House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Seventh Report

9 The relationship between development assistance and humanitarian aid

185. This inquiry has demonstrated a clear need for development practitioners and humanitarian actors to pay more attention to the linkages between their fields. Each field has the potential to contribute to the other to an extent which to date has not been fully realised. On the contrary, we have heard examples of development interventions which have ignored or even exacerbated vulnerability to disasters, and humanitarian interventions which have paid no heed to or which have even undermined long term development interventions.[313] The two fields operate according to different principles which they guard carefully, with justification, but these principles should not stand in the way of closer cooperation.

186. A study commissioned by DFID identified a number of constraints to a more effective relationship between humanitarian and development sectors.[314] These included:

The contrast between the visibility and media-friendliness of humanitarianism and development;
Humanitarians' focus on complex political emergencies at the expense of attention to vulnerability to natural hazards;
The 'institutional gulf' between donors' humanitarian and development sections;
Flawed assumptions that if development endeavours to reduce poverty then reduced vulnerability will necessarily follow;
Development professionals' lack of exposure to disaster risk reduction issues; and
Difficult questions over timing, criteria and mechanisms for transitions from relief to development modes.

187. Humanitarian actors and development practitioners need to stop treating natural disasters as one-off events and instead consider them as an integral part of the context in which they operate. As noted in a recent World Bank report, although most natural disasters are not predictable, they are foreseeable.[315] We know, for example, that: small island states in the Caribbean are prone to hurricane damage; Pacific Rim countries are susceptible to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions; low-lying areas on the Bay of Bengal are sure to experience periodic flooding; and, countries in sub-Saharan Africa are liable to experience erratic rainfall and drought.[316] Development and humanitarian actors need actively to recognise such realities, and do more to plan their operations accordingly.

188. In our view the concept of vulnerability holds considerable potential to bridge the gap between development and humanitarianism. Very often the root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions which combine to create populations which are vulnerable to disasters are the very factors which development actors are seeking to tackle in their projects and programmes in disaster-prone countries. Development actors need to make more effort to analyse and recognise the natural hazards which could potentially affect the countries and regions in which they are working. If they fail to meet this challenge they risk seeing considerable investments of time and money disappear in the wake of natural hazards.

189. Equally, humanitarian actors need to make more effort to move away from a reactive agenda and instead develop a proactive approach in countries and regions they know to be disaster-prone.[317] In these countries they need to invest in DRR and develop their understanding of humanitarian emergencies as resulting from particular manifestations of human vulnerability created by processes operating in both the short and long term. When disasters occur their engagement in this proactive agenda will enable them to understand better the contextual factors that influence vulnerability and consequently shape the impacts of hazards. This will equip them better to determine which humanitarian interventions will be the most appropriate and effective.

190. We are convinced that there needs to be a significant shift towards a much more proactive approach to disasters, in both the humanitarian and development fields. If development actors are to mainstream an understanding of disaster risk into their programmes more effectively, and humanitarian actors are to expand their work on disaster preparedness and planning, then donors will need to provide them with sufficient resources to do so. In Chapter 4 we discussed the evidence we have received about the lack of human resources in the humanitarian sector. In Chapter 5 we analysed the insufficiency of funding for the humanitarian sector. In Chapter 8 we set out the particular difficulties in attracting funding for Disaster Risk Reduction. Donors need to address these issues if humanitarian and development actors are to achieve the shift we advocate. DFID needs to begin by allocating 10% of its entire humanitarian budget to DRR and by increasing the funds allocated to reducing disaster vulnerability within its development programmes. The Department must also continue its advocacy to ensure that by 2010 all the multilateral agencies which HMG funds for humanitarian work are allocating at least 10% of their funds to DRR. In the longer term we would like to see the proportion of funds which all agencies spend on DRR rise beyond 10%. We are convinced that such investments will provide a substantial return in terms of reduced costs of responding to natural disasters.

191. In the course of this inquiry we have explored the transition between humanitarian and development programming. This issue often seems to be neglected, both at the start of humanitarian interventions — for example we heard about humanitarian actors not taking sufficient account of development interventions in the Sahel[318] — and at the end — for example we heard about humanitarian actors leaving abruptly when their funding finished in Pakistan. We have seen that, although the transition from disaster relief to recovery, reconstruction and development is rarely linear, funding frequently is.[319] The lack of long term predictable funding creates problems for the long term sustainability of interventions. Humanitarian actors should be encouraged to plan for the process of transition to development, either working through the transition themselves (where organisations are engaged in both development and humanitarian work) or engaging development actors as partners to deliver the development phase. Such plans must acknowledge that relief, recovery, reconstruction and development are rarely distinct phases and often overlap. Donors, including DFID, should be ready to recognise the value of such integrated planning and reward it with longer term, predictable funding. We believe that this would improve responses to disasters by reducing competition between actors, promoting coordination and improving working practices.

