47. Ninth supplementary memorandum
submitted by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home
Office
1. UKVISAS
1.1 The entry clearance operation is
intended to break even but UKvisas does not produce its own audited
financial statements from which this can be confirmed. What are
the total costs incurred by UKvisas in issuing visas, advising
applicants and dealing with appeals etc? Can these costs be analysed
by location and type (eg staff costs, accommodation, IT and telecoms,
producing forms and leaflets etc)? Is there any benchmarking of
costs between offices?
Financial Statements
— UKvisas is a joint Home Office and FCO
directorate. The total cost of UKvisas is made up of (1) direct
income and costs (eg salaries) incurred by UKvisas and (2) shared
costs (eg accommodation, IT, and Post overheads) incurred at Post
and by the FCO in the UK.
— Shared costs (ie (2) above) are allocated
to UKvisas based on a return which is completed by all Home and
Overseas staff. This return identifies the objectives that each
officer is supporting. Entry Clearance is an FCO objective. The
methodology used to calculate the total cost of UKvisas has been
formally approved by the FCO Finance Director and is reviewed
each year by the FCO Internal Audit as part of the larger annual
NAO Audit of the FCO Statutory Accounts.
— The total cost of UKvisas is shown in
the annual FCO Statutory Accounts (attached) and is also provided
within the UKvisas annual Memorandum Trading Accounts, which were
presented to HMT as part of the 2005 Fees Review.
Breakdown of Costs
— As shown in the schedule originally provided
to the HAC, the total costs of UKvisas can be broken down into
cost headings eg salaries, accommodation, overheads by geographic
region.
— UKvisas do not currently have a means
of breaking down costs into individual activity costs (eg issuing
visas, processing appeals). However UKvisas have successfully
piloted an activity based costing system which would calculate
these costs. Staff at Post will be asked to breakdown their total
time which they allocate to entry clearance in the annual return
process into a number of key activities.
— This tool will facilitate benchmarking
of resource utilisation between different Posts. UKvisas are currently
reviewing the lessons learned during the pilot and refining the
process with a view to a further pilot within the next eight weeks.
Resource Accounts 2004-05
http://www.fconet.fco.gov.uk/About+the+FCO/Facts+and+Figs/ResourceAccounts2004-2005.pdf
1.2 What were the recommendations of
the Streamlining Review referred to in the UKvisas Business Plan
for 2005-06 as due to report by 31 May 2005? Please indicate progress
with implementing them.
— The background to Streamlining is as
follows: in recent years UKvisas has experienced an accelerating
increase in demand, the rate of growth having doubled over the
past three years. To meet the challenge of this growth and still
meet PSA performance targets, while maintaining effective immigration
control, the Department has looked at a number of different methods
of streamlining. These methods included the successful partnering
with companies such as VFS, Fedex, DHL, Abtran and others, who
provide the administrative aspects of the visa application process.
— Over the past year, we have added to
posts who run an outsourcing operation to include China, South
Africa, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia and Nigeria.
— The results of the Streamlining Review
are outlined in the attached document, which has already been
provided to the Inquiry. [not printed]
— The high level recommendations were:
— that as all measures introduced under
streamlining had a positive impact on productivity, a mixed economy
approach should continue to be followed; and
— that, with the introduction of new initiatives,
particularly the biometrics programme and the points-based system,
partnering arrangements should be expanded in order to meet the
increase in demand and ensure swiftness of service.
— UKvisas continues to promote streamlining
initiatives to all posts. Regional Operations Manager posts were
created in late 2005 with a specific task to ensure that all posts
in their region adopt streamlining measures. These managers are
supported by a dedicated team in UKvisas who assist them in conducting
efficiency reviews.
— UKvisas have established a programme
to deliver commercial partnership arrangements to all posts that
require support. Contracts are expected to be in place by early
2007.
— The Commercial Partnerships Programme
will work closely with the regional and in-country management
structure and with the other change programmes within UKvisas
to ensure existing benefits are maintained and future needs are
accommodated within any new arrangements.
1.3 Are there any plans to revise UKVisas
targets in 2006-07 to give more emphasis to control issues?
— Our current targets focus mainly (PSA
targets 1-3) on speed of customer service. The control element
is reflected in PSA target 4, but more needs to be done. We have
therefore begun a programme of work which is defined by UKvisas'
new Mission Statement:
"UK visas is the overseas arm of the
UK's integrated border management. Our goals are to bring communities
together and improve the UK's competitiveness as a destination
for travel, trade, migration and investment through programmes
which prevent immigration abuse, deliver value for money and earn
public confidence."
