4. Memorandum submitted by the British
Red Cross
1. Ensuring that NEGLECTED EMERGENCIES remain
high on the humanitarian agenda of governments and the media is
a challenge. We welcome the attention DFID tries to give to such
forgotten crises and urge that this continues. Instruments for
quick resource allocation like the UN's Central Emergency Revolving
Fund (CERF) and the Federation's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
(DREF) are crucial for emergency responses (11.4; 14.3), but resources
are often lacking for longer-term recovery programmes (17.3).
2. The role of governments in ensuring understanding
of and support for NEUTRAL INDEPENDENT HUMANITARIAN ACTION is
paramount, particularly in complex emergencies where areas of
conflict and natural disasters fall together such as seen during
the Pakistan earthquake, the tsunami, and ongoing in Darfur (16.1;
16.2).
3. IMPLEMENTING THE LESSONS LEARNT FROM
EVALUATIONS in disaster response remains a challenge (12.8). Lessons
drawn from evaluations have enabled some significant improvements
in humanitarian responses, particularly around the assessment
of humanitarian needs and the timeliness and quality of disaster
response for rapid onset disasters such as earthquakes. However,
identification and implementation of lessons has been less effective
in slow-onset disasters such as food crises.
4. Ongoing efforts to REFORM the INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM must prioritise enabling an effective response
at the local level not least by strengthening mechanisms and capacities
for good cooperation and coordination. There is a risk that much
of the effort concentrates at the capital city level, and that
funds are channelled mainly through the UN system, yet the other
"pillars" of the humanitarian system (NGOs and RC/RC
Movement) are key elements for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
There is a risk that prioritisation of the CERF may lead to their
marginalisation at local level (14.2).
5. We observe a trend towards increasing
USE OF MILITARY ASSETS in response to natural disasters. While
recognising that is appropriate in particular circumstances to
reinforce the humanitarian capacity, we have concerns over the
use of military assets becoming a "default" position.
We urge that this should be exceptional and a last resort (15.1).
6. We stress the importance of donors and
agencies investing into both PREPAREDNESS for response and PREVENTION
of disasters. We are pleased to see DFID commitment to providing
up to 10% of its funding for disaster risk reduction (see 11.5
and 18.1). There is growing evidence that disaster preparedness
at local level pays off (17.1).
7. DFID plays an important and influential
role amongst the humanitarian community which we welcome. In particular,
its leadership in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHD)
has certainly contributed to the progress of that important initiative.
However, it is still difficult to gauge the impact of GHD as many
of the commitments made at the Stockholm meeting in 2003 have
not yet translated into routine concrete changes at the field
level (12.9).
ACRONYMS
BRC | British Red Cross
|
| CERF | Central Emergency Revolving Fund
|
| DEC | Disaster Emergency Committee
|
| DDR | Disaster Risk Reduction
|
| DREF | Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
|
| EWS | Early Warning System |
| GHD | Good Humanitarian Donorship
|
| HRR | Humanitarian Response Review
|
| INGOs | International Non Governmental Organisations
|
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross
|
| NGOs | Non Governmental Organisations
|
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
|
| |
BACKGROUND ON
THE BRITISH
RED CROSS
8. The British Red Cross helps people in crisis, whoever
and wherever they are. We are part of a global network of volunteer
based organisations that respond to conflicts, natural disasters
and individual emergencies. We enable vulnerable people in the
UK and abroad to prepare for and withstand emergencies in their
own communities. And when the crisis is over, we help them to
recover and move on with their lives.
9. The British Red Cross (BRC) is part of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the RC/RC Movement), which
comprises:
9.1 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
9.2 The International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (the Federation); and
9.3 more than 183 National Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies worldwide.
10. The British Red Cross is pleased to have the opportunity
to provide this written statement to the inquiry into Humanitarian
Response to Natural Disasters. We are responding to this inquiry
as the British Red Cross, but we refer throughout to work conducted
with, or by, other parts of the Movement.
RESPONSE OF
THE BRITISH
RED CROSS
TO THE
INQUIRY
Initial disaster response and the international humanitarian
system
11. How do INGOs, national NGOs, the media, parliamentarians
and the public influence DFID's decision-making and responses
to natural disasters?
11.1 We suggest that the following are key factors that
influence whether or not DFID responds to natural disasters:
11.1.1 The quality, accuracy and speed of assessments
on the ground provided by key actors, including the RC/RC Movement.
Quality information in principle allows donors like DFID to allocate
resources on the basis of priority needs. The balance between
speed and meeting humanitarian needs can be a difficult one to
ensure especially in a rapid onset emergency and occasionally
even in a slow-onset emergency. Reasons for this include significant
security constraints or the complexity of the crisis; for example
in 2002-03 in Southern Africa where the impact of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic upon household economic security demanded new approaches
of assessments.
11.1.2 The attention the media gives to a disaster. Arguably
the intense coverage of the tsunami, the crisis in Niger and the
Pakistan earthquake played a strong role in both the generosity
of the response of the British public as well as the British government.
We respect the fact that this is not the only factor in DFID's
decision-making. For example, despite low media coverage of the
current East Africa food crisis, DFID has been very engaged and
sought to contribute appropriately.
11.1.3 National/global politics: Examples include consideration
of big diaspora groups (the example of the Gujarat earthquake)
or—arguably—the response to the Pakistan earthquake
for reasons of global politics.
11.1.4 Good collaboration among the major players. In
this respect the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) plays an important
role in not only coordinating the fundraising efforts of its member
agencies but also in building up some momentum if not pressure
towards a response from government. During the tsunami a number
of governments—including the British government—appeared
to be scaling up their initial contribution in response to perceived
public pressure, the generosity of the public and the efforts
of NGOs and the Red Cross, rather than on the basis of an assessment
of needs.
11.2 Information on disasters from independent sources
like the RC/RC Movement is particularly important in situations
where DFID does not have its own direct field presence or access.
Examples include the 2005 South Asian earthquake, where DFID benefited
from information provided by the ICRC on areas where DFID had
no access, as well as similar quality information following the
2003 Bam earthquake in Iran.
11.3 There are also a few examples where the availability
of quality information on natural disasters indicates no requirement
for international resources to be mobilised. An example is the
timely Red Cross information provided on the 2006 mud slides in
the Philippines. In this case the response had been sufficiently
covered at the national level, and there was no need for DFID
or other donors working internationally to release funds. There
are also occasions when we think that DFID should have responded
but decided not to, for example the 2004 Eritrea emergency drought
appeal where we believe that there was a good assessment of needs
and an appropriate/robust intervention being proposed. Sometimes,
DFID may decide not to support small scale disasters, as was the
case recently with the floods in Romania. We recognise the bureaucracy
required by DFID to support small scale disaster responses, however,
such funding is critical and we believe DFID should maintain appropriate
levels of funding for small scale as well as large scale disasters,
particularly when funding from other donors is not forthcoming.
Therefore, as mentioned elsewhere in this paper, we would encourage
DFID to maintain and even increase support to the Federation's
DREF.
11.4 Given the important role media coverage plays in
attracting resources for disaster response, the humanitarian system
has a huge challenge in responding to neglected or forgotten emergencies
such as the ones in DR Congo or Northern Uganda. We welcome the
attention DFID is trying to give to such forgotten crises and
urge that this continues to be supported. One instrument available
for responding fast, at least initially to low media profile disasters
are central funds such as the UN's new Central Emergency Revolving
Fund (CERF). The Federation has for several years managed the
Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF), the basic model of which
is the same as the CERF and exists to ensure that National Societies
are able to respond immediately. DREF has been and should continue
to be supported with DFID funds especially given positive recent
evaluation findings with regard to its effectiveness.
11.5 The RC/RC Movement has consistently engaged in a
humanitarian policy dialogue with DFID, and in particular around
the importance of disaster preparedness and risk reduction which
is consistently highlighted by independent and multi-agency evaluations
and reviews. We are therefore very pleased to see DFID's recent
commitment to providing up to 10% of its funding for disaster
risk reduction.
12. Are lessons drawn from evaluations applied during
later responses? What impact has the Good Humanitarian Donorship
(GHD) initiative had on practices?
12.1 We have seen evaluation practice improve in recent
years and most particularly since the 1996 Joint Evaluation of
the Emergency Assistance to Rwanda drew public attention to recurring
issues. There are several positive examples where lessons from
evaluations have been clearly applied in later responses as documented
in the series of DEC multi-agency evaluations.
12.2 A regular finding from evaluations is the weakness
of needs assessment practice. These findings have been taken on
board by the Federation, which, with support from the British
Red Cross, has developed practical guidelines that are now being
used more systematically in disaster situations. We have, for
example, seen more systematic Federation needs assessments and
more rapid communication of data and analysis during the 2003
Bam and 2005 Pakistan earthquake response operations.
12.3 Another issue that is frequently highlighted in
evaluations is the need for better coordination. We have seen
better coordination among parts of the RC/RC Movement during recent
operations such as the Pakistan earthquake response both internally
within the RC/RC Movement and externally with the responsible
Government actors, other humanitarian organisations and Donors.
Moreover, UNOCHA under the leadership of Jan Egeland has been
making credible efforts to strengthen coordination mechanisms,
especially among governmental actors and donors. Of particular
importance is the need to establish clear agreements and mechanisms
for in-country coordination. Governments should continue to support
UNOCHA efforts in this regard. The RC/RC Movement is willing to
participate in such coordination mechanisms, while insisting that
its neutrality and independence must be acknowledged and respected.
12.4 We suggest that important progress has been made
in the humanitarian sector in recent years. Greater concern for
quality and accountability has had an overall benefit for humanitarian
responses. In the case of the RC/RC Movement, we see significant
improvements in the quality of disaster response, as documented
in various evaluation reports such as the 1998 Hurricane Mitch
response, the 2005 World Disasters Report—which says that
by end January 2005 the humanitarian system had ensured that all
affected persons had received immediate assistance—and the
British Red Cross Society's Tsunami learning review which emphasises
progress since Bam.
12.5 However, there is still much that could be done
to systematically review and implement the learning of lessons
from one response to another and donors need to be prepared to
support agencies in this learning. DFID sets a good example for
other donors in this regard, and has consistently offered support
to quality and accountability initiatives. These include the Humanitarian
Accountability Partnership-International (HAP-I), promoting accountability
to the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance through
self-regulation mechanisms, the Active Learning Network for Accountability
and Performance (ALNAP), a sector-wide network which aims to promote
a culture of learning across the humanitarian sector in order
to improve performance, and the Sphere Project setting out the
Humanitarian Charter, which describes the rights of people affected
by disasters, and the minimum standards and key indicators for
humanitarian response, developed through an extensive collaboration.
12.6 A particular challenge is to demonstrate learning
during an ongoing response. Our experience is that real time evaluations
that provide feedback to the concerned implementers as they manage
a response are a useful tool for learning and improving practice.
We thus recommend increasing usage of this tool provided that
it is understood and used appropriately by professionals with
demonstrated skill. Another challenge, particularly important
with real-time evaluations, is to communicate to the media and
the public complex messages from evaluations in an accurate and
intelligible manner, and to ensure that these messages are not
deformed, oversimplified, or used out of context by the media.
12.7 A specific lesson learnt—and an area where
operational practice needs to improve—is the importance
of involvement of and accountability towards beneficiaries. The
World Disasters Report 2005 gives a much-quoted example of some
beneficiaries receiving 12 cooking pots as a result of inadequate
consultation with beneficiaries in fast moving situations as well
as too little coordination amongst the involved agencies. These
situations happen too often in disaster responses. Despite progresses
made by humanitarian agencies, including the BRC, we recognise
that there is still much to be done in practice. We are encouraged
by DFID's commitments in that respect and hope to see DFID and
other donors providing support to agencies wishing to develop
tools and training.
12.8 Ensuring improvement of humanitarian response has
been more straightforward and more effective in situations of
rapid onset disasters such as earthquakes than in situations of
slow-onset disasters such as food crises caused by factors such
as drought but is often not just a product of one such factor.
It is more difficult to assess needs and vulnerabilities in such
slow-onset situations: these scenarios can not be understood through
"snapshot assessments"; they require more sophisticated
and multi-layered analyses reflecting on causes from household
to National Government level and the response should be both to
short-term as well as longer-term needs and vulnerabilities. We
are seeing this currently in the African food security crises
where all humanitarian actors are engaged in a complex analysis
of the causal factors and struggling to translate this into meaningful
appeals for funding and into actual humanitarian action. This
includes the difficulties of ensuring that the humanitarian community
speaks with one voice with regard to the severity of the situation
as was illustrated in the divergent analyses of the level of needs
in the case of the 2005 Niger food crisis. We recognise the challenges
faced by donors that are required to make funding decisions in
the midst of such complexity. We do not see quick fixes in this
context, and encourage donors to take the necessary time and make
use of professional expertise to better understand and define
an evolving response to such situations.
12.9 The Good Humanitarian Donor (GHD) Initiative is
an important endeavour on the part of donor governments as it
clearly articulates the commitments made by donors regarding the
funding of humanitarian aid, and in particular their commitment
to adhere to humanitarian principles. The RC/RC Movement has been
consistently supportive of the GHD and, though we see little new
in the avowed Principles and Practice, have been pleased by their
reaffirmation at Donor level and most particularly to the commitments
with regard to independent humanitarian space. However, it is
still difficult to gauge the impact of GHD as many of the commitments
made at the Stockholm meeting in 2003 have not yet translated
into routine concrete changes at the field level as most are still
being piloted in the 2005-06 work plan. Importantly the Red Cross
has benefited from DFID's commitment to the coordinated and harmonised
reporting practices during the last year and hope that the commitment
expressed by DFID and other donors in Stockholm can be pursued
and maintained. We look forward to seeing similar visible progress
on the other commitments and feel that DFID pursued these actively
as the recent Chair of GHD.
13. How useful have recent reviews of the capacity, effectiveness
and flexibility of the international humanitarian system been?
13.1 We are supportive of the recent reviews of the international
humanitarian system, and feels that it is appropriate that DFID
continues to follow this process. Much of the focus of discussion
since the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) has been largely
on the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the Cluster
system. Other recommendations from the HRR need to be followed
through. We are in particular concerned about paying more attention
to the need for strong country level coordination of humanitarian
response and about addressing coordination and implementation
weaknesses in situations where host governments may be weak and
or unwilling to co-operate.
13.2 The 2005 Report on Integrated Missions, [1]an
independent study commissioned by the UN expanded Executive Committee
on Humanitarian Affairs Core Group has highlighted some of the
challenges associated with integrated missions. While recognising
that integrated missions promote stronger coordination and dialogue
amongst different actors, the RC/RC Movement is concerned with
the uncritical use of this model in a growing number of contexts.
There is a particular "humanitarian dilemma" inherent
to most integrated missions, whereby the subordination of humanitarian
action to political or military goals means that populations may
perceive the humanitarian agencies as instruments of foreign policy
agendas. This translates into security risks for personnel working
in international organisations, and is against the fundamental
principles of impartial and independent humanitarian aid. This
is particularly the case in countries with ongoing conflicts or
violence, such as Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo.
14. Are proposals (including those from HMG) for the reform
of the international humanitarian system realistic and comprehensive?
Are they likely to affect the responsiveness of the public and
government to future humanitarian funding appeals?
14.1 We believe that it is too early to gauge the success
and effectiveness of the UN humanitarian reform as none of the
proposed reforms have yet been fully tested. The Cluster approach
was used in 2005 South Asian earthquake, but not during the first
few weeks of the response, and therefore it is not possible to
fully measure the effectiveness of the approach. However, we would
like to highlight a few issues that we believe are important.
14.2 There is a risk that much of the effort concentrates
at the capital city level rather than upon the actual field delivery
of humanitarian aid with daily meetings of different cluster groups
requiring key personnel present in the capital and inhibiting
travel to the field. It also encourages a perception (as expressed
by field staff in the Pakistan response) that donor accountability
and information flow outