Select Committee on Home Affairs Additional Written Evidence


47.  Ninth supplementary memorandum submitted by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office

1.  UKVISAS

  1.1  The entry clearance operation is intended to break even but UKvisas does not produce its own audited financial statements from which this can be confirmed. What are the total costs incurred by UKvisas in issuing visas, advising applicants and dealing with appeals etc? Can these costs be analysed by location and type (eg staff costs, accommodation, IT and telecoms, producing forms and leaflets etc)? Is there any benchmarking of costs between offices?

Financial Statements

—  UKvisas is a joint Home Office and FCO directorate. The total cost of UKvisas is made up of (1) direct income and costs (eg salaries) incurred by UKvisas and (2) shared costs (eg accommodation, IT, and Post overheads) incurred at Post and by the FCO in the UK.

—  Shared costs (ie (2) above) are allocated to UKvisas based on a return which is completed by all Home and Overseas staff. This return identifies the objectives that each officer is supporting. Entry Clearance is an FCO objective. The methodology used to calculate the total cost of UKvisas has been formally approved by the FCO Finance Director and is reviewed each year by the FCO Internal Audit as part of the larger annual NAO Audit of the FCO Statutory Accounts.

—  The total cost of UKvisas is shown in the annual FCO Statutory Accounts (attached) and is also provided within the UKvisas annual Memorandum Trading Accounts, which were presented to HMT as part of the 2005 Fees Review.

Breakdown of Costs

—  As shown in the schedule originally provided to the HAC, the total costs of UKvisas can be broken down into cost headings eg salaries, accommodation, overheads by geographic region.

—  UKvisas do not currently have a means of breaking down costs into individual activity costs (eg issuing visas, processing appeals). However UKvisas have successfully piloted an activity based costing system which would calculate these costs. Staff at Post will be asked to breakdown their total time which they allocate to entry clearance in the annual return process into a number of key activities.

—  This tool will facilitate benchmarking of resource utilisation between different Posts. UKvisas are currently reviewing the lessons learned during the pilot and refining the process with a view to a further pilot within the next eight weeks.

Resource Accounts 2004-05

  http://www.fconet.fco.gov.uk/About+the+FCO/Facts+and+Figs/ResourceAccounts2004-2005.pdf

  1.2  What were the recommendations of the Streamlining Review referred to in the UKvisas Business Plan for 2005-06 as due to report by 31 May 2005? Please indicate progress with implementing them.

—  The background to Streamlining is as follows: in recent years UKvisas has experienced an accelerating increase in demand, the rate of growth having doubled over the past three years. To meet the challenge of this growth and still meet PSA performance targets, while maintaining effective immigration control, the Department has looked at a number of different methods of streamlining. These methods included the successful partnering with companies such as VFS, Fedex, DHL, Abtran and others, who provide the administrative aspects of the visa application process.

—  Over the past year, we have added to posts who run an outsourcing operation to include China, South Africa, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia and Nigeria.

—  The results of the Streamlining Review are outlined in the attached document, which has already been provided to the Inquiry. [not printed]

—  The high level recommendations were:

—  that as all measures introduced under streamlining had a positive impact on productivity, a mixed economy approach should continue to be followed; and

—  that, with the introduction of new initiatives, particularly the biometrics programme and the points-based system, partnering arrangements should be expanded in order to meet the increase in demand and ensure swiftness of service.

—  UKvisas continues to promote streamlining initiatives to all posts. Regional Operations Manager posts were created in late 2005 with a specific task to ensure that all posts in their region adopt streamlining measures. These managers are supported by a dedicated team in UKvisas who assist them in conducting efficiency reviews.

—  UKvisas have established a programme to deliver commercial partnership arrangements to all posts that require support. Contracts are expected to be in place by early 2007.

—  The Commercial Partnerships Programme will work closely with the regional and in-country management structure and with the other change programmes within UKvisas to ensure existing benefits are maintained and future needs are accommodated within any new arrangements.

  1.3  Are there any plans to revise UKVisas targets in 2006-07 to give more emphasis to control issues?

—  Our current targets focus mainly (PSA targets 1-3) on speed of customer service. The control element is reflected in PSA target 4, but more needs to be done. We have therefore begun a programme of work which is defined by UKvisas' new Mission Statement:

    "UK visas is the overseas arm of the UK's integrated border management. Our goals are to bring communities together and improve the UK's competitiveness as a destination for travel, trade, migration and investment through programmes which prevent immigration abuse, deliver value for money and earn public confidence."

