House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Seventh Report

4 Reform of the humanitarian sector: coordination and leadership

55. If one sat down today to design an international humanitarian system, it is unlikely that the result would bear much resemblance to the current system, which has grown organically over the past few decades. The main actors include:

affected states which bear the primary responsibility for protecting and assisting those affected by humanitarian emergencies within their own borders;
the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, an international organisation which comprises the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), and 183 national Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies, with a mandate for impartial involvement in disaster response;
the United Nations humanitarian system, led by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which has responsibility for coordinating the international humanitarian response and for the coordination of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), and is supported by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC);[80]
donor governments, which in 2003 contributed US$7.8 billion in official humanitarian assistance (11% of total official development assistance (ODA)), and of which recently the US has been the largest contributor, exceeding the contributions of the next six largest donors combined - the UK, France, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and Germany;[81]
multilateral donors, including the European Commission (EC), a multilateral organisation that is also a donor through the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), and the World Bank;
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), operating at local, national and international levels; and,
private sector organisations, which are playing an increasing role through funding, CSR initiatives and commercial contracts.

56. Given the number of actors which make up the international humanitarian system it is perhaps unsurprising that significant inconsistencies in the quality, speed and effectiveness of international capacity to respond to humanitarian disasters have been identified.[82] These inconsistencies occur both within and between responses to disasters. Within the response to the South Asian Earthquake, for example, we heard that certain sectors were relatively neglected, while others were well provided for. In terms of inconsistencies between disasters, Jan Egeland has repeatedly highlighted the problem of 'forgotten emergencies' to which there is little or no international response, while to others there is a more than adequate response. We return to the issue of forgotten emergencies in Chapter 5.

57. Many of the solutions proposed to the inconsistencies in the international humanitarian system have focused on improving coordination and leadership in the system. Several such proposals were contained within the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR),[83] an analysis of the international humanitarian system commissioned by Jan Egeland in 2004, in response to the slowness and inadequacy of the humanitarian response in Darfur.[84] Other proposals have come from the UK and from the UN Secretary General's two reports A more secure world: our shared responsibility,[85] and In Larger Freedom.[86] This chapter examines the problems which have been identified in these areas, and the proposals which have been made to address them.

Coordination

58. In relation to coordination, the HRR concluded that: "As far as international humanitarian coordination is concerned, the [HRR] team believes that there are limited linkages and collaboration between the three humanitarian systems examined (UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs)."[87] The evidence we have received has shown that there are also problems in coordination among NGOs and within the UN system.[88]

THE CLUSTER APPROACH

59. Of the recommendations included in the HRR, Jan Egeland prioritised the implementation of the 'cluster approach': a proposal to ensure that gaps in humanitarian provision in certain sectors were filled. The basic premise of the cluster approach is that the accountability, predictability and reliability of responses can be improved by identifying organisational leaders (or 'cluster leads') for areas in which gaps in provision have been identified, which will support the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators in ensuring a coordinated response. The HRR proposed that, although the cluster lead agencies would not necessarily carry out all of the activities in their cluster themselves, they would be the 'provider of last resort', with responsibility for ensuring that activities were implemented. Jan Egeland described the practical consequences of this system for the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC):

"we have a phone number now for shelter; we did not have that in the past, we were very unclear who was responsible for the shelter crisis in Darfur. It was very clear that you came to me and asked, "Why is there not enough shelter?" when we met last time and discussed Sudan. Now I have somebody I can call upon and that is UNHCR in man-made disasters, it would be the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement in natural disasters."[89]

60. At the beginning of September 2005, the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) agreed that the cluster approach would be implemented in all new emergencies, and the heads of UN agencies agreed to the following cluster leads:[90]

