Exporting the border
186. The whole visa operation is in a sense 'exporting
the border' because it checks applicants before they arrive in
the country, but more recent initiatives include:
- requiring carriers to check
passengers' documents;[199]
- deploying Airline Liaison Officers to help airlines
carry out those checks and to make sure that people who are getting
on planes are the same people who were granted visas;
- operating what are called 'juxtaposed controls'
where IOs operate UK immigration controls at French ferry ports
and Eurostar stations; and
- using new detection technology such as thermal
imaging devices, heart-beat monitors and CO2 probes
at ports in France and the Netherlands;
187. Under carriers' liability legislation, which
was originally introduced in 1987, carriers such as airlines and
shipping companies are liable to a £2000 fine for each inadequately
documented passenger they bring into the UK.[200]
This acts as an incentive for them to carry out document checks
and to refuse boarding to those whose documents they doubt.
188. A network of Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs)
employed by the IND provides training for airline staff in passport
and visa requirements, passenger assessment and forgery awareness.
They also go to airports to give on-the-spot advice to check-in
staff on the documents presented by passengers and to assist the
local authorities in identifying facilitators and racketeers involved
in the organised movement of inadequately documented passengers.[201]
There are now 34 ALOs in 32 locations, 6 Deputy ALOs and 5 ALO
"floaters".[202]
In 2003, 33,000 people were prevented from travelling to the UK
from airports where ALOs were stationed,[203]
and numbers of Inadequately Documented Arrivals (IDAs) detected
after arriving by air have fallen from 14,071 in 2003 to 6,831
in 2005. Over the same period, the number of clandestine entrants
detected arriving by sea also fell, from 3,482 to 1,588.
[204]
189. In future, under the e-Borders programme, it
is proposed that the travel industry will supply data on passengers
intending to travel to or from the UK, allowing the risks they
present to be assessed and 'alerts' passed to the relevant border
control agency. Under an Authority to Carry (ATC) scheme, carriers
would not be permitted to take individual passengers to the UK
until fingerprints of visa-holders and information in travel documents
and airline booking information had been checked against UK databases.[205]
190. This seems an attractive idea, but there are
some practical difficulties. Individual airlines and their umbrella
organisations have pointed out that charter airlines in particular
generally do not hold passenger information in advance of check-in,
and that not all UK airports are currently capable of collecting
and transmitting passenger information data. They also suggest
that it is unlikely that help-desk facilities for passengers denied
boarding will be able to deal with all queries, especially if
the passenger does not speak English, which could lead to delayed
flights or passengers missing their flights.[206]
They fear these facilities will also be very difficult and costly
to put in place where the airport is seldom used for flights to
Britain, and refer to the complications caused by the fact that
no global standards have yet been agreed.[207]
191. There is some criticism that all these measures
are blunt instruments, in that they may prevent people from travelling
even if they have a legitimate reason for coming to the UK. Bobbie
Chan, an immigration caseworker at the Central London Law Centre
in Chinatown, suggested to us that airline staff are stopping
a lot more people coming in than they should because they are
worried that they will be fined under carriers' liability legislation.[208]
Dr Khalid Koser of the Global Commission for International Migration
put forward the view that legitimate efforts to try to stem or
stop or reduce irregular migration can have an impact on refugees:
"It is increasingly difficult practically for asylum seekers
to arrive in countries like the UK (but not just the UK) in a
legal, regular fashion."[209]
Oxfam and the Refugee Council are concerned that it is not known
how many people in need of international protection are stopped
from travelling by ALOs, given that ALOs are posted to countries
"where human rights abuses are well-documented, from which
refugees originate, or through which refugees transit". Their
concern is that extra-territorial controls are unable to identify
people with protection needs and that they therefore threaten
the structure of the international asylum regime.[210]
The Independent Race Monitor, Mary Coussey, is concerned that
the likelihood of being refused is greater at the juxtaposed controls
than at ports in the UK.[211]
Moreover, in the Prague Airport case, pre-entry immigration control
aimed principally at stemming the flow of asylum seekers from
the Czech Republic was found to be racially discriminatory.[212]
192. No efforts have been made by the Government
to determine how many people stopped from travelling to the UK
may have had a legitimate claim to protection. Our predecessor
Committee in the last Parliament acknowledged, in a report published
in 2004, that the Government's "restrictive measures"
had made it more difficult for refugees to make a successful claim
for asylum, and that this placed a moral responsibility on the
Government to explore alternative refugee programmes so that people
do not have to resort to illegal methods of getting to the UK.