—  To support this work, we are introducing a balanced scorecard throughout UKvisas' business, focused on outcomes in five areas: Controls, Customers, Costs, Confidence, Capabilities. We aim to agree new PSA targets taken from balanced scorecard measures, in time for the new public spending triennium 2007-08, focusing on Controls and Customers.

—  For 2005-06, we amended PSA 2 to allow greater focus to be placed on control issues. The target previously allowed up to 10 days to be taken to process an application if an interview was required. The revised target allows up to 15 days to investigate a case if either additional checks or an interview is required. This change has enabled significant numbers of applications to be put through a more rigorous process whilst still meeting PSA targets.

  1.4  What plans are there to widen and improve the availability of performance information, particularly on the quality of decision-making?

  As in 1.3 above: we are embarking on an ambitious change programme in UKvisas, to align with the Balanced Scorecard approach to our business. The successful implementation of the Scorecard is dependent on the widening and improving of management and performance information. As a result, this work (which includes outcomes and measures relating to the quality of decision-making) forms an integral part of the project currently underway to develop the Scorecard approach. In the meantime, recent improvements to our IT caseworking database have enabled us to move away from monthly paper based performance reporting from all posts to central data collection from the IT system. This new system will go live next month.

  1.5  What factors inform UKvisas' risk assessment process, and what impact are the new units having on the quality of decisions and efficiency of operations?

  There are a variety of informing factors: local (Post) information obtained in the course of the application/field trips, UK Government databases, data sharing with EU colleagues, input from and closer liaison with other Government departments and agencies. The new units are intended to give front-line entry clearance staff as comprehensive a knowledge as possible to enrich their decision making process and are already showing positive results. Selected profiling and checking of applications has deterred and in some cases prevented further visa abuse occurring and identified significant forgery issues enabling a more efficient allocation of resources to tackle visa abuse. Evidence previously supplied to the Committee provides detailed information on the scale of abuse detected by the Risk Assessment Units and the amount of fraud prevented.

  1.6  How many risk assessment units are there now, and how many more are planned for the future?

  There are currently 15 RAUs in operation, with planned expansion to 26 (some with a regional role), by mid-2006. Our target is that 75% of all visa applications will be considered in accordance with risk assessment principles by 2007-08. This encompasses all posts dealing with nationalities that pose the greatest risk to the immigration control.

  1.7  What risk assessment takes place in posts without such a unit?

  Entry clearance officers consider local information and local knowledge in addition to entry clearance requirements, and requests are forwarded to London for additional checks to be made on applicants who give rise to concern. The plan is however that global coverage should be achieved by developing regional roles. Guidance has been drawn up for posts not currently covered by a formal RAU to ensure that they are applying risk assessment in their decision making.

  1.8  Has UK visas performed detailed analysis of the outcome of appeal decisions, particularly by post, and if not why not?

  We provided the Committee with a copy of the ECO Quality Assurance Report [not printed]. An exercise was undertaken in January-February 2006, with presenting officers from the nine regional units appraising 801 entry clearance officer notices of decision by completing the ECO Quality Assurance Report. This exercise examined both quality of the notices of decision and the outcome of the hearings. The data from the exercise is currently under examination and the results will feed into the work UKvisas are undertaking in respect of decision-making quality.

  1.9  Does the Central Reference System contain complete and up-to-date information on suspect or criminal activity as well as details of previous visa applications?

  The Central Reference System does hold details of current and previous applications (issues and refusals), but not of suspect or criminal activity.

2.  ARRIVALS

  2.1  How many people annually are not being detained on arrival whom the immigration service think should in fact be detained? What is the reason for this?

  This information is not routinely recorded. If this is required it might be a case of having to examine either locally held records or every entry on the Caseworking Information Database, but this will not be comprehensive.

  2.2  Please provide precise statistics for the numbers of Inadequately Documented Arrivals identified annually from 1987 to date.