— To support this work, we are introducing
a balanced scorecard throughout UKvisas' business, focused on
outcomes in five areas: Controls, Customers, Costs, Confidence,
Capabilities. We aim to agree new PSA targets taken from balanced
scorecard measures, in time for the new public spending triennium
2007-08, focusing on Controls and Customers.
— For 2005-06, we amended PSA 2 to allow
greater focus to be placed on control issues. The target previously
allowed up to 10 days to be taken to process an application if
an interview was required. The revised target allows up to 15
days to investigate a case if either additional checks or an interview
is required. This change has enabled significant numbers of applications
to be put through a more rigorous process whilst still meeting
PSA targets.
1.4 What plans are there to widen and
improve the availability of performance information, particularly
on the quality of decision-making?
As in 1.3 above: we are embarking on an ambitious
change programme in UKvisas, to align with the Balanced Scorecard
approach to our business. The successful implementation of the
Scorecard is dependent on the widening and improving of management
and performance information. As a result, this work (which includes
outcomes and measures relating to the quality of decision-making)
forms an integral part of the project currently underway to develop
the Scorecard approach. In the meantime, recent improvements to
our IT caseworking database have enabled us to move away from
monthly paper based performance reporting from all posts to central
data collection from the IT system. This new system will go live
next month.
1.5 What factors inform UKvisas' risk
assessment process, and what impact are the new units having on
the quality of decisions and efficiency of operations?
There are a variety of informing factors: local
(Post) information obtained in the course of the application/field
trips, UK Government databases, data sharing with EU colleagues,
input from and closer liaison with other Government departments
and agencies. The new units are intended to give front-line entry
clearance staff as comprehensive a knowledge as possible to enrich
their decision making process and are already showing positive
results. Selected profiling and checking of applications has deterred
and in some cases prevented further visa abuse occurring and identified
significant forgery issues enabling a more efficient allocation
of resources to tackle visa abuse. Evidence previously supplied
to the Committee provides detailed information on the scale of
abuse detected by the Risk Assessment Units and the amount of
fraud prevented.
1.6 How many risk assessment units are
there now, and how many more are planned for the future?
There are currently 15 RAUs in operation, with
planned expansion to 26 (some with a regional role), by mid-2006.
Our target is that 75% of all visa applications will be considered
in accordance with risk assessment principles by 2007-08. This
encompasses all posts dealing with nationalities that pose the
greatest risk to the immigration control.
1.7 What risk assessment takes place
in posts without such a unit?
Entry clearance officers consider local information
and local knowledge in addition to entry clearance requirements,
and requests are forwarded to London for additional checks to
be made on applicants who give rise to concern. The plan is however
that global coverage should be achieved by developing regional
roles. Guidance has been drawn up for posts not currently covered
by a formal RAU to ensure that they are applying risk assessment
in their decision making.
1.8 Has UK visas performed detailed analysis
of the outcome of appeal decisions, particularly by post, and
if not why not?
We provided the Committee with a copy of the
ECO Quality Assurance Report [not printed]. An exercise
was undertaken in January-February 2006, with presenting officers
from the nine regional units appraising 801 entry clearance officer
notices of decision by completing the ECO Quality Assurance Report.
This exercise examined both quality of the notices of decision
and the outcome of the hearings. The data from the exercise is
currently under examination and the results will feed into the
work UKvisas are undertaking in respect of decision-making quality.
1.9 Does the Central Reference System
contain complete and up-to-date information on suspect or criminal
activity as well as details of previous visa applications?
The Central Reference System does hold details
of current and previous applications (issues and refusals), but
not of suspect or criminal activity.
2. ARRIVALS
2.1 How many people annually are not
being detained on arrival whom the immigration service think should
in fact be detained? What is the reason for this?
This information is not routinely recorded.
If this is required it might be a case of having to examine either
locally held records or every entry on the Caseworking Information
Database, but this will not be comprehensive.
2.2 Please provide precise statistics
for the numbers of Inadequately Documented Arrivals identified
annually from 1987 to date.
