Evidence submitted by UNISON (Def 18)
Introduction
1.1 UNISON is the major union in the health
service. Our health care service group represents more than 400,000
employees in the NHS and staff employed by private contractors,
the voluntary sector and general practitioners.
1.2 We welcome the fact that since 1997
the NHS has benefited from record levels of spending, and the
fact that workforce shortages in the 1980s and 1990s have been
redressed to the benefit of NHS staff and patients using the service,
for whom waiting lists have fallen and the quality of care has
risen.
1.3 Despite this very welcome investment,
some trusts in England are facing substantial financial deficits,
a situation which is leading to job cuts and placing in jeopardy
much of the hard-earned goodwill towards the service, with the
reduction and loss of some key services for patients. UNISON therefore
welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this inquiry.
The reasons for the deficits: whether the causes
are systemic or local (eg the role of poor local management and
poor central management, the effect of pay awards and Government
policy decisions)
2.1 UNISON does not believe it is fair to
blame the deficits entirely on poor local management at trusts
and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). The Government has indicated that
the deficits are largely the result of poor management within
individual institutions, implying that solutions lie within the
control of individual managers. Such an opinion is not, however,
borne out by recent Public Interest Reports from the Audit Commission,
which have singled out only a few NHS institutions for specific
management failings.[98]
2.2 Where there have been local problems,
there is little evidence of a structural management problem replicated
across the country. Instead problems are often associated with
individual circumstances, such as problems caused by capital projects
funded under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) that have cost
more than expected in the longer-term. This may be indicative
of one area in which management has fallen short: a failure to
consider the longer-term impact of using such measures to avoid
funding problems in the short-term.
2.3 Nor does UNISON believe that the funding
of Agenda for Change is to blame for the deficits. Such initiatives
are helping to secure long overdue changes in salary structures
and are going some way to righting previous inequities. The new
pay system aims to reward staff properly for the work they do,
but also encourages more flexibility which should in the longer-term
boost the efficiency of trusts.
2.4 The cost of implementing the new consultant
contract for England has had an impact. The Department of Health
has acknowledged that it will cost £90 million more than
expected and research for the King's Fund into the impact this
is having on management in London trusts concluded that "the
underestimate at national level has caused considerable cost pressures
at local level." Management have found the costs of the new
contract producing deficits of £1 million and over.[99]
2.5 UNISON believes that one of the main
reasons for the deficits is the continuing marketisation of the
NHS. The previous Health Secretary, John Reid, claimed in 2004
that the vast bulk of health services would remain within the
public sector (with no more than 15% going private), but successive
policies to bring the market into health care are leading to the
fragmentation and destabilisation of the service. Evidence from
other countries shows that the transaction costs of administering
new systems of competition between providers are high, and the
Department of Health has itself recognised that new incentive-based
reforms will bring some "financial volatility" to the
NHS.[100]
Reforms set out in Commissioning a Patient Led NHS and Our Health,
Our Care, Our Say threaten to fragment the health service further,
forcing providers to compete rather than cooperate which will
cause greater financial pressures for trusts and PCTs. Competition
between providers undermines collaborative working and the sharing
of good practice, both clinical and financial. The efficient provision
of healthcare requires long-term workforce planning, which is
undermined by the constraints of a competitive market.
2.6 The first wave of Independent Sector
Treatment Centres (ISTCs) has placed severe financial pressure
on PCTs. The uneven playing field established between them and
NHS providers means ISTCs being paid in full by PCTs regardless
of contract delivery; the commercial costs and risks are effectively
transferred back to the public sector. The new centres have been
able to select the cases they take, leaving the NHS with the more
complicated and costly ones but without any additional funding
to cover a more mixed intake of patients.
2.7 It was claimed at the outset that the
ISTC programme would provide value for money. One of the main
areas of contention, however, has been the cost of private sector
involvement and the effects on the NHS having to pick up the bill.