  We hold figures going back to 1989:

19898247 199828,320
199014,1821999 31,212
199113,1782000 27,064
199294,842001 19,305
199397,582002 19,224
199411,6472003 17,229
199513,9912004 11,233
199613,0362005 7,125
199721,157



  2.3.  Please provide a full update on implementation of the recommendations of Operation Paladin Child, including a list of the ports of entry which now have a joint child protection team including police and social services.

Update on the Paladin Recommendations

—  Recommendation 1—The learning from the Paladin project should be shared as widely as possible across the four statutory agencies involved through briefings and seminars.

  Numerous internal and external briefings have been held. In January 2006 the CAIC hosted a one day national law enforcement seminar with 80 police and immigration officers from across the UK. A new ACPO lead, DCC Jim Gamble from the Child Exploitation and On-line Protection Centre (CEOPS) has been appointed.

—  Recommendation 2—Bespoke joint training for professionals working at ports and visa agency in this field is required to educate staff on the different roles and responsibilities of each agency.

  Immigration officers have joined the MPS child abuse investigation foundation course and over 600 of their minors team staff have received a police input on child protection. Immigration Service have appointed consultants to progress this recommendation.

—  Recommendation 3—More generic training for police and social services child protection officers is necessary to raise awareness of immigration legislation and risk indicators to identify trafficked children, and those migrating or in transit where there are safeguarding concerns.

  There has been no joint training to date although the Association of Directors of Social Services have appointed Hannah Miller the Croydon Director to lead on this area.

—  Recommendation 4—Any UKIS dedicated `minor's officers or teams should consider undergoing where appropriate, the same pre-selection screening as child protection colleagues and will require training in safeguarding principles.

  Heathrow Airport—12 Immigration officers on the minor's team, have had the initial Child Protection course.

—  Recommendation 5—All airlines bringing unaccompanied minors to the UK should have in place safeguarding policies for children in transit. This should include pre-screening procedures for employees and training in risk identification.

  This action remains outstanding although we have hosted three awareness-raising seminars for airline staff. We are also progressing this through IATA/CAWG as a recommended practice. A further two awareness-raising seminars are being scheduled and in addition plans are in progress to deliver awareness to airline staff abroad via the ALON network.

—  Recommendation 6—UKIS, MPS, Hillingdon Social Services and the NSPCC should consider creating a permanent multi-agency partnership team based at Heathrow to address specific safeguarding needs of UAMs. The needs are greater than just exploitation.

  On 17 October 2005, a joint working team commenced operations at Heathrow Airport. This team is made up of five SCD5 officers and UK Immigration Service officers, led by Detective Inspector Gordon Valentine. The Immigration service has recruited the original SCD5 officer at Heathrow to a national police liaison post. Social Services still await government funding for their staff.

—  Recommendation 7—A Government working group is formed to develop the learning from the Paladin experience for application to other significant ports of entry to the UK.

  AC Ghaffur raised this matter with the Home Secretary in July 2005 and the Home Office have appointed a children's coordinator, David McDonald, to co-ordinate their response to child trafficking. The MPS have asked the Home Secretary to consider a similar task force approach to that used to combat child abuse on the internet due to the number of different stakeholders in this field. IND have also appointed a children's champion to engage in this recommendation.

—  Recommendation 8—The Government ensures that the Paladin data is assimilated into a wider national system for tracking children and to allow information sharing across agencies involved in safeguarding children. This should be connected to any national developments in Information Sharing and national databases of children.

  The National Register for Unaccompanied Children (NRUC) was launched in November 2004 and roll out to local authorities begun in January 2005. No register exists for non-asylum seeking children.

—  Recommendation 9—An independent specialist researcher is tasked to explore the feasibility of a set of risk indicators using the Paladin data for use by UKIS staff at the control desks.

  &

—  Recommendation 10—An independent specialist researcher is tasked with exploring the feasibility of a more detailed risk assessment process for use once UKIS have identified a child may be at risk.

  A consultant (former MPS officer) has been appointed to work for IND. He has been asked to progress this recommendation.

—  Recommendation 11—The Paladin process be adapted for a more focused group of children that matches the profile of those we have not been able to trace.

  &

—  Recommendation 17—Advanced passenger information on UAMs be made available to the Ports Safeguarding Team to allow for pre-arrival risk assessment and to focus operational deployments.