We hold figures going back to 1989:
| 1989 | 8247
| 1998 | 28,320 |
| 1990 | 14,182 | 1999
| 31,212 |
| 1991 | 13,178 | 2000
| 27,064 |
| 1992 | 94,84 | 2001
| 19,305 |
| 1993 | 97,58 | 2002
| 19,224 |
| 1994 | 11,647 | 2003
| 17,229 |
| 1995 | 13,991 | 2004
| 11,233 |
| 1996 | 13,036 | 2005
| 7,125 |
| 1997 | 21,157 |
| |
2.3. Please provide a full update on implementation
of the recommendations of Operation Paladin Child, including a
list of the ports of entry which now have a joint child protection
team including police and social services.
Update on the Paladin Recommendations
— Recommendation 1—The learning from the Paladin
project should be shared as widely as possible across the four
statutory agencies involved through briefings and seminars.
Numerous internal and external briefings have been held.
In January 2006 the CAIC hosted a one day national law enforcement
seminar with 80 police and immigration officers from across the
UK. A new ACPO lead, DCC Jim Gamble from the Child Exploitation
and On-line Protection Centre (CEOPS) has been appointed.
— Recommendation 2—Bespoke joint training for
professionals working at ports and visa agency in this field is
required to educate staff on the different roles and responsibilities
of each agency.
Immigration officers have joined the MPS child abuse investigation
foundation course and over 600 of their minors team staff have
received a police input on child protection. Immigration Service
have appointed consultants to progress this recommendation.
— Recommendation 3—More generic training for police
and social services child protection officers is necessary to
raise awareness of immigration legislation and risk indicators
to identify trafficked children, and those migrating or in transit
where there are safeguarding concerns.
There has been no joint training to date although the Association
of Directors of Social Services have appointed Hannah Miller the
Croydon Director to lead on this area.
— Recommendation 4—Any UKIS dedicated `minor's
officers or teams should consider undergoing where appropriate,
the same pre-selection screening as child protection colleagues
and will require training in safeguarding principles.
Heathrow Airport—12 Immigration officers on the minor's
team, have had the initial Child Protection course.
— Recommendation 5—All airlines bringing unaccompanied
minors to the UK should have in place safeguarding policies for
children in transit. This should include pre-screening procedures
for employees and training in risk identification.
This action remains outstanding although we have hosted three
awareness-raising seminars for airline staff. We are also progressing
this through IATA/CAWG as a recommended practice. A further two
awareness-raising seminars are being scheduled and in addition
plans are in progress to deliver awareness to airline staff abroad
via the ALON network.
— Recommendation 6—UKIS, MPS, Hillingdon Social
Services and the NSPCC should consider creating a permanent multi-agency
partnership team based at Heathrow to address specific safeguarding
needs of UAMs. The needs are greater than just exploitation.
On 17 October 2005, a joint working team commenced operations
at Heathrow Airport. This team is made up of five SCD5 officers
and UK Immigration Service officers, led by Detective Inspector
Gordon Valentine. The Immigration service has recruited the original
SCD5 officer at Heathrow to a national police liaison post. Social
Services still await government funding for their staff.
— Recommendation 7—A Government working group
is formed to develop the learning from the Paladin experience
for application to other significant ports of entry to the UK.
AC Ghaffur raised this matter with the Home Secretary in
July 2005 and the Home Office have appointed a children's coordinator,
David McDonald, to co-ordinate their response to child trafficking.
The MPS have asked the Home Secretary to consider a similar task
force approach to that used to combat child abuse on the internet
due to the number of different stakeholders in this field. IND
have also appointed a children's champion to engage in this recommendation.
— Recommendation 8—The Government ensures that
the Paladin data is assimilated into a wider national system for
tracking children and to allow information sharing across agencies
involved in safeguarding children. This should be connected to
any national developments in Information Sharing and national
databases of children.
The National Register for Unaccompanied Children (NRUC) was
launched in November 2004 and roll out to local authorities begun
in January 2005. No register exists for non-asylum seeking children.
— Recommendation 9—An independent specialist researcher
is tasked to explore the feasibility of a set of risk indicators
using the Paladin data for use by UKIS staff at the control desks.
&
— Recommendation 10—An independent specialist
researcher is tasked with exploring the feasibility of a more
detailed risk assessment process for use once UKIS have identified
a child may be at risk.
A consultant (former MPS officer) has been appointed to work
for IND. He has been asked to progress this recommendation.
— Recommendation 11—The Paladin process be adapted
for a more focused group of children that matches the profile
of those we have not been able to trace.
