Select Committee on Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 560 - 579)

MONDAY 21 NOVEMBER 2005

FIONA MACTAGGART MP, MR ADAM SMITH AND MR NICK FUSSELL

  Q560  Gwyn Prosser: Minister, in your opening remarks you said on this issue of individual liability the starting point was that this was a Bill designed to prosecute corporations, and large corporations, and you made some reference to Labour Party discussions. Would you not agree with me that during the discussions and the speeches made at the 1997 Labour Party Conference, and subsequent manifesto promises, individual liability of directors was also at the heart of those discussions? Is it not true that our Government's first proposals for a Corporate Manslaughter Bill included individual liability?

  Fiona Mactaggart: It did. Part of the difficulty that that fell into was that the original proposals created some objections from other interests. You have raised the issue of the Labour Party's own internal discussions. The Labour Party had quite profound internal discussions about this and the Warwick Agreement agreed that the approach set out in this Bill should be an approach which could command support, partly because it managed to balance the different aspirations for dealing with the issue of corporate manslaughter in a way which could command consent from different parties. I think that is the reason why that happened at that meeting at Warwick.

  Q561  Gwyn Prosser: Do you think that it would be unfair to say that the Government's initial thinking, supported by the Party itself, has been thrown off course by pressure from big business and from the CBI in particular?

  Fiona Mactaggart: No, I do not. First of all, the issue of individual liability for manslaughter within a corporate failure is inevitably going to be difficult to prove in a big company. What one effectively needs is first of all to make sure that in big companies we can hold the company to account. Secondly, to make sure that where individuals have individual responsibility for failing, that they can be held to account under health and safety legislation. The question then is, is there a sufficient penalty for an individual in those circumstances. One of the things that happens is that under health and safety legislation there are unlimited fines. These are not very often applied in a very substantial way and one of the things that we need to look at is whether some of those offences can be more effectively applied. This is quite a simple Bill in a way, it has got intellectual coherence and I think in that regard we can command support for it. So far someone has always thought of something more important and more urgent to do. I am very keen that we do not find something more important and more urgent to do and we have a Bill that will not be pushed off course.

  Q562  Harry Cohen: Can I follow up very briefly on the Warwick Agreement. You said the Warwick Agreement agreed corporate manslaughter legislation but surely it did not go into any detail about what that legislation should be.

  Fiona Mactaggart: The draft Bill was published at the time of the Warwick Agreement.

  Q563  Gwyn Prosser: Surely it did not in any explicit way exclude any individual liability?

  Fiona Mactaggart: No, I do not think it did but, as I say, the draft Bill was published at the time. I was not a party to the discussions but I am quite sure that all the parties were aware of what was the probable proposal.

  Q564  Chairman: Just very briefly, hopefully: we were told in an earlier evidence session that if this Bill is enacted as it stands we anticipate five prosecutions a year, that is all.

  Fiona Mactaggart: Five additional prosecutions. I imagine that many of the existing prosecutions will be more likely to be successful.

  Q565  Mr Rooney: I specifically asked if there was any instance of a major prosecution in the last 15 years that failed that would succeed under this Bill, and I was told no. I would suggest to you that the Bill as currently in place will not achieve the objectives that the Home Office seem to have set for it. If we go back to the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Marchioness, all of these, none of those would have succeeded under this Bill. That is what we were told.

  Fiona Mactaggart: You asked about past cases which might have had a different outcome under the new offence, and of course it is very difficult to say if a past case would have a different outcome. That is because the jury has to decide whether the behaviour amounts to gross negligence. The problem with past cases is that in many of the difficulties of prosecution there had to be the question of a directing mind, a responsible—

  Q566  Mr Rooney: I understand that. I asked this specific question of the people who were in this room: had this Bill been in force would any of the major prosecutions in the last 15 years that failed have succeeded and I was told no. That suggests to me that the Bill is in some way deficient.

  Fiona Mactaggart: I was not the person who told you no. I have been advised, and I do not know if Adam would like to add to this, that in past cases the identification principle—if you look at the Herald of Free Enterprise there was criticism of sloppy management and so on—has been the principle which has prevented prosecution, so there might have been cases which were not prosecuted, or led to a failed prosecution. I do not know if you would like to add to that on past cases because you are more aware of the history of litigation in this field than I am.

