Examination of Witnesses (Questions 440
- 459)
TUESDAY 7 MARCH 2006
MS MANDIE
CAMPBELL, MR
TOM DOWDALL,
MR CHRIS
HUDSON AND
MR DAVE
WILSON
Q440 Steve McCabe: When did that
come into effect?
Mr Hudson: I think the Sutton
reports were in mid-2004 and it was soon after those reports that
we began a process which I am personally involved in of clearing
at my level casework instructions and guidance to caseworkers.
If there is any doubt about if there are bits of the process where
we have backlogs then it is also my responsibility to say precisely
how those backlogs should be tackled. Again, any instructions
that are given about the clearance of backlogs would be down to
me to issue. There should not be any lack of clarity.
Q441 Steve McCabe: As far as that
particular explanation is concerned, that should not happen again,
should it?
Mr Hudson: Yes. That is why these
processes are in place, to try to prevent it. I hope we will not
have a recurrence.
Q442 Steve McCabe: I understand that
out of 703 allegations of internal corruption or misconduct levels
of staff in the IND—and, in fact, these are all cases that
have been reported to the Security and Anti-Corruption Unit within
the last five years—only 139 cases have led to prosecutions
or disciplinary action. I wondered how you explain that and how
it compares to other parts of the immigration control system.
It seems a remarkably small figure to me.
Mr Wilson: It depends how you
look at it.
Q443 Steve McCabe: 703 and 139 dealt
with seems to me to be a small figure.
Mr Wilson: You must understand
that allegations are properly investigated. Immigration Service
staff are investigated, which is all I can speak about, very thoroughly.
It is not always the case that there is a case to answer and in
very many cases these complaints or allegations are made maliciously,
there is no evidence to support them, but certainly in every case
where there has been evidence uncovered that person has been dealt
with under the disciplinary procedures or under the judicial procedures.
Q444 Steve McCabe: How does your
experience compare with other parts of the immigration control
system? I am trying to find out if this level is roughly the same
across the system. Only 139 dealt with cases sounds rather small
to me. There are still about 270 under investigation and this
is over a five-year period. That would suggest that some of the
investigations are taking some time. I just wondered how that
compared with the rest of the system.
Ms Campbell: From an overseas
perspective, we have a very small number of allegations of corruption
that occur during the course of the year against staff working
overseas, and during 2005 we have had two cases taken to prosecution,
so our numbers are very small in comparison.
Mr Dowdall: Where allegations
are made, we ensure that they are properly and thoroughly investigated.
As Mr Wilson has said, the nature of the allegations come in from
various means, some of which can be malicious, but all of these
allegations are properly investigated and, where appropriate,
also referred to prosecuting authorities.
Q445 Steve McCabe: How appropriate
do you think it is for registrars, colleges, employers and airlines
to be involved in immigration control, particularly when they
do not have specific training for that purpose and where there
could be a conflict of interest between the immigration control
demands and the commercial interests?
Mr Dowdall: We seek to work very
closely with carriers and with ports authorities, indeed with
other agencies; that is hugely important. In terms of conflicts
with commercial issues, the carriers recognise that they have
a responsibility to their passengers and a responsibility for
the security of their aircraft. It is quite important that some
of the issues which are important to us from an immigration point
of view may also be of interest to them in terms of who they are
carrying, et cetera. So certainly something that we do is value
that engagement that we have with the carriers. Naturally enough,
we will come into conflict from time to time. I think the important
thing is that we have properly articulated what our position is,
that the carriers can understand that and we work to try and come
up with sensible solutions. We could not really do our work unless
we worked very closely with that community.
Mr Hudson: In terms of some of
the in-country sponsors you were talking about, registrars and
education establishments, the proposals that the Government has
published this morning place an increased emphasis on the role
of sponsors. I would characterise this more as working together
with sponsors to ensure that we have good information about whether
people are actually being employed where they said they would
be employed and being educated where they said they would be.
I do not see it as transferring responsibility for immigration
control to those partners. It is about having a much closer working
relationship and then for us being able to act upon the information
that they give us about cases where people have left the employment
and they do not know where they are. It is about having that much
better communication so that sponsors have a real stake in the
way that the system works, because it is in their interests to
get people who are suited to be educated at their establishment
or to work in their employment.