&
— Recommendation 17—Advanced passenger information
on UAMs be made available to the Ports Safeguarding Team to allow
for pre-arrival risk assessment and to focus operational deployments.
&
— Recommendation 19—The government to research
the feasibility of providing electronic access to visa application
details.
In November 2005, a multi-agency, national safeguarding children
pilot operation, initiated by UK Immigration Service and operated
by the Ports Safeguarding Team commenced for three months. Based
on analysis of existing intelligence, the first phase monitored
unaccompanied children flying to Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester
between 31 October 2005 and 28 January 2006 from Jamaica. Work
on this pilot will inform the development of a substantial work-stream
to monitor flights from countries and continents known for high
levels of child migration. This process makes use of advanced
passenger information to risk assess children prior to arrival
in the UK. It was designed to test systems, and it should be noted
there is no significant identified risk to children from this
destination. The evaluation phase has now commenced.
CRS the computer record service which provides access to
visa details is now available electronically to UKIS.
— Recommendation 12—The Paladin form be redesigned
to be more focused to assist in the identification of a child.
Outstanding. The evaluation of the Kingston pilot will address
this issue.
— Recommendation 13—An analyst be appointed to
the MPS Ports Safeguarding Team to cross reference the data captured
on other UKIS systems and with data at Lunar House to identify
patterns and trends. This will assist in the development of intelligence
on potential trafficking operations.
Appointment confirmed and discussions in hand with regard
to managing the work from the ports.
— Recommendation 14—The multi agency team be given
access to existing child protection databases managed by the MPS
eg Merlin, CRIS and CRIMINT to allow for more thorough and timely
risk assessments.
The Paladin team currently makes use of Special Branch terminals
in the arrivals lounge. They also have one AWARE terminal in the
Paladin office giving access to Merlin (child protection) and
Crimint (intelligence).
— Recommendation 15—The DFES lead on IRT must
liaise with the Government to ensure UKIS are involved in the
IRT process.
Awaits new DFeS IT systems.
— Recommendation 16—The Government formalise procedures
for the central recording on police databases, details of children
who are unaccounted for as part of either the Paladin or asylum
process.
Outstanding.
— Recommendation 18—UK Visa Agency and UKIS control
point staff be given access to established `quick address' databases
to validate information provided, whether by child or receiving
adult.
Outstanding.
— Recommendation 20—UKIS staff should be provided
with the technology to capture biometric data from passports of
minors meeting the Paladin criteria.
&
— Recommendation 21—The government to examine
the feasibility of empowering the Ports Safeguarding teams to
take a fingerprint of each UAM within set criteria to aid future
identification.
The legal issues surrounding the taking of biometrics are
likely to be resolved through the Immigration Asylum and Nationality
Bill that is currently passing through parliament.
— Recommendation 22—All UMs awaiting risk assessment
process should be provided with a suitable private environment
under the supervision of an appropriately selected and trained
guardian, for example an NSPCC officer.
Outstanding.
— Recommendation 23—The UK Government identify
a project lead to create the Heathrow Safeguarding Team and identify
funding streams to finance this initiative.
There is now a Home Office-led multi agency steering group,
see below for MPS funding arrangements.
— Recommendation 24—The Association of Directors
of Social Services considers the implications of the Paladin scoping
study for their departments.
Outstanding (see Rec 3 above).
— Recommendation 25—The Government considers the
initiative to make available on arrival a card with dedicated
helpline numbers for NSPCC and Childline at all UK ports.
IND are currently producing a leaflet for all unaccompanied
minors arriving in the UK.
— Recommendation 26—DFES and ADSS jointly review
current private fostering arrangements, the terminology used and
examine the effectiveness of their enforcement across the UK.
This has been addressed in part in the new Children's Act.
Joint Child Protection Team
Heathrow is the only UK port that has a joint child protection
team. The establishment of a joint-working unit at Heathrow airport
was one of the recommendations in the Operation Paladin Child
report. The Paladin Team consists of co-located Metropolitan Police
Child Protection Officers and Immigration staff tasked with safeguarding
children arriving in and transiting through Heathrow. The Paladin
Team is jointly funded by Met Police and UKIS. It is hoped that
the team will expand, in due course, to include representatives
from social services. This team has been operational since 17
October 2005 and is headed by a Detective Inspector.
