5. Memorandum submitted by
Napo
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Napo welcomes the opportunity to submit
evidence to the Enquiry into the Government's consultation paper,
Restructuring Probation to Reduce Re-offending. Napo, the
principal probation trade union, believes that the consultation
paper is fundamentally flawed and that it will not improve the
delivery of the Probation Service. Indeed it may well place those
services at critical risk. In Napo's view the proposals will,
if implemented, lead to the fragmentation of the Probation Service
and part or wholesale privatisation. Napo believes the proposals
will prove to be expensive and that they will not achieve the
task of reducing re-offending. Napo fears that the proposals will
threaten the quality of justice and could well undermine the service's
excellent work. Napo bases its views on a number of premises.
2. REORGANISATION
2.1 The Probation Service was last reorganised
in April 2001 with the creation of the National Probation Service
and the National Probation Directorate. Since that date, probation
has been given additional duties in respect of high risk offenders
under the multi-agency public protection arrangements, which places
a duty on the service to cooperate with the police in producing
supervision plans for those released from prison at most risk
to the community. In addition statutory contact with victims has
increased for all offenders serving twelve months or more. There
has also been major legislation during the period, including the
Criminal Justice Act 2003, which introduces a generic community
sentence; and also Custody Plus, aimed at diverting those convicted
of less serious offences from jail. The Home Office estimates
that it will result in an increase of 70,000 to the probation
caseload.
2.2 Napo believes that the 2001 reorganisation
which was welcomed, was fundamental, but it was not monitored
and has not yet been evaluated. It is essential that this happens
before the service is restructured again. It is likely that the
service will face further restructuring when the police boundaries
are redrawn in 2007-08. The effect of constant reorganisation
and change for staff leads to demoralisation, difficulties in
retention, and is also extremely stressful.
3. OVERVIEW
3.1 The main proposal in Restructuring
Probation to Reduce Re-offending will essentially divide the
Probation Service, which is a public service, into business units
dominated by business managers. Any private providers used to
deliver probation services would have a first loyalty in law to
their directors and shareholders, not in the administration of
justice. The consultation paper assumes in its title that there
is a direct relationship between restructuring the Probation Service
and the outcome of reducing re-offending. This assumption was
also contained in the Patrick Carter report, which led to the
establishment of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS),
although there was no evidence given to support it. In fact re-offending
will be affected by the ability of staff to address its causes,
which are extremely complex. Napo believes change is achieved
through the skills and qualities of probation staff, not from
the bureaucratic structures around them. The consultation paper
recommends the end-to-end management of all offenders through
the prison and probation systems, which is a concept supported
by Napo. But Napo believes that this objective will not be achieved
by the fragmentation of the Probation Service. Indeed, if the
Home Office has struggled to coordinate the Prison and Probation
Services in the past, it will not find it easier to manage scores
of independent not-for-profit and private sector contractors.
4. PERFORMANCE
4.1 Napo finds it extraordinary that it
is being argued that privatisation will drive up performance when,
despite acute resource problems, the Probation Service is performing
better than ever. Figures for November 2004 showed that "breach"
targets were achieved in 87% of cases, "orders" were
completed in 70% of cases and "offender behaviour programmes"
were completed in 91% of targeted cases. In addition, eight out
of 10 supervisees were still in contact with their probation officer
after six months of supervision and 93% of victims were contacted
within the required period.
5. PRIVATISATION
5.1 Napo believes that the experience of
privatisation so far in the Prison and Probation Service has not
been satisfactory. The private sector has been involved in prison
administration since 1991. However, the private sector has only
been involved in the building and running of new prisons which
means it has not faced the disadvantages of chronic overcrowding,
and Victorian architecture, but has had the benefit of new technology
and modern building design. Nevertheless, there is no firm evidence
to suggest that standards have universally improved.