  &

—  Recommendation 19—The government to research the feasibility of providing electronic access to visa application details.

  In November 2005, a multi-agency, national safeguarding children pilot operation, initiated by UK Immigration Service and operated by the Ports Safeguarding Team commenced for three months. Based on analysis of existing intelligence, the first phase monitored unaccompanied children flying to Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester between 31 October 2005 and 28 January 2006 from Jamaica. Work on this pilot will inform the development of a substantial work-stream to monitor flights from countries and continents known for high levels of child migration. This process makes use of advanced passenger information to risk assess children prior to arrival in the UK. It was designed to test systems, and it should be noted there is no significant identified risk to children from this destination. The evaluation phase has now commenced.

  CRS the computer record service which provides access to visa details is now available electronically to UKIS.

—  Recommendation 12—The Paladin form be redesigned to be more focused to assist in the identification of a child.

  Outstanding. The evaluation of the Kingston pilot will address this issue.

—  Recommendation 13—An analyst be appointed to the MPS Ports Safeguarding Team to cross reference the data captured on other UKIS systems and with data at Lunar House to identify patterns and trends. This will assist in the development of intelligence on potential trafficking operations.

  Appointment confirmed and discussions in hand with regard to managing the work from the ports.

—  Recommendation 14—The multi agency team be given access to existing child protection databases managed by the MPS eg Merlin, CRIS and CRIMINT to allow for more thorough and timely risk assessments.

  The Paladin team currently makes use of Special Branch terminals in the arrivals lounge. They also have one AWARE terminal in the Paladin office giving access to Merlin (child protection) and Crimint (intelligence).

—  Recommendation 15—The DFES lead on IRT must liaise with the Government to ensure UKIS are involved in the IRT process.

  Awaits new DFeS IT systems.

—  Recommendation 16—The Government formalise procedures for the central recording on police databases, details of children who are unaccounted for as part of either the Paladin or asylum process.

  Outstanding.

—  Recommendation 18—UK Visa Agency and UKIS control point staff be given access to established `quick address' databases to validate information provided, whether by child or receiving adult.

  Outstanding.

—  Recommendation 20—UKIS staff should be provided with the technology to capture biometric data from passports of minors meeting the Paladin criteria.

  &

—  Recommendation 21—The government to examine the feasibility of empowering the Ports Safeguarding teams to take a fingerprint of each UAM within set criteria to aid future identification.

  The legal issues surrounding the taking of biometrics are likely to be resolved through the Immigration Asylum and Nationality Bill that is currently passing through parliament.

—  Recommendation 22—All UMs awaiting risk assessment process should be provided with a suitable private environment under the supervision of an appropriately selected and trained guardian, for example an NSPCC officer.

  Outstanding.

—  Recommendation 23—The UK Government identify a project lead to create the Heathrow Safeguarding Team and identify funding streams to finance this initiative.

  There is now a Home Office-led multi agency steering group, see below for MPS funding arrangements.

—  Recommendation 24—The Association of Directors of Social Services considers the implications of the Paladin scoping study for their departments.

  Outstanding (see Rec 3 above).

—  Recommendation 25—The Government considers the initiative to make available on arrival a card with dedicated helpline numbers for NSPCC and Childline at all UK ports.

  IND are currently producing a leaflet for all unaccompanied minors arriving in the UK.

—  Recommendation 26—DFES and ADSS jointly review current private fostering arrangements, the terminology used and examine the effectiveness of their enforcement across the UK.

  This has been addressed in part in the new Children's Act.

Joint Child Protection Team

  Heathrow is the only UK port that has a joint child protection team. The establishment of a joint-working unit at Heathrow airport was one of the recommendations in the Operation Paladin Child report. The Paladin Team consists of co-located Metropolitan Police Child Protection Officers and Immigration staff tasked with safeguarding children arriving in and transiting through Heathrow. The Paladin Team is jointly funded by Met Police and UKIS. It is hoped that the team will expand, in due course, to include representatives from social services. This team has been operational since 17 October 2005 and is headed by a Detective Inspector.