Q446 Mr Benyon: A lot of airlines
are complaining about the likely impact of e-border requirements
and having to provide data to the IND and particularly the cost
implications. Is it your understanding that the Government is
going to pick up some of these costs or is this going to be imposed
on the airlines?
Mr Dowdall: Much of that is still
being worked through. In terms of e-borders, I can speak on it
as a user of the tools that e-borders will provide rather than
a programme management perspective. In terms of context, what
we are seeking to achieve with e-borders is not very different
to what many other countries are looking to do as well in terms
of an ability to be able to gather information for us to be able
to risk assess that information properly. We are certainly looking,
through e-borders and through our Border Management Programme,
to provide to the industry a single window by which they can provide
their commercial information to us. There are real benefits to
the industry there because at the moment the travel industry will
argue that they are providing that information separately to us,
to Revenue and Customs, to the police and others and so a benefit
for the industry is to be able to provide that information once.
What we are working through with the e-borders programme at the
moment is the best means by which they will provide that information
once, ie do they push that information to the agencies or is it
pulled from them, and all of that will have an impact overall
on what that cost will be. When we go out to tender we will work
through with potential tenderers the best means of being able
to do that and in the discussions around that we have talked constantly
to the carriers about the best way to do it and the best way to
mitigate those costs and we will continue to do so. So decisions
on the extent to which Government will pay are still being worked
through within the e-borders programme.
Q447 Mr Benyon: Can you give us a
brief indication of the timescales here? When is this tendering
process due to come about? When should the airlines feel that
the Government will have decided whether they are going to pick
up any of the tab?
Mr Dowdall: The intention is that
e-borders will start to deliver its range of tools from 2008 onwards;
there is a window of 2008 through to around about 2014 or 2015.
Therefore, that procurement exercise will be starting later this
year and leading us up to 2008. Even prior to any formal tendering
process there have been, and still will be, discussions going
on with the industry in terms of identifying very clearly what
our user requirements are and what is reasonable and sensible
and proportionate to be looking to get from the carriers.
Q448 Mr Benyon: Looking at the reasons
why people are refused entry, in what circumstances are passengers
who have been prevented from travelling to the UK referred to
the relevant authorities in those countries if, for example, trafficking,
fraudulent documents or whatever is identified?
Ms Campbell: Perhaps I could give
you an example of how we operate in Ghana in relation specifically
to forged documents. We have engaged in a programme of work jointly
with the Ghanaian authorities to look to drive down the use of
fraudulent documents in visa applications. We notify the authorities
when forged documents are provided in support of visa applications
and they then take action against those individuals. Since we
have engaged in this programme with them over the last 18 months
they have prosecuted 1,400 individuals for providing forged documents
in relation to their visa applications. That is a very good example
of how we can drive down abuse jointly. Clearly there are issues
to work out before we can enter into one of those sorts of programmes.
We have to look very carefully at the likely response of the Ghanaian
authorities and make sure that the penalties are of an equal level
to those in the UK and proportionate to the offence that had occurred.
The programme is working very well and it has had a very positive
impact on the numbers of forged documents now being produced in
support of visa applications.
Q449 Mr Benyon: Where a government
is acting with you and is clamping down on the kind of fraud you
can sense the benefit here and in the number of applications,
can you not?
Ms Campbell: We can, yes.
Mr Dowdall: In addition to the
work of UKvisas we have our Airline Liaison Officer Network operating
in 32 locations across the world. They provide primarily advice
to carriers in terms of the carrier's ability to identify incorrect
documents of passengers. We have got our liaison officers based
in both source countries but also in key transit countries across
the world and in Europe and again there we can identify very clearly
the forms of abuse and that also assists the carriers in knowing
who they can bring to the UK.
Q450 Mr Benyon: For months now I
have been asking questions about an investigation you have been
running into an alleged abuse of the ancestral visa route from
Zimbabwe. I have yet to be given any real proof that people have
been identified as fraudulently claiming documents. All I know
is that a lot of legitimate people seeking to come to this country
under a long-established route have been held in a state of limbo.
