5. Memorandum submitted by
Bedfordshire Police
INTRODUCTION
As part of its inquiries, the Committee are
examining scams in which a third party receives payment for securing
the documents that a foreign national needs to enter the country.
The Committee are keen to get a sense from ACPO of:
— how big a problem these kind of
scams are;
— whether they are a growing problem;
and
— the different types of scam which
are going on, including any loopholes in the law which are being
exploited.
RESPONSE
Scale of problem/growth trend/varieties of scam
Bedfordshire Police would assess the scale of this
problem as significant and growing. This is based primarily on
the frequency with which persons are found in possession of fraudulent
documentation—however it is commonly not known whether or
not the fraudulent documentation was used to facilitate entry
to the UK, where it was obtained and whether it was paid for.
Common sense dictates it has almost certainly been paid for on
most occasions. Whether or not the documentation was used to facilitate
entry into the UK is much more difficult to estimate. It is clear
some fraudulent documentation is also used for other purposes
such as to secure employment once entry to the UK has been gained.
Illegal entry to the UK is possible without transiting legitimate
immigration channels at all or by transiting UK immigration w/o
any documentation.
Examples of cases recently dealt with by Bedfordshire
appear below:
— The force recently charged a person
for having a false passport as she entered the country via Luton
Airport. A second person was charged with facilitating her entry.
It is suspected she was going to be placed in the sex industry.
Kent police searched an address associated with these two persons
at our request and found a passport-making factory. From the available
intelligence we would infer activity well beyond the scope of
the two charges preferred.
— The force recently conducted proactive
operations into a Luton based male whom reliable intelligence
indicated was a supplier of false passports. The operation was
ultimately transferred to national agencies. It is believed this
individual is engaged in organised people trafficking and routinely
uses false documentation to facilitate illegal entry. Again we
would infer widespread activity.
— Recent investigation in the county
intercepted a parcel containing 35 forged construction industry
certificates and subsequently recovered 100 further forged certificates
at a Luton address. These were all made out in the names of individuals.
The person at the centre of this investigation is linked by intelligence
to illegal immigration—he has been involved in the past
in seriously assaulting persons who were found to be illegal immigrants.
The certificates were mainly in the identities of IC4 persons.
Intelligence suggests the certificates were intended to allow
illegal immigrants to provide forged documentation necessary to
work on construction sites. This is of concern as it would appear
very likely the intended recipients do not have the skills or
awareness supposedly evidenced by the certificates—there
is an apparent risk both to the intended recipient, work colleagues
and the public. Although these 135 forged documents would not
facilitate entry into the UK it is reasonable, based on all the
intelligence, to infer substantial parallel activity around illegal
immigration. Enquiries to date have not revealed any suggestion
that the forged documentation was being purchased by legally present
citizens simply to circumvent construction employment regulations.
— The force has also dealt with a
case where a false document was used to obtain employment with
the NHS, within a care home for vulnerable adults. In this instance
an individual who was not entitled to employment in this country,
used a stolen ID card from Martinique (French—therefore
entitled to work via EU status) and adapted it with her photograph.
She was actually African in origin. We are not satisfied either
that she had genuine nursing qualifications—these may also
have been forged.
— A man arrested in the county for
minor criminality was fingerprinted on livescan and found to be
a person previously deported to Zimbabwe. The man was found in
possession of a false Malawi passport. It appears the false document
was used to facilitate illegal entry though we cannot be certain.
— False passport documentation is
fairly regularly seized during operations in Bedfordshire.
— On occasion false passports are
seized from persons who are entitled to residence via the EU.
A small number of Polish persons in Bedfordshire have been found
in possession of false Polish Passports This appears linked to
the fact that they are wanted in their real identities in Poland.
— The force also fairly regularly
encounters false stamps in legitimate passports—stamps which
indicate a permission to remain beyond the time actually agreed
or which permit the passport holder to work have been investigated.
Some have been found to be extremely crude—the word "secretary"
in "secretary of state" being misspelled in the stamp
for example.
— The force has widespread experience
of false passports and other identity documentation being used
to open bank accounts. Intelligence indicates a significant number
of attacks on bank accounts via West African organised criminals
(Nigerian/Zimbabwean). Offenders are able to open bank accounts
and then launder the proceeds from other stolen cheques through
those accounts opened with fake ID documents. Proceeds then to
a small degree fund lifestyle in this country but also funds are
transferred by the likes of Western Union Money Transfer abroad.
This offence is also widely perpetrated by home based criminals.
