Examination of Witnesses (Questions 43-59)
SIR IAN
BLAIR AND
MR ANDY
HAYMAN
13 SEPTEMBER 2005
Chairman: Sir Ian and
Mr Hayman, thank you very much for coming this morning. I know
you have had the opportunity of listening to the Home Secretary.
Q43 Mr Clappison: Commissioner,
you have been sitting very patiently through the Home Secretary's
evidence and you have heard his assessment of the terrorist threat.
Is there anything you would like to add to what has been said?
Sir Ian Blair: No. In so far as
the Home Secretary touched on areas that are my responsibility
I am entirely in agreement with his view of that threat.
Q44 Mr Clappison: Looking
at the messages which have been given out in recent times and
taking into account what the Home Secretary told us, that intelligence
is not knowledge, you will recollect that very shortly before
the attacks which took place in July you made certain comments
on the radio, which were no doubt well justified, about the excellence
of our counter-terrorism forces and the high standards in the
Metropolitan Police, but do you now, in the light of what has
taken place, have any reflections on the message which was sent
out?
Sir Ian Blair: No. One is always
going to be caught by a pre-recorded interview from the day before
which is then overtaken by events. I do not resile at all from
what I said about the fact that the Metropolitan Police Service's
counter-terrorist capacity had been described as the envy of the
policing world because that counter-terrorist capacity is in three
stages: emergency response, investigation and consequence management,
and in all three of those I think it has been manifest since 7
July and on 7 and 21 July that that response was given. The issue
has always been around whether or not we were able with our partners
in other agencies to prevent all possible attacks. I remember
Mr Magee, the bomber at Brighton, who said, "We only have
to be lucky once. You have to be lucky all the time". It
is a very difficult process.
Q45 Mr Clappison: Do you
share the government's focus on foreign radicals and does your
deployment of officers reflect this priority or have you put greater
effort into British-born terrorism?
Sir Ian Blair: I take the same
response—and I shall be guided by anything that Mr Hayman
wants to say—in the sense that we do both. We absolutely
have to do both. The events of 7 July appear to be involving groups
who are largely British-born. The events on 21 July were by people
who were also British brought up but from different backgrounds.
On the other hand we are concerned about the influence of al-Quaeda
and its associates, and that, of course, takes us abroad. Both
are absolutely vital. We cannot concentrate on one to the exclusion
of the other.
Q46 Chairman: I should
have given you the opportunity to introduce yourselves. Sir Ian
is familiar to us, both in this role and in his previous one,
but perhaps you would like to introduce yourself, Mr Hayman.
Mr Hayman: Thank you very much,
Chairman. I am Andy Hayman, the Assistant Commissioner with responsibility
for specialist operations, which includes counter-terrorism. The
point I would like to add is that it would be very unsafe to make
any distinction based on any factor at all. From an investigative
point of view and also from a preventative perspective one needs
to have a very open mind and be led by the intelligence or the
evidence. If you closed any of those options down you would get
a very narrow perspective and my argument would be that that is
very unsafe.
Q47 Mr Browne: Sir Ian,
we have had approximately two months now since the attacks in
July. The committee would be interested to hear you reflect upon
what lessons have been learned since the attacks, what went well
in terms of the response of the police and the emergency services,
what could have gone better and whether there are any failings
in liaison between the police and the other emergency services
in the immediate aftermath and in the weeks after the bombs.
Sir Ian Blair: In terms of the
7 and 21 July I think that the initial response, as I said earlier
and as the Home Secretary said, was excellent. It was a Team London
event and I think it showed the clear value of rehearsal, of preparation,
of co-ordination. That worked in exactly the way we hoped it could
have worked. There was huge dedication by people from all sorts
of organisations and I think we should be proud of that. In terms
of community engagement, which is another side of this, the lessons
that have been learned from the Lawrence inquiry about the importance
of independent advice came straight into operation. We had advisers
with us on the afternoon of the 7th about how we were going to
engage with the various communities of London. Andy will speak
better than I can about the investigation but I would describe
it as fast-moving, innovative and clearly effective both in terms
of the 7th and the 21st. What did we learn that we could do better?
