House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Seventh Report

7 Operational Issues

127. In this chapter we examine some of the operational issues which are currently subject to concern or debate among humanitarian agencies working in field contexts. In addition to receiving written and oral evidence on these issues, we heard about them at first-hand from the humanitarian practitioners we met during our visit to northern Pakistan. We have chosen to focus specifically on three issues:

first, the way in which humanitarian actors work with affected governments;
second, the relationship between humanitarian actors and military and civil defence actors; and
third, the question of whether humanitarian actors should label or "flag" their assistance.

Working with affected governments

128. Sovereign states bear primary responsibility for protecting and assisting the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders.[194] Humanitarian principles including the Red Cross/Crescent Code of Conduct, Sphere standards and the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative underline the primary role of affected people and their authorities in responding to disasters. Whether a natural hazard results in a humanitarian disaster requiring international assistance is significantly determined by the capacity and political will of the affected state. The nature of the role played by the state should inform the response by the international humanitarian system and the roles played by different actors.

129. Political interests can influence how crises are presented by the affected states, which may not wish to have crises within their borders labelled 'humanitarian disasters' as this would attract unwanted international attention. There is an additional concern that governments in countries facing slow-onset disasters may lack the motivation to take the necessary measures to avert them, which may carry a political and capital cost, recognising that if the culmination of a slow-onset disaster is conspicuous it is likely to attract international attention and far greater funds than at the pre-disaster phase.

130. The high level of cooperation from the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and the role played by the Pakistani military in the relief effort have been cited as key factors in the success of the response to the South Asia Earthquake in 2005, including the prevention of a feared second wave of winter deaths. Salman Shah, Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, told us that within two weeks of the earthquake the GoP had established the Federal Relief Commission (FRC), a new institution based within the Prime Minister's office charged with coordinating emergency relief efforts. The GoP then went on to establish a second ad hoc body, the Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA) with the mandate to plan, coordinate, monitor and regulate reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in earthquake affected areas. We heard that there were some problems with coordination and overlap between the two bodies; the FRC had a higher profile and was more dynamically led initially, while ERRA experienced some delays and was less well-integrated into the international humanitarian response.[195] We were impressed by the comprehensive plans for reconstruction we were shown by ERRA officials, and the programme of compensation which they outlined to us. We heard concerns from NGOs, however, about the administration of the compensation scheme, and the unrealistic nature of the timescale for the reconstruction programme. DFID officials expressed similar concerns, saying that the GoP was planning to rebuild in 3 years what would be more likely to take 10 years to achieve. They felt that ERRA was too focused on outputs and needed to switch to an emphasis on outcomes.

131. Despite these specific concerns it was evident that DFID was working closely with the GoP, and that the GoP appreciated this approach. Salman Shah compared DFID's approach favourably with that of USAID, saying that USAID had taken longer to get its relief efforts up and running, and had been more expensive because it had established its own programmes and used its own contractors, rather than working with ERRA. We support DFID's acknowledgement that: "it is important for donors to have working partnerships with the governments of disaster-affected countries, partnerships which respect and support local capacities rather than supplanting or cutting across them."[196]

132. In addition to the role of national governments, we heard evidence about the importance of the role played by local government and institutions. We were told that local responses to disasters are often overlooked by humanitarian actors, particularly in the case of sudden onset disasters.[197] A representative of Oxfam in Pakistan told us that the staff, records and offices of the provincial government and district health authority in Muzaffarabad had been decimated by the earthquake.[198] In such situations, support and capacity building for remaining staff is particularly crucial.

133. The need for donors to recognise and work through local and national government was one of the key messages of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition's final synthesis report. We support the TEC's conclusion and recommendation:

"As is often the case in the aftermath of a sudden and intense natural disaster, it was those directly affected by the calamity and those people in the immediate vicinity who were the first to respond…Yet the contribution of affected populations and local organisations are often overlooked by international aid agencies, private aid providers and the media. The international aid effort geared up several days after the immediate life-saving work had taken place. One of the biggest weaknesses with the international operation was its lack of understanding of the local context and its reluctance and/or inability to consult with and work through and with local communities, groups and organisations. This laid the basis for some inappropriate and poor quality programming which in some cases even undermined the progress of local initiatives. International aid was found to be more effective when provided in tandem with local and national initiatives. The key issue here is that of ownership. Aid works best when local communities and authorities have been consulted and are involved in the planning and management of programmes. Such collaboration creates an environment where responsibilities are owned by local people…