Minors' teams at ports of entry

  It may be helpful to know that most of the Border Control ports have `Minors' Teams' consisting of specially trained staff, who deal with all cases of unaccompanied children. These teams, as encouraged in the UK Immigration Service `Guidance—Children Arriving in the UK', have begun to form working relationships with their local authorities and many have established good practices with social services.

  Currently minors' teams have been established at the following Border Control locations:

StanstedHull/Humber Ports
ASU CroydonRobin Hood Airport
ASU LiverpoolCalais/Cheriton
Gatwick NorthNewcastle Airport
Gatwick SouthDurham Tees Valley Airport
Heathrow Terminal 1Harwich International Airport
Heathrow Terminal 2Leeds Bradford Airport
Heathrow Terminal 3Birmingham International Airport
Heathrow Terminal 4Liverpool John Lennon Airport
ManchesterLondon City Airport
Portsmouth
Plymouth


IATA/CAWG Unaccompanied Minors Initiative

  UKIS is currently taking forward with IATA a proposal for minimum standards to be adopted by air carriers in respect of the carriage of unaccompanied minors. An initial presentation was extremely well received with IATA stating that it was one of the most important pieces of work the group had undertaken to date. Work is underway on producing a Best Practice document for minors.

  2.4  Please provide the report of the Paladin team which is analysing Project Semaphore information on arriving children from Jamaica.

  The results of the `Kingston Pilot' are still being analysed and the final report has not yet been published however the following is a brief overview of the initial findings.

Background

  The Kingston Pilot involved the examination of Advance Passenger Information (API) via carriers involved in Project Semaphore in order to identify all children travelling to the United Kingdom on direct flights from Jamaica. Airline staff participating in the Kingston Pilot received child protection awareness training delivered by UKIS and the Met police. A hotline staffed by Border Control officers was provided to airline check-in staff so they could report concerns about any children travelling to the Untied Kingdom during the trial. The pilot ran from 30 October 2005 to 28 January 2006.

  The purpose of the Kingston Pilot was to address safeguarding issues around children specifically, the identification of unaccompanied minors entering the United Kingdom from Jamaica whereby their sponsors and destination addresses would be interrogated on United Kingdom Immigration Service (UKIS), social services and Police (including Semaphore) databases to ensure their continued safety.

Summary of initial findings

  As anticipated, Heathrow received the highest numbers of arriving minors. The total number of minors encountered was 2,718 and of those 2,418 were EEA nationals, and 300 were non-EEA (other) nationals.

  London Gatwick encountered a substantial number although not the volume experienced at London Heathrow. The total number of minors encountered was 1,443 and of those 1,259 were EEA nationals, and 184 were other nationals.

  The report of the Kingston Pilot will be made available once the full analytical process has been completed.

3.  IND STAFF

  3.1  Are staff answering telephone inquiries in INEB the same grade as caseworkers who decide applications? Is there much movement between these jobs?

  Telephone enquiry agents are Administrative Officer grade. Some aspects of caseworking are dealt with at AO level; other aspects are dealt with by higher grade officers.

  I have attached for your information the advert that we are using for our current recruitment campaign, which gives you an idea of the requirements for the role [not printed]. Recruitment into INEB tends to be external, ie not Home Office or Civil Service. It is very unusual for new starters to come from caseworking areas within IND.

  I attach a spreadsheet showing leavers from INEB over the last 12 months and where they have gone [not printed]. There were 70 leavers, of which 34 (49%) were promoted to EO, 15 (21%) level transferred, 13 (19%) resigned, 3 (4%) career breaks, 2 (3%) casuals (recruited for summer, returned to university) and 3 (4%) dismissals. The level of leavers reflects the fact that most staff remain with INEB for no more than 2 years. INEB is seen by staff joining the department as an area where they receive good training and acquire skills which will help them to move onto other roles within IND. 70% of the staff who left INEB remained within IND/Home Office.

  From the spreadsheet of leavers 18 (26%) staff have moved to caseworking areas, which include MP's Correspondence and Enforcement.

4.  MANAGED MIGRATION

  4.1  How many in-country applications as a dependant relative are refused, annually for last five years?

  We are unable to provide statistical information prior to 2003 but the total number of applications refused from persons applying as the dependent spouse or child for the years from 2003 are as follows:


Date
Number of applications refused from persons applying as the dependent spouse or child*

2003
4,739
2004
5,992
2005
7,359
2006 (to date)
2,254

  This information has not been quality assured, and is not a National Statistic. It should be treated as provisional management information.

