Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
MONDAY 24 OCTOBER 2005
MS PAMELA
DIX, MS
SOPHIE TARASSENKO
AND MS
ANNE JONES
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon. Thank
you very much indeed for coming to give evidence to us this afternoon.
As you will know, this is the first of the public hearings that
the Committee has held, as part of our scrutiny of the draft Corporate
Manslaughter Bill, and we are very grateful to you for coming.
Perhaps if you could start, Ms Dix, and explain your organisation
and its aims and then Anne Jones I will come to you for the same?
Ms Dix: Thank you. We are very
glad to have the opportunity to come to present our views to you
this afternoon, so thank you very much for this opportunity. Disaster
Action, as you will know, is a group of survivors and bereaved
people from a series of major disasters. We came together first
in the late 1980s as a result of eight disasters which happened
over a period of three years. There were in addition two disasters
20 years ago, in 1985, and the people affected by those events
have also joined our organisation. The main point is that all
of the disasters have very specific, common features: the survivors
and the bereaved and the public asking questions about why something
happened, how it was allowed to happen and what should be done
about the fact that it had happened. Our main raison d'être
is to help create a climate of safety in which disasters are simply
less likely to occur and to encourage a corporate culture that
understands the importance and the sanctity of human life. I would
like to read something from our original document, just a couple
of lines long, which will encapsulate these views. "Disaster
Action wants to encourage responsible corporate behaviour but
where organisations fail in their duty of care and are grossly
negligent or indifferent to safety they should be subject to a
workable process of law which imposes appropriate penalties on
guilty parties." Thank you.
Q2 Chairman: Thank you very much
indeed. Anne Jones?
Ms Jones: I would reiterate Pamela's
thanks to you for allowing me to come to put forward our views.
The Simon Jones Memorial Campaign was set up initially by Simon's
friends. Simon was my son. He was a 24 year old university student
taking a year out, and to finance himself before he went back
to take finals he had signed on at an employment agency to get
work. One morning, without prior knowledge of where he was being
sent, he was put in a taxi and sent to Shoreham Docks. Within
two hours of his arrival there he was dead. The Campaign was set
up initially to get justice for Simon. As Pamela has said, people
were saying, "How could this happen? Didn't these people
have a duty of care to him? Shouldn't they have ensured adequate
communication? Shouldn't there have been enough workers, shouldn't
there have been enough trained workers? Where was the supervisor?
Why should anyone be so indifferent to human life?" Simon
was killed in 1998. To this day, I have never had so much as two
lines from the company that killed him. So, first to get justice
for Simon, but as we delved into the problems we wanted to raise
awareness of the law's failure to protect workers in general and
agency workers in particular from death or serious injury. We
wanted to campaign against poorly-paid, untrained workers being
used to replace properly-trained, experienced workers. Most importantly,
we wanted to persuade the Government to honour its pledges to
improve the law by making companies more accountable for their
actions and omissions and, in particular, their promise, in Revitalising
Health and Safety in 2000, to hold the decision-makers of
employing organisations to account.
Q3 Chairman: Thank you very much
indeed. Both of you have spoken both about particular people responsible
for particular incidents but about the need also to change corporate
culture. Can I ask you to say what role exactly you think being
able to get successful criminal prosecutions would play in doing
that? This Bill is all about being able to prosecute people and
it is important for us to understand how the ability to prosecute
fits into that broader agenda, in addition to meeting your understandable
feelings about your loved ones. Anne Jones, would you like to
answer first?
Ms Jones: The first thing we feel
is that a successful prosecution brings into the public domain
all the failings that led to a preventable death and, very importantly,
it shows that this country values all human life and is prepared
to punish those who are negligent or indifferent to the lives
of workers. It would make people with the real power in an organisation
accept responsibility for what they have done. Most importantly,
it allows lessons to be learned from mistakes and acts as a spur
to other employers to rectify similar problems. Also, it gives
the only consolation available to the bereaved family, that their
son, daughter, husband or wife has not died in vain but that by
their loss the annual carnage involved in work-related incidents
in Britain will cease.
Q4 Chairman: Pamela Dix, is there
anything you would like to add to that?