The Committee commented that:
As it becomes increasingly difficult to get into
the UK to make an asylum claim, it must be the case that many
people who would have a well-founded case for asylum will be unable
to make a claim. There is agreement that a large proportion of
asylum seekers arrive in the UK as the result of illegal people-smuggling
operations conducted by criminal gangs. We also note that the
asylum seekers who do manage to make a claim in the UK are not
representative of the world's wider refugee populationthey
are more likely to be young, male, healthy, educated and with
access to significant financial support, and less likely to be
old, female, ill, uneducated or poor. We believe this creates
a moral responsibility on the British Government to provide alternative
legitimate means by which refugees can gain access to this country,
to assist refugees closer to their country of origin, and to tackle
the roots of enforced migration.
We
support the UK's participation in the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees' quota refugee resettlement
scheme, and call for this to be expanded. We recommend that if
the number of successful asylum applications made in the UK declines,
Ministers should increase the UK's resettlement quotas through
the scheme each year by a proportionate amount.[213]
193. 'Exporting the border' effectively cuts
down on the numbers of people travelling undocumented to the UK.
We recommend that the use of Airline Liaison Officers should be
expanded, and that consideration is given to how to deal with
people who are stopped from travelling but may have protection
needs. We repeat the call by our predecessors for the Government
to be active in seeking to assist refugees in or near to their
countries of origin, as well as to expand its policy for assisting
refugees through UNHCR.
194. Whilst we were impressed at the series of checks
which is carried out at the juxtaposed controls in Calais, by
both the French and the British authorities, the equipment is
not entirely reliable or effective. It comes up with both false
negatives and false positives. The Immigration Service is trying
to find better equipment, but we were told during our visit to
Calais that for instance a new type of heartbeat monitor for which
there had been high hopes would not in fact be any better than
the existing ones.
195. In addition, the 'human element' will remain
important. For example, we were told by the Public and Commercial
Services Union (PCS) that:
we have evidence of a vehicle being allowed to
proceed when a positive reading had been obtained from detection
equipment. IS civil service staff intervened and removed people
from the vehicle. On another occasion contract staff were observed
searching vehicles without their detection equipment switched
on.[214]
PCS argued accordingly that "the use of technology
should remain in support of, rather than as a replacement for,
immigration staff".[215]
The PCS Union fears that increasing the number of private contractors
working for the Immigration Service will weaken border security:
"The union remains
concerned that privatisation of many parts of immigration control
may become a reality over the next few years. If this does happen
we believe it would pose a serious risk to the integrity of our
borders and consequently endanger the security of UK citizens."[216]
196. These high-tech checks may in any case be undermined
by the lack of security at the ferry port in Calais. During our
visit we learned that the ease with which would-be immigrants
can get into the terminal is worrying; we saw group after group
of people, mainly young men, waiting for their chance on the roadside,
beneath underpasses or in the scrubland near the lorry park. There
had been improvements to the perimeter fences, but there still
are points at which it is easy for people to climb over fences
or gates and into vehicles which have already been through most
of the checks.
197. When we visited Calais ferry port, we were given
figures on the number of people caught trying to smuggle themselves
into the UK. These showed a total of 9,652 in 2005 and 3,174 in
the first three months of 2006.[217]
198. Despite the success of recent measures in
detecting people attempting to enter the UK illegally through
Calais, the port is a continuing focus of attention for those
seeking to evade the UK's border controls. All aspects of port
security in Calais must therefore be kept under constant review
and strengthened wherever necessary, and the accuracy and application
of new detection technology must continue to be improved.