  4.2  How many of these refusals are overturned on appeal?

  At present we are not able to identify the number of cases which have been refused that are overturned at appeal. Work continues to be done by our statistics gathering teams to improve the statistical information that we are able to provide.

  4.3  How often are children brought here from overseas and then left behind here, perhaps with other relatives, leading to the courts granting residence or adoption orders "in the best interests of the child" even though this was not the apparent intention at the time the child applied to come to the UK?

  Our standard way of collecting data is according to the categories of entry and further leave to remain that are in the immigration rules. Hence, we cannot provide accurate statistics on the outcome expressed in the question. Unaccompanied children can arrive under a number of headings but those coming for the purposes described are most likely to arrive as visitors and then remain beyond the period allowed as a visitor. We have conducted an internal exercise to seek to establish how many unaccompanied non-asylum seeking children arrive in the UK using data for 2003.

  In that year IND received 16,200 applications requesting further leave to remain that were not asylum related and where the lead applicant was under 18. This excludes those applicants under 18 whose basis of stay would be as a dependant or for education where a prior entry clearance is required. It therefore provides a very broad indicator of how many children there might be in the UK who arrived in that year and who could be classed as "unaccompanied". However, it must be stressed that this is an estimate arrived at by excluding other types of application and cannot be regarded as a precise measure.

  We have not broken this data down any further. Most of the applications are supported by a relative although some will reflect the concerns of local education authorities or social services departments about the immigration status of the child. Occasionally the child's life will have taken a turn such that the courts are already involved at this stage because a care order is being sought and they are seeking information about the child's immigration status.

  Our normal practice is to grant leave to remain since this provides the best basis for resolving the issues surrounding the child's current and future welfare needs. We will not do so, however, if this means sanctioning a deliberate abuse of the various systems involved for advantage that could not be honestly obtained. The courts themselves have indicated that in making their decisions about the welfare of the child they do not wish to be in the position of endorsing deception by applicants or poor administration by other agencies.

  The Department of Health compile statistics on the number of children that are "looked after" in the course of a year by local authorities, with a breakdown of the category of care or intervention provided, and its outcome. These figures have since 2003 included unaccompanied asylum seeking children as a specific group but they do not identify unaccompanied non-asylum seeking children.

  4.4  When foreign nationals are granted National Insurance numbers, are there any checks to make sure they are allowed to work in the UK?

  The Immigration and Nationality Directorate are not responsible for granting National Insurance Numbers (NINOs). The allocation of NINOs to adult foreign nationals is the responsibility of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), and a process administered by Jobcentre Plus—part of DWP. Colleagues in DWP have therefore contributed to this response.

  The NINO is a unique reference number used by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs to record tax and national insurance contributions paid and credits awarded. It is also an administrative identifier used by DWP to administer Social Security benefits. The circumstances under which an individual must or may register for a NINO are set out in Regulation 9 of the Social Security (Crediting and treatment of contributions and National Insurance Numbers) Regulations 2001.  Possession of a NINO does not however confer right to live or work status in the UK or an automatic entitlement to benefits.

  Individuals entering the UK from abroad, who require a NINO must attend Jobcentre Plus for an Evidence of Identity Interview. The interviewing process is primarily designed to guard against identity fraud; it does not provide a rigorous check on immigration status. This is because there may be legitimate reasons why an individual requires a NINO irrespective of immigration status. For example, a NINO may be required by an individual who does not have regularised status because they are a partner of an UK national claiming benefits or tax credits. However, if Jobcentre Plus becomes aware of right to work/immigration irregularities as part of the NINO allocation process., the Immigration and Nationality Directorate are notified so that appropriate action can be taken against the individual NINO applicant concerned.

  In order to facilitate this process a National Partnership Agreement for data sharing in connection with Suspected Benefit Fraud Cases and Immigration Offences has been signed between the Home Office Immigration and Nationality Department and Jobcentre Plus, which allows for Jobcentre Plus colleagues to check the immigration status of applicants. The agreement also provides a network of contacts in both departments to facilitate data sharing at a local level, where this would be more beneficial. DWP colleagues are IND's most common partner in local enforcement operations.

