Select Committee on Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200 - 213)

MONDAY 7 NOVEMBER 2005

MR ADRIAN LYONS AND MR AIDAN NELSON

  Q200  Mr Clappison: There were some very interesting suggestions as to the causes of the Potters Bar crash that generated headlines which have not subsequently been sustained by inquiries. Can I ask if you see the draft Bill having any impact on the situation which you describe?

  Mr Nelson: No, I do not. I think the existing legislation is sufficient and the basis on which civil litigation is pursued is appropriate. Any responsible industry that does not wish to have its reputation tarnished will ensure that the needs of the victims are properly taken into account and addressed up front without the blame issue as to who was responsible getting in the way. The industry ought to be responsible and able to do that.

  Q201  Mr Clappison: Where do you see subcontracting fitting into this? Should not the company that contracts out its work always be reasonable for the work of its subcontractors?

  Mr Nelson: Again, it is the same point about subsidiaries and parents. The chain of responsibility needs to be clear. You need to be absolutely clear what you are contracting and you need to be absolutely clear as to the client. At each stage there could be several layers of subcontracting in some projects. There has to be clarity as to responsibility, as to management arrangements and ultimately the client needs to be satisfied that he has in place a regime where by way of contract work is to be delivered safely without harm to those working on it or the subsequent owners of it.

  Q202  Mr Clappison: Even where responsibilities are clear, should not the main contractor always be responsible for the work of the subcontractor?

  Mr Nelson: The client or the main contractor moving down towards subcontractors should be responsible for assuring that the arrangements the contractor has in place will deliver the work safely.

  Mr Lyons: Yes, of course, and that is the way it works on the railways. A subcontractor is not just handed a piece of track and told to get on with it. The key issue is the gross breach. It is possible to imagine a subcontractor, for hopefully completely bizarre reasons, not doing what he is meant to and the management deciding for various reasons not to, in which case the gross breach can go no higher than the subcontractor. It has to be proved that it was the person placing the contract who committed the gross breach and led the subcontractor into a situation for this to come within the terms of this Bill.

  Q203  Harry Cohen: Should he not also have a monitoring role to check that it has been carried out by the subcontractor?

  Mr Lyons: Yes. On the railways it is hopefully difficult to envisage a situation where the present structures would lead to a subcontractor committing a gross breach because—you are right—there is checking and there is also very specific involvement in the work being carried out.

  Q204  Chairman: All those situations we have read about where casual people are taken on and not given proper training have stopped, have they? That is the sort of thing that makes people worry and think that contractors are not really responsible.

  Mr Nelson: The industry put in place through Railtrack a system called Sentinel, which is a secure registration system for track workers and others in varying degrees of competency. I cannot give you the detail of the last audit that Network Rail performed but they do perform regular audits and they are demonstrating high levels of compliance with the people they find on site being certificated as competent.

  Q205  Chairman: What is a high level of compliance?

  Mr Nelson: 99% in that area. If you would like I could provide the detail.

  Chairman: That would be useful. Thank you.

  Q206  Gwyn Prosser: I want to ask about the provisions in the Bill which require an occupier of land to show a duty of care, in particular looking at the issue of deaths on the railway, trespassers and suicides. Do you consider it desirable or appropriate that there should be provisions in the Bill to apply corporate manslaughter in certain circumstances and, if so, perhaps you could elaborate?

  Mr Nelson: The case of British Railways Board v Herrington (House of Lords 1972) led to the 1974 Occupiers Liability Act. It demonstrates that there is a duty of care in relation to trespassers. It can be construed in the way in which society operates, that it sees a greater duty of care to, for example, children without the maturity to understand the risk as opposed to an adult male who has had too much to drink on a Friday night and thinks the shortcut across the railway is acceptable. You have to take the expectations of society into account in determining the point at which a gross breach has occurred. It is only reasonable to go so far in taking precautions to prevent access to the railway. If you have an 11,000 mile railway, you have 22,000 miles of boundary fence. It is necessary to provide fencing appropriate to the risk. When you come to deal with the suicide issue, you have to start from the point of view that it is a mental health problem. If you do identify patterns in relation to suicide, it is incumbent upon you as a duty holder to do that which is reasonable, perhaps in association with the operation of the mental health facility. I am aware that in a number of places work is ongoing that takes this into account. We have to recognise that if we divert people from suicide on the railway we may in some cases prevent suicide because the urge to take one's life passes as someone perhaps gets back to medication or whatever. In other cases, what we will do is create a diversion to another mode of suicide. Therefore, you have to start looking at this in the round as a mental health issue. The railways have a part to play but at the moment I do not conceive of a situation, so long as they do that which is reasonable in relation to the patterns of trespass and suicide, where a gross breach is likely to occur.