Camp Coordination and Management - UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (for conflict-generated internally displaced people (IDPs))
Emergency Telecommunications — OCHA for overall process owner; UNICEF for data collection; World Food Programme (WFP) for common security telecommunications service
Early Recovery (formerly called Reintegration and Recovery) — UN Development Programme (UNDP)
Emergency Shelter — UNHCR (for conflict-generated IDPs)
Health — World Health Organisation (WHO)
Logistics — WFP
Nutrition — UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Protection — UNHCR (for conflict-generated IDPs)
Water and Sanitation — UNICEF

61. Shortly after these responsibilities were agreed, on 8 October 2005, the South Asian Earthquake took place. The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) together with the Humanitarian Coordinator and the UN Country Team, decided to use the new cluster system to implement the international response. Most of the evidence we received indicated that the first implementation of the cluster approach in Pakistan had demonstrated the potential of the system, but several problems were highlighted.

62. At the most fundamental level, there was confusion over the purpose of the cluster system. Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop from the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)[91] told us that when first set out in the HRR, the cluster approach seemed intended to remedy the problem of inequity between different sectors of response, to ensure that there were no gaps in provision. When put into practice in Pakistan, however, the cluster approach seemed to be intended as a means to improve field-level coordination.[92] The confusion was heightened by the inclusion of certain sectors as clusters when NGOs did not perceive any gap in provision (for example health), and the absence of clusters where NGOs did perceive gaps in provision (for example education).[93] We think that the IASC needs to clarify the aims and objectives of the cluster approach as these have evolved since the initial formulation of the approach.

63. The implementation of the cluster system in Pakistan was hindered by the fact that the earthquake occurred before responsibility for certain clusters had been agreed. For example, a decision had not been reached on responsibility for shelter and camp management for natural disaster-generated IDPs.[94] We were told that DFID's secondment of personnel to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was key in enabling them, belatedly, to take on responsibility for the shelter cluster in NWFP. We heard evidence that this was necessary because the UN agency with the greatest expertise in the field, the UNHCR, had refused to extend its mandate to include IDPs.[95] We support DFID's view that the UNHCR should formally extend its mandate to enable it to take on responsibility for internally displaced people resulting from natural disasters as well as those arising from conflict.[96] We were disappointed that UNHCR chose not to give oral or written evidence to our inquiry, because they felt their work was not relevant to it, despite the fact that other agencies clearly believe it is.

64. As implemented in Pakistan, the cluster approach was rather bureaucratic. Cluster leads held meetings in Islamabad as well as in 4 cluster hubs in the field (in Bagh, Batagram, Muzaffarabad and Mansehra). We were told of delays and breakdowns in communication between the hubs and Islamabad.[97] Meetings were inefficient and sometimes minutes were not taken. Some NGOs did not have representation in Islamabad, and given their limited staffing and the transport difficulties in the affected area, many found it difficult to attend the numerous cluster coordination meetings while also pursuing their field activities.[98] At the same time NGOs were unwilling to miss meetings in case funding decisions were made. Local NGOs were effectively excluded because meetings were held in English.[99] We conclude that the IASC should systematically review organisational aspects of the way the cluster approach was implemented in Pakistan in order to refine the system.

65. A fundamental aspect of the cluster system, on which agreement is yet to be reached, is that of the concept of 'provider of last resort'. We were told that, as a result of concerns about financial liability, lines of accountability and lack of powers to direct other agencies, several humanitarian agencies selected as cluster leads had refused to take on this aspect of the role.[100] Agencies were concerned that if no other agency came forward, their leadership of a cluster might force them to undertake activities or take on roles that were incompatible with their organisational mandate.[101] Matthias Schmale from the British Red Cross commented:

"[the IFRC] is in ongoing negotiations and discussions with the UN in particular on what "lead role" means. We have clearly said, and it defeats the purpose of lead role, that we are not able to accept a role of lender of last resort, and we also have difficulties with the idea of reporting to the UN, being accountable to the UN."[102]

Afshan Khan from UNICEF told us:

"you remember that the provider of last resort phenomenon is for up to 500,000 people in any one given situation, and it is not just the UN that has hesitated. IFRC also spoke about it, IOM is also hesitating, because to be accountable for that without being given the resources to be able to respond to that crisis, nor the flexibility internally to move your own budgets around to swing that kind of money in to respond to a crisis, is political suicide, for lack of a better word."[103]

66. As Jan Egeland told us, further clarification of the concept of 'provider of last resort' will be required if it is to be effectively used.[104] This must include elucidation of, and agreement over the concept's financial implications and negotiations over the lines of accountability it will involve. The concept is central to the cluster approach: without it the cluster approach is little different from any of the existing coordination mechanisms within the international humanitarian system. Resolution of this issue is therefore crucial.

THE INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE (IASC)

67. While the cluster approach may be one means of improving field-level coordination, the IASC is a key mechanism for policy development and coordination. Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop told us that there was a need for greater acknowledgement of the role which the IASC could play in facilitating dialogue within the humanitarian sector.[105] Currently however it was too UN-centric, and needed to find ways of involving NGOs so that it became a more balanced coordination mechanism.[106] We believe that the IASC should play a greater role in facilitating dialogue between UN agencies and NGOs; as Jan Egeland put it: "We have to get some UN people, especially at country level, to be less arrogant and some of the NGOs to be more rational in their way of behaving".[107]

STREAMLINING THE UN

68. Many discussions about possible reform of the United Nations have highlighted the very large number of UN agencies, often with overlapping mandates, which have been established since the organisation was created. This observation is particularly relevant in relation to the UN's development and humanitarian agencies.[108] There has been a proliferation of UN agencies contributing to humanitarian responses, which are in constant competition for funds. At times this has led to inefficiencies, lack of coordination and difficulties with joint working.

69. The task of coordinating the UN's humanitarian response, which falls to UN-OCHA internationally, and the UN humanitarian coordinator in relation to specific disasters, would undoubtedly be simpler if there were fewer agencies involved. However, as in many previous inquiries which have touched on the role of the UN,[109] this inquiry has demonstrated to us the intractable nature of the issues which militate against such rationalisation. Once an agency is established, its staff have a vested interest in maintaining its existence, and consequently in involving themselves in as many UN-wide processes and programmes as possible, whether or not their expertise warrants this. Furthermore, the UN quota system for providing salaried positions to member states makes it unlikely that smaller or poorer states will vote to reduce the number of UN jobs to which they have access. The representatives of UN agencies who gave evidence to us were keen to establish the unique contribution of their own agency to the UN humanitarian system.[110]

70. Rather than tackle the politically sensitive issue of closing UN agencies, most proposals for reform have focused on rationalising the operation of agencies within specific countries. One example of such proposals is the "four ones" principle advocated by the Secretary of State in one of his White Paper speeches during 2006:

"If we think of what reforms would best improve the UN's role in a country, then it seems clear to me that we should adopt the principles of four ones — One UN Office, One UN Representative, One Programme and Budget, and One Funding Mechanism. The deal would be, you give us a clear, common UN plan for what you plan to do in the country to help development and if we think it's right we will then fund it." [111]

71. The 'four ones' proposal relates to the everyday operations of the UN in a country, but would have important benefits for the UN system in the event of a humanitarian emergency. UN agencies that were already coordinating their administration, programmes and funding would find it easier to coordinate in relation to humanitarian issues, and UN agencies intervening in a country for the first time in the event of a specific emergency would have one established UN structure into which to integrate. As with any proposal for change within the UN system, however, we heard of hesitation from UN agencies (particularly the largest and most well-established), which are uncertain about the possible implications for their funding and autonomy.[112] We approve of DFID's decision to support the "four ones" initiative and think that the UK should work with other major donors to the UN to find ways to provide incentives for UN agencies to increase their coordination through such mechanisms.

