House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Seventh Report

3 The UK's initial disaster response

19. The speed, nature and scale of the UK's response to a humanitarian crisis is determined by the interaction of various actors, which occurs within the context of wider factors such as the availability of funding and extent of political will. In this chapter we examine the roles of the key actors who shape the UK's response to natural disasters. In subsequent chapters we consider many of the factors which shape the context in which they operate. As discussed previously, the HMG response to humanitarian disasters is led by DFID, with support from the FCO and MOD. In the non-governmental sector there are numerous UK-based NGOs engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Thirteen of the most prominent humanitarian NGOs are members of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), an umbrella organisation which provides a mechanism for coordinating fundraising for large-scale disasters and facilitating inter-agency cooperation.[41] The nature and extent of the coverage of natural disasters by media organisations plays a key role in determining the UK response to humanitarian crises by shaping the public's reaction to disasters. The private sector is becoming increasingly involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

The role of DFID

20. Within DFID, humanitarian affairs are dealt with primarily through the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) and the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU). Responsibility for dealing with slow-onset and recurrent natural disasters rests in the first instance with DFID country offices. DFID's Operations Team (CHASE OT) is responsible for 24-hour monitoring of emerging disasters, initial response to rapid-onset natural disasters and providing advice on request to ACHU and DFID country offices on chronic disasters and complex emergencies.

21. A wide range of factors were identified in oral and written evidence as affecting the scale and nature of DFID's response to particular disasters. According to the evidence we received, DFID's decisions are usually based primarily on assessments of unmet needs carried out on the ground by key actors (including in some cases DFID staff). We return to the issue of needs assessment in the humanitarian sector in Chapter 6. Other factors inevitably have an influence on DFID's decision to respond, including the extent of attention paid by other actors (including the media, NGOs and other national governments), and national and global politics.

22. The evidence we saw regarding the operations of CHASE-OT impressed us. The efficacy of the 24-hour emergency monitoring system was clearly demonstrated by the rapid and effective response which DFID was able to mount on 26 December 2004 following the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster. Few other organisations were able to respond as quickly, as many staff were absent for the Christmas holiday. In Pakistan several different interlocutors, including representatives of the Government of Pakistan (GoP), commended the fact that the UK search and rescue teams had been the first to arrive in country following the South Asian Earthquake. The UK's High Commissioner to Pakistan told us that the inclusion of women in the search and rescue teams had been an important move culturally.

23. Speed is of the essence for successful search and rescue missions, but obviously the quality and effectiveness of the initial response is just as, if not more, important. The evidence we received about the quality and effectiveness of DFID's initial disaster responses was uniformly positive. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), an NGO which was one of DFID's key implementing partners for the provision of emergency shelter in Pakistan, told us in their written submission:

"DFID decided to second staff to strengthen [provision of emergency shelter]… which quickly improved the situation. A caseload of one million people whose emergency shelter delivery was delayed for two months because of lack of coordination were addressed and could be dealt with in a systematic manner… DFID played a very proactive role in the coordination of the emergency phase… DFID's decisions and actions saved many lives at a crucial time."[42]

24. This extract makes reference to one of CHASE-OT's key strategies in its initial response to a disaster, that of seconding both its core staff and other specialists from its databases, to fill critical gaps in capacity in UN agencies, and to provide surge capacity for DFID offices. It is regrettable in this case that the UN did not identify the gap in its capacity sooner; we will return to this issue in Chapter 4. Given the problems of coordination and leadership which are currently evident amongst UN agencies, we applaud the effectiveness of DFID's secondment strategy.

25. We saw that the UK's rapid provision of assistance following the South Asian Earthquake had done more to raise the profile of DFID in Pakistan than many years of long term programmes had done. We conclude that nationally identified search and rescue teams are among the most effective forms of "flagging" available to bilateral donors. However such expenditure should not be at the expense of long term assistance for disaster preparedness which will have much more success in reducing fatalities and injuries when natural disasters occur.