  Records show that IND receives between 200-300 status requests per week from colleagues in JobCentre Plus. Where a request is highlighted as a priority it will be dealt with within 4 days of receipt and on average 95% are completed within target. Where a request is considered routine it will be dealt within 10 days of receipt and 100% are completed within target. Where staff identify newer addresses from these referrals, our records are updated.

  Where IND receives intelligence that an immigration offence has been committed, they are centrally recorded, considered and disseminated for IND intelligence units to act upon at the earliest possible opportunity. Intelligence officers will decide whether to refer cases for action through their local Tasking and Co-ordinating Groups whose priorities are set by a control framework at the Senior Managers Tactical and Tasking Group.

  Even where no action is taken, the information is added to the IND intelligence database, Mycroft. This is helping to increase the body of knowledge that IND has about all areas of abuse of the system and may, where appropriate, be used at a later date.

  4.5  Is there an annual report or equivalent setting out the work and achievements of the Managed Migration Intelligence Unit?

****

5.  REMOVALS

  5.1  We were told that on average 78% of detainees at Colnbrook are removed and 22% are given Temporary Admission. Is this typical across the whole estate? Is the immigration service satisfied that this is the right balance?

  Excluding Oakington Reception Centre, around 70% of detainees are removed and 30% are given temporary admission, bail or granted leave to enter or remain in the UK. A higher rate of temporary admission applies at Oakington Reception Centre, which is used for fast-tracking of certain asylum applications. Around 90% of these cases have an in-country right of appeal and in such circumstances it is appropriate to release.

  Detention is governed by a tight legal framework, is only used where necessary and always for the shortest period possible. People are detained within the estate for a range of reasons and processes. Detention may be considered appropriate for any of the following:

—  to effect removal (including deportation after serving a prison sentence);

—  whilst establishing a person's identity and claim;

—  where an individual is believed to present a risk of absconding, and

—  where an asylum application is capable of being considered quickly.

  In certain circumstances it is right that people should be given temporary admission. For example, it may be that a successful Judicial Review application has been made and that there is no reasonable prospect of the case being considered quickly. In other cases, it might be that a late asylum application has been made and again there is no early prospect of considering the application. Equally, as circumstances change on individual cases it may be considered appropriate to give a previously detained person temporary admission. Each individual case is reviewed at regular intervals through the internal management chain. In addition trends on detention periods are reviewed by a Senior Detention Board and a periodic quality assurance inspection of detained casework has been introduced. Detainees also have the right to apply for bail.

  5.2  Could you provide a list of companies authorised to carry out escorted removals on behalf of the IND or the Home Office?

  There are at present three companies engaged in this activity on our behalf:—

—  Group 4 Securicor

—  International Trading Agency Overseas Escorts Ltd.

—  RSI Immigration Services Ltd.

  5.3  Please list the checks the Home Office carries out on these companies as to their operating procedures, training, employee screening and financial probity—both before granting the contract and also on a continuing basis.

  The following checks are conducted prior to Contract award:

Potential suppliers submit detailed operating procedures, training plans, employee screening and financial accounts which are scrutinised by operational and business support colleagues prior to being awarded a contract or gaining acceptance on to an approved list of suppliers.

In terms of financial probity independent financial assessments are obtained as to the financial status of each company/subsidiary and parent company.

Employee screening is carried out by the supplier but prior to any employee being allowed to perform escort duties they must have successfully completed training and obtained ISCAT clearance.

After acceptance or contract award the performance of the supplier is overseen by Contract Monitors who review and attending training courses/plans, liaison with the supplier who conducts tests on operating procedures in particular contingency procedures. Operational concerns are addressed at regular meetings and elevated if necessary.

The Authority has the right under the Contract at any time to review the Contractor's records and the Contractor is required when requested to provide any such records as and when required. If necessary independent assessors can be brought in to investigate the financial probity of a supplier.

  5.4  Is an immigration officer always present at an enforced removal, particularly at the port of embarkation? If not, please specify the guidelines which determine when an immigration officer should be present and explain how you check that these are being applied correctly.