I know that the backlog is now being dealt with and I know that
a number of people have now been given indefinite leave to remain.
It seems to me a very blunt instrument when a large number of
perfectly innocent people are disadvantaged for a very long length
of time, with considerable difficulties, for example, travelling
back to Zimbabwe to bury a relative or visit somebody who is sick
because their travel documents are locked up under this great
big umbrella of a title that an investigation is taking place.
It has taken an enormously long time. Is this a typical example
of one particular route where there is a very long and drawn out
investigation or is it more complicated than I imagine?
Mr Hudson: I do not know whether
it is more complicated. It is certainly true that this was one
area where we felt there was potential abuse of the immigration
control system in relation to the production of birth certificates
in these cases. It may well be that we could have got on more
quickly with identifying that abuse and dealing with the cases.
As it was, we wanted to make sure, before progressing with the
casework for them, that we were quite clear about the potential
abuse and what action we would have to take to try to identify
those cases which should not be granted under the UK ancestry
provisions. We held the cases for a while whilst we were investigating.
That does mean that they were not being processed and decisions
were not being made. We identified what action we needed to take
in terms of further investigations and then we began the casework
process again. A number of them have now been granted either limited
or indefinite leave to remain, but there are still some cases
where we have referred them to our intelligence unit for further
investigation to satisfy ourselves that the applications are genuine
and that the supporting documentation supports the claim being
made. It is very difficult to put a limit on how much time one
should take to try to satisfy oneself that the correct procedures
are being followed and that abuse is not being allowed to slip
through. In other cases and in the ECAA case we referred to earlier
we again had a hold on cases for several months whilst the difficulties
were investigated and new guidance was prepared. It is not unusual
when we do get cases of this kind where we suspect abuse that
there may be delays in processing those applications. We do not
seek to extend that unduly, but we do try to make sure that we
are quite clear about what has to be done before we resume the
processing of them.
Q451 Mr Benyon: I am interested in
the Lithuanian case that you put in your document. It appears
that it is easier to obtain forged or fraudulent documents from
some countries, such as Lithuania in this case, than from others.
When you find patterns of fraud or forgery, do you make representations
to that country and follow it up through the usual channels?
Mr Wilson: Yes, we do. It is perhaps
slightly misleading to say that some documents are easier to forge
in some countries than others. The countries that are targeted
by the forgers and the fraudsters are the ones that they think
will have the best chance of getting through the controls, which
will be ones where they use the British passport first of all
and then it will be European Union passports because there is
less of an examination on arrival. Those are the documents that
are going to be targeted. They are not necessarily easier to forge,
although in today's world the production of a forged document
has become much easier through modern technology. We have done
a number of intelligence-led exercises looking at Lithuanian documentation
and the Lithuanian Government gave us access to their records
when we let them know that this was happening. In the wider European
Union where the Lithuanian documentation has become a bit of a
problem for all of the Member States the Lithuanians are seeking
to work with the rest of the European Union in order to try and
solve the problem.
Q452 Mr Benyon: A number of police
forces have told us that large numbers of people are fraudulently
applying from outside the EU using forged travel documents from
accession states. What practical changes have you made to the
scope and focus of your intelligence and counter-fraud work to
deal with the challenges of EU expansion and the effects of this
wider problem?
Mr Wilson: We have a first-rate
national forgery unit which looks at all forged documentation
not just for the Immigration Service or IND but for the police
forces as well. We produce guidance and training courses to almost
anyone who wants it and who should have it at three levels, ie
low, intermediate and high, the high one being a 12 week intensive
course which is available to anybody who is on the frontline and
needs that sort of expertise. We produce regular guidance. I think
I have one here which was produced for the UK Presidency which
goes into great detail about what sort of things to look for.
All of this is made available to our frontline staff. On the Immigration
Service's intranet there are examples of what to look for on forged
documents. As soon as a trend becomes noticeable it is put into
what is called a forgery finder, which is a detailed explanation
of what to look for within a particular document and that is circulated
to all frontline staff.
Q453 Mr Benyon: It is must be a constantly
changing world.
Mr Wilson: It is.
Mr Hudson: I understood your question
to be about how we change our approach with new areas where there
may be abuse in the system and expansion of the EU is one of those
areas. It is not possible to say in advance of such developments
precisely where abuse might arise, but we picked up Lithuanian
forged documents and then began to put in place greater numbers
of checks as it became apparent that this was a route that was
being used for forged documents. I do not think it is possible
necessarily to pre-empt it, but what it is certainly possible
to do and what we try to do and work with UKvisas on in terms
of what may be happening overseas in relation to EU residents
here is to try to track what is happening in the system in real
time, to try to identify where abuse appears to be occurring,
to put more focus on that area and then work out what sort of
response we can develop. Certainly there is an issue about EU
residency permits being sought by people abroad who may be seeking
to join people who are not EU residents and that is something
that we have to be aware of and try to monitor.
Mr Wilson: As we get better at
it, and we are pretty good at the identification process, so it
moves into other areas, such as the supporting documents required
to get passports, which is a real issue and which we have touched
upon previously, getting a forged birth certificate or a forged
sponsorship statement or whatever, which then enables the person
to get a travel document or an identity card.
Q454 Chairman: We understand that
biometric data has been useful in a number of African countries
in revealing attempts to get visas for people with bad immigration
histories and so on. How many people have currently been subject
to the production of biometric data, and is there a target for
making this routine for all visa applications to this country?
Ms Campbell: Yes, there is. We
currently collect fingerprint data in 11 locations and those are
countries in East Africa, in Sri Lanka, in Vietnam and, most recently,
in Amsterdam. During the course of the last six months of 2005,
we had around 8,000 matches against the immigration and asylum
fingerprint database, but, of those 8,000, over 7,500 were people
who were matching against their previous visa application, so
it is simply affirming that those were the same people that were
travelling and around 450 that matched against asylum records
in the asylum fingerprint database. Now, those would not necessarily
all be people that had matched by producing documents in a different
identity, but those would certainly be people that we would then
want to look at more closely, and a number of them would be applicants
who had produced different identity documents in the course of
their visa application from those that were held centrally in
the immigration and asylum fingerprint database. We have a global
programme to roll out biometric capture in the visa application
process throughout the whole of the world and we aim to do that
by the end of 2007. We will start the main global roll-out in
the summer of this year and initially it is likely to start rolling
out the process throughout Europe and then will go more widely
at the start of next year. We will do that because at the moment
our ability to match fingerprints against the immigration database
is limited by database size, so we are increasing the size of
the database along with IND so that we can actually have the numbers
of matches that will give us the response time that we need because
we are aiming to match that fingerprint data within 30 minutes
of the fingerprint being taken in an overseas environment, so
the system is being built to give us that sort of response time.
Q455 Chairman: Will that fingerprint
data also be available in due course internally in this country,
say, if the police are seeking to identify somebody?
Ms Campbell: It will be. The data
at the moment all comes back from our overseas posts and it is
stored on the immigration and asylum fingerprint database, so
it is available from the point of collection.
Q456 Chairman: The cost of £70
million that you gave the Committee in your evidence, is that
the full cost of introducing this project or is this the capital
cost?
Ms Campbell: That is the estimated
capital cost.
Q457 Chairman: There has been some
evidence given to us from the JCWI, and this has also come up
in relation to the identity card project, that the current biometric
data systems have proved less accurate with certain, what in this
country would be, ethnic minorities, though obviously not in the
countries they are coming from. Is there an issue here about the
quality of biometric data being used for this purpose?
Ms Campbell: There is certainly
no evidence that any particular nationality group has lower-quality
fingerprints than others and clearly there are issues around—
Q458 Chairman: I should know this
from your evidence, but is this solely fingerprints we are talking
about here?
Ms Campbell: Fingerprints and
now a digital facial image as well.
Q459 Chairman: I think it is the
digital facial image which has been questioned in the ID card
project as being unreliable.
Ms Campbell: We are not using
that to match at the moment; we are simply using the fingerprint
data to conduct the matching against the asylum database and that
will be used in visa purposes as a secondary match, if we need
to do that, if there is a query about the fingerprint match.
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