Recommendation: The international humanitarian response system needs to work much harder to understand local contexts and work with and through local structures… International agencies must respect the role and responsibility of affected states as the primary duty bearers and authorities in responding to natural disasters."[199]

Working with the military and civil defence actors

134. Although this inquiry has focused on humanitarian responses to natural disasters, our investigation has highlighted the increasing demands placed upon the international humanitarian system by complex and conflict-related humanitarian crises. In many humanitarian emergencies, whether generated by nature or by political forces, the role of military and civil defence actors has become a significant and sometimes contentious issue, for a number of reasons.

135. Natural disasters often occur in areas currently or historically affected by conflict or political suppression. For the population of such areas, military actors are often viewed with suspicion or fear. It may be difficult for affected people to accept the participation of the military or civil defence actors in the provision of humanitarian relief, when they have seen the same people acting with very different motivations and consequences. In such circumstances military and civil defence actors may simply be inappropriate vectors for humanitarian assistance and where possible their use should be avoided.

136. There are also gender issues relating to the involvement of the military in humanitarian aid provision. Ideally there should be a gender balance in the humanitarian actors distributing aid, but throughout the world military and civil defence forces are composed predominantly of men. Where military and civil defence forces are used to deliver humanitarian aid, this can cause problems in the equity and ethics of distribution. Women may be less willing or able to receive relief supplies from men, men may be more inclined to distribute aid "via" other men, and sexual exploitation is possible. Furthermore, although there are variations in the education and training which armed forces in different countries receive, and the emphasis is usually on military accomplishment rather than on the complex and subtle negotiating skills which are necessary to identify humanitarian needs and ensure equitable distribution of assistance.

137. During our visit to Pakistan we heard a lot about the important role played by the Pakistani military in the response to the South Asian earthquake. Most of those we spoke to acknowledged the need for the involvement of the military due to the extreme logistical difficulty of accessing many of the communities affected by the earthquake in remote mountain areas. The Pakistani military had the best (though still not complete) knowledge of the distribution of settlements in the inaccessible valleys affected by the earthquake. They also had the helicopters[200] and heavy lift capacity to transport people and aid supplies into these remote areas. This capacity was particularly important once the winter arrived. We were told that in the course of the humanitarian response, many humanitarian actors, including the ICRC, had worked to an unprecedented extent with military actors. Some of those we spoke to felt that a significant shift in military-humanitarian relations had taken place as a result of the disaster.

138. A number of NGOs, however, expressed reservations about the involvement of the Pakistani military in the relief effort. Their comments were focused on perennial concerns around "humanitarian space": the possibility that the neutrality of humanitarian actors could be compromised through association with the military, and that access to disaster situations could thereby be reduced or humanitarian actors endangered. Care International told us that, particularly in the early stages of the response, the Pakistani military had exerted "considerable pressure… to conduct centralised distribution of relief," and had "attempted to impose military escorts on CARE response teams."[201] The British Red Cross told us: "While recognising that it is appropriate in particular circumstances to reinforce the humanitarian capacity, we have concerns about the use of military assets becoming a 'default' position. We urge that this should be exceptional and a last resort."

139. A report from the International Crisis Group went much further in criticising international humanitarian organisations for their "embedded relationship" with the Pakistani military, commenting: "While civilian authorities and institutions usually undertake humanitarian relief, the military has, even after the initial emergency phase, excluded elected bodies, civil society organisations and communities and sidelined civil administration from the effort, as well as its reconstruction and rehabilitation plans… The willingness of donors to accept military directives and priorities, willingly or reluctantly, has also inadvertently empowered extremists and, if extended to the reconstruction phase, could further undermine the prospects of democratisation in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir."[202] ActionAid International told us: "the widespread use of the Pakistani military sidelined elected bodies and civil society organisations from the relief effort."[203] We support ActionAid International's recommendation that: "in order to support democratic processes in both rapid onset and complex emergencies the role of the military should be governed by parliamentary oversight."[204] Despite these concerns, the weight of opinion we heard during our visit to Pakistan was supportive of the role which the Pakistani military had played.

