Select Committee on Home Affairs Written Evidence


119. Memorandum submitted by Centrica Plc

  This response sets out the considered views of Centrica plc and its subsidiary companies, including, but not limited to, British Gas Services Limited, British Gas Trading Limited and Hydrocarbon Resources Limited.

  Centrica plc does not object, in principle, to the introduction of a new statutory offence of corporate manslaughter. We are pleased that the draft legislation does not seek to impose individual liability on directors, company secretaries, and other officers of the company. However, we do have concerns that, in addition to a corporate manslaughter prosecution being brought against a company, the existing manslaughter law could be used to prosecute individual directors and officers. Further, in the event of the failure of a corporate manslaughter charge, it would be open to prosecuting authorities to bring charges against the company and against individuals under the HSWA. Further, a successful criminal prosecution of a company is likely to lead to civil claims being brought against it. We presume that the Government's main objective of the proposed legislation is to bring about improvements in Health and Safety, and not to bring about multiple criminal and civil remedies against companies. Please refer to our comments in relation to page 7 paragraph 6 below with regard to prosecution policy.

PAGE 7 PARAGRAPH 6

  The following statement is made: "The extra deterrent effect of a possible corporate manslaughter conviction for organisations who consistently fail to meet proper standards of health and safety will also provide a further driver for ensuring safer working practices". We do not believe that strong evidence exists to support this statement. We believe that passive legislation which is used only in the aftermath of an accident is unlikely to act as a deterrent or to actively drive safety improvements. Further, the document states "The UK has a very strong H&S record, but there remain unacceptably high levels of work related deaths each year". This statement is, on the face of it, contradictory. In any event, work related deaths have reduced substantially in recent years without the existence of corporate manslaughter legislation. We believe that further reductions will be brought about by improved working practices and engagement with organisations such as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). It is important that any new offence is not aimed at those companies that consistently try to meet proper standards of health and safety.

  In practice, we believe that the prosecuting authorities are likely to prosecute, where they are unsure as to whether the conduct in question is grave enough to do so. We believe that prosecutions should be undertaken by the CPS, who are less close to these issues than the HSE, and are therefore more likely to take an objective view. We also believe that the CPS needs to be provided with support and guidance on when and how to prosecute this offence having regard to the public interest test.

PAGE 9 PARAGRAPH 14

  Reference is made to "management failings by an organisation's senior managers". We are concerned that it is unclear as to who is to be classed as a senior manager. Such uncertainty is likely to lead to uncertainty and costly litigation. We do not believe that the Government should rely on the courts to determine this definition, rather that the statute should offer certainty. A clear definition would also be more likely to push health and safety matters higher up corporate agendas.

  Reference is also made to an approach that focuses on the arrangements and practices for carrying out an organisation's work, rather than any immediate negligent act. We believe that there will be pressure on companies to move towards formally certified Health and Safety Management systems, potentially resulting in unnecessary additional costs for businesses. Such processes would not, by themselves, prevent poor performance, and we believe that certification bodies would struggle to find resources of the right calibre. Further, however good the certification process was, there would be a danger of it becoming automatic rather than focusing on individual risks in a dynamic way.

PAGE 9 PARAGRAPH 15

  Reference is made to the management failure amounting to "a gross breach of the duty to take reasonable care". We support the Government's intention to provide offences that are "clear and effective". It therefore follows that there should be total clarity as to what constitutes a gross breach of duty of care. Without such clarity, we believe that there would be extensive reliance on expert testimony, leading to lengthy and complex trials. We believe that the criminal threshold should be higher than the civil one, and that the prosecution should be compelled to prove that the organisation exhibited an intent to commit a gross breach of its duty of care. An appropriate mental element should be specifically included in the draft legislation.

PAGE 10 PARAGRAPHS 18 ONWARDS

  We are concerned about the applicability of the proposed legislation to public bodies, which, we believe, will lead to inequality of treatment. Whilst we accept that it would be inappropriate for the legislation to apply to certain public bodies, such as the armed forces, we do not believe it to be in the public interest for certain Government bodies to be exempt. This would cause anomalies in cases where services are jointly provided by public bodies and private organisation, for example in relation to prison management and prisoner transportation. The result would be to create inequality in areas in which public bodies and private companies compete, burdening private companies with liabilities from which such public organisations are exempt.

PAGE 12 PARAGRAPHS 26 TO 30

  The document refers to senior managers having a "significant role" or "substantial responsibility" in an organisation. Reference is also made to the scale of physical or practical operations. This does not appear to recognise the fact that in corporate decision making, those with "substantial influence" may reside in other disciplines, for example Finance or Information Systems. Furthermore, we believe that use of these definitions may push liability further down the organisation than the Government intended. There is a strong case for these definitions to be amended and tightened up.

PAGE 13 PARAGRAPH 32

  Reference is made to "conduct that falls far below what can be expected in the circumstances". Generally, we would expect such conduct to be judged against an established or recognised standard of good practice such as an Approved Code of Practice. We are concerned, however, about the use of the words "in the circumstances". This suggests that larger companies, with substantial resources, could be judged differently from smaller ones. Page 36 paragraph18 refers to compliance with "relevant health and safety legislation and guidance". Whilst this is clearly defined, it causes us concerns, as our experience is that some Health and Safety guidance aims for impractical standards and has been produced without consultation with organisations. This is included in the draft Bill—section 3 (3) (b).

  We must stress that it is vital that what is assessed and measured by the prosecuting authorities and the courts is the breach itself and not the consequences of the breach. This is particularly important in relation to businesses such as ours, where a single and isolated minor breach can lead to a fatality. We believe that what should be measured is the degree of departure from accepted standards.

PAGE 14 PARAGRAPHS 36 AND 37

  Under these proposals, parent companies would be liable if their "own management failures were a cause of the death concerned". We do not believe this definition is clear enough, and we therefore believe that parent companies are as likely to be prosecuted as operating subsidiaries. However, in large Groups, it is often the case that the main operating subsidiaries have responsibility for health and safety, with the parent company setting a framework for compliance. This framework is often tailored to meet the subsidiary's specific requirements. It is unclear as to whether the setting of such parameters would, by virtue of the proposed legislation, impose a duty of care on the parent company. We therefore believe that the proposed legislation should better define the circumstances in which parent companies may be liable. Otherwise, parent companies may decide to simply delegate such responsibilities, in their entirety, to operating subsidiaries.

  We are also concerned that these proposals could result, in effect, to a lifting of the corporate veil. We therefore believe that these sections should be carefully re-examined.

PAGE 18 PARAGRAPH 54

  We are very concerned that under these proposals, courts could impose remedial orders on organisations. Such orders might be imposed without any proper risk assessments and could affect the whole Group—not just address the particular issue which had contributed to the death. Further, such remedies may also cut across enforcement measures taken by bodies such as the HSE.

OTHER MATTERS

  We would like specific clarification that Road Traffic accidents are excluded from the ambit of the proposed legislation.

  We also believe that it would be helpful for guidance to be produced on the range of financial penalties to be imposed by the courts.

16 June 2005





 
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