  Q207  Gwyn Prosser: On the issue of gross breach, I think both organisations have expressed concern at the fact that a jury may have regard to any matters it considers relevant when determining whether an organisation has committed a gross breach. There is a whole list of factors which might be required to be taken into account. Do you think there should be a more comprehensive list or almost an exhaustive list to make that process easier, or would it make it more difficult?

  Mr Nelson: The particular point that we drew out in the RSSB response was that, following a major accident, we receive as an industry hundreds of proposals from the public, from engineers, from people selling products, proposing something. It may be that one of those propositions captures the eye of the media but it may not be reasonably practicable to pursue that recommendation. The important thing is that the industry has in place processes that identify what is unreasonable but they close out those issues within their management system that can be seen to be reasonable in addressing that. What we were concerned about were some of the more fanciful ideas. I do not put laminated glass and seatbelts in the realm of fantasy; I put those in the area where the industry is doing serious work to identify what is reasonably practicable, but there were others that were essentially fanciful and we must avoid any of those which capture the public attention that are unreasonable as being cited as an element of a gross breach for not following what was offered as an option. More seriously, when bodies make recommendations, many of them will be accepted. In some cases it may be appropriate that a recommendation from an independent body investigating an accident is rejected. So long as the reasons for that rejection are sound—the railways are working in a permissioning regime—and it is acceptable in that context, the failure to comply with that recommendation should not be capable of being cited as an element of a case for gross breach.

  Q208  Gwyn Prosser: In the earlier discussion on whether this Bill should take action against individual directors rather than corporates, you cited the 1861 legislation. Perhaps I should know but under that legislation can you give us some examples of the most serious prosecutions that have taken place against individual directors of companies?

  Mr Nelson: I cannot cite any successful ones in the railway industry in recent times. I used the 1861 legislation as making the point that there were already provisions for dealing with people who, by neglectful intent, cause harm to people on the railway. I am sorry I cannot answer your specific question. We can attempt to find out.

  Chairman: That would be very helpful.

  Q209  Justine Greening: We started to touch on some of the lessons that are pulled out from accidents and you had hundreds of proposals that came in. In terms of moving on to get the learnings from these accidents so that they cannot happen again, do you think there is a danger that, if we see an increase in corporate manslaughter prosecutions, whilst the courts are going through that process of prosecuting the case, because of the risks of contempt of court, we will now see a huge delay in the time when we can have a proper inquiry or investigation to take the learnings from the accidents so that they will not be continued and that will end up perversely delaying those learnings from taking place?

  Mr Nelson: I do not think that is the case. The industry's track record is that, when learning is there and there are things that can be fixed to prevent a recurrence, whether it comes out in the first days of the investigation or subsequently, the industry is professionally responsive. I do not see the threat of litigation in this way as doing other than incentivising people to demonstrate that, when learning of a failing, they took the appropriate action, taking into account whether it was reasonably practicable or not.

  Mr Lyons: This also covers remedial issues. There are very sophisticated systems in the industry, building on decades of good practice. It has been very much tested in recent times. We have had the Rail Accident Investigation Branch, the Office of the Rail Regulator and the Rail Safety and Standards Board. Those all have very clear remits. Their job is to ensure that safety is maintained and enhanced. I do not think it would be the case that if something was awaiting prosecution under this Act it should in any way stop improvements being made to the railway. I think it would be a very unfortunate outcome if that was even a possibility.

  Mr Nelson: Indeed. The principal weapon or means by which this can be addressed if there were any failing—it is a hypothetical failing on the part of industry—is that the Health and Safety Executive currently—soon to be the ORI—have the powers to serve improvement and prohibition notices on railway businesses. The means of enforcing, were there to be theoretically a recalcitrant employer, are there already.