140. The British Red Cross (BRC) noted that one argument used to justify the use of the military in relief operations is that of cost-effectiveness, but that they have not seen any evidence about the relative cost-effectiveness of the military in comparison to humanitarian agencies. They say: "This is a matter that has been repeatedly documented in the NGO Military Contact Group, hosted and chaired by the BRC, and we have asked HMG to provide such evidence, but no data has been made available so far."[205] We recommend that, in the interests of transparency, DFID publishes any documents relating to its decision-making processes for logistics in relation to the humanitarian response in Pakistan to the South Asia Earthquake and in Indonesia to the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster. We would like to see evidence of the projected costs of the different options which were considered for the transportation and delivery of assistance by different actors, and the actual costs of the options which were selected, including how much was paid to military agents.

141. The OECD DAC Peer review of the UK found that: "Complications arise for DFID's mandate to provide principled humanitarian aid when the UK is part of the conflict such as in Iraq and Afghanistan…. While DFID's policy on humanitarian aid recognises the risks of compromising humanitarian principles, the FCO and MOD could further define their respective roles in civil-military operations and develop procedures designed to clarify such operations and protect the principles." We were pleased to note the commitment made in DFID's 2006 White Paper to "develop clear arrangements for using UK military equipment and personnel in humanitarian crises." We look forward to seeing the outcome of the exchange of letters between DFID and the Ministry of Defence on this issue. We recommend that DFID uses this opportunity to initiate the development of a joint FCO/MOD/DFID policy framework delineating the respective roles of each department, and that of the military, in civil-military operations taking place in the context of humanitarian situations. This framework should be based on existing best practice and guidelines identified under the IASC, and consistent with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

"Flying the flag"

142. The issue of flagging was brought to our attention during a visit to a village in NWFP which had been supplied with emergency housing by the Norwegian Refugee Council. Or at least this was our impression when we arrived in the village and saw a number of shiny new shelters prominently stamped with the logo and name of the NRC. We were later told, however, that DFID had funded over 50% of the NRC's emergency shelter activities in Mansehra.[206]

143. We accept that there are good reasons why DFID usually chooses not to "fly the flag" over the programmes it has funded and the initiatives it has supported. Often this is in order to increase a sense of ownership of the programme by the local community or national government, with the aim of building capacity and making the programme more sustainable in the long term. But this aim will be frustrated if DFID's partner agencies put their own "flags" on such programmes. We also accept that in some situations security considerations make it inappropriate for DFID to identify the programmes it has funded. We feel however that there are some circumstances in which it would be appropriate for DFID to identify its contributions to humanitarian assistance, as this could have a positive impact on perceptions of the UK in the countries concerned. We recommend that DFID reviews its policy on "flagging". DFID should stipulate that where the UK has provided more than 50% of the funding for a programme of humanitarian assistance to be delivered by a partner agency, that agency should not advertise its own name or logo in connection with that programme without also displaying DFID's name or logo.

144. During our visit to Pakistan we saw many instances of donors and NGOs displaying their name or logo on or around the projects they had funded. We were surprised to note that the vast majority of this signage was in English. We recommend that wherever possible, labels identifying DFID's participation in or funding of a project should be translated into the local language.

194 As outlined in Resolution 46/182 of the UN General Assembly: "Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory." Back

195 Refugees International Press Release, 'Pakistan: Housing a priority as post-earthquake recovery begins', 10 May 2006. Back

196 Ev 133 [DFID] Back

197 Ev 157 [British Red Cross]; IFRC 'World Disasters Report 2004' (2004). Back

198 There were political sensitivities over the provision of assistance in AJK because the Government of AJK wanted to be more involved than the Government of Pakistan would allow. Back

199 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 'Key messages: Tsunami Evaluation Commission Synthesis Report', (2006) p.1-2. Back

200 Although we heard that a significant proportion of Pakistan's helicopter fleet was not mobilised for the disaster response, being on active duty in tribal and border areas of Southern Pakistan.We also heard about delays in the arrival of UN helicopters to support the relief effort, although these claims have been refuted by the WFP (see Ev 188 [WFP]). Back

201 Ev 163 [CARE International] Back

202 International Crisis Group, 'Overview: Pakistan: Political impact of the earthquake', Asia Briefing No.46, (15 March 2006). Back

203 Ev 189 [ActionAid International] Back

204 Ibid Back

205 Ev 157 [British Red Cross] Back