  Mr Smith: I think the point is that there is a very high threshold in the offence of gross negligence which applies now which makes it very difficult to go back over cases and say, "We can now say without any doubt that X company in X position was guilty of gross negligence" when there have been findings that those companies are not guilty. Two things are clear. The first is that when the Law Commission was considering the approach on which this Bill is based, their view was that the prosecution—on the facts of the Herald of Free Enterprise—could be capable of being left to a jury in a way under their Bill that could not have been done before. That is certainly the case under the proposals as we have got them. Whether a jury would then agree that that was gross negligence I think is a second matter. I think that is the difficulty with saying these are convictions. The second point is that there have been other cases, and I think this underlines how the identification principle is such a problem, where the judges have contrasted the fact that individuals themselves were not to blame with the fact that there have been very serious cases of corporate negligence. That was most recently the case at the end of the Hatfield prosecution. The court on the one hand said that individuals were guilty of no more than errors of judgment. On the other hand the judge thought that the facts as presented to him represented one of the worst cases of industrial negligence he had ever seen. What that indicates is that there is a very urgent need to be able to put these sorts of cases to the jury on a different basis to what individuals were doing.

  Q567  Chairman: What the Minister is saying to us, if we take the Hatfield case, is: suppose this law had been in place and it had been possible to have a prosecution for corporate manslaughter; the companies may have been convicted but the position so far as the individuals were concerned would be absolutely unchanged because there will be no increased liability for individuals. What we need to be perfectly clear about is that that is the Government's position, that that is the best obtainable outcome under this legislation. Is that right?

  Fiona Mactaggart: Yes. Can I add one particular way in which things would change? With the lifting of crown immunity there is a whole class of cases which currently could not be prosecuted which would be.

  Q568  Natascha Engel: This is about the senior management test which again has been an issue during most of the inquiry. Many witnesses have argued that the restriction of the offence to failures by an organisation's senior managers is problematic. We have also heard evidence that the Law Commission's proposals were too broad as they would include management even at supervisory level, so a sort of delegation. Given that there has been a massive debate about definitions and the senior management test, has the Home Office done any more thinking on this particular issue and do you have any suggestions as to how any of the problems that have come out during this inquiry about the senior management test might be resolved?

  Fiona Mactaggart: I suppose one of the things that I was hoping was that your scrutiny might help us to deal with this problem, let us be quite honest about it, because you are quite right that the Law Commission's initial arrangement could potentially capture some supervisory level, a shop manager or someone, who is merely not following the standard company procedure, and that is not what we intend to be the outcome of this. Is the way that we have framed the test a way which genuinely can capture the major management of an enterprise, those who are profoundly fundamentally responsible? We hope so, but if it does not then we would certainly wish it to. We did not think that management failure at a low level should be able to be caught but our aim is to make sure that wider corporate management failings, those who are actually responsible for the corporate business of the company, should be the right test. I would certainly welcome the advice of this committee about whether we have got the focus right or whether there is a different way of casting that particular test. If we share a view that it should be at a senior level I would very much welcome advice on how to frame that as the kind of thing which pre-legislative scrutiny can help to drill down into and, I hope, end up with a better Bill as a result of it.

  Q569  Natascha Engel: From what you were saying before though, about trying to target the very large corporations which are not captured at the moment, that again goes right into the issue, which is that it is a distinction between the larger corporations and the small companies. The smaller companies and the directors of smaller companies are the ones that are successfully prosecuted. Is that what you are saying, that the emphasis will be on those larger corporations?

  Fiona Mactaggart: No, I am not saying that. What I am saying is that the problem with the present offence is that you need to find the directing mind. That is very difficult to do in a large complex corporation so we have tried to provide something which is a simpler test which requires a senior level of management but does not drill down to the directing mind point. It is going to be different between different companies of different sizes and different complexity. What we do not want to do is catch the relatively junior manager who is operating in the context of a company policy which somebody is responsible for, if you see what I mean. As to whether you need to say that that seniority requires you to have some engagement on the broader company policy, I do not know how exactly we frame that. We hoped that the senior manager test did that. If it does not do that we want a test which does that rather than deals with the person who is just dealing with a part of the operation or something which is, say, a branch of Gap as opposed to the whole of Gap, if you see what I mean. I am sorry to pick on one particular company. It seems to me that to get a corporate manslaughter charge for someone who is at a relatively senior level it does not need to be a person. It needs to be a process at a relatively senior level that is responsible for this.