Ms Dix: One thing I would like
to say is that there will be instances when both Sophie and I
would like to answer a particular question, so we will not be
interjecting in order to add for the sake of it but to add something
of substance. We sit here in representation of many people and
I think the point I would like to make, before handing over to
Sophie, in terms of a successful prosecution, is to go back to
the words of one of our founder members whose son died on the
rather extraordinarily named Herald of Free Enterprise. Peter
Spooner said in 1990, which, I would like you all really to bear
in mind, is 15 years ago: "Corporate responsibility is not
a question of conforming with the minimum standards imposed by
increasingly hesitant legislators, it is also a question of sharing
moral leadership and of developing truly responsible codes of
corporate conduct." That man is now too old to be here and
say this for himself to you but, in terms of specifically trying
to get a prosecution, he was one of those who were trying. Perhaps
I could hand over to Sophie, just to finish our answer to this
question.
Q5 Chairman: Perhaps, in doing that,
I could ask you to move on to cover what was going to be my next
question, which is, without going through every individual case,
can you distil, if you like, the essence of your experience in
trying to get successful prosecutions?
Ms Tarassenko: My own experience
comes from the King's Cross fire, in which my brother was killed.
In that instance we did not get to stage one, because although
we had advice that we may have a case for a private prosecution,
it is prohibitive, basically, to do that, so there were no criminal
proceedings, there were no health and safety breaches that were
prosecuted either, there was no civil liability admitted and there
was an inquest verdict of accidental death. Actually there was
no recognition at law by any body of what came out in the Fennell
Report, which was a fairly negligent culture which existed in
the Underground at the time; that was the difficulty for us. Since
then, of course, our members were in the Herald of Free Enterprise
case, which failed after a few days, and at Southall we also have
members basically who did not get ahead on day one. It is very
frustrating, to say the least. There does not seem to be a forum
whereby accountability is recognised. The importance of a deterrent
I would emphasise again. I know that lots of corporations will
say, "Well, having an offence is never going to make a corporation
behave better, that's not the way corporations work." That
may be true but I always like to think of comparing it with the
legislation which came in on the wearing of seat-belts. You will
get a body of people that wear seat-belts anyway, you will get
a body of people that will never wear seat-belts, whether there
is a law against it or not, and there is a substantial body of
people who will start wearing seat-belts because the law has been
passed. I think corporations do not behave entirely differently
from that.
Chairman: Thank you very much.
Q6 Gwyn Prosser: Mrs Jones, as you
know, in the current state of the draft Bill, no criminal sanctions
can be taken against individuals, even if those individuals are
senior directors in a company which is proved to be grossly negligent.
That being the case, do you think this Bill is worth having?
Ms Jones: Unfortunately, that
being the case, I do not think that really it will be any easier
to prosecute this Bill than the old Bill of Corporate Manslaughter,
because we have this big problem about the definition of a senior
manager and woven into the offence that the organiser of the breach
has got to have involved a senior manager. The definition of a
senior manager is so narrow that to try to show that he was involved
is going to be no easier than the old "controlling mind"
legislation. The other thing is that, even if you can identify
a senior manager, because there are no statutory duties placed
on him to ensure that his organisation is complying with health
and safety legislation and the management of Health and Safety
at Work regulations, we are back with the situation that we ended
up with in court, with Martell's defence arguing successfully
that, even though he had designed the hazardous system of work
and, on his own evidence, insisted that it was used unless he
said they could do otherwise, he was not there that morning. He
was not supervising and therefore he could not possibly be expected
to know exactly how it was being used and that he had no duty
to know.
Q7 Gwyn Prosser: You are identifying
what you consider to be a very clear flaw in the Draft Bill but,
that being the case, is it a Bill worth having?
Ms Jones: Not without considerable
amendment. That is the main thing. There are good things about
it, for instance, including at least some Crown bodies, and so
on, but it seriously needs amending to make it effective and operational.
Q8 Gwyn Prosser: May I ask Pamela
Dix the same question. In your submission you did not actually
go into these issues of holding individuals culpable. What is
your view?
Ms Dix: I will hand over to Sophie
to answer that.
Ms Tarassenko: Our view is that,
of course, at the highest level, for the reasons pointed out,
directors must be held to be accountable, but I think it is a
different issue, because here, in this Bill, and Anne is right,
basically we are going back to what the law is. All in all, there
is not a vast amount of difference between a current "directing
mind" issue and the way this Bill is worded, so it is barely
different at all, which is why we did not address this issue particularly.