Leadership

72. In addition to improving coordination within the humanitarian sector, a need for improved leadership at various levels was identified by our inquiry. We heard about problems with the leadership of individual clusters, issues with the system of UN Humanitarian Coordinators, and concerns about the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator. Jan Egeland told us:

"the third leg of this three-legged humanitarian reform effort is really to have predictable leadership. Number one is predictable funding… The second is predictable response capacity… The third is predictable leadership and, as you have implied, no, we have not been predictable enough, we have been great in some aspects and with some people and not been great elsewhere."

SECTOR COORDINATORS

73. We heard about problems resulting from the poor leadership skills of some of the individuals chosen to coordinate clusters in Pakistan. These were mainly staff appointed by the designated cluster lead organisations (mostly UN agencies) from amongst their own employees. We were told that coordination meetings in some clusters were excessively long and poorly prioritised by cluster coordinators who lacked organisational and management skills. Some cluster members complained that cluster coordinators proved unable to step outside the organisational culture and priorities of their own agency when attempting to coordinate a variety of organisations. There were problems created by rapid turnover of staff. For example, we were told that there had been a series of 7 different coordinators sent by WHO to lead the health cluster in a period of just 8 months. We recommend that UN agencies give particular consideration to prior coordination experience and leadership skills when recruiting staff to coordinate clusters, and suggest that pre-emptive training be provided to staff who are likely to take on such roles in the future.

HUMANITARIAN COORDINATORS

74. In the event of a humanitarian emergency, the ERC appoints a UN official as the Humanitarian Coordinator, who is responsible for ensuring coherence of relief operations in the field, and who acts as the main intermediary between NGOs, donors and the affected country government. In practice it is usually the UN Resident Coordinator in the affected country who is appointed as Humanitarian Coordinator, and this was the case in Pakistan following the South Asian Earthquake.

75. We were told that some of the problems inherent in the Humanitarian Coordinator system were demonstrated in Pakistan. The UN Resident Coordinator in Pakistan had only recently arrived in-country when the earthquake occurred. He was made Humanitarian Coordinator, but unfortunately had little previous humanitarian experience. The secretariat appointed to support him was initially inadequate, except in the field of search and rescue. The first Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator was not appointed until approximately 5 weeks after the earthquake, and thereafter there was a rapid succession of individuals in the position. The lack of adequate coordinating capacity early in the disaster meant that steps were not taken then which might have mitigated problems later.

76. These views echoed several of the more general concerns we heard about the efficacy of the Humanitarian Coordinator system. We were told that a potential conflict arises when a Resident Coordinator tries in addition to take on the Humanitarian Coordinator role. The role of a Resident Coordinator is to build a close relationship with the country government in order to facilitate UN programmes on an ongoing basis. By contrast the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator is often to confront the government and to challenge the adequacy of its response to a crisis. Furthermore, the skills required to manage a coherent humanitarian response are different to those needed as a Resident Coordinator, and many Resident Coordinators have no prior humanitarian experience. Having no actual power to direct UN agencies, Humanitarian Coordinators have to fulfil a complex task by persuasion rather than formal powers.

77. Jan Egeland acknowledged problems with the Humanitarian Coordinator system. He told us of plans by UNDP to train a specialist cadre of humanitarian coordinators who would be deployed in areas vulnerable to disasters, or brought in rapidly once a disaster occurred.[113] We applaud this initiative. The issue which he first highlighted to us in November 2005,[114] of how to empower humanitarian coordinators, remains however. Giving evidence to this inquiry, Mr Egeland told us " Yes, in the long run there should be clearer [command] lines with a stronger humanitarian co-ordinator function. A humanitarian co-ordinator should be able to instruct more." We agree.