UNISON contends that the future of ISTCs is about a sustainable
market for the private sector and not what is in the best interests
of patients or the public purse. Department of Health figures
show that wave one and phase two of the ISTC programme will cost
the NHS over £4 billion over five years[101]
and the research so far has shown that ISTCs do not provide value
for money, but instead place further strain on already demanding
PCT budgets. Local decision making and accountability is threatened
with PCTs being forced to sign up to potentially damaging contracts
that are under utilised and sometimes in places where the NHS
has spare capacity itself. One particularly vivid example of this
from 2005 was quoted by UNISON in the evidence to the Health Select
Committee on ISTCs: in the first six months of South West Oxfordshire
PCT's contract with Netcare, the company were paid £255,000
despite having carried out only £40,000 of operations and
assessments.[102]
2.8 Despite having been only recently introduced,
the move towards Payment by Results (PbR), with money following
the patient as hospitals are paid a set tariff for each procedure,
is already having a detrimental financial effect on both PCTs
and NHS providers and is likely to have a more profound impact
on finances in the future. The Audit Commission has highlighted
greater financial instability for PCTs as the most significant
risk of PbR.[103]
Under block contracts funding was not adjusted for activity levels,
enabling PCTs to manage and control their costs. PbR on the other
hand imposes a commitment on PCTs to pay for work done on a fee
per patient basis. In addition under the old system the cost of
an additional volume of operations reflected only the additional
variable costs involved, such as additional staffing hours, but
not fixed costs like providing an operating theatre. With PbR
the amount charged for each additional patient reflects both fixed
and variable cost, meaning PCTs are exposed to greater financial
volatility and will find it harder to control their budgets. The
picture of increased financial instability is replicated for NHS
providers. Under the old block contract system trusts were guaranteed
a certain income which enabled them to plan ahead more effectively.
A trust would know the services it had been commissioned to provide
and have some idea of their requirements regarding infrastructure
and staff. With PbR this is not the casea hospital could
build new wards and then find they don't have the patients to
fill them. Where hospitals are funded using PFI, cost implications
are likely to be particularly grave because the fixed tariff fee
for each item of treatment takes no account of the inflated overhead
costs that come with large-scale PFI building schemes.
2.9 The 2005 Audit Commission Report highlighted
the case of Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust,
which used different and higher forecasts of patient activity
than its commissioning PCTs, and on this basis employed 300 additional
staff. This resulted in higher costs and lower than planned income,
leading to serious financial problems.[104]
For specialist hospitals the existing tariff is not sophisticated
enough to account for the greater complexity of the operations
and other procedures carried out. An example of this is the £22
million total deficit expected by four children's hospitals (Alder
Hey, Great Ormond Street, Sheffield Children's Trust and Birmingham
Children's Trust) as a result of fixed prices for NHS procedures.
UNISON was pleased to hear the Health Secretary state in April
2006 that the Department is discussing such issues with the children's
hospitals.
2.10 UNISON has been warning against the
use of PFI and NHS LIFT (Local Improvement Finance Trusts) in
the building and servicing of hospitals for many years. Far from
being a cheaper way to run projects, PFI is allowing private companies
to cream off profits while hospitals are saddled with high levels
of ongoing debt. A recent example is the Norfolk & Norwich
Hospital, where the hospital's PFI joint working company took
£115 million out of the scheme and replaced the money in
the project with borrowed funds, leading the Commons Public Accounts
Committee to criticise this refinancing deal for having "lined
the pockets of the investors" while the hospital has been
left to deal with a large deficit.[105]
In December 2005 a Price Waterhouse Coopers report for the Audit
Commission warned that the deficit at Queen Elizabeth Hospital
NHS trust in Woolwich would amount to £100 million by 2008-09
unless its PFI debt was restructured.[106]
The deal added around £9 million a year to the costs met
by an equivalent hospital built with money borrowed from the Government.
A further example of the failure of PFI to provide value for money
is Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals which is also financially in
the red. The capital value of their PFI scheme is £54 million,
yet nearly £42 million has already been paid in unitary payments
over the last two years with many more payments to come.[107]
2.11 UNISON does not believe that the apparent
switch towards NHS LIFT will provide better value for money: in
evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts,
the example of Newham was raised where two LIFT buildings serving
8% of the population were found to be using 33% of the premises
budget.[108]
2.12 New plans for Practice-Based Commissioning
are likely to exacerbate financial problems in the future. The
initial costs of setting up the new system will be provided in
advance by PCTs, who will also meet any overspends. Savings made
will be the only available source of funding to meet new administrative
and management costs, meaning that if savings are not made budgets
will automatically be overspent.