What we looked at in the Bill was and what we would like to argue
is that you cannot have this liability requirement on senior managers.
We have argued that the law needs to look at—and that is
where I use the Australian Code as an example—the existence
of a corporate culture, because in almost every single public
inquiry report the words "culture of safety" or "the
existence of a culture" were found to have been at least
one of the causes of the deaths, if not the cause of the deaths,
certainly as a background. The cause of death normally will be
the act of a very junior employee, someone who did not shut the
door, or whatever it was, and behind that lies corporate culture.
If you have just "senior manager" and if you have to
find a link between just a senior manager and a death it is never
going to be found. Therefore, this whole idea for us is completely
unworkable.[1]
Q9 Gwyn Prosser: You mentioned the Australian
model. Some people argue that defining the culture of a company,
or the corporate body, is far too vague and that it will be difficult
for juries to get a grip of, especially if their understanding
of the company corporate is lacking. What is your comment on that?
Ms Tarassenko: The Australian
Code actually provides a definition of what they mean by "corporate
culture". It is an attitude, a policy, a set of rules, a
course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate
generally. However, the Australian legislation also provides a
defence of a kind of counter-defence of "due diligence"
in terms of showing that their attitudes, policies and rules were
not sloppy or negligent, so there is that balance. I think the
jury, in being asked to prosecute an offence under the Bill with
the way it is worded presently, would have immense difficulty
in linking any senior manager with the cause of death; it is going
to be impossible, in my view, for almost any jury, given any reasonable
defence lawyer.[2]
Q10 Mr Clappison: You have made certain
observations about what you see as being the difficulty of proving
that a senior manager is responsible for what has taken place.
Perhaps I could start with Anne Jones on this. Putting that to
one side, assuming that the case has been made out and there has
been a finding of guilt against the company concerned, do you
believe that there should be individual liability for directors
of those companies, that they should face individual punishment?
Ms Jones: I think that this is
going to be almost essential, because many companies, to avoid
the suggested fine, will go into liquidation. It is very, very,
difficult, therefore, to have a sanction against the company or
anyone involved in it if it goes into liquidation. However, if
you do insist, as in the consultation document that was put out
in 2000, that there should be an associative crime of contributing
to, conniving at or assisting in corporate manslaughter, aimed
at senior management or directors, then you would have some way
of still putting the sanction on the decision-makers in the company.
This is the real problem. I can see the point entirely in targeting
the entire company because everybody within that company is benefiting,
effectively, from the shortcuts that were taken that caused the
tragedy, but it is not the company that makes the decision. It
is not the organisation that makes the decision and unless you
target decision-makers in some way then they are not going to
change their behaviour. A company cannot change its behaviour,
the decision-makers can change the way a company behaves. Therefore,
unless you have got some way of targeting those decision-makers
I do not think it is going to work. Having said that, assuming
that we had got a sort of wonderful world where this would work
then we do have to look at how you sanction the company. As I
say, non-payment of fine is a very common problem. This happened
in the Ramsgate walkway collapse. I do not think the fine was
ever paid and you do have to have some method of targeting individuals.
Even if you say, "Right, we're not going to imprison this
director for this but clearly he isn't worthy of having such a
senior post in a company, any company, and he should be disqualified
from holding any post for a minimum of 10 years," there is
a precedent in company law for unlawful trading within this sort
of thing, then you would have some sort of hope because the company
might have to reorganise itself totally if enough of its board
of directors have been disqualified from acting. The only other
way I can see round it, with this at it stands, is if you accept
that to take shortcuts that cause loss of life is criminal negligence
and therefore that any company which effectively is gaining assets
by criminal activity can have its assets frozen during an investigation
and a prosecution. You say, "Right, this is a criminal investigation.
We believe you have been benefiting from criminal activity."
That is about the only way I can see it.
Chairman: Mrs Jones, we are going to
pick up that point at a later stage in the inquiry.
Q11 Mr Clappison: Thank you for that.
To Disaster Action, have you got anything to add to that; either
Pam or Sophie?