I echo the Home Secretary's answer about transport. That was a
difficult issue. When you have got the largest crime scene in
English criminal history which also happens to be part of your
transport infrastructure that produces some grave difficulties.
We need a new response to the casualty bureau. In the first hour
we received 44,000 phone calls. There is no system that anybody
knows anywhere that can deal with that number of inquiries and
therefore I think there was, and I sympathise with it immensely,
agony for so many families, not only those who did end up having
victims involved but those that did not even know, and that is
very difficult. Managing 24-hour rolling news produces some very
difficult effects for all of us. It is something we are going
to have to learn with. We have reviewed our operation and we have
some changes that we will probably make in some of the command
structures and so on but they are not of a significance that will
be of particular interest to this committee unless you wish to
go there. There are some processes we already have in train in
terms of how we thought we might reorganise some of our capacity
and you have seen an announcement about that in relation to the
Counter-Terrorism Branch and its amalgamation with Special Branch
functions. That was already in train but our understanding of
what happened during July made that a clearer necessity.
Mr Hayman: On this particular
question I have some points that might give an impression of the
scale of what was being faced as a challenge. I often reflect
on what we were doing during July. Were we investigating 54 murders?
Were we conducting a manhunt? Were we trying to reassure the public?
Were we trying to identify and arrest and deal with any associations
that may have been linked to the crimes? Were we trying to prevent
further attacks? Actually, we were doing all of those in a very
fast-moving operation. Some of the statistics which paint quite
a rich picture of what not only the Police Service but also the
intelligence services and the emergency services were having to
face include over 38,000 exhibits which have taken up two warehouses.
When you are looking at preparation for court a little mistake
along the line there would be fatal for a successful prosecution.
You will be aware of some of the footage that was paraded as part
of the investigation to try and identify people, the extensive
use of CCTV. 80,000 videos have been seized and people are viewing
those to try and identify the images. What might have been irrelevant
on first viewing becomes relevant when they pick up something
down the line. There are over 1,400 fingerprints and over 160
crime scenes. There is a lot of learning in there which needs
to be extracted and we do not want to lose the opportunity to
do that and the points that Sir Ian has made there I think summarise
the strategic perspective and we could lace that with the practical
application of that.
Q48 Mr Browne: In summary
the systems worked. Were there to be another bombing you would
feel confident that the lessons have been learned and the response
to that would be similar to the response on this occasion? There
was not a glaring hole in your operation which you feel could
be corrected?
Sir Ian Blair: No. I can state
quite categorically that there was no glaring hole. The operation
went exactly as we had rehearsed and planned it.
Q49 Mr Browne: Mr Hayman
listed a whole series of different aspects of the police work
on 7 July. Which of those would you say has been given the greatest
immediate priority? For example, you mentioned managing 24-hour
rolling news, which is obviously a consideration but many people
would put it further down the list than the other items mentioned.
Is there a hierarchy of priorities when you are dealing with events
of this magnitude?
Sir Ian Blair: The greatest position
is the protection of the public from further attack. That is what
we were after: find the bombers, find those responsible. When
I mentioned 24-hour rolling news it is just because that becomes
a factor, particularly when we find scenes of crime and find ourselves
in a position where the press are announcing where the scenes
of crime are as we are arriving there to control them. It is a
difficult issue. When we had officers deployed in nuclear and
biological suits suddenly we were into a press position which
could have led to fears of evacuation and so on. It is a less
important issue but it remains an issue. It has to be handled.
Q50 Mr Browne: Do you
think the press coverage is unhelpful? Does it hinder your ability
to function effectively when such a large scale event has taken
place and events are unfolding so quickly?