26. The reputational benefit that DFID can derive from the excellent work of CHASE-OT should not be limited to partner countries, however. At a time when DFID has secured a significant increase in its total budget, as a result of G8 commitments during 2005, Sir Suma Chakrabarti, the Permanent Secretary, has acknowledged the need for the Department to sustain the UK public's commitment to DFID's agenda.[43] We were concerned to hear of evidence that the UK public remains largely unaware of the key role that DFID plays in the UK response to humanitarian disasters, instead seeing NGOs as the main actors.[44] In fact a significant proportion of funding for NGOs working in the humanitarian sector is provided by DFID, which relies on UN agencies, the Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement and NGOs to disburse much of its humanitarian funding and manage much of its project work on the ground.[45]

27. We think that the work of CHASE-OT has the potential to be one effective means of creating and maintaining public commitment to DFID's work. Consequently, we commend both the decision to include information on CHASE-OT's response to the South Asian Earthquake in the Department's 2006 Annual Report, and the new initiative of publishing monthly reports on DFID's humanitarian work on the Departmental website.[46] We recommend that DFID gives further thought to ways in which positive publicity for the Department can be gained from promoting the work of CHASE-OT more widely, potentially through work with the DEC and media organisations.

28. One further issue relating to the work of CHASE-OT is the effectiveness of the transition between their work in the initial emergency phase of humanitarian response, and the later recovery and reconstruction phases, which are usually undertaken by DFID's existing country teams. We return to this issue in Chapter 9.

The role of NGOs

29. A large number of UK-based NGOs and UK branches of international NGOs (INGOs) are involved to some extent in humanitarian response to natural disasters. Their submissions to our inquiry reflect the considerable scope and variety of their work, which includes advocacy,[47] policy development and the provision of assistance on the ground. During our visit to Pakistan we had the opportunity to visit water and sanitation projects being delivered by Oxfam near Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), and villages near Mansehra in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) where the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) had provided emergency shelter. We also met representatives of Care International, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), ActionAid, HelpAge International, the ICRC and Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) working in the Muzaffarabad area. We were impressed by many of the examples we heard of the humanitarian work undertaken NGOs.

30. We were told that the number of NGOs involved in humanitarian response to natural disasters is constantly increasing.[48] The origins of many humanitarian NGOs lie in the response of an individual or group to a specific disaster. Each new humanitarian disaster therefore has the potential to spawn new humanitarian NGOs. The work done by these new organisations can be valuable, but they face a number of challenges: they may find it difficult to secure donor funding without a proven track record of providing assistance; they often lack connection to existing networks of humanitarian actors through which advice and best practice can be disseminated; their staff are often inexperienced; and they are often unaware of the principles and standards which have been developed within the humanitarian sector.[49] Nicholas Stockton from the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership — International, told us that it was easier for medium-sized agencies to provide donors with good value for their money.[50]

31. Some witnesses expressed fears that such organisations (described to us variously as "phoenix", "cowboy" and "briefcase" NGOs) could hinder the work of more experienced NGOs and damage the reputation of humanitarian actors more generally. In the worst case, entirely fraudulent NGOs had been established to take advantage of the extensive funding available in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster.[51] However, Nicholas Stockton argued that aside from outright fraud, there was no evidence of the detrimental effects of 'briefcase NGOs'.[52] Paul Harvey, Research Fellow in the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) also cautioned against squashing the humanitarian instinct embodied by such organisations. He stressed that humanitarianism was a basic human impulse which should be encouraged, and warned that efforts to ensure the professionalism of the humanitarian sector should not undermine the very values which generated it in the first place.[53]