Minors' teams at ports of entry
It may be helpful to know that most of the Border Control
ports have `Minors' Teams' consisting of specially trained staff,
who deal with all cases of unaccompanied children. These teams,
as encouraged in the UK Immigration Service `Guidance—Children
Arriving in the UK', have begun to form working relationships
with their local authorities and many have established good practices
with social services.
Currently minors' teams have been established at the following
Border Control locations:
| Stansted | Hull/Humber Ports
|
| ASU Croydon | Robin Hood Airport
|
| ASU Liverpool | Calais/Cheriton
|
| Gatwick North | Newcastle Airport
|
| Gatwick South | Durham Tees Valley Airport
|
| Heathrow Terminal 1 | Harwich International Airport
|
| Heathrow Terminal 2 | Leeds Bradford Airport
|
| Heathrow Terminal 3 | Birmingham International Airport
|
| Heathrow Terminal 4 | Liverpool John Lennon Airport
|
| Manchester | London City Airport
|
| Portsmouth | |
| Plymouth | |
IATA/CAWG Unaccompanied Minors Initiative
UKIS is currently taking forward with IATA a proposal for
minimum standards to be adopted by air carriers in respect of
the carriage of unaccompanied minors. An initial presentation
was extremely well received with IATA stating that it was one
of the most important pieces of work the group had undertaken
to date. Work is underway on producing a Best Practice document
for minors.
2.4 Please provide the report of the Paladin team
which is analysing Project Semaphore information on arriving children
from Jamaica.
The results of the `Kingston Pilot' are still being analysed
and the final report has not yet been published however the following
is a brief overview of the initial findings.
Background
The Kingston Pilot involved the examination of Advance Passenger
Information (API) via carriers involved in Project Semaphore in
order to identify all children travelling to the United Kingdom
on direct flights from Jamaica. Airline staff participating in
the Kingston Pilot received child protection awareness training
delivered by UKIS and the Met police. A hotline staffed by Border
Control officers was provided to airline check-in staff so they
could report concerns about any children travelling to the Untied
Kingdom during the trial. The pilot ran from 30 October 2005 to
28 January 2006.
The purpose of the Kingston Pilot was to address safeguarding
issues around children specifically, the identification of unaccompanied
minors entering the United Kingdom from Jamaica whereby their
sponsors and destination addresses would be interrogated on United
Kingdom Immigration Service (UKIS), social services and Police
(including Semaphore) databases to ensure their continued safety.
Summary of initial findings
As anticipated, Heathrow received the highest numbers of
arriving minors. The total number of minors encountered was 2,718
and of those 2,418 were EEA nationals, and 300 were non-EEA (other)
nationals.
London Gatwick encountered a substantial number although
not the volume experienced at London Heathrow. The total number
of minors encountered was 1,443 and of those 1,259 were EEA nationals,
and 184 were other nationals.
The report of the Kingston Pilot will be made available once
the full analytical process has been completed.
3. IND STAFF
3.1 Are staff answering telephone inquiries in INEB
the same grade as caseworkers who decide applications? Is there
much movement between these jobs?
Telephone enquiry agents are Administrative Officer grade.
Some aspects of caseworking are dealt with at AO level; other
aspects are dealt with by higher grade officers.
I have attached for your information the advert that we are
using for our current recruitment campaign, which gives you an
idea of the requirements for the role [not printed]. Recruitment
into INEB tends to be external, ie not Home Office or Civil Service.
It is very unusual for new starters to come from caseworking areas
within IND.
I attach a spreadsheet showing leavers from INEB over the
last 12 months and where they have gone [not printed]. There were
70 leavers, of which 34 (49%) were promoted to EO, 15 (21%) level
transferred, 13 (19%) resigned, 3 (4%) career breaks, 2 (3%) casuals
(recruited for summer, returned to university) and 3 (4%) dismissals.
The level of leavers reflects the fact that most staff remain
with INEB for no more than 2 years. INEB is seen by staff joining
the department as an area where they receive good training and
acquire skills which will help them to move onto other roles within
IND. 70% of the staff who left INEB remained within IND/Home Office.
From the spreadsheet of leavers 18 (26%) staff have moved
to caseworking areas, which include MP's Correspondence and Enforcement.
4. MANAGED MIGRATION
4.1 How many in-country applications as a dependant
relative are refused, annually for last five years?
We are unable to provide statistical information prior to
2003 but the total number of applications refused from persons
applying as the dependent spouse or child for the years from 2003
are as follows:
|
| Date | Number of applications refused from persons applying as the dependent spouse or child*
|
|
| 2003 | 4,739
|
| 2004 | 5,992
|
| 2005 | 7,359
|
| 2006 (to date) | 2,254
|
|
This information has not been quality assured, and is not
a National Statistic. It should be treated as provisional management
information.