  An immigration officer is not always present at an enforced removal as our contractors supervise the detention and movement of passengers including escorting them to the flight. However an immigration officer may sometimes be present as an observer if the removal is potentially difficult or in order to liaise with the airline over practical problems such as luggage. If a removal is identified as requiring very close supervision because of a behavioural or medical history, then we employ trained escorts who will accompany the passenger from detention, through the boarding stage and stay with the passenger on the flight until they have reached their destination. Whether or not an immigration officer is present will be decided according to the merits of each case.

  Guidance on the removal of a person via a port of embarkation is contained in chapter 9.11 of the Operational Enforcement Manual (OEM). This information is available on the IND website. It sets out the responsibilities for the caseworking port and the departure port.

  5.5  What specific problems are there with carriers over enforced removals? What consultations have there been with carriers over these problems?

  Carriers are mainly concerned with the increase in disruptive behaviour with regard to enforced removals. There is a perception by the majority of airlines consulted that returnees often engage in deliberately obstructive behaviour designed to frustrate removal. This behaviour can result in other fare-paying passengers obtaining a negative image of the airline involved and airlines are concerned that this will impact on their commercial interests. Carriers have also raised concerns about capacity and the number and type (escorted or not, families etc) of removals they are prepared to carry on each flight, about lost revenue when removals are postponed often at late notice and the logistics of effecting removal. The Immigration Service seeks to address airlines' concerns both through local liaison by the Removal Facilitation Units at Heathrow and Gatwick airports from which by far the majority of removals are effected as well as regular meetings held with the airlines most frequently used to effect removals.

  5.6  How many overseas nationals who have completed a sentence in a UK prison are being held in detention centres awaiting deportation and how many of these are being denied entry into their home country? Does the Home Office have a strategy for dealing with such cases?

  Those detained in prison beyond the completion of their criminal sentences are usually awaiting deportation, either on the recommendation of the court as part of their criminal sentence or on the grounds that their removal from the United Kingdom is deemed to be conducive to the public good. In such circumstances the Immigration Service will make every effort to ensure that a person's removal by deportation coincides as far as possible with his earliest release date from prison. Where this does not happen, the following are among the principal reasons:

—  the prisoner may be awaiting the outcome of an appeal against the decision to deport him; or

—  the prisoner may have applied to remain on human rights grounds; or

—  late in his sentence, the prisoner may have lodged a further application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom, and the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) is considering that application;

—  the Immigration Service may be awaiting the issue of a travel document on which to effect his removal; or

—  there may, especially at certain times of the year, be a shortage of seats on aircraft serving a particular destination; or

—  there may be other matters that need to be addressed before the deportation can be effected.

  IND's policy on detention in immigration cases is that while there is a presumption in favour of the grant of temporary admission or temporary release, detention is normally justified:

—  where there is a reasonable belief that the individual will fail to keep to the terms of temporary admission or temporary release;

—  initially, to clarify a person's identity and the basis of their claim for leave to enter or remain in the UK; or

—  where removal is imminent.

  While a large number of detainees are held in immigration removal centres, there are a number who are detained in prison past their release date, as removal centres do not always an appropriate level of security for many of those who have completed prison sentences in the UK, either because of the nature of the offences they have committed, or because of the risk they would potentially pose to other detainees and staff, or because of the risk of their absconding.

  On 19 April 2006 there were 240 overseas national prisoners detained in Immigration Detention Centres. Of those cases where it had been agreed to pursue deportation action, 55 were detained awaiting appropriate travel documentation and 7 were detained due to difficulties in either establishing nationality or in pursuing removal directions to their country of origin.

  As at 12 April 2006 313 overseas nationals who had completed their sentence were detained in prison establishments. Of those cases where it had been agreed to pursue deportation action, 99 were detained awaiting appropriate travel documentation and 24 were detained due to difficulties in either establishing nationality or in pursuing removal directions.

  IND, working with FCO, seeks effective returns arrangements in particular with countries from which high volumes of immigration offenders have originated. Overseas nationals reaching the end of sentence are priority cases for re-documentation and return within these arrangements.

  Of those detained either in Immigration Detention Centres or in HM Prisons no overseas national had been denied physical entry to their home country. However, in some of those cases where the overseas national was awaiting documentation difficulties may have been incurred in establishing the individual's nationality.

3 May 2006





 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2006
Prepared 23 July 2006