Appendix: Government response
[Paragraph 4] '…The Secretary of State pointed
to the increasing number of people being fed by the World Food
Programme (WFP) and to a decline in one type of violence, "attacks
on people in their homes and the ending of aerial bombardment".
It is clear to us, however, that the reason for the decline in
the type of attacks seen in 2004 is that the de facto
ethnic cleansing has succeeded and people have fled their homes
for the protection of the camps.'
Large areas of Darfur have been depopulated as a
result of the violence since 2003. Large-scale attacks have reduced
in number since the beginning of 2004 but incidents are still
taking place resulting in major displacement and re-displacement.
The attacks on Mershing and Shearia in late January 2006 were
a notable example, forcing 70,000 people to flee the areas. Recent
instability and violence along the Chad border has also resulted
in a new influx of 10,000 Chadian refugees into Darfur. Many areas
remain highly vulnerable. Darfurians living close to the border
are now seeking greater protection — on both sides of the
border — and are moving into formal camp environments. Limited
access to large areas due to insecurity limits the ability of
humanitarian agencies to accurately assess the situation of vulnerable
populations. Overall, the security situation has deteriorated.
[Paragraph 5] 'To concentrate only on the WFP
and WHO statistics is to miss the wider point. The figure which
counts is the 1.8 million people who remain in camps and who,
as Hilary Benn told us, "are not going to move until they
think it is safe to do so"… The increase in the number
of people dependent on humanitarian assistance is all the more
worrying since the ability of aid agencies to deliver assistance
— and not only in West Darfur — has been seriously
affected by the increase in banditry and violence'
The Government remains very concerned by the deterioration
of the security situation over the past months and the consequent
impact on the humanitarian response, given the vulnerability of
the population. In his last report to the Security Council, the
Secretary General stated that humanitarian access had fallen to
70% — the lowest level since April 2004. The situation in
West Darfur is of particular concern, where the UN has raised
its security level to "phase 4", in which only life
saving humanitarian operations can take place, due to rising instability
and Chad-Sudan tensions. UNHCR announced in early March 2006 that
their appeal for operations in Darfur has been revised downwards
from $33m to $18.5m. This reflects an adjustment to their operations
in light of the deteriorating security environment, and the subsequent
restrictions placed on humanitarian agencies in January 2006 to
reduce the number of staff present in volatile areas of Darfur.
The continuing insecurity in Darfur will limit the ability of
humanitarian agencies to provide humanitarian assistance.
Nonetheless, humanitarian agencies are making great
efforts to maintain assistance to populations throughout Darfur.
For example, the World Food Programme is continuing to provide
food aid in West Darfur through the private sector, the local
staff of agencies and local food distribution committees.
[Paragraph 9] 'Simply making the GoS meet the
commitments it has undertaken would be a first in Sudan for the
international community. The UK Government was right to tell the
GoS "in no uncertain terms", as Lord Triesman said he
had done, that it had to fulfil its commitments, but the GoS has
not done so. The UK Government should propose to the UN Security
Council that it should apply credible sanctions until the GoS
has complied.
It is clear that all parties in Darfur are failing
to meet their obligations. The Government will continue to press
them to do so and is using all measures at its disposal. We want
to see full use made of the sanctions regime established under
UN Security Council Resolution 1591, which the UK argued for strongly.
We have circulated to members of the UN's Sudan Sanctions Committee
a list of individuals whom we believe should be the target of
such sanctions. The Panel of Experts established under UN Security
Council Resolution 1591 has presented its report and recommendations
— which we support — to the Sanctions Committee.
The Panel proposed a list of individuals against whom it believed
sanctions should be applied; we are pressing the Sanctions Committee
to consider this list. We are also pressing for the UN to impose
an arms embargo on the whole of Sudan, extending the existing
embargo which applies only to Darfur.
[Paragraph 10] '…The Committee is concerned
that existing funding for the AU mission will be exhausted by
early 2006, thus preventing the AU from fulfilling its mandate
and leaving civilians ever more vulnerable to attack. We support
statements by Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the UK Permanent Representative
to the UN, who urged stronger world support, including greater
EU funding for the AU force.'
The UK is a key supporter of AMIS, both in terms
of our own contribution (£52m bilaterally in addition to
our share of the €162 million contribution the European Commission
has made) and in our efforts to engage other donors. We are concerned
that there is still a significant shortfall in the AU's budget.
We are urging EU and G8 partners and other UN Security Council
members to help fund the mission.