5.2 A report published by the think tank
Catalyst in Summer 2004 found that on an hourly level public sector
prison officers' pay rates are on average 51% greater than their
private sector counterparts. When the value of pensions and holiday
benefits are added to this the difference rises to 70%. The report
also showed, not surprisingly, that high levels of labour turnover
are a serious problem in many PFI prisons. Overall, amongst prison
custody officers, turnover is 25% per annum, an astonishing 10
times greater than the 2.5% rate for state prison officers.
5.3 The private sector was introduced into
the Probation Service in 2002 when National Probation Directorate
(NPD) privatised hostel facilities, including cooks, cleaners
and maintenance staff. The contract was awarded to Morrison's
and subsequently costs rose by on average 62%. In 2003, a decision
was taken by the NPD to privatise the management and maintenance
of Probation premises. This in turn led to an immediate increase
in costs of 35%. Both privatised projects have been characterised
by a fall in service standards.
5.4 Curfew orders with electronic tagging
operated by private companies were launched in 1995 and rolled
out nationally in 1998. The cost of electronic surveillance for
a full year is £6,500 compared to £3,080 for supervision
by probation staff. Figures from March 2005 show that there is
a large profit margin made by the private companies operating
the tagging system—the cost of kit (which can be used at
least five times) is £375, the fitting cost is £150,
and each call out is £150. Evidence collected by Napo also
shows that there are numerous problems with the operation of the
tagging including: delay in fitting the tag; poor communication;
failure to bring breaches to Court; technical problems; and a
number of violations not routinely monitored.
6. INDEPENDENCE
6.1 The consultation paper notes that probation
staff are agents of justice. Under these proposals they will become
agents of commerce. The possibility of probation staff becoming
private sector employees will undermine the independence and integrity
of the Service, and the interests of justice will be forced to
compete with those of commerce. Probation staff who transfer to
a private company would be in the invidious position of recommending
a sentence to the court where their employers, the private sector,
have a financial interest particularly if the outcome involved
a prison sentence or tagging. In addition the supervision of those
that pose the greatest risk to the public, could be transferred
from the state to the private sector. It would be unthinkable
that the Category A dispersal prison estate would by run by any
other than agents of the Crown.
7. TRAINING
7.1 Currently probation staff receive two
years' training on placement at work and through correspondence
with a college. This leads to the award of the Diploma in Probation
Studies. Napo is concerned that the consultation document is silent
on the issue of training in the future. It is envisaged that most
commissioning undertaken under the proposals will be on the basis
of three to five year contracts. It is highly unlikely that organisations
other than the Probation Service who successfully win bids will
have sufficient surplus capital to invest in training. If the
Probation Service contracts it will face similar problems. There
is, therefore, a real fear that the service is being de-professionalised
and in the short term there will be a shortage of trained staff.
This is particularly alarming given the trend in recent years
for the Probation Service to increasingly specialise in supervising
high-risk offenders.
8. LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY
8.1 The Probation Service in England and
Wales has strong accountable links to local communities. Under
the proposals those links will disappear. There will no longer
be a requirement for local Board or Trust members to come from
local communities or reflect them in terms of diversity. The national
and regional bodies that will run local services will not have
any local government representatives. It is alarming that there
will be no statutory requirement to have a judge or magistrate
on the Board or Trust. It is also worrying that if a Board loses
out in competition and ceases to exist it will never again be
in a position to bid for that work.
9. CONTRACTING
OUT AND
COSTS
9.1 The contracting out process will impose
extra costs on the provision of every public service because of
the need for the contracts to be legally watertight. The commissioner
would only be able to order change if it was provided for in the
contract. It is envisaged that Regional Offender Managers (ROMs)
would be commissioners. However, they would only be able to order
change if it was provided for in the contract. The contract will
need to spell out all the statutory obligations of the present
Probation Boards and their current responsibility to the judiciary
and local communities. There will also be a need to contain powers
to force providers to cooperate and share information, which they
will be reluctant to do because of the nature of competition.
Each ROM will have an enormous task in managing all Probation
tasks by contract and, in a very short period of time, will need
to assemble legal, accounting, management and bargaining skills.
This will lead to a significant rise in bureaucracy and added
work for front-line staff.