192. Collaboration between humanitarian and development actors is particularly desirable as it is likely to reduce instances of dislocated or conflicting programming. We recognise the contribution that DFID's Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU) is making to the integration of DFID's development and humanitarian planning in Africa. This was a contribution which we saw working in practice during our visit to Malawi in March 2006. We agree with the finding of the OECD DAC Peer Review, that DFID should examine the lessons which can be learnt from the operations of ACHU for its programmes in other geographical areas.[320]

193. We are impressed by the efforts which we have seen underway to reform the international humanitarian system. The degree to which the proposed technical and managerial reforms will result in positive impacts for populations in crisis remains uncertain however. Many of the reform initiatives which have been proposed are heavily reliant on the UN multilateral system and call for donors to channel large resources through mechanisms managed by UN agencies.[321] As we have discussed however, NGOs and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent movement undertake the majority of the implementation. We are concerned that this should not result in a middle level of bureaucracy without the value of this being closely monitored. The speed at which the multilateral system can find and engage suitable implementing partners in the event of any specific disaster will be critical in determining impact on the ground.

194. All reforms must take place in the context of a clear awareness of the nature of the international humanitarian system they are trying to create. At the centre of this system must be the populations who are vulnerable to and affected by disasters. As reforms are operationalised it is consequently essential that there is opportunity for dialogue, consultation and review, including input by recipient states and populations. Without this the success of reform efforts will be hampered.[322]

195. While pursuing this reform agenda we must also remain aware that the more efficient, equitable international humanitarian system we are seeking to create will only be as effective as political decision-makers will allow. Whether or not a humanitarian crisis results directly from political decision-making, very often it is political factors which are ultimately responsible for determining the nature and extent of the humanitarian response which will be forthcoming, "Averting humanitarian crises is also, therefore, unavoidably a question of political action."[323] The danger, as Jan Egeland pointed out in reference to the humanitarian crisis created by the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict, is that we are "perfecting the plaster on the wound but… not looking at the wound as such."[324]

196. Anecdotal evidence suggests that political and public support for humanitarian assistance is very robust and that support for development assistance is underpinned by it.[325] The political capital created by this public sense of humanitarianism has been enhanced by the huge public response to disasters during 2005 and the sense of confidence created by the process of reform underway in the international humanitarian system. Humanitarian agencies should not take this political capital for granted but should find ways of exploiting it to create the most effective response possible. This includes addressing the challenges of coordination created by the large number of actors involved in humanitarianism, and harnessing humanitarian instinct in ways which are useful and not counterproductive. As Global Humanitarian Assistance note:

"In development cooperation, years of development education and public awareness raising have resulted in a well informed, articulate constituency that demonstrated its political clout in 2005 with the call to Make Poverty History. Humanitarian awareness raising and education now needs to match the huge fund of good will and political capital that has been mobilised so powerfully."[326]

197. When opportunities arise, HMG should seize the opportunity to lead this humanitarian awareness-raising agenda. We heard that such a chance was missed in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster. In the face of rapidly rising public pledges of assistance through the DEC,[327]the Prime Minister made a public statement that HMG's funding would match public contributions to the disaster.[328] When the public response proved exceptionally generous,the Government allowed this commitment to fade away. There was certainly an adequate response to the humanitarian needs created by the tsunami. However, as the evaluation of the DEC response to the Tsunami pointed out, the massive public response to the disaster should have been an opportunity to promote dialogue on the issue of disaster 'bingeing'; the habit of the public to respond generously to certain disasters while ignoring others, and to encourage commitments to forgotten emergencies. We recommend that DFID works to promote understanding across Whitehall of the need for a rational and needs-based approach to disasters, so that HMG can work coherently to promote appropriate and equitable responses to disasters.

313 "For slow onset, natural disasters, a hurried humanitarian response can be counterproductive to longer term initiatives… In the case of the Sahel humanitarian response in 2005, rapidly responding humanitarians largely ignored the longer term context of human needs." [Ev 183 Mr John Scicchitano]. "According to ActionAid's research… there were also found to be poor linkages between the earthquake response and on-going development activities." [Ev 189 ActionAid International]. Back

314 Overseas Development Group, School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia 'Disaster risk reduction: A development concern. Scoping study on the links between disaster risk reduction, poverty and development,' (2005),DFID, London. Available online at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/disaster-risk-reduction-scoping.pdf. Back

315 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 'Hazards of Nature, Risks to development: An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Assistance for Natural Disasters' (2006). Back

316 Ev 186 [Mr Jean-Jacques Graisse] Back

317 Ev 197 [Christian Aid] Back

318 Ev 183 [Mr John Scicchitano] Back

319 Ev 217 [Merlin]; Ev 187 [WFP] Back

320 OECD, 'United Kingdom: Development Assistance Committee peer review' (2006), available online athttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/57/37010997.pdf. Back

321 Ev 195 [Christian Aid] Back

322 Humanitarian Policy Group 'The Currency of Humanitarian Reform', (November 2005) HPG Briefing Note, London: ODI. Available online at www.odi.org.uk/hpg.See also Ev 193 [Christian Aid]. Back

323 Ev 128 [DFID] Back

324 Q 314 Mr Jan Egeland Back