32. We conclude that, unfortunately, competition for funds within the humanitarian sector discourages established NGOs from supporting newly emerging organisations. Although as one witness from a large UK-based NGO told us "in most situations there are too few humanitarian actors", new NGOs tend to be seen as potential competitors rather than prospective partners to be nurtured. We accept that there may be instances in which newly created humanitarian NGOs may deliberately or inadvertently create problems. However, we see the increase in the number of organisations engaged in humanitarian work, particularly from the South, as a positive expression of the importance of humanitarianism, provided there is a clear commitment to partnership working and aligning their work with the priorities of local communities. Quite often such new NGOs may tap into new sources of funds or bring access to resources in-kind such as professional skills. This occurred with the medical and civil engineering professions following the South Asian earthquake, for example. We conclude that established NGOs should see it as their responsibility to provide peer advice and support to new organisations, in order to ensure that the principles and standards they have created are maintained. DFID could take such work into account when making decisions about which NGOs to fund. We recommend that DFID provides on its website advice and contacts for new humanitarian NGOs, as well as for existing NGOs that wish to become involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

33. One of the key factors determining the speed and nature of the NGO contribution to the UK response to a humanitarian disaster is the way in which donors disburse funds to their implementing partners. We discuss financing in the humanitarian sector in some detail in Chapter 5, consequently in this section we limit our remarks to those relating specifically to initial disaster responses in the UK.

34. Although many UK-based NGOs have private and existing sources of funds which enable them to begin the provision of assistance according to their own timetable, many others have to await specific funding decisions by donors in relation to each emergency. DFID told us that their decision-making process and response is dependent on the type and quality of project proposals submitted by NGOs, as well as on the capacities of agencies on the ground to assess needs, to develop needs-based proposals and appeals and to implement programmes.[54] We heard concerns from some NGOs that DFID was not taking funding decisions quickly enough,[55] but were convinced by the Secretary of State's argument that it would be difficult for the process to be accelerated without the validity of funding decisions being compromised.[56]

35. It also seems likely that attempts to accelerate DFID's allocation of funds to implementing partners would be likely to advantage disproportionately NGOs which already have an established working relationship with DFID. Nicholas Stockton told us that the largest and best politically connected NGOs are already the most likely to secure donor funding, although they are not necessarily the organisations which can provide the best service. He suggested that 'medium-sized' NGOs were often best able to offer the most flexible response and value for money. Whether or not this is the case is clearly a decision for DFID to make in each specific situation. It would be a mistake to accelerate DFID's funding evaluation process if this would work to the detriment of new applicants, including national NGOs in countries affected by disasters. We commend DFID's efforts to work through developing country partners where possible.

36. We encourage DFID to undertake frequent evaluations to ensure that its process for determining which partners will deliver most efficiently and successfully in a given humanitarian situation is clear, transparent and as rapid as possible without compromising its effectiveness. DFID will inevitably end up funding many of the same NGOs in different emergencies due to these organisations' humanitarian expertise. Nonetheless, we agree with Nicholas Stockton that DFID's aim should be to create an open market-place for its humanitarian funding, in which exemplary work is encouraged and recognised through future funding decisions, whereas inadequate work has discernible consequences for the organisation concerned.

37. Effective realisation of this recommendation will clearly be dependent on the adequacy of DFID's evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, a subject which we return to, together with a discussion of the accountability of NGOs, in Chapter 6.

The role of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC)

38. Since the DEC was established in 1963 its role has been to coordinate non-governmental fundraising for the largest humanitarian emergencies. This has involved working with the UK's aid, corporate, public and broadcasting sectors both to maximise the income raised from the British public and to ensure the funds raised are deployed by the agency best placed to deliver them.[57] Figures for the sums raised through DEC appeals[58] demonstrate that the DEC is a highly effective organisation, which makes a significant contribution to the humanitarian sector in the UK. The DEC is a unique organisation and fulfils a very important role within the humanitarian sector in the UK. We recommend that the DEC explores ways in which its model of collective fundraising could be exported to other donor countries, in order to maximise the availability of funds for humanitarian work worldwide, and that DFID should consider funding such a project.