4.2 How many of these refusals are overturned on appeal?
At present we are not able to identify the number of cases
which have been refused that are overturned at appeal. Work continues
to be done by our statistics gathering teams to improve the statistical
information that we are able to provide.
4.3 How often are children brought here from overseas
and then left behind here, perhaps with other relatives, leading
to the courts granting residence or adoption orders "in the
best interests of the child" even though this was not the
apparent intention at the time the child applied to come to the
UK?
Our standard way of collecting data is according to the categories
of entry and further leave to remain that are in the immigration
rules. Hence, we cannot provide accurate statistics on the outcome
expressed in the question. Unaccompanied children can arrive under
a number of headings but those coming for the purposes described
are most likely to arrive as visitors and then remain beyond the
period allowed as a visitor. We have conducted an internal exercise
to seek to establish how many unaccompanied non-asylum seeking
children arrive in the UK using data for 2003.
In that year IND received 16,200 applications requesting
further leave to remain that were not asylum related and where
the lead applicant was under 18. This excludes those applicants
under 18 whose basis of stay would be as a dependant or for education
where a prior entry clearance is required. It therefore provides
a very broad indicator of how many children there might be in
the UK who arrived in that year and who could be classed as "unaccompanied".
However, it must be stressed that this is an estimate arrived
at by excluding other types of application and cannot be regarded
as a precise measure.
We have not broken this data down any further. Most of the
applications are supported by a relative although some will reflect
the concerns of local education authorities or social services
departments about the immigration status of the child. Occasionally
the child's life will have taken a turn such that the courts are
already involved at this stage because a care order is being sought
and they are seeking information about the child's immigration
status.
Our normal practice is to grant leave to remain since this
provides the best basis for resolving the issues surrounding the
child's current and future welfare needs. We will not do so, however,
if this means sanctioning a deliberate abuse of the various systems
involved for advantage that could not be honestly obtained. The
courts themselves have indicated that in making their decisions
about the welfare of the child they do not wish to be in the position
of endorsing deception by applicants or poor administration by
other agencies.
The Department of Health compile statistics on the number
of children that are "looked after" in the course of
a year by local authorities, with a breakdown of the category
of care or intervention provided, and its outcome. These figures
have since 2003 included unaccompanied asylum seeking children
as a specific group but they do not identify unaccompanied non-asylum
seeking children.
4.4 When foreign nationals are granted National Insurance
numbers, are there any checks to make sure they are allowed to
work in the UK?
The Immigration and Nationality Directorate are not responsible
for granting National Insurance Numbers (NINOs). The allocation
of NINOs to adult foreign nationals is the responsibility of the
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), and a process administered
by Jobcentre Plus—part of DWP. Colleagues in DWP have therefore
contributed to this response.
The NINO is a unique reference number used by Her Majesty's
Revenue and Customs to record tax and national insurance contributions
paid and credits awarded. It is also an administrative identifier
used by DWP to administer Social Security benefits. The circumstances
under which an individual must or may register for a NINO are
set out in Regulation 9 of the Social Security (Crediting and
treatment of contributions and National Insurance Numbers) Regulations
2001. Possession of a NINO does not however confer right to
live or work status in the UK or an automatic entitlement to benefits.
Individuals entering the UK from abroad, who require a NINO
must attend Jobcentre Plus for an Evidence of Identity Interview.
The interviewing process is primarily designed to guard against
identity fraud; it does not provide a rigorous check on immigration
status. This is because there may be legitimate reasons why an
individual requires a NINO irrespective of immigration status.
For example, a NINO may be required by an individual who does
not have regularised status because they are a partner of an UK
national claiming benefits or tax credits. However, if Jobcentre
Plus becomes aware of right to work/immigration irregularities
as part of the NINO allocation process., the Immigration and Nationality
Directorate are notified so that appropriate action can be taken
against the individual NINO applicant concerned.
In order to facilitate this process a National Partnership
Agreement for data sharing in connection with Suspected Benefit
Fraud Cases and Immigration Offences has been signed between the
Home Office Immigration and Nationality Department and Jobcentre
Plus, which allows for Jobcentre Plus colleagues to check the
immigration status of applicants. The agreement also provides
a network of contacts in both departments to facilitate data sharing
at a local level, where this would be more beneficial. DWP colleagues
are IND's most common partner in local enforcement operations.
