Select Committee on Home Affairs Additional Written Evidence


27.  Memorandum submitted by South Yorkshire Police

BACKGROUND

  The Home Affairs Select Committee has requested information from police forces on immigration frauds in which a third party receives payment for securing immigration and identity documents.

South Yorkshire Police co-ordinates a sub-regional multi-agency taskforce, tackling organised immigration crime as part of the national "Operation Reflex" initiative. Partners in the taskforce include other regional police forces, the UK Passport Service and the Immigration Service.

SCALE OF DOCUMENT FRAUDS

In our experience, the problem of document fraud is growing. Our "Reflex" unit has dealt with four operations involving Russian speakers using Lithuanian and Latvian passports and we are currently investigating the use by Algerian suspects of forged French passports. A further current operation centres on forged UK passports.

Our principal focus in these investigations is the offence of assisting unlawful immigration, contrary to section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971. This offence carries a maximum sentence of 14 years.

The problem of third parties receiving payments for securing documents to facilitate the entry of foreign nationals into the UK appears to be increasing from our experience and has escalated since the accession of nations to Europe in 2004. This has resulted in the availability of many more passports, which are often of poor quality and with minimal security features. They are more easily altered or reproduced than those with developed anti-forgery protection. Given the economic conditions in many of the accession states it is common to find individuals selling their passports to criminal groups.

In terms of third-party scams, an emerging issue that reveals a loophole in legislation and regulation is the abuse of educational permits and visas. Our investigations have revealed that under the guise of providing educational courses some colleges are charging foreign nationals several thousand pounds to facilitate their entry to the UK. The individuals enter the UK as vocational students but the actual educational component of their training is nil. They are, in effect, put to work without work permits on the pretence that this is "on the job" training.

The educational scam described above is appears to be widespread and reflects the creativity and innovation of those engaged in organised immigration crime.

NATURE OF FRAUDS

Examples of frauds include photo substitution, altered biographic data pages and counterfeit immigration stamps; all common scams used by forgers.

A fast growing phenomenon is the use of forged passports from countries like Lithuania and Latvia whose nationals speak Russian. These passports are being used by Russian speaking non-European nationals to enter the UK (including suspected Moldavian, Ukrainian, Russian and Georgian nationals).

EXPLOITATION OF VULNERABILITIES

In the case of air travel, the first examination of a passport takes place when an individual checks-in at an airport. If check-in staff fail to spot an obvious forgery they may be liable for a £2,000 fine under the Carriers Liaison Act. However, these staff are low paid and usually inexperienced in forgery detection.

The next examination of passports is at immigration control points where staff are required to satisfy themselves that the holder is the rightful bearer of the document. This is done by checking the photograph against the holder and by scanning the document into the system available at control; this will identify if the bio-data is counterfeit but will not necessarily identify a substituted photograph. The high quality of some photo substitutions precludes many forgeries being detected at busy immigration controls.

If a document is identified as a forgery at this point the holder will be detained and dealt with as an illegal entrant. However, unless the correct travel document can be located on the individual, they may not be able to be removed immediately. This is well known amongst immigration crime groups and the traveller will have been advised by the forgers not to carry any documentation relating to their true identity or nationality. When questioned about the source of their false documentation, it is rare for an individual to provide more than vague and general information.

Detention in these cases will not be considered due to there being no immediate prospect of removal. This results in temporary release of the person with conditions relating to place of residence, prohibition of working and reporting to the police and UKIS. All these controls carry a risk of non-compliance by the individual concerned.

Where there may be a prospect of immediate removal the individual will often claim asylum in order to delay the process, in which case their nationality determines whether they are detained to facilitate the asylum process. The majority of those claiming asylum will be given temporary release as above.

False passports are also utilised by those who have entered the UK lawfully but whose conditions preclude them from working here. Forgers will insert forged Home Office and UKIS stamps in legitimate passports in order to give the appearance that permission has been granted for work in the UK. This enables the holder to acquire a national insurance number which further legitimises their activities within the UK, giving access to NHS and educational systems, enabling them to open bank accounts, and so forth.

The Schengen agreement of which many European countries are signatories allows an individual to travel freely across Europe. This means that fraud or corruption at one point in the Schengen area can enable travel documents to be obtained giving access across the signatory nations and therefore controls are only as strong as the weakest link.

Matthew Jakes

Detective Superintendent

6 February 2006





 
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