[Paragraph 11] 'The overriding priority for the
international community must be to end the bloodshed. Given the
capacity and funding issues being experienced by AMIS, the Committee
believes that the UN should mobilize additional resources for
the AU Mission's work and reinforce its role with a UN mandate.
This would allow for the AU Mission to be blue-helmeted, make
greater resources available and thus speed up deployment. This
needs to happen immediately'
The Government welcomes the African Union's (AU)
decision at the 10 March Peace and Security Council (PSC) to reaffirm
its support in principle for a handover of AMIS to the UN, and
to extend AMIS' mandate to 30 September. We are pressing the UN
to work towards this date as a deadline for the handover; and
are pressing the Sudanese Government to accept this. We have also
provided a planner from the UK Ministry of Defence to support
the UN in planning for transition.
In the meantime, we will continue to encourage the
UN and AMIS to coordinate their work. We will also continue to
provide financial, technical and logistical support to both AMIS
and the AU-led mediation of the Abuja peace talks on Darfur. We
urge the international community to do the same. It is vital that
AMIS continues to protect the people of Darfur.
[Paragraph 14] '…It strikes us that the
[Abuja] talks are bedevilled by a lack of urgency and that, though
capacity building by donors is helpful, what is really needed
is to persuade those African countries which have been providing
assistance to the rebels to now put pressure on them to make progress.
The Deputy Head of the Joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit described the
Libyans as on side though not actively so. We urge the UK Government
to do more to persuade the relevant African countries, and in
particular Libya, to bring pressure to bear on the Darfur rebels
to take the Abuja negotiations seriously. The criticism of the
rebels' behaviour at the negotiations does not detract from the
primary responsibility which the GoS bears for failing to protect
its own citizens. This is not a conflict between protagonists
of equal strength; the government-backed militias continue to
attack civilians, including those in IDP camps.'
We agree there is an important role for African countries
in addressing the problems of Darfur, and we are continuing to
encourage and press key African states and their leaders to engage
positively with the International Community's efforts there. Alan
Goulty, the United Kingdom's special representative for Darfur,
recently visited Tripoli, Cairo and Asmara for talks with the
Libyan, Egyptian and Eritrean Governments. We hope that he will
be able to visit N'djamena shortly. We will continue to bring
pressure on other African countries to play a constructive role
in addressing the problems in Darfur. We welcome the decision
of the AU Peace and Security Commission on 10 March to establish
a Committee of Heads of State and Government, including Presidents
Obasanjo, Mbeki and Sassou-Nguesso and Chairperson Konare, to
engage the Sudanese authorities and others on how to expedite
the peace process in Darfur.
[Paragraph 15] 'On the Government of Sudan side,
there has been a question mark over whether the delegation representing
the GoS at Abuja also represents the SPLM and reflects the composition
and position of the new Government of National Unity. The difficulty
has been that the ruling National Congress Party and the SPLM
have not been able to agree on a common negotiating position.
As a consequence, the rebels have found themselves being asked
to negotiate with the same party that has been responsible for
engineering the ethnic cleansing in Darfur. Since our evidence
session, DFID has told us of progress made by the GNU in formulating
a joint strategy for Darfur and that the SPLM will be part of
the current round of talks at Abuja. Nevertheless, pressure needs
to be maintained to ensure the National Congress Party adjusts
to the new reality — that it is now part of the Government
of National Unity and needs to develop a joint position with its
new partner, not only on Darfur but also on eastern Sudan where
a similar emergency is developing.'
We are maintaining pressure on the parties to work
as a unified Government, but building such coordination and trust
does take time. On Abuja, the National Congress Party and Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) seem to be engaging well with
each other. We welcome the constructive participation of the SPLM
as part of the Government's delegation there, and in particular
the recent joint negotiating position presented by them. We will
continue to work with all sides to ensure a just and fair peace
for the people of Darfur.
We also continue to press the SPLM to take an active
role in any talks on the East, though it is currently unclear
when these will start.
[Paragraph 16] '…Mr Baldo called for the
establishment of a similar [to that established for Naivasha]
troika for the Abuja process, expanded to include the EU and France.
We endorse this suggestion. We were pleased to see DFID respond
that it is working closely with its partners, but note that when
HMG refers to "maximising the pressure on the parties",
no mention is made of how this is being done. The history of lack
of sanctions for non-compliance by the GoS does not inspire our
confidence.'
Both in capitals, and at the talks in Abuja, we continue
to work closely with international partners, including the EU,
the US, Canada, Norway and the Netherlands, to maintain and increase
pressure on the Parties to the Abuja talks to reach an early agreement.