9.2 In the past commerce has not been attracted
to the market potential of supervising offenders, the vast majority
of whom have multiple problems including addiction, mental illness,
and literacy and numeracy problems. Business has been eager to
tag offenders and be involved in other forms of surveillance,
including satellite tracking, but that is because these have measurable
outputs. Individuals often re-offend for reasons the current Probation
Service cannot control, making it difficult to set forecasts,
targets and business plans. It is also difficult to see how any
commercial enterprise which does win a contract, would invest
in items like long-term technology and staff development when
it could lose the contract in three to five years.
10. VOLUNTARY
SECTOR
10.1 It is essential that work with the
voluntary sector be conducted in partnership and not competition.
The voluntary sector could provide certain interventions on a
partnership rather than competitive nature. Napo is concerned
that the voluntary providers would face the same risk as business
providers, such as static revenue and rising costs. They would
also need to build a bank of suitable professional staff and have
spare capacity in order to make bids. This will be beyond most
existing voluntary organisations and they could face a loss of
work. In addition, the voluntary sector is likely to find the
costs needed to set up a bid a barrier to any further involvement
in probation work at all.
11. MULTI-AGENCY
APPROACH AND
YOUTH OFFENDING
TEAMS
11.1 Napo has always supported a multi-agency
approach to tackling the causes of offending and has good working
arrangements with a range of statutory and voluntary organisations
including the police, mental health services, social services
and psychologists. However, the model proposed could force Regional
Offender Managers into creating and managing scores of separate
contracts involving organisations with different objectives, systems
of management and different geographical areas. The multiple supplier
approach also raises the issue of confidentiality and data protection.
The Probation Service holds sensitive information on offenders
and their families and also victims. With multiple suppliers there
is an enhanced risk that this could be compromised. The contestability
model proposed also means that numerous organisations will compete
for scarce funds. There is a risk that achievements will be exaggerated
and smaller organisations without the capacity to put together
complicated bids, will go out of business.
11.2 The Government and the Carter report
endorsed the work of Youth Offending Teams. The Probation Service
is a key contributor to the work of the teams, yet the consultation
document is silent on the impact the change will have on Youth
Justice. In reality the teams could end up dealing with scores
of different providers, all working to different contracts, to
which the Youth Justice Board is not a party. They would also
have no sanction against a contractor if it fails in its duties.
Currently, Probation is a Criminal Justice agency but under these
proposals the Service will be dominated by value for money contracts
and commercial values.
12. SCOTLAND
AND WALES
12.1 In March 2005 the Management of Offenders
(Scotland) Bill was published. The main clauses of this Bill place
a duty on the criminal justice agencies and local government to
cooperate with the Scottish Prison Service, to share information,
to submit annual plans and involve others in planning new Community
Justice Authorities. It also places a duty on the Community Justice
Authorities to establish information-sharing networks with partners.
Scotland, therefore, has rejected the notion of privatising probation
work and opted for a devolved local model rather than one based
on centralised control and command.
12.2 Similarly, in Wales, the Welsh Assembly
has rejected the notion of contestability and wishes to see services
organised conterminously with local authorities and other justice
agencies. Napo believes that this model should be explored as
a matter of urgency by the Home Office to see what relevance it
has for structures in England.
13. CONCLUSION
13.1 Napo believes that the introduction
of the market into the Probation Service will not be successful.
It will not lead to a decrease in re-offending rates and it is
likely to result in increased costs, as providers have to take
on extra staff to run bids and defend work. As a consequence of
the fragmentation of the Probation Service cooperation between
agencies will deteriorate, staff will leave, and it is highly
likely that prison numbers will rise. The notion of contestability
has been rejected in Scotland and Wales, instead offender services
are being provided by local authorities and probation services
in mandatory partnership with voluntary, private and not for profit
sector organisations. Napo believes that the Government's proposals
should be rejected. Local communities and Boards are crucial for
the future development of probation work and the values and experience
of practitioners in this century-old service need to be maintained
and developed as the essential basis of a viable public service.
Harry Fletcher
Assistant General Secretary, Napo
14 November 2005
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