39. Brendan Gormley from the DEC, told us that funds raised by the DEC in each appeal were distributed between partner agencies according to their relative size. DEC partner agencies sometimes agreed to forego their full pro rata entitlement in circumstances where the requirements were less for one partner's area of expertise or specialisation but favoured another partner with a lower entitlement. Some have suggested that the remit of the DEC could be extended to include the coordination of joint working by DEC partner agencies.[59] Such suggestions reflect concerns about the negative impact of NGO rivalry over programmatic territory and funding. The competitive environment in which humanitarian NGOs operate tends to discourage cooperation and coordination, and to encourage duplication and disconnection.

40. Although happy to coordinate over fundraising, DEC partner agencies have, to date, defended their programmatic and operational sovereignty within the DEC fiercely. Brendan Gormley told us that that there was no appetite among DEC partner agencies to use the DEC as a mechanism to coordinate collective programmatic activities. In his view the realisation of suggestions to extend the remit of the DEC would divert its energies from its core fundraising remit, and would be beyond the capacity of the DEC's small secretariat (which consists of only 5 people).[60] We are not convinced by arguments that the DEC should expand its remit. We think that DEC partner agencies ought to explore ways of increasing the extent of their programmatic cooperation and coordination, but that the DEC is not necessarily the best mechanism for achieving this.

41. The DEC has been acknowledged as a leader in promoting accountability within the humanitarian sector. One method of ensuring the accountability of DEC partner agencies has been for the DEC secretariat to evaluate and monitor their activities in the field. Brendan Gormley told us that the secretariat was now considering shifting the balance of their monitoring and evaluation to focus more on the activities of NGO head offices in the North.[61] Given that DEC agencies retain programmatic sovereignty for their operations on the ground, we agree that it makes more sense for the DEC to focus on the development of policies and practices in NGO head offices in the North.

42. For the last 5 years, another key means of ensuring accountability has been the secretariat's commissioning of independent evaluations of the DEC's responses to humanitarian disasters. Until 2004, it had been normal practice for the DEC to publish these evaluation reports in full. However, following adverse press comment on the DEC's Southern Africa Appeal evaluation, the DEC secretariat took a decision not to publish its evaluations automatically, and to retain the option of deciding what to release. Following the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster, the DEC secretariat commissioned two evaluations (a full evaluation and a shorter report to the Board of Trustees) and, fearing that the media would pick up on critical passages in the full evaluation in isolation, decided to release only the report to the Board. In the event, an early version of the full evaluation was leaked and its contents formed the basis of criticism of DEC agencies on the BBC's Newsnight programme. This confirmed the DEC's decision not to publish the full report, which was circulated as planned within the DEC and among its partner agencies to allow dialogue and lesson learning.

43. The DEC has been criticised for its decision not to publish the full evaluation report into the Tsunami crisis response. Critics have argued that this decision represented a retrograde step for accountability within the humanitarian sector, reduced public dialogue and limited the chance of lesson learning beyond the DEC agencies. There has also been the suggestion that the existence of a 'secret' report may prove a temptation to journalists seeking to criticise the humanitarian sector. The media can certainly play an important role in holding the humanitarian sector to account, as we discuss in the next section. However, Brendan Gormley told us that due to the increasing tendency for the media to report evaluations selectively and take criticisms out of context, the DEC was now looking for new ways to ensure the accountability of its operations, to the public as well as to its trustees. We agree that it is essential that the DEC finds a way to sustain its reputation for accountability, without which the trust of the UK public may be lost, and their generosity towards humanitarian disasters may diminish.