The reasons for the deficits: the findings of
the "turn-around" teams, whether these findings are
right and whether the turn-around teams have provided value for
money
3.1 The report from the Department of Health's
finance director, incorporating the KPMG turnaround teams' initial
analysis of NHS organisations with the worst financial problems,
found that "the capability of the management was inadequate
to deal with the challenges of their current financial position."[109]
As stated above, UNISON believes it is too simplistic to lay the
blame for financial problems solely at the door of local management.
To some extent our position is supported by the third key conclusion
of the auditors, which states that in some cases Strategic Health
Authorities "were allowing unproductive behaviour between
trusts and PCTs," which seems to be a tacit acknowledgement
of some of the problems that have come about as a result of the
new era of competition and a resulting lack of cooperation. Similarly,
the report acknowledges that the categorisation of some trusts
as needing "urgent intervention" does not necessarily
reflect upon the quality of the management; for some organisations
"the scale of the turnaround problems faced are such they
would challenge the very best management."[110]
3.2 In terms of value for money, it is hard
to justify the substantial turnaround expenditure at some trusts
when hospital staff stand to lose their jobs. For example, Leeds
Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust is paying advisers from Price Waterhouse
Coopers £100,000 to help the Trust save money. Similarly,
the Surrey & Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust is reportedly paying
KPMG £700,000 to help reduce costs.
The reasons for the deficits: the relationship
between the funding formula, the allocation of funds to trusts
and the size of their deficits or surpluses
4.1 UNISON accepts that some of the larger
deficits are occurring in more affluent areas of southern England,
and it is possible that certain areas are under-funded. It should
be noted, however, that the deficits are not restricted to these
areas; trusts in the Midlands and the north of England are struggling
to balance their books as well. The funding formula is designed
to take into account factors such as the cost of living, age profiles,
levels of deprivation and geographical variations in the cost
of providing services. It is right that funding continue to be
directed towards the areas of greatest need and the Department
of Health is committed to ensuring that no area is more than 3.5%
below its fair funding target. For the last three years and for
the next two the NHS is receiving a 9% growth in funding each
year, which is a significant amount of additional money even if
some areas are benefiting more than others. UNISON's major concerns,
as outlined above, are for areas where the extra money is not
going towards boosting patient care or improving staff conditions
but being absorbed by the private sector and leaving the NHS to
pick up the debt.
The consequences of the deficits: the effect on
care
5.1 A recent BMA survey suggested that 37%
of medical directors were planning to reduce services due to financial
difficulties[111]
and the report of KPMG's experience with turnaround teams suggested
as one its range of potential improvement opportunities for 2005-06
that there should be "capacity reductions" and "recruitment
bans for back office functions."[112]
UNISON does not agree with the contention of the NHS Confederation
that fewer hospital beds will mean better care.[113]
Smaller numbers of beds can lead to greater risks of cross-infection,
at a time when clinical staff and cleaners in hospitals are doing
their best to combat the rise of the MRSA super bug. The Healthcare
Commission's recently released Survey of Inpatients 2005 reported
that the proportion of patients that perceived their room or ward
as "very clean" has fallen since 2002.[114]
5.2 The deficits have produced situations
where patients are having to wait for operations when there are
doctors and theatres free to carry out surgery. Some trusts have
had to change their thresholds for treatment, meaning people with
mild conditions will receive less care. Similarly, some operations
are being delayed until the next financial year so as not to add
an extra burden to debt-ridden hospitals. Some prominent recent
examples of the effect on care include flagship services such
as NHS Direct where, despite some centres expanding, 12 smaller
call centres are closing and there is likely to be 400 fewer operators.
Similarly, the commissioning of nurse-led NHS walk-in centres,
one of the most popular recent Government initiatives singled
out for praise in the Government's Let's Talk initiative, is likely
to come under threat as PCTs look to tighten their belts.