Sir Ian Blair: I think it is almost
pointless to describe it as helpful or unhelpful. It just is.
It is part of the environment in which we are operating.
Q51 Mr Browne: You have
announced an increase of, I believe, 33% of officers working on
counter-terrorism as part of the reorganisation of the police.
That is clearly going to involve a significant increase in funding.
I was concerned when I was listening to the Home Secretary and
he said that there were discussions taking place in government
"as to what extent we can meet the extra costs" were
the exact words he used, I believe, in terms of responding to
terrorism and policing increases in budget. "To what extent"
I do not think would reassure most people. I think most people
would wish to see that cost met in full and I personally would
much rather the billions of pounds being spent on ID cards and
testing the irises of every person in the country were spent on
exactly the sort of front-line activities you describe. Are you
confident that you are getting the money you need in order to
function as efficiently as possible if any further terrorist events
take place?
Sir Ian Blair: I think it is quite
important that the Commissioner does not negotiate with the Home
Secretary even in front of the Select Committee about how much
money the Metropolitan Police needs. There are two conversations
going on. Conversation one is about repayment for the monies that
are already being spent by the Metropolitan Police. This is the
first time in living memory that the Metropolitan Police has declared
something called "mutual aid", which means that we are
paying hundreds of officers from other forces to work with us.
That means you have to pick up that national cost as well. The
Home Secretary explained what that amount of money was and we
are in negotiations. That is one discussion.
Q52 Chairman: And that
is an agreed figure, is it, the £60 million?
Sir Ian Blair: Yes. It is £30
million actual costs and £30 million opportunity costs taken
together, in all £60 million. Then there is a discussion
about what is the future resourcing of the Metropolitan Police
Service, which is the national counter-terrorism police force.
What we have seen here is an extension of the level of risk management
and investigation we have to carry out. We have got a crime scene
that extends to Leeds, to Aylesbury, to Birmingham. That is a
very significant development.
Q53 Mr Browne: Is there
any area of activity that you would like to be undertaking but
are feeling impeded from doing so because of financial costs?
Sir Ian Blair: No, there is not
in that sense but we are clearly under strain. To deal with an
investigation on the scale which Andy Hayman has just mentioned
it means that some other investigations are not being progressed
at the same speed. Of course, that is what you pay us for, to
prioritise between the different processes. What we are quite
determined to do is not to lose our eye on policing in the communities
in order to do this.
Q54 Mr Benyon: Do you
think before 7 July enough lessons had been learned from incidents
on the Paris Metro, in Tokyo, even our own underground system,
on the specifics of policing an underground system, and do you
believe that they worked in response to this?
Sir Ian Blair: Yes, I do, with
one major caveat, which is clearly in the public domain.
There had been discussions, which I think the Chairman will remember
because they go back that far, about the use of radio systems
on the underground. This goes as far as back as the Fenton Report
into the King's Cross fire which required the operators, in whichever
public or private sense they were at that stage, to provide a
radio system to British Transport Police. Unfortunately, that
does not apply to the Metropolitan Police and there are ongoing
discussions which are made more difficult by private finance initiative
agreements because of the changes that would be required. I do
not think that on the days of the 21st and the 7th that made much
difference to us but, clearly, as events then transpired, other
considerations may come into account.
Q55 Chairman: Can I clarify
one point as you mentioned places outside London like Aylesbury?
As I understand it you announced last week the merger of your
own counter-terrorism unit with the Metropolitan Police Special
Branch. Are there any plans in the pipeline to reorganise the
Special Branches which are attached to all the other 42 police
forces in England and Wales and even those in Scotland?
Sir Ian Blair: That will be a
matter for discussion. What is a very important point to make
is that we are not abolishing the functions of Special Branch.
It is just that, because we have such a significant counter-terrorist
operation which does not exist in any other force, then having
a large Special Branch separate from that seemed to us to be inappropriate
in the current situation.