Records show that IND receives between 200-300 status requests
per week from colleagues in JobCentre Plus. Where a request is
highlighted as a priority it will be dealt with within 4 days
of receipt and on average 95% are completed within target. Where
a request is considered routine it will be dealt within 10 days
of receipt and 100% are completed within target. Where staff identify
newer addresses from these referrals, our records are updated.
Where IND receives intelligence that an immigration offence
has been committed, they are centrally recorded, considered and
disseminated for IND intelligence units to act upon at the earliest
possible opportunity. Intelligence officers will decide whether
to refer cases for action through their local Tasking and Co-ordinating
Groups whose priorities are set by a control framework at the
Senior Managers Tactical and Tasking Group.
Even where no action is taken, the information is added to
the IND intelligence database, Mycroft. This is helping to increase
the body of knowledge that IND has about all areas of abuse of
the system and may, where appropriate, be used at a later date.
4.5 Is there an annual report or equivalent setting
out the work and achievements of the Managed Migration Intelligence
Unit?
****
5. REMOVALS
5.1 We were told that on average 78% of detainees
at Colnbrook are removed and 22% are given Temporary Admission.
Is this typical across the whole estate? Is the immigration service
satisfied that this is the right balance?
Excluding Oakington Reception Centre, around 70% of detainees
are removed and 30% are given temporary admission, bail or granted
leave to enter or remain in the UK. A higher rate of temporary
admission applies at Oakington Reception Centre, which is used
for fast-tracking of certain asylum applications. Around 90% of
these cases have an in-country right of appeal and in such circumstances
it is appropriate to release.
Detention is governed by a tight legal framework, is only
used where necessary and always for the shortest period possible.
People are detained within the estate for a range of reasons and
processes. Detention may be considered appropriate for any of
the following:
— to effect removal (including deportation after serving
a prison sentence);
— whilst establishing a person's identity and claim;
— where an individual is believed to present a risk
of absconding, and
— where an asylum application is capable of being considered
quickly.
In certain circumstances it is right that people should be
given temporary admission. For example, it may be that a successful
Judicial Review application has been made and that there is no
reasonable prospect of the case being considered quickly. In other
cases, it might be that a late asylum application has been made
and again there is no early prospect of considering the application.
Equally, as circumstances change on individual cases it may be
considered appropriate to give a previously detained person temporary
admission. Each individual case is reviewed at regular intervals
through the internal management chain. In addition trends on detention
periods are reviewed by a Senior Detention Board and a periodic
quality assurance inspection of detained casework has been introduced.
Detainees also have the right to apply for bail.
5.2 Could you provide a list of companies authorised
to carry out escorted removals on behalf of the IND or the Home
Office?
There are at present three companies engaged in this activity
on our behalf:—
— Group 4 Securicor
— International Trading Agency Overseas Escorts Ltd.
— RSI Immigration Services Ltd.
5.3 Please list the checks the Home Office carries
out on these companies as to their operating procedures, training,
employee screening and financial probity—both before granting
the contract and also on a continuing basis.
The following checks are conducted prior to Contract award:
Potential suppliers submit detailed operating procedures, training
plans, employee screening and financial accounts which are scrutinised
by operational and business support colleagues prior to being
awarded a contract or gaining acceptance on to an approved list
of suppliers.
In terms of financial probity independent financial assessments
are obtained as to the financial status of each company/subsidiary
and parent company.
Employee screening is carried out by the supplier but prior to
any employee being allowed to perform escort duties they must
have successfully completed training and obtained ISCAT clearance.
After acceptance or contract award the performance of the supplier
is overseen by Contract Monitors who review and attending training
courses/plans, liaison with the supplier who conducts tests on
operating procedures in particular contingency procedures. Operational
concerns are addressed at regular meetings and elevated if necessary.
The Authority has the right under the Contract at any time to
review the Contractor's records and the Contractor is required
when requested to provide any such records as and when required.
If necessary independent assessors can be brought in to investigate
the financial probity of a supplier.
5.4 Is an immigration officer always present at an
enforced removal, particularly at the port of embarkation? If
not, please specify the guidelines which determine when an immigration
officer should be present and explain how you check that these
are being applied correctly.