The role of the media[62]

44. Media coverage of humanitarian disasters is an important factor in determining the timing, funding and scale of any international response. However, we heard that while media coverage may be the key factor in initiating a humanitarian response, the extent of humanitarian need is only one of the factors driving editorial decisions about whether and how to cover a humanitarian disaster. Witnesses from the print and broadcast media told us that decisions were also driven by the location of the disaster, its relative significance in comparison to other disasters, the extent and location of the media organisation's own resources, and the importance of the story to the UK public.[63] David Munk from The Guardian, reminded us that "we are all quite parochial" in our humanitarian concerns.[64] He also made the important point that media coverage of disasters is necessarily selective: if the media covered all the humanitarian emergencies which are constantly occurring, the public would rapidly be afflicted by "compassion fatigue", and the impact of the reporting would be significantly reduced.[65]

45. We accept that although lives may be saved in a humanitarian emergency as a consequence of the media's work, saving lives is not their job.[66] However, we think that where the media choose to report on humanitarian emergencies, they should accept that they also take on certain responsibilities. These include: operating on a 'do no harm' basis by not impeding the work of humanitarian agencies;[67] seeking to avoid stereotyping and disempowering disaster 'victims'; and, wherever possible, communicating with humanitarian agencies working on the ground, in order to portray humanitarian needs accurately. We believe there is scope for the media and civil society to work together to develop an informal ethical code for media representatives reporting on humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian NGOs should also consider offering training to media representatives on the standards and practices of humanitarianism, in order to improve the accuracy of media representations of disasters.

46. While the media should acknowledge these responsibilities, humanitarian NGOs need to accept the priorities and requirements of the media. NGOs are right to see the media as a resource for attracting public and political attention, and consequently funding, to 'forgotten' and emerging crises, but they need to acknowledge that the media are also driven by financial imperatives[68] and audience requirements. Humanitarian agencies need to work to find creative ways of communicating with media organisations, and to ensure that they are conveying the information they require in a suitable format. We recommend that the DEC initiates a process of dialogue between representatives of media organisations and the non-governmental humanitarian sector in the UK, to explore ways in which the reporting of humanitarian disasters and the activities of humanitarian actors could be more mutually productive.

47. In addition to raising awareness of emerging humanitarian disasters, the media can play an important role in sustaining attention to, and consequently funding for, disasters which occurred in the past or which are ongoing. We were pleased to be assured by Lyse Doucet, Presenter and Special Correspondent for BBC World television and World Service radio, that the BBC has a policy of "staying with stories".[69] In the case of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster for example, the BBC had returned to the affected areas 1 month, 100 days, 6 months and a year after the disaster, to examine the recovery and reconstruction processes. We hope that this policy will be applied to humanitarian disasters with a lower profile than the tsunami, and that other media organisations will follow the same approach.

The role of the private sector

48. The level of private donations made worldwide for humanitarian assistance has been increasing over time.[70] Private contributions are particularly significant in relation to high profile disasters, as was demonstrated by those which occurred during 2005. According to a Reuters study, private donations exceeded government pledges in 8 of the 20 countries which were the biggest donors to the humanitarian response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster.[71] According to Reuters, private donations from the UK totalled $663 million (£351 million), while the HMG pledge was $445.2 million (£236 million).[72] The generous response of private individuals in the UK to the South Asian Earthquake, reflected the proportion of the UK population with links to the sub-continent.

49. In addition to monetary donations, private individuals often choose to make donations in kind. Where such donations fulfil specific unmet needs they are clearly useful. However, in-kind donations may be inappropriate and even hinder relief efforts. In Pakistan we heard that road access to areas affected by the South Asian Earthquake for humanitarian actors had been hindered by private individuals driving into the area to deliver goods that they had collected from family and friends. 90% of the tents distributed were not 'winterised' (designed to withstand the cold of Himalayan winter)[73] and the streets of Muzaffarabad had been littered with unwanted second-hand clothes. In the aftermath of the earthquake, as in most other humanitarian situations, cash donations allowed the greatest flexibility for humanitarian agencies to meet the needs which they identified. We applaud the initiative taken by DFID and the DEC in producing their booklet Disasters and Emergencies Overseas: How you can help[74] to guide private individuals and organisations who wish to make a contribution to humanitarian emergencies. We recommend that DFID and the DEC consider ways in which the key messages contained in the Disasters and Emergencies Overseas publication can be more effectively disseminated.