  Q570  Harry Cohen: Minister, you said right at the beginning that you wanted this to apply to corporate bodies, but what about unincorporated ones—partnerships, sole traders and others, such as clubs and associations, which are excluded from the scope of this offence under the current Bill? Organisations like the Transport and General Workers' Union have told us that that would lead to "well over half a million workers, as well as the millions of ordinary citizens who come into contact with these various organisations, beyond the protection of the law", and they argue for the employing organisations to be in the Bill. Should not unincorporated bodies be included as a matter of principle?

  Fiona Mactaggart: Employing organisations have responsibilities in health and safety law. Sole traders are individuals who could be individually prosecuted. There are quite a lot of organisations which are generally thought of as unincorporated associations who have used some of the new incorporated forms of associations, so that, for example, a large number of partnerships which are traditionally unincorporated have now become corporate bodies. What we are seeking to do is to try and get an offence which is directed at organisations that exist, not at the individuals who are responsible but at an organisation that exists. You need an organisation and that is why it is a corporate manslaughter offence, that is why we have focused on corporations. There is a risk, and I do not think there is a big scale issue here and we are not trying to duck it, for some small unincorporated bodies, voluntary organisations and so on, who do not have a corporate existence to become very fearful as a result of this legislation and extremely risk averse. I was advised of a voluntary body which was providing transport services on a community basis which felt that it would require them to individually check at every booking the licence and insurance of the individual driver at every point. That was due to a misunderstanding of the kinds of health and safety obligations that were upon them but that is the sort of anxiety which is most likely to arise in the kinds of unincorporated bodies which do not have the infrastructure that corporate entities do on the whole—there are, of course, some unincorporated associations which do have quite substantial infrastructure—but that class of body might be quite destroyed by their fearfulness of the risk of doing this. And it might be, for example, that some of these bodies do not have the same people at the time you get around to a prosecution from the time when the offence actually occurred and there is no corporate body. That is really why we focused on using bodies that exist for this corporate manslaughter offence. If there is somebody who is a partner or a responsible individual as part of a partnership or some unincorporated association, they can be proceeded against individually, but you need a body to proceed against corporately.

  Q571  Harry Cohen: I understand that point and I think it is right to focus on the corporate side. Nevertheless, on this point of being fearful and risk averse, they might have caused a death by their actions, it may have been an employee or a member of the public, and they would have this safeguard presumably if they met the appropriate standards of health and safety (or whatever the duties were) as a defence anyway. Surely what we are creating here is a bit of a loophole for some of these organisations. Health and safety legislation, for example, applies to some unincorporated bodies, so why could that not apply to them?

  Fiona Mactaggart: Let us be completely clear: all employers are responsible for the health and safety of their employees. They have a health and safety duty as an employer and they have a responsibility to ensure that the appropriate standards are adhered to in terms of their health and safety duties. What this offence is about is punishing bodies when as a body they have committed this very serious offence of manslaughter. You need a body to commit it, if you see what I mean. I do not think that you can say that you can punish a body which is not a body. That is our difficulty. If there is no such body to do that, it makes little sense. You could prosecute them in terms of their health and safety liabilities as an employer, which is the most likely occasion on which it might arise, but actually I do not think you could give them a corporate responsibility if they are not a corporation.

  Q572  Harry Cohen: I hear that but I think you are right about the health and safety powers there, and in fact individual manslaughter could come in.

  Fiona Mactaggart: It would under these circumstances.

  Q573  Harry Cohen: Let me just give you an example of an unincorporated firm. A lot of law firms are unincorporated but we would really recognise them as bodies or as an organisation that could have a legal entity if they took some policy judgment that caused the death of someone.

  Fiona Mactaggart: I did discuss this with my advisers earlier today. Mr Fussell pointed out the status of a number of law firms. Can I hand over to him on that particular point and then I will come back?

  Mr Fussell: As the Minister said earlier, many law firms now are limited liability partnerships but with the law firms that are not limited liability partnerships there is the issue that the Minister has highlighted, namely, that they have a number of partners who are the body on the day of the death and then a few years down the line who are you prosecuting if all the partners have changed if there is no corporate entity prosecuted?

  Fiona Mactaggart: One of our difficulties is that we have to draw a line somewhere and the easiest way to draw a line is where there actually is a corporate entity rather than trying to turn something which is not an entity into an entity.