An immigration officer is not always present at an enforced
removal as our contractors supervise the detention and movement
of passengers including escorting them to the flight. However
an immigration officer may sometimes be present as an observer
if the removal is potentially difficult or in order to liaise
with the airline over practical problems such as luggage. If a
removal is identified as requiring very close supervision because
of a behavioural or medical history, then we employ trained escorts
who will accompany the passenger from detention, through the boarding
stage and stay with the passenger on the flight until they have
reached their destination. Whether or not an immigration officer
is present will be decided according to the merits of each case.
Guidance on the removal of a person via a port of embarkation
is contained in chapter 9.11 of the Operational Enforcement Manual
(OEM). This information is available on the IND website. It sets
out the responsibilities for the caseworking port and the departure
port.
5.5 What specific problems are there with carriers
over enforced removals? What consultations have there been with
carriers over these problems?
Carriers are mainly concerned with the increase in disruptive
behaviour with regard to enforced removals. There is a perception
by the majority of airlines consulted that returnees often engage
in deliberately obstructive behaviour designed to frustrate removal.
This behaviour can result in other fare-paying passengers obtaining
a negative image of the airline involved and airlines are concerned
that this will impact on their commercial interests. Carriers
have also raised concerns about capacity and the number and type
(escorted or not, families etc) of removals they are prepared
to carry on each flight, about lost revenue when removals are
postponed often at late notice and the logistics of effecting
removal. The Immigration Service seeks to address airlines' concerns
both through local liaison by the Removal Facilitation Units at
Heathrow and Gatwick airports from which by far the majority of
removals are effected as well as regular meetings held with the
airlines most frequently used to effect removals.
5.6 How many overseas nationals who have completed
a sentence in a UK prison are being held in detention centres
awaiting deportation and how many of these are being denied entry
into their home country? Does the Home Office have a strategy
for dealing with such cases?
Those detained in prison beyond the completion of their criminal
sentences are usually awaiting deportation, either on the recommendation
of the court as part of their criminal sentence or on the grounds
that their removal from the United Kingdom is deemed to be conducive
to the public good. In such circumstances the Immigration Service
will make every effort to ensure that a person's removal by deportation
coincides as far as possible with his earliest release date from
prison. Where this does not happen, the following are among the
principal reasons:
— the prisoner may be awaiting the outcome of an appeal
against the decision to deport him; or
— the prisoner may have applied to remain on human rights
grounds; or
— late in his sentence, the prisoner may have lodged
a further application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom,
and the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) is considering
that application;
— the Immigration Service may be awaiting the issue
of a travel document on which to effect his removal; or
— there may, especially at certain times of the year,
be a shortage of seats on aircraft serving a particular destination;
or
— there may be other matters that need to be addressed
before the deportation can be effected.
IND's policy on detention in immigration cases is that while
there is a presumption in favour of the grant of temporary admission
or temporary release, detention is normally justified:
— where there is a reasonable belief that the individual
will fail to keep to the terms of temporary admission or temporary
release;
— initially, to clarify a person's identity and the
basis of their claim for leave to enter or remain in the UK; or
— where removal is imminent.
While a large number of detainees are held in immigration
removal centres, there are a number who are detained in prison
past their release date, as removal centres do not always an appropriate
level of security for many of those who have completed prison
sentences in the UK, either because of the nature of the offences
they have committed, or because of the risk they would potentially
pose to other detainees and staff, or because of the risk of their
absconding.
On 19 April 2006 there were 240 overseas national prisoners
detained in Immigration Detention Centres. Of those cases where
it had been agreed to pursue deportation action, 55 were detained
awaiting appropriate travel documentation and 7 were detained
due to difficulties in either establishing nationality or in pursuing
removal directions to their country of origin.
As at 12 April 2006 313 overseas nationals who had completed
their sentence were detained in prison establishments. Of those
cases where it had been agreed to pursue deportation action, 99
were detained awaiting appropriate travel documentation and 24
were detained due to difficulties in either establishing nationality
or in pursuing removal directions.
IND, working with FCO, seeks effective returns arrangements
in particular with countries from which high volumes of immigration
offenders have originated. Overseas nationals reaching the end
of sentence are priority cases for re-documentation and return
within these arrangements.
Of those detained either in Immigration Detention Centres
or in HM Prisons no overseas national had been denied physical
entry to their home country. However, in some of those cases where
the overseas national was awaiting documentation difficulties
may have been incurred in establishing the individual's nationality.
3 May 2006
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