50. In our oral evidence session with the Secretary of State, we discussed the possibility of DFID producing a booklet on best practice in volunteering, including twinning initiatives.[75] We appreciate the speed with which DFID followed up this discussion with supplementary evidence setting out how they plan to address these issues.[76] We look forward to an update from DFID within the next twelve months on the possibility of using twinning initiatives to support the Department's work in raising development awareness.

51. Private sector involvement in humanitarian response to natural disasters takes a variety of forms, from philanthropy and donations in kind, to profit-oriented activities, such as tendering for reconstruction contracts or selling products. The growing 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR) agenda, which we examined in detail in our July 2006 report on Private Sector Development, has made private sector organisations increasingly keen to be seen to be involved in development and disaster relief work.[77] We heard the example of a UK company donating bottled water, which was flown to the Maldives by DFID following the tsunami.[78] Although companies may be keen to become involved in this way, searching questions always need to be asked about the economic rationality of transporting goods across the world which could have been sourced locally, thereby supporting the economy of a disaster-affected region. The NRC told us that the majority of the materials they had used in their emergency shelter programme had been sourced from South Asia.

52. In their written memorandum, Crown Agents comment that the variety of ways in which the private sector has become involved in humanitarian response has made it difficult to track systematically the contributions made by companies to humanitarian work. It is difficult to ensure that the private sector organisations that involve themselves in humanitarian work adhere to the principles and standards which are integral to the humanitarian sector. Potential conflicts could arise as a result of the increasing involvement in humanitarian activities of "the private sector, whose actions are primarily motivated by profits, in a highly value-laden sector, where the work of traditional actors has been predominantly driven by a sense of moral obligation and a duty to promote and protect basic human rights."[79] Nevertheless we acknowledge that some companies respond with a similar sense of wider moral obligation and duty especially in terms of the provision of skills and expertise.

53. We recommend that DFID should take a leading role in engaging the private sector in humanitarian responses. It should formalise this involvement by promoting the establishment of a network of private sector organisations involved in humanitarian response through which information and training on humanitarian standards and principles could be delivered.

The wider context

54. In this chapter we have examined the roles played by various actors in the initial UK response to humanitarian disasters. This individual country response occurs within the context of the international humanitarian system. Analyses of the shortcomings of this system have identified the need to improve the timeliness, appropriateness and equity of international responses to humanitarian disasters. The next three chapters look in turn at proposals for reform of: the coordination and leadership of international response capacity; the level, mechanisms and equity of financing; and, the measurement of needs and of collective performance. For each of these three areas, we examine the problems which have been identified and the initiatives which seek to address them.

41 The current members of the DEC are: ActionAid, British Red Cross, CAFOD, Care International UK, Christian Aid, Concern, Help the Aged, Islamic Relief, Merlin, Oxfam, Save the Children, Tearfund and World Vision. Back

42 Ev 220-222 [Norwegian Refugee Council] Back

43 Minutes of evidence taken before the International Development Committee, 11 July 2006, Q 34 Sir Suma Chakrabarti, available online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmintdev/c1491-i/c149102.htm. Back

44 Comments made during a private seminar on Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters held by the IDC, 25 May 2006. Back

45 Ev 127 and 129 [DFID] Back

46 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/emergencies/humanitarian_update.asp. Back

47 DFID told us that NGOs and INGOs play a useful role by lobbying to raise awareness of less well publicised emergencies [Ev 129]. Back

48 Q 276 Mr Jan Egeland Back

49 Q 34 Mr Toby Porter; Q 48 Mr Marcus Oxley, Tearfund; Q 290 Mr Jan Egeland Back

50 Q 135 Mr Nicholas Stockton, HAP-I Back