  Q574  Gwyn Prosser: Minister, the Bill in its present form excludes police forces from its contents but we understand that the Government want to bring them back into the scope of the Bill. Can you tell us what difficulties there are in doing that and whether you have resolved them yet?

  Fiona Mactaggart: We do intend to make it apply to police forces. There are two options about how to do that. One is to build on the way in which the Health and Safety Executive has held police forces accountable by prosecuting the office of the Chief Constable or by adding police forces to the list in the schedule of bodies. The mechanism about how to proceed is one that we have not come to a conclusion on and if the committee has views about that we would very much welcome them. There is also an issue of operational contact. How do we hold the police to account? Our mechanisms for the accountability of the police have developed over years. They are a tripartite arrangement with the Home Secretary, the Police Authority and the Chief Constable. We think those arrangements have operated pretty well. We do not want to disturb those basic arrangements for accountability. There are also, of course, issues about the nature of police activities because they will frequently be involved in seeking to minimise the risk to others by their actions.

  Q575  Chairman: Minister, if I can take you up on that, basically you have got two options, they will be in the Bill and you have not resolved which way to do it?

  Fiona Mactaggart: That is correct.

  Q576  Mr Rooney: It has been suggested that it is not certain that case law on the chain of causation has developed in the way the introduction to the draft Bill suggests, and we have had witnesses saying that. If we accept that the argument that case law has developed in this area are there any other reasons why the Government believe the Law Commission's original provision on causation should not be included?

  Fiona Mactaggart: The Law Commission's evidence to this committee seems to suggest that we are proceeding in the appropriate way, and I think that to include a provision along the lines that the Law Commission originally recommended could risk this. Although their proposal makes clear that the most immediate cause will not stop the management failure also being the cause of death, it does not say when that chain of causation will be broken. That is important because it might lead to courts saying that the chain of causation is broken under different circumstances than under the general rules, and that could risk the law approaching differently the case of a senior manager causing death, for example, under the gross negligence manslaughter offence that exists at present, from the company causing death even if the failure was one and the same in this case. It seems to me therefore that it is necessary to have the way in which causation is understood for an individual prosecution, which could run side by side with a corporate prosecution, to operate in the same way and that is what we are seeking to do in this Bill.

  Q577  Mr Rooney: We all accept that we have seen all too often individual prosecutions fail, do we not? Never mind. We need to move on. Some respondents have argued whether senior managers sought to "profit from failure" is not something juries should be required to adjudicate on. Have you had any further thoughts on this?

  Fiona Mactaggart: Our intention in putting this provision was not to use profit merely in the sense of financial gain, but if it was to gain advantage. Our aim was, for example, to get at the kind of behaviour that companies might adopt in order to save money and get jobs done faster, for example, so it was not trying to tie a specific profit to a particular action. If the committee had a view that there was a way that one could get at this point differently from how we framed it, in my view this could be a matter which could perhaps more appropriately be dealt with in terms of its impact on sentencing rather than its impact on the criminal behaviour itself, and that is something that we should perhaps consider in the light of your report.

  Q578  Mr Rooney: A number of witnesses from all sides of this argument have suggested that "benefit" would be a better word than "profit".

  Fiona Mactaggart: Absolutely. I welcome such a suggestion.

  Q579  Mr Rooney: The Law Commission proposals contained no requirement that a duty of care be owed. Why has the Government decided to link the offence to a duty of care owed under the law of negligence?

  Fiona Mactaggart: I think that they assumed that the duty of care was implicit in their original framing of the Bill. It seems to me that requiring a duty of care defines clearly the circumstances in which the new offence might apply and it is important to have this for an offence of a failure to act. This is key because an offence of not doing something could lead one to have a successful prosecution. That is not usual in most offences that I can imagine. Because failure to act could be as significant in a prosecution like this as action it is necessary to make clear when companies are liable. The best way to do that is to depend on the duty of care which is the kind of framework of our basic legislative approach in these things. I am being passed something so perhaps, Mr Smith, you could tell the committee what it was you were trying to show me because I cannot read things in that small print.

  Mr Smith: The question whether it was included in the Law Commission's original proposals or not I think is interesting in the light of their written evidence to the committee, which says, "We believe that this was implicit in the Commission's Bill but we see value in making it explicit".


 
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