Ms Tarassenko: We recognise that
this is probably one of the biggest sticking points, because certainly
the Institute of Directors and those respondents have professed
the most hostility towards this, so we recognise this as a major
issue in this Bill. There are other ways of getting directors
to behave better. We think it should be in there but if it were
not to be in there, if we are talking only corporate responsibility
as opposed to individual directors' responsibility, we think there
should be parallel legislation imposing safety duties on directors,
in the same way that they have financial duties under the Companies
Act imposed on them, that there should be actual legal obligations.
We think this would improve matters considerably. We would have
liked to have the offence of aiding and abetting a company to
commit manslaughter, but if that is going to be a sticking point
and it is never going to be accepted we would have the Corporate
Manslaughter Bill with accompanying legislation for directors
but within another forum, if you like.
Q12 Mr Clappison: Could I ask you
about one other issue, with regard to establishing liability in
the first place, and that is the somewhat technical issue of causation.
You are probably aware that the Law Commission's 1996 proposals
suggested the legislation should contain a special provision on
causation which would clarify that "the management failure
may be a cause of the death even if the immediate cause is the
act or omission of an individual." The Home Office, in its
proposals, has left that out. I think you believe the Home Office
is wrong to do that. Could you say why you think it is wrong?
Ms Tarassenko: My understanding
is that the Home Office may have left it out because of a couple
of cases that have intervened, the Empress Car case[3]
and the Finlay case[4],
that have sort of clarified this area. I have two things to say
about that. First of all, the Empress Car is a specific pollution
case and it is notorious that the law has said, "Oh, well,"
like in the Meridian case[5],
"we will accept this and that in terms of this type of offence
but not manslaughter." It may always be argued that the Empress
Car way of thinking is not applicable to manslaughter, it was
applied in Finlay but Finlay was individual manslaughter, not
corporate manslaughter. I can see ways in which a defence would
easily find holes through that particular reason for leaving it
out. Secondly, a new piece of legislation is an ideal opportunity
to clarify what is an incredibly difficult area of law, which
of course has been wrestling with causation for years and why
not take that opportunity to make it absolutely clear.
Q13 Mr Clappison: You believe that
there would be clarity and that it would be preferable to have
it dealt with by statute rather than through arguments over previous
case law?
Ms Tarassenko: Absolutely.
Q14 Mr Rooney: Can I address this
to Anne. In your opinion, does the draft Bill clarify enough the
different types of relationships in employment and if not what
would you suggest should be there, where an employment agency
did something like this?
Ms Jones: I think this is one
of its really big problems. It is not just agency workers. Everyone
knows that on a big construction site, like Wembley, for instance,
there are enormous numbers of contractors and sub-contractors
and sub-contractors that are taking on agency workers and even
agencies that have borrowed workers from other agencies. There
was one case, I think it was two years ago, of an Eastern European
who had been killed on a construction site and there were enormous
problems with identifying who was employing him, because each
layer was passing the buck, saying, "He's not our employee."
There is a big, big problem with agencies, even though they are
executing a PAYE system, dictating where the person works and
when a person works, what their rate of pay is, what their hours
of work are, then turning round and trying to say, "But they're
self-employed." Unless we can tighten that up, in the first
place, this bill has got a real problem on its hands. If only
we could insist on saying to an agency, which effectively is a
sub-contractor supplying labour, "Right, you are the principal
employer, health and safety law says that you are responsible,"
and this is quite correct, the agency is actually responsible
for that person's health and safety at work and for their training
but the host employer is responsible for the safe systems of work.
As agencies just about never visit the host employer to assess
whether a safe system of work is operating there, it seems odd
that it is very rare for an agency to be targeted with the corporate
manslaughter law, because, in my view, they are as guilty if they
have failed in their duty to establish that the company they sent
the person to was operating a safe system of work. It is not only
my son, in this case, I have had so many other people contact
me. A more recent case, showing the terrible involvement, was
another university student, Michael Mungovan. He was sent by McGinley's
recruitment agency to work doing rail maintenance for Balfour
Beatty, who had been sub-contracted by Railtrack, to do a particular
job. McGinley's, just like Personnel Selection, had no idea what
job he was going to be doing, they simply sent him there. He had
never done that particular type of work before. Within two hours
of being there he was dead, he had been hit by a train. The inquest
returned a verdict of unlawful killing. It was horrendous, the
errors of communication and everything else that had taken place,
but the CPS did not prosecute, and I could quite understand their
point. Although you could see the company was definitely guilty
of that young man's death, it was very difficult to follow the
paper trail to see exactly who should shoulder the total responsibility.