— General intelligence indicates the
majority of females working in Massage parlours and Saunas in
parts of the county are of Eastern European extraction. Many of
them are believed to be illegal immigrants. It appears possible
they entered the country using false documentation although it
is equally possible they were simply smuggled in and did not transit
legitimate immigration channels at all.
— Some intelligence reveals that illegal
entry can be facilitated without documentation of any sort even
when transiting official immigration channels. Stanstead and Luton
Airports have recently seen a small trend in young Chinese nationals
presenting w/o documentation of any kind (having presumably either
destroyed it or given it to an accomplice to take through the
airport.) and then claiming asylum. Owing to age the persons are
placed in non secure social service care homes but then abscond
within 24 to 48 hours—obviously it appears to a pre-arranged
rendezvous or to dial a pre-arranged phone number.
OVERALL CONCLUSION
All of the above suggests that the problem of false
passports and associated ID documentation is a significant problem
in terms of scale, although not limited purely to illegal entry
into the UK. (Indeed, as seen above, illegal entry can be facilitated
without any false documentation.) As can be seen from the cases
above false document producers can supply different customers
for different reasons including illegal entry, obtaining illegal
employment within the legitimate employment arena, concealing
identity (for example if wanted) and facilitating financial crime.
The resilience of the criminal market in false documentation is
significantly increased by these differing outlets for its products
in the same way that a legitimate market benefits from a diverse
customer base. Equally, given these differing outlets it is problematic
for intelligence units to quantify the exact scale of the problem
just in relation to one sub market—the facilitation of illegal
entry into the UK. Nevertheless based on the likely hypothesis
that the force is probably only encountering the "tip of
the iceberg," the scale of the problem being considered by
the Maxwell committee appears substantial. Our assessment is that
the market for false documentation is growing—entry into
the UK can be facilitated via false documentation (or without)
but once entry has been obtained access to employment, education
and some types of healthcare and welfare can all be obtained via
false documentation. In addition some criminal activity, particularly
financial crime is significantly aided by the ready supply of
false documentation.
Bedfordshire Police is not aware of any legislative
loopholes significantly aiding those producing and supplying false
documentation.
Rather long term relevant factors influencing the
growing prevalence of forged ID appear to be those the committee
will be well aware of:
— Increased "membership benefits"
for legitimate citizens of the British State are now being accessed
via fairly simple, often outmoded identification documents which
can easily be forged.
— These simple documents have also
become increasingly used to access financial, telecommunications
and other systems that have grown more sophisticated over time—allowing
remote access to funds and services in a way not possible a few
years back.
— Increased technology available to
the public has made false document production easier and cheaper.
The increased "membership benefits" mentioned above
provide clear incentives for forgery as has use of the simple
documents in gaining access to sophisticated banking, telecomms
systems etc. As a form of criminality forgery is seen as relatively
low risk, enforcement is patchy, the risk of "turf wars"
in comparison to drug trafficking is very low.
— Increased transport and communications
links makes it much easier for persons to travel and try and tap
into "membership benefits" of other states/commit crime
against banking and communications networks.
— The degree of rigour in border control
is probably influential.
— The degree to which possession of
requisite state issued ID controls access to "member benefits"
such as employment, health and welfare is probably influential.
— The degree to which private institutions
like banks rely on forms of state ID to control at least initial
access to the banking network is almost certainly influential.
— There has been no apparent corresponding
increase in defensive measures to prevent forgery around most
forms of simple state issued ID. We need to identify the key documents
needed by legitimate citizens to access the state's "membership
benefits" (Employment, healthcare, welfare etc) and invest
in anti-forgery measures around those documents to make them more
secure.—Perhaps adopting some of the measures being taken
to protect currency/cheques/credit cards etc.
— There may be advantages in combining
some of these State ID documents into one to cut down the expense
of anti-forgery measures and aid the fight against forgery—however
there may also be benefits in having more than one type of state
ID with different anti-forgery measures to make criminal replication
of the citizen "set" of ID cards needed more difficult.
— Consideration of incorporation of
unique identifiers into ID forms such as DNA / F/Print/Retina
pattern—however to be effective data held on the ID would
need to be capable of being quickly checked against the person
presenting the ID—accepted this entails harnessing developing
technologies and a discussion around human rights.
Fundamentally, closing legal loopholes or passing
new legislation appears unlikely to tackle the problem outlined—basically
forged ID appears to us to be intrinsically linked with criminals—who
are prepared to break the law in any case.
Detective Superintendent Richer
Director of Intelligence
10 February 2006
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