78. Giving humanitarian coordinators greater power over the distribution of funds, and accountability for their use, might be one method of strengthening this role. This is the intention behind the proposal to establish Common Funds at country level, outlined by Hilary Benn as part of his 2004 humanitarian reform agenda. Referring specifically to crises like Darfur, he highlighted the need for improved leadership at country level and strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator, to improve the effectiveness of the international response. A Common Fund is a multi-donor fund managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator for the humanitarian elements of the UN´s annual workplan for a country experiencing an ongoing humanitarian emergency. Joanna Macrae from CHASE, DFID expanded on the rationale behind the Common Fund:

"One of the huge in-built weaknesses at the moment to the humanitarian system is that we are requiring that humanitarian co-ordinators deliver the consolidated appeal behind which is the common humanitarian action plan. So we are asking them to deliver a strategic plan, but at the moment the way that we fund that is we say "Thank you very much for the strategic plan. Now we are going to cherry-pick all these little bits that we do like and fund those" in a completely project-ised way. Part of the thinking behind the Common Fund is to reverse that trend and to say "No, actually, we actually want to try and keep the integrity of that strategic plan" and to empower the person who is responsible for delivering it, the humanitarian co-ordinator, with the ability to exert some real leverage over the operational partners, in other words, to influence resource allocation."[115]

The first Common Funds are being trialled in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). We believe that it is currently too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the Common Fund initiative. It seems that Common Funds have the potential to improve the speed, coordination and prioritisation of the distribution of funds at a country level, and may have the additional benefit of empowering the Humanitarian Coordinator.[116] We will watch the progress of the trial funds with interest.

The Emergency Relief Coordinator and OCHA

79. Some of the reforms that have been proposed to the international humanitarian system, including the HRR, have involved increasing the powers of the ERC and UN-OCHA. These reform proposals see strengthening the body which already has responsibility for leading and coordinating the sector as the most promising way of improving the international humanitarian system. As we discuss in more depth in Chapter 5, the expansion of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) from a $50m loan-based facility to a $500m grant-based facility has already given the ERC greater financial powers.[117] Other reforms have proposed increasing the powers of humanitarian coordinators and the ERC to direct UN agencies.[118] However, these have been resisted by individual UN agencies.[119] Some NGOs are also reluctant to see the ERC and OCHA acquire greater powers. Nicholas Stockton told us that in his view the need for greater coordination within the international humanitarian sector had been overstated, and that UN-OCHA specifically contributed "very little value added" to coordination:

"You cannot do a proper humanitarian job without [management] resources. But, that does not mean to say that there is a justification, for example, for having a coordination body within the United Nations, which is generally considered in the field to have very little value added by those people who work in the field, which employs 700 international civil servants."[120]

80. The structure of the UN system, with each UN agency led independently, militates against the coordination of UN agencies. This is particularly the case in situations where these agencies are competing for the same pot of money. The witnesses we heard from UN agencies, including UNICEF and the WFP, were staunch in defending the remit of their own organisations, but less convincing in their declarations of the importance of coordination among UN bodies.[121] This demonstrated to us the difficulty of UN-OCHA's task in coordinating and leading the UN response to humanitarian disasters. Merely increasing the human and financial resources available to UN-OCHA will not solve the difficulties it experiences in fulfilling its role. We believe that the member states of the UN should press the UN Secretary-General to devolve greater powers to the ERC and his team of humanitarian coordinators, in order to increase their capacity to achieve their coordination and leadership remit.

STAFFING IN THE HUMANITARIAN SECTOR

81. Efforts to enhance leadership in the humanitarian sector will only be effective if the sector improves its ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of qualified and experienced humanitarian workers.[122] The irregular, intensive and demanding nature of humanitarian work often results in 'burn-out' and a high turnover of staff. This is particularly unfortunate given the importance of expertise and experience for effective humanitarian assistance. DFID acknowledges in its 2006 White Paper that there is a need to find more skilled and experienced people to work in emergency situations.[123]

82. UN staff often need to take on key roles in coordinating and delivering the international response to humanitarian emergencies on the ground, and deficiencies in their capacity to take on these roles can cause significant problems. One mechanism for overcoming such deficiencies in UN agencies has been staff secondments by NGOs and donors. We were impressed by the model of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), a non-governmental organisation which seconds its trained and experienced staff to UN agencies as necessary when emergencies occur. As noted earlier, DFID also seconds its humanitarian staff into UN agencies to very positive effect. In its written submission, the NRC argues that such secondments should not be the role of donor organisations:

"it is worrying that a donor has to take on such a role (or at all find themselves in a position where they have to choose whether to do so or not) — simply because the UN is unable, under-funded or unwilling to perform outside their agencies' programme mandates, confusing their coordination responsibilities with their own programme responsibilities."[124]

83. We understand these concerns and agree that there is a need for UN agencies to be more flexible in contributing to international responses to humanitarian disasters. Given the intermittent nature of natural disasters, however, it would be inefficient for the UN to maintain a large cadre of trained humanitarian workers on standby in all countries potentially at risk of natural disasters at all times. Consequently, we believe that the model of donors and NGOs seconding staff into UN agencies is a useful one. It depends crucially however on rapid and accurate assessments of existing capacity in the relevant agencies undertaken immediately after a natural disaster occurs.

84. The Secretary-General has set a goal of 50/50 gender distribution of UN staff and reports annually to the General Assembly on progress towards this goal. By mid-June 2005, 37.1% of all UN professional staff were women. As we discuss in more detail in Chapter 7, gender is a significant factor in the equity and efficacy of humanitarian assistance. Within OCHA women represent 50.3% of all staff, but only 40.5% of professional staff and just 31% of professional staff at field level.[125] We are concerned that the international humanitarian system is unlikely to be able to deliver humanitarian assistance equitably while its own gender make-up is unbalanced. We recommend that DFID urge UN humanitarian agencies to accelerate their efforts to achieve an equitable gender balance in professional staff operating at both headquarters and field level, as well as paying attention to the gender balance within its own humanitarian team.

80 The IASC brings together a range of humanitarian actors, including UN operational agencies, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), three consortia of major international NGOs, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the internally-displaced and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent movement. Back

81 Development Initiatives 'Global Humanitarian Assistance: Update 2004-05', (2005) Somerset. Back

82 See, for example the Synthesis Report of the Tsunami Evaluation Committee at www.tsunami-evaluation.org. Back

83 Adinolfi, Bassiouni, Fossum Lauritzsen and Roy Williams, 'Humanitarian Response Review: An independent report commissioned by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) August 2005', available online at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/ocha-gen-02sep.pdf. Back

84 The HRR has been criticised for examining the international response to humanitarian disasters without including national responses [ICVA talkback 7 (3) October 2005, available online at http://www.icva.ch]. Back

85 'A More Secure World - Our Shared Responsibility', Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, November 2004, A/59/565, available online at http://www.un.org/secureworld. Back

86 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all', Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for decision by Heads of State and Government in September 2005.Available online at: http://www.un.org/largerfreedom. Back

87 Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) (see footnote 83). The HRR's conceptualisation of the international humanitarian sector as composed of three systems has been criticised as an overly simplistic model 'What the HRR pictures as three vertical networks are, in reality, groupings of highly diverse agencies with very different structures for decision-making. Such a description comes close to being out of touch with reality in assuming that the NGO community works as one of these vertical "columns."' ICVA talkback 7 (3) October 2005, available online at http://www.icva.ch. Back

88 Susan Johnson told us that even coordination within the Red Cross/ Red Crescent movement was like "herding cats" [Q 338 Ms Susan Johnson, IFRC]. Back

89 Q 277 Mr Jan Egeland Back

90 Sectors where no significant gaps were identified were not included among the clusters, and would continue to be headed by existing lead agencies, for example the WFP on food. Back

91 The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), founded in 1962, is a global network of human rights, humanitarian, and development NGOs, which focuses its information exchange and advocacy efforts primarily on humanitarian affairs and refugee issues.ICVA is one of 3 NGO groupings involved in the IASC, the other two being InterAction and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR). Back