It is happening on construction sites and in docks all over the
country, and until we tighten up this, placing a responsibility
plainly on the people sending out the workers, then all that will
happen is that the host employer will argue, "This isn't
my duty of care, this isn't my responsibility," and they
will walk free.
Q15 Mr Rooney: Thank you for that.
Why do you think it is important that the bereaved are given the
right to bring private prosecutions without prior approval of
DPP?
Ms Jones: As far as I understand
it, the reasoning for requiring the approval of the DPP is to
prevent spurious prosecutions. I think the idea of that happening
is remote. First, the financial hurdles are absolutely enormous.
You have not only to find the money to bring your private prosecution
but you have also got to fund it sufficiently should you lose
the case and have to pay the other side's costs, so that is an
enormous financial hurdle. Second, if you do manage to bring the
private prosecution it will have a preliminary hearing at a magistrates'
court and the magistrate can examine the case, decide whether
you have a valid case to continue or throw it out at that stage.
If it goes on to the Crown Court, the judge at the pre-trial hearing
can also look at it and decide whether or not you have a valid
case and throw it out, so I think the chances of a spurious prosecution
are very, very low indeed. However, it is often the case that
the DPP has not necessarily got all the information. In our own
case, I was raising points right up to two months before the trial,
particularly people who had not even been interviewed, and I was
saying, "Look, he was supposed to be doing that, where was
he, why wasn't he doing it?" "Oh, who's that?"
they would say. It is often the case that the bereaved family,
because they have spoken to so many people and because they are
very, very focused, have actually got more information than the
DPP and there may have a very valid case for bringing a private
prosecution. As I said, I cannot see any bereaved family doing
this on a spurious case, they would have to be a very, very, very
wealthy bereaved family, and the idea of, say, Richard Branson's
son being in the position of my son is laughable, it would not
happen.
Ms Tarassenko: I very much go
along with that, in all its points. Sometimes relatives have actually
got the staying power that the DPP does not have, so they may
actually get there, but certainly we were quoted about a quarter
of a million to get to the first magistrates hearing, so nobody
has the money. It is never going to happen. It is a sacrosanct
right which has existed for hundreds of years, there is no reason
to get rid of it at all.
Q16 Harry Cohen: The draft Bill proposes
sanctions of unlimited fines and/or a remedial order for those
found guilty of corporate manslaughter. I understand that you
are not satisfied that is sufficient. Leaving aside the individual
directors, what more would you argue for as being amongst the
sanctions that should be there?
Ms Dix: If I can deal briefly
with the issue of fines in themselves, we think basically, on
a philosophical basis, that they are meaningless. There is no
connection between the number of people killed, the kind of event,
the kind of incident and the nature of a fine imposed. There is
no way in which it has ever been done on a basis that we can all
sit here and agree had some logical sense, so that situation is
likely to continue into the future should this Bill be enacted.
I would also say that when a fine is exacted there are these questions
about what happens to the money. The money goes into the Treasury,
it is not ring-fenced in any way in relation to the use to which
it might be put, the money just disappears into a big pot. What
is the point, except for a headline in a newspaper that might
suggest that fining a company over £13 million is meaningful;
we would argue that it is not particularly meaningful either as
punishment or as deterrence. You might be interested in the situation
which pertains in the United States whereby the product of corporate
fines often goes into a pot for the office for victims of crime,
whereby the money is put to some use in relation to activities
for the victims of crime, including corporate crime. That is not
proposed here. I know that Sophie has something she would like
to add to that.
Ms Tarassenko: Going along the
same lines, there could be criminal compensation which could be
a form of punitive compensation, which would make more philosophical
sense in terms of the bereaved families, certainly as a bereaved
person, in terms of doing the maths. A death is very cheap if
the person is over 18 and has no dependants and that is a glaring
flaw in any system for us. In the past, Disaster Action has also
proposed corporate probation to avoid slippage because companies
tend to do things right for a year or two and then start slipping
back and a long probation order would prevent slippage. Finally,
equity fines may also be valuable. I think probably what corporations
fear most is the diminution of their equity value, so that could
be a very strong disincentive as well as what I have mentioned
previously, disqualification of directors who may have been involved
in the criminal context.