  Q210  Justine Greening: Do you think there is a danger or do you think there is no danger that we will be delayed in looking at this?

  Mr Lyons: I do not think there is a danger at all. If there is any slight legal danger, we would be pressing very hard for it to be removed.

  Q211  Justine Greening: The courts have used their powers on health and safety to impose fines. One of the potential proposals in the draft Bill is that they could also force remedial action to be taken. I understand both your organisations have expressed some concerns about that. Could you tell us a bit more about why you are concerned about the proposal to have remedial orders?

  Mr Lyons: There are very sophisticated systems to make sure that there is an external audit of safety standards and oversight from various bodies. I believe to leave it to a judge whose main focus is not on the safety process to make recommendations that could be binding on the industry would be particularly unsound in many cases. It is conceivably possible that he could point out areas but he must leave it to the existing statutory bodies to do their job.

  Mr Nelson: I agree. I think there is a good example in the relatively recent past where the state determined that it wished to regulate to require a change of state of the infrastructure and rolling stock on the railway. Regulations were laid before Parliament and accepted, which led to the train protection and warning system being installed and to mark one rolling stock being eliminated from the mainline railway. That was the state exercising its authority to bring regulations and, in bringing those, it is about satisfying Parliament essentially that it is acting in the societal interest in so proceeding. If I may go back to the previous question, one of the points that I would like to get across is that evidence to what had been the industry's formal inquiries—we now have RAIB investigations—is essentially confidential. That is an important part of ensuring that we get full cooperation. If someone is looking for a gross breach, what they cannot do is start from the evidence that has been given in a formal inquiry and now in the RAIB inquiries. It is important we do not compromise an investigation process to establish an immediate and underlying cause because we have a premature determination to bring action to demonstrate gross breach.

  Q212  Justine Greening: Do you think that fines are an effective way of punishing companies?

  Mr Lyons: I believe they are. Not only do they hurt the company financially; they bring significant reputational risk issues with them. No firm likes to be the subject of a fine. No board of directors likes to be fined. They are very severe judgments on a particular company. I believe all the indications we have had in the railway industry, where there have been major incidents, that clearly there has been some blame lying with the companies, show that you have seen major changes in those companies as a response to those accidents. In Railtrack's case, it was a very dramatic change and other companies as well have had to significantly rethink their management procedures and structures as an outcome of these various incidents which have taken place on the railways.

  Mr Nelson: I entirely agree. The key issue is one's reputation.

  Q213  Mr Rooney: You have talked about blame and reputation etc, but all these things happen after a very serious event. They never happen before. In the civil aviation industry, it is effectively a no blame culture that probably encourages more openness. Do you think, if the same extended to the railway industry and maritime, we might have a better managed system and much less risk of major incidents?

  Mr Lyons: I am a great believer that good safety cultures are not fear driven. That is a contradiction in terms. Good safety cultures are everybody in the organisation pursuing an overall quality product and making sure that safety is an integral part of it. I naturally have a preference in such a circumstance for no blame cultures to get to the bottom of problems that arise. We are now in the situation on the railways that, where things go wrong in safety terms, they go wrong for very complex sets of reasons. If they were easy to spot, they would have been put right. It is interactions which, in a particular way, lead to unsatisfactory safety outcomes. The only way to put it right is to get all those involved together and monitor how it is never going to happen again. To answer your question, I believe that is the direction in which to go. I would be worried if this Act were seen to be bringing fear back into the safety debate. I do not think it will but it is an issue that we must always bear in mind with enactments like this.

  Mr Nelson: I agree. Fear is not the best way of learning lessons. We need a culture that is open, progressive and based on competence. It is about aligned behaviours, aligned beliefs, aligned attitudes, people working together. I do not go as far as saying there is never a point at which blame needs to be dealt with because, if you find that someone with wilful intent seeks to hide behind the fact that you have an open culture, then we do not have a just culture.

  Mr Rooney: You talked about the fear factor within safety but you have not talked about the fear factor in relation to the travelling public. You might want to reflect on that.

  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed, gentlemen.





 
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