Q56 Chairman: But you
effectively provide an effective counter-terrorist capacity for
the country as a whole?
Sir Ian Blair: Yes, not just for
London.
Q57 Chairman: Does it
not follow that if you see a need to bring that together with
Special Branch in London there does need to be some rationalisation
of Special Branches, which are sometimes very small indeed, in
some rural police forces which may still turn out to be of interest?
Mr Hayman: You can be reassured
that that work has already started some 12 or 18 months ago. There
is a big investment of assets across the country to bolster up
the regional capability around Special Branch and that will link
into the intelligence services which are doing similar work. The
aspiration is greater capability regionally into which everyone
can then connect. The point that is made there, about not losing
sight of the functionality that can still be identified of being
a national footprint or in London, is very strong. We are just
changing what we call that outfit but they can still connect with
the rest of the country. In summary, the feeling, not only professionally
but also from the planning we have done along with the national
ACPO responsible lead for that, who is the Chief Constable from
Sussex, Ken Jones, is that it will be a strengthened position
rather than a diluted one.
Q58 Nick Harvey: Do you
accept that, as the crime statistics appear to indicate, the police
concentration on terrorism in the weeks following 7 July led to
a major increase in other crimes, particularly street crime? Would
it be fair to say that for some weeks the outer London boroughs
were particularly affected by this, because other police had to
come in and help with what you were doing?
Sir Ian Blair: There was some
but relatively limited displacement. There have been a number
of reports that we really could not source in fact. There was
a significant fall in crime, as I think everybody would expect,
on the Thursday and the Friday immediately after the bombings,
but then it rose back to fairly normal levels. There was a lower
than expected level of crime around some of the transport hubs
and that is exactly what you would expect because there were lots
of police officers there and there was an increase to some degree
in the outer boroughs but, actually, the logic of that is that
that is what you would expect. If you did not have that then it
would be fairly concerning because it would mean that numbers
of police officers would not affect crimes in public places. Well,
they do, so to some degree it is quod est demonstrandum,
is it not?
Q59 Mr Herbert: As you
know, we are not able to discuss the details of the shooting of
Mr Menezes but there is great public concern about the policy
which we would like to discuss. Can I ask you when the new policy
on the use of lethal force in relation to potential suicide bombers
came into force and with which of the various bodies that you
are accountable to was that policy discussed, for instance, the
Mayor, the police authority and the Home Office?
Sir Ian Blair: Can I just say
one thing before addressing that? I am aware that members of the
Menezes family are in the room and it is the first time that I
have been in the room with them. Through you I think it is important
that once again I apologise for the death of Mr Menezes. I am—the
Metropolitan Police are—extremely sorry for that death.
We offer our condolences and we are absolutely determined, with
help from many other sources, to learn from the events that took
place. It is also important with the IPCC representatives here
to make clear that, while I am prepared to discuss the policy
and must discuss that policy, that does not mean that that policy
was necessarily or was not necessarily connected to the death
of Mr Menezes. In terms of what you asked, the policy began to
be developed, of course, after 9/11. It was finally agreed nationally
by the Association of Chief Police Officers in January 2003. Throughout
the process of its production Home Office officials, the CPS,
Treasury counsel, independent advisers were aware of the policy,
and in fact the Metropolitan Police Authority (I am not sure about
the Mayor; he will have to answer for that himself when you come
to his evidence) were briefed on this matter in March 2002. There
are a couple of significant issues here. It was a development
of existing law. It is not a new set of laws and perhaps we can
explore that in a moment. While this policy is a very difficult
issue for the general public, for ourselves, for our officers,
I have, I think, described it accurately as the least worst option.
I think it would be a much worse position for a Commissioner to
appear in front of the Home Affairs Committee to say that on 7
July and 21 July the Metropolitan Police and other services had
no policy and no capability to deal with suicide bombers on the
loose.
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