5.3 There are some telling examples of the
effect on care from specific trusts. At the Weston General Hospital
Trust in Weston Super Mare, savings of £11 million are being
made to remove a deficit and make other savings. Although a turnaround
director has been appointed, UNISON considers the trust one of
the most prudent in the south west. Problems have arisen not because
of mismanagement but due to the transitional arrangements of PbR.
In addition local PCTs withdrew 15% of elective admissions from
the hospital, guaranteeing them instead to the new privately-operated
treatment centre based 20 miles away in Shepton Mallet. The result
of these twin pressures on the trust is that 60 beds have been
closed, the equivalent of two wards, modern matrons and ward managers
posts have been halved, and nurse posts are being reviewed.
5.4 The example of the University Hospital
North Staffordshire (UHNS) NHS Trust is more well-known and one
of those trusts where substantial management failings have been
highlighted. Such shortcomings have been compounded, however,
by the pressure of attempting (unsuccessfully) to secure a PFI
deal and by a failure to come to terms with the effect on budgets
of new policies to divert a proportion of NHS patients to ISTCs.
The Audit Commission's Public Interest Report into problems at
UHNS found that "the Trust failed to take account of the
local PCTs' financial position and commissioning intentions which
sought to reduce activity with the Trust."[115]
These problems were confirmed by the announcement in May 2006
that UHNS had lost out on a £1.5 million contract to a private
sector diagnostic and treatment centre based in Burton on Trent.
With the NHS Confederation acknowledging that up to 550 jobs are
likely to be lost, patients will be affected with beds being closed,
home care visits reduced and cutbacks for a new unit dealing with
strokes.
5.5 The impact of PbR on financial planning
is amongst the major reasons for a combined deficit of £38
million across Gloucestershire. In terms of patient care, this
means the loss of 240 hospital beds and a number of community
hospitals are being closed, with a particular impact on mental
health services and maternity care.
5.6 It is possible that in some of the examples
outlined above trusts have been able to use the deficits as a
reason to close down particular services. This is something which
the charity Rethink has highlighted in relation to the perceived
disproportionate impact of the deficits on mental health services.[116]
5.7 Training is also being affected which will
have a detrimental impact on patient care in the longer-term.
The number of training posts for nurses and occupational therapists
has been cut and the continuation of Department of Health funding
for NHS Learning Accounts, NVQs and Skills for Life Frameworks
may come under threat. Furthermore, UNISON fears that the current
lack of job security within some trustswhether perceived
or realwill have an adverse effect on the ability of the
NHS to attract staff in future.
The consequences of the deficits: the number of
job losses
6.1 The deficits within the health care system
are already having a real impact on NHS staff. Although the exact
number of job losses is hard to quantify and estimates have varied
widely, the volatility within the service is clear and workers
will lose their jobs in both clinical and non-clinical professions.
UNISON accepts that not all the cuts are directly related to deficits,
but feedback from UNISON branches confirms a picture of uncertainty
and anxiety amongst workers in the NHS, with the likelihood of
more redundancy announcements in the future.
6.2 The recent claim that the cuts will affect
posts not people does not tell the whole story; real people are
working in these posts and although some may find work elsewhere,
some will not. Where cuts apply to temporary agency employees
this will still have an impact on wards, where the remaining workers
will find themselves increasingly stretched. One of the Healthcare
Commission patient survey's recommended "areas for improvement"
is around the fact that 40% of patients said there were not always
enough nurses.[117]
Claims that reductions in NHS posts are predominantly among administrative
and clerical staff are similarly wide of the mark. Staff in administrative
or other posts are still workers and provide an invaluable service
to the NHS. The importance of the team in health care is at risk
of being undermined: clinical staff will suffer the knock-on effects
if porters, cleaners and administrative staff lose their jobs.
The consequences of the deficits: the effects
of "top-slicing" in the current and future years
7.1 The recommendation that trusts "top
slice" a small proportion of their budget to hold in contingency
funds to guard against overspends in the future means in effect
that trusts are having to start from the point of being under
funded compared to their usual figures; savings will have to be
made just to balance the budget. If the end result of top-slicing
is that extra funding going into the NHS is used to fend off the
prospect of financial deficits in the future, there is a danger
of the service failing to live up to the expectations of patients
and staff, which have been raised by the extra attention and expenditure
the NHS has received.