Q17 Chairman: For my benefit, can
you explain how an equity fine will work?
Ms Tarassenko: My understanding
of an equity fine, and I think CCA might have a detailed explanation
later on, is that I think some equity fines work in that the Government
actually takes a holding of the company and reduces the company's
holding, or there is a reduction in value of the shares, which
of course would bring about a shareholder revolt, which is the
other thing that companies fear most of all. That would be a strong
disincentive. I do not know exactly how equity fines work, to
be honest.
Ms Jones: Could I contribute on
fines. At present, we have the ability to impose an unlimited
fine for health and safety offences. We are not distinguishing
between a health and safety offence and a corporate manslaughter
offence, in that case. I think one of the reasons why fines do
not have a deterrent effect is because they are not big enough
and the only way you can do it is to make fines so large that
it would bring about corporate death. The reason it does not have
a deterrent effect is based in company law, about the only duty
placed on directors being that they act in the best interests
of the company, and that has been interpreted by the courts to
imply that they must act to maximise profit. Effectively, if they
reduce profit to increase safety they are actually disobeying
company law. The only way then you could make a fine on corporate
manslaughter tie in with it is to make it so big that the company
would fall if it had to pay this fine for corporate manslaughter,
in which case then to act in the best interest of the company
they would have to put safety in place. We are talking of fines
that would have to be more than 10% of annual turnover to have
any effect on them. On its own, I do not think that will work.
Remedial orders sound great but the Health and Safety Executive
can already do that. I was very worried about the draft Bill saying
that people could apply for an extension on it and then it says
and they could apply for a second extension, and there does not
seem to be any limit placed on how many extensions a company can
ask for, for how long it is going to take them to put in this
remedial work. I cannot see why, if the judge says, "You
have got to put everything right that causes death, you've got
to increase staffing, improve training, improve communications,
get the right machinery in place," and so on, "and you
have got three months to do it," if the company fails to
do that then the directors are not in court on a `contempt of
court' charge, for which there is a custodial sentence. That might
focus their minds on correcting the errors and omissions which
caused the death in the first place.
Q18 Harry Cohen: I want to ask this
of Anne Jones, because I understand that your organisation has
mooted the possibility of freezing company assets in certain circumstances.
I am not sure what those circumstances are. Is it justified to
freeze a company's assets and put it out of business and all the
other workers in that company, to put their jobs in jeopardy?
Ms Jones: They are not necessarily
out of business if their assets are frozen, if you put in, for
instance, a receiver to act for them during the investigation
and judicial process. You would only do it, let us be honest,
if you were pretty certain that they had negligently or recklessly
caused a death. Obviously, one of the big problems in this area
has always been the lack of police numbers and police training
to investigate this. I understand, from reading, I think it was,
the Police Federation's response that one of their big problems
is knowing where to look. I have been to the National Police Training
Centre and asked about training for investigating work-related
deaths. They have no course for it. I contacted the Home Office
and said "Can we have a course set up for the police so that
they know how to investigate work-related deaths?" I was
told the training providers think that the training they provide
is adequate. I do not know who audited the work but it is not
showing up by an improved prosecution rate, or anything like it.
Q19 Harry Cohen: Can I come back
to this point about freezing of a company's assets directly, because
I can see the argument of the fear that a company goes into liquidation
and I think that is the way they avoid fines or penalties. Are
you arguing that they should not be allowed to go into liquidation,
that their assets should be frozen ahead of it? Is that the point
you are making?
Ms Jones: Yes. This happens, for
instance, in, say, serious fraud cases, they can freeze their
assets. Why cannot you do it if it is killing somebody, if you
can do it in other cases? If they have been seen to be profiting
from criminal activity their assets can be frozen, so if it can
happen in other cases is not this a crime? Are we getting away
from the idea that this is a crime? This is criminal activity.
Should not the same things apply if you are killing people as
if you are taking their money?
1 See Ev 114 Back
2
See Ev 114 Back
3
Note by witness: Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd v National
Rivers Authority [1999] 2 AC 22, [1998] 1 All ER 481. Back
4
Note by witness: R v Finlay [2003] EWCA Crim 3858. Back
5
Note by witness: Meridian Global Funds Management Asia
Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2AC 500 [1995] 3 All ER 918. Back
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