Last year as EU Presidency, the UK delivered tough messages through
the EU-Sudan Troika meeting in Khartoum.
On 14 February this year, the Foreign Secretary visited
the Abuja talks and delivered tough messages to the delegates
there. In co-ordination with other International Partners, the
new Special Representative for the talks, Rod Pullen (former Ambassador
to Harare) has continued to pass these tough messages to the Parties.
The Security Council, through resolution 1591, has
created a mechanism to impose sanctions on those who are impeding
the peace process in Darfur. We are pressing for swift action
by the UN Sudan Sanctions Committee, who are currently discussing
the issue, to impose such sanctions. We are clear that there can
be no impunity for those who violate human rights or impede the
peace process in Sudan.
We also sponsored Resolution 1593 which referred
the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Both Resolutions constitute
serious measures which will take time to work through. We are
also committed to using all available measures, including political
engagement through high level Ministerial contacts, our high-level
representation at the Abuja talks and our Embassy in Khartoum.
[Paragraph 19] 'Hilary Benn pointed out that
political will and legal base were one thing, but having the capacity
to intervene was what really counted. At present there was not
"sufficient of the right capacity to make a difference"
and "that is why we have to ensure that we do build that
over time, including supporting, in this case, Africa's efforts
to provide some of that capacity". But the dispossessed of
Darfur cannot wait that long. One option would be to call on those
who have the capacity, but Lord Triesman thought a NATO intervention
might be seen as an act of war and resisted strongly by the GoS.
What does remain is the possibility of NATO and the EU helping
to provide the tools for the job. This means: force preparation,
deployment, sustainment, intelligence, command and control, communications
and tactical (day and night) mobility. The AU made many of these
points to us during our visit back in February — including
the suggestion of intelligence communication equipment. What has
been on offer since has been limited to the Canadian armoured
personnel carriers, some of which, at the time of our evidence
session, were still waiting on the quayside at Dakar. If the UK
Government and the international community are determined on an
African solution to an African problem then they have an obligation
to give practical help to make the AU Mission work. This is an
area where political will is paramount. Until there is a change
of heart, despite the endorsement of the concept at the 2005 Millennium
Review Summit, the Responsibility to Protect will remain just
an aspiration'
[Paragraph 21] '…We favour African solutions
to African problems, but at present, despite the best efforts
of the African Union, the AU Mission in Sudan is not providing
adequate protection for people in Darfur. The Responsibility
to Protect, agreed at the UN Millennium Review Summit, should
be a responsibility which falls on all UN members, not just on
neighbouring states. Given the expiry of the AU's mandate at
the end of March, we are convinced of the urgency of the need
to put resources in place, whether through the AU or the UN, to
ensure effective protection for people in Darfur. This needs to
happen immediately. We request that the UK Government, in its
response to this report, sets out the actions which it has taken
to put this into effect.'
[See also response to paragraph 11, above]
The UK participated in the AU joint assessment mission
to Darfur in December last year. This produced a range of recommendations
on ways to enhance AMIS operations in the short term. Together
with the AU and other partners, we are now looking at the most
appropriate ways to take these forward; this includes the further
£20 million of support to AMIS announced by Hilary Benn on
February 20th during his visit to Darfur. In the longer
term we are looking at the transition of the AU mission to a UN
peace support operation.
The Government hopes that the collective commitment
to the 'Responsibility to Protect' will in future mean that all
nations will be on the lookout for early warning signs of crises
and will be galvanised to respond proactively. What is happening
in Darfur is that we are creating the capacity for regional organisations
— in this case the AU — to fulfill their responsibilities
to protect. However, we still need to see countries in the region
play a more constructive role in getting parties to secure a peace
agreement in Darfur.
The UK is strongly supportive of the development
of a comprehensive peace and security strategy and technical capacity
within the AU. We used our G8 and EU Presidencies to marshal international
support behind the African agenda. We are taking forward work
with G8/EU and African partners to:
- Build strategic level management
capacity at the AU
- Support development of standby brigades (with
emphasis on west and east Africa) capable of standalone observer
mission
- Establish an arrangement for transport and logistics,
taking into account existing capacity
- Maximise efficiency of the network of regional
peacekeeping training centres (Koulikouro and Kofi Annan in West
Africa, Karen in East Africa)
- Provide more accessible and flexible funding
for African PSO
- Address the need for effective civilian policing
components in PSO
- Ensure better co-ordination between donors and
the AU and regional organisation
Department for International Development
17 March 2006
| 