The period over which balance should be achieved
8.1 It may be necessary for the Department
of Health to reconsider the length of time permitted for trusts
to clear their deficits. The report of the turnaround teams acknowledges
that bringing financial order to trusts with deficits "will
not be achieved overnight" and yet goes on to say that "each
NHS organisation should plan for in-year financial balance and
in most cases immediate recovery of 2005-06 overspends."
The report accepts that in some "exceptional circumstances"
the DoH may agree to recovering the overspend over more than one
year.[118]
UNISON believes that these exceptional circumstances will need
to be extended more widely to allow trusts more time to come to
terms with Government reforms and new ways of working. Insisting
on a one-year turnaround is likely to produce a knee-jerk reaction
that leads to a reduction in jobs and a reduction in services.
Properly staffed hospitals and clinics run more cost-efficiently
and are the best way to ensure the patient does not suffer. Equally,
an inflexible timescale for reducing debt is likely to compromise
the ability of trusts to fund the very welcome agreement to end
the two-tier workforce in health, as secured between unions and
the Government as part of the Warwick accord.
Additional information
9.1 UNISON is not opposed to reform, and we
want to see the best quality health service possible, but trusts
and PCTs need a chance to take stock and adapt to new systems
which have not yet been able to bed down. We are calling on the
Government to halt further expansion of the role of the private
sector in the NHS until there has been an opportunity to discuss
the consequences of recent reforms, and to review the role and
regulation of markets in the NHS. Reforms that are brought in
need to be pilot-tested first, following proper consultation with
those responsible for delivering change, and should only be applied
more widely once it has been demonstrated they will produce genuine
improvements rather than contribute to financial instability.
9.2 UNISON would welcome the opportunity to
give oral evidence to the Health Select Committee.
Karen Jennings
National Secretary (Health Care), UNISON
June 2006
98 King's Fund, Briefing: Deficits in the NHS,
April 2006, p 4. Back
99
King's Fund (Sally Williams & James Buchan), Assessing the
New NHS Consultant Contract: A Something for Something Deal?,
May 2006, pp 19-20. Back
100
Department of Health, The NHS in England: the Operating Framework
for 2006-07. Back
101
Department of Health, Independent Sector Treatment Centres:
A Report from Ken Anderson, Commercial Director, to the Secretary
of State for Health, 16 February 2006. Back
102
UNISON, Evidence to the Health Select Committee Inquiry on Independent
Sector Treatment Centres, February 2006. Back
103
Audit Commission, Early Lessons from Payment By Results, October
2005. Back
104
Ibid. Back
105
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, The Refinancing
of the Norfolk and Norwich PFI Hospital, May 2006. Back
106
Price Waterhouse Coopers, Queen Elizabeth Hospital NHS Trust:
Public Interest Report, December 2005. Back
107
House of Commons written answer from Andy Burnham MP to a question
from Roger Godsiff MP on Private Finance Initiative and Hospital
Deficits, 25 May 2006. Back
108
UNISON (Rachel Aldred), In the Interests of Profit, At the Expense
of Patients, January 2006, p 10. Back
109
Department of Health, Financial Turnaround in the NHS: A Report
from Richard Douglas, Finance Director, to the Secretary of State
for Health, 25 January 2006. Back
110
Ibid. Back
111
BMA, Funding Difficulties in the NHS: A Survey of Medical Directors
of Trusts in England, 5 October 2005. Back
112
Department of Health, Financial Turnaround in the NHS. Back
113
NHS Confederation, Briefing: What's Happening with the NHS Workforce?,
16 May 2006. Back
114
Healthcare Commission, Survey of Inpatients 2005, May 2006. Back
115
audit Commission, Public Interest Report: University Hospital
of North Staffordshire NHS Trust, April 2006. Back
116
Rethink, A Cut Too Far: A Rethink Report into Cuts Affecting
Mental Health Services, May 2006. Back
117
Healthcare Commission, Survey of Inpatients 2005. Back
118
Department of Health, Financial Turnaround in the NHS. Back
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