Checks on arriving passengers
199. Arriving passengers subject to immigration control
may be asked basic questions by an Immigration Officer (IO) about
the purpose of their visit, the intended length of stay (confirmed
by their return ticket), and address in the UK. Most passengers
are given leave to enter at this point. If the IO has any reason
to doubt a passenger's reasons for coming to the UK, the passenger
is asked further questions. If the delay is likely to last more
than an hour, the passenger must be given formal notice.[218]
200. In 2004, 31,930 passengers were refused entry
at port and subsequently removed, compared with 17,220 refusals
at port in 1994 and a high of 50,360 in 2002.[219]
The nationalities most likely to be refused at port in 2003 (excluding
nationals of the EU Accession States and asylum applicants) were
Malaysian (6.3% of Malaysian arrivals, 1,130 people), Jamaican
(5.4%, 1,455 people) and Brazilian (3.3%, 4,385 people).[220]
201. Between July 2003 and December 2004, fewer than
1% of all non-EAA nationals were delayed for questioning for more
than an hour after arrival, but there were ten countries which
accounted for 32% of those questioned at length and 38% of refusals,
even though they amounted to only 13% of non-EAA arrivals in the
period. By purpose of visit, students were most likely to be delayed
for questioning, and then visitors; least likely to be delayed
were business visitors.[221]
202. We felt from our visits that there are many
obstacles which hinder IOs from stopping people at ports. They
are under a lot of pressure (for instance we saw teams in Calais
getting to the end of their shift but not being relieved because
another team was not available), forgeries can be very difficult
to spot especially given the range of documents which could be
encountered,[222] database
checks are not comprehensive, there is a lack of proper accommodation
for questioning or detaining passengers,[223]
it may be difficult to obtain interpreters, and forms have to
be filled in.
203. Immigration Officers are allowed to discriminate
on the basis of nationality when deciding which passengers to
question, but only when they have been given express permission
to do so through a Ministerial Authorisation.[224]
The list of "priority nationals" subject to the authorisation
is issued monthly and disseminated to each port, but it is not
published. Priority nationals are listed when adverse decisions
and immigration breaches reach more than 50 in total, and 5 of
every 1,000 admitted persons of a particular nationality.[225]
204. In her annual report, Mary Coussey, the Independent
Race Monitor who examines the operation of this discrimination,
commented that she was impressed with most of the questioning
she saw during 2004-05. However, she also observed scepticism
amongst IOs, particularly in relation to nationalities on the
authorisation list, and different perceptions of nationalities
with high refusal rates between IOs at different ports. She found
some indication that different standards and profiles were applied
at different ports to questions of credibility, and was concerned
at marked differences in refusal rates between ports. She concluded
that, although there were strong arguments for the use of authorisations,
this also carried the risk of treating passengers from priority
nationalities more sceptically than others.[226]
One of her main recommendations is for more detailed monitoring,
in particular of refusal rates by port, in order to provide "greater
rigour and a more informed basis for assessing the impact of practices".[227]
The Immigration Service has begun research into refusal rates
but it is "subject to resources".[228]
205. Statistics must be kept on Immigration Officers'
decisions on people subject to race discrimination authorisations,
in particular to determine refusal rates by port. Appropriate
action must be taken by managers if it is found that these people
are treated more sceptically than other passengers.
206. Many of the difficulties
of checking people at the border could be avoided if more checks
were made on passengers before departure. The Authority to Carry
scheme will provide some additional information and checks (see
paragraphs 189 to 190 above) but another possibility is to require
everyone apart from EEA nationals to get a visa before travelling
to the UK. Already there are over 108 countries on the list of
those whose nationals require a visa before they travel to the
UK for any purpose,[229]
and people of all nationalities outside the EEA who intend to
enter for more than six months, or to settle or to marry, must
also obtain entry clearance. On our calculation, this means that
visa-free travel to the UK is currently available only to nationals
of 56 countries outside the EEA who are intending to come here
for less than six months.[230]
It is not clear to us how the decision on which countries should
be on or off the list is made. Australia, by contrast, requires
visas of all travellers except New Zealand citizens, whatever
the purpose of their trip, and then makes it very straightforward
and quick to apply for visas which are issued
as an electronic record on the department's computer systems and
not necessarily as a label or a stamp in the passport.
207. In view of the difficulties
in carrying out checks at port, the Government should continue
to develop methods of ensuring that travellers to the UK are checked
before departure. Whilst carriers have a role to play in this,
the Government should explore the implications of requiring all
non-EEA nationals to get visas before any trip to the UK, looking
at Australia's practice as an example and bearing in mind the
need for tourists and business visitors to be able to travel to
the UK without unnecessary inconvenience.
195 The European Economic Area (EEA) consists of the
EU member states plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, with
a linked agreement for Switzerland Back
196
i.e. passenger journeys, so an individual arriving more than once
would be counted each time. Back
197
The Common Travel Area consists of the UK, the Channel Islands,
the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland. Back
198
Home Office, Control of Immigration Statistics 2004 Cm 6690 Table
2.2 Back
199
This requirement was introduced in the Carriers' Liability Act
1987 but now contained in s. 40 of the Immigration and Asylum
Act 1999 Back
200
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s. 40 Back
201
UKvisas Diplomatic Service Procedures ch. 1 Annex 1.7 Back
202
Ev 282, HC 775-III Back
203
Home Office, Controlling our borders: Making migration work for
Britain - Five Year Strategy for asylum and immigration, February
2005, para. 53 Back
204
Ev 281-2, HC 775-III Back
205
Home Office, Controlling our borders: Making migration work
for Britain, Cm 6472, February 2005, Annex 1, and Ev 45-46,
HC 775-II Back
206
Ev 19 and 14, HC 775-II Back
207
Ev 14 and 21, HC 775-II Back
208
Q 616, 28 March 2006 Back
209
Q 110, 10 January 2006 Back
210 Ev
105-107 paras 3.4.3, 4.3 and 4.8.2, HC 775-II Back
211
Qq 41-42, 13 December 2005 Back
212
European Roma Rights Center v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport,
[2004] UKHL 55 Back
213
Home Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2003-04, Asylum
Applications (HC 218-I), summary; see also paras 159-61, 287,
291. For the Government's reply to these recommendations, see
Cm 6166, pp 15-17. Back
214
Ev 100, para 23, HC 775-II Back
215
Ev 100, para 27, HC 775-II Back
216
Ev 100, para.20, HC 775-II Back
217
These figures refer to numbers of detections: the same individual
may well have been caught several times Back
218
Mary Coussey, Independent Race Monitor Annual Report 2004-5, 5
July 2005, para 9 Back
219
Home Office, Control of Immigration Statistics 2004 Cm
6690 Table 2.1.The removal will not necessarily be in the same
year as the arrival, because some of the people removed in this
category will have been granted Temporary Admission, for example
to make an asylum claim. Back
220
Mary Coussey, Independent Race Monitor Annual Report 2004-5, 5
July 2005,para. 2.3 Back
221
Mary Coussey, Independent Race Monitor Annual Report 2004-5, 5
July 2005, para. 2.36 Back
222
See Qq451-453, 7 March 2006, for the training and guidance provided
on forgeries. Back
223
See HMIP Report on the unannounced inspection of three short-term
non-residential immigration holding facilities: Calais Seaport,
Coquelles Freight, Coquelles Tourist, France, 2-3 August 2005,
pp 15-16,23-24 and 31-32 Back
224
Under section 19D of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000.The
nine authorisations which were in effect during 2004-05 are listed
in an appendix to the Independent Race Monitor Annual Report 2004-5,
5 July 2005 Back
225
Mary Coussey, Independent Race Monitor Annual Report 2004-5, 5
July 2005, para. 1.6 Back
226
Mary Coussey, Independent Race Monitor Annual Report 2004-05,
5 July 2005, paras 2.15-2.35 Back
227
Mary Coussey, Independent Race Monitor Annual Report 2004-05,
5 July 2005, paras 2.36-2.39 Back
228
Q 39 and Q 52, 13 December 2005 Back
229
The list of nationalities, which is amended from time to time,
is set out in Appendix 1 to the Immigration Rules (HC 395
of 1993-94, as amended) Back
230
There are 192 countries in the world, from which the 27 countries
of the EEA and Switzerland (whose nationals can travel freely
to the UK) and the 108 countries on the visa nationals list are
subtracted. Back