mr Clarke: This will be a major
debate of course, as you rightly say, Mr Burgon, about which there
will be many differences of opinion. I am certain that ID cards
both in this country and abroad will have a significant role to
play in combating terrorism. The main reason for that is that
terrorist organisations work in a way which both needs intelligence
to understand what they are doing, but also uses identity theft
to address many of its concerns and identity cards will help to
deal with that. As I said earlier, I do not believe it is a golden
bullet which solves the problem completely but it will help to
address it. There are cases under different regimes. For example
in Madrid, after the Madrid bombing in a country where the purchaser
pay-as-you-go phones can only be done by providing identity, where
the identity information was very important to help the Spanish
authorities in preventing further atrocities in Madrid. I make
the point again: it is not the case that you can say, "If
only that was in place then that would have been stopped";
but if you ask me, as you did in the language you were using just
now, "Will identity cards help us in addressing the threat
that we face here?" I am certain it will.
Q18 Mr Benyon: Home Secretary,
what is your assessment of the way in which the emergency services
responded to the attacks on 7 July and 21 July? Were there areas,
in your view, in which the response could have been better organised?
If any, what lessons do you believe can be learned for the future?
Mr Clarke: Firstly, I think the
response of the emergency services was absolutely outstanding
at both the personal and leadership level. The courage and heroism
shown by a number of individuals was extraordinary, and the effectiveness
with which these services worked as a whole as inspirational.
The Committee may be interested to know that people throughout
the world have paid tribute to what we have done by comparison
with the overall state of affairs. I feel very positive about
what was achieved and how they approached it. That said, I think
it is very important to learn lessons from what took place—what
was good and what was bad. To that end, the Government is very
actively considering, under a Cabinet Committee which I chair,
what are the lessons of what happened and where we could improve.
There are two or three areas where we do need to look to improve
and the first is information to victims, relatives and friends
about the situation. It is a massive procedural problem actually:
you get literally millions of calls that come in and how do you
handle those calls over what is a very short period of time in
a way that is effective and operates? We did have some problems
right at the early hours of the crisis in handling what needed
to be done in the most effective way. I commend the authorities
on getting hold of that fairly quickly; and within a day or two
we did actually get the system back. I have been praised by many
victims' relatives, those who were also in the tube trains or
on the bus or who were near but were not actually killed, for
the support for victims that is there now. All that said there
are improvements which we think we need to carry through. Secondly,
we are looking very closely at how the transport decisions are
taken, and they are difficult problems—about whether to
keep the buses running; what transport to close; what to open
and so on—which were taken extremely professionally on 7
July and, to a lesser extent, on 21 July. We need to make sure
that in any other potential attack we get this absolutely right.
Thirdly, there are important issues of memorials, compensation,
coroners' operations, which we need to look at. The overall picture
which I want to give to the Committee is of a very strong, literally
world-class performance, by our emergency services; but the necessity
constantly to say, "How can we improve what we are doing";
and I have just outlined two or three of the areas where we thought
we could improve what we are doing and take it forward in a better
way.
Q19 Mr Benyon: We are
hearing from Sir Ian and the Mayor later, but we would be grateful
if you could outline what measures have been taken since 7 July
to strengthen security in the capital and elsewhere?
Mr Clarke: The basic operation
which has been taken is to get to a state of affairs where what
I call "vigilance" as the means of doing it is actually
being carried through routinely in all of our transport and other
infrastructure. The key answer, to be quite candid, is in the
relationship of the whole community together in London, to be
able to understand where threats are coming from and how things
can operate. We have been very conscious too I need to say of
the possibility of attacks elsewhere in the country as well. There
have been very strong relationships between the Metropolitan Police
and the police leaderships in other parts of the country in order
to ensure that we all understand the situation. The protections
that we have in place I think are strong. We go back to the point
the Chairman and Mr Winnick were raising with me right at the
beginning which is, that we do not know what the situation is;
we do not know whether there is a particular threat we can deal
with, and that remains our central issue. We try and improve our
intelligence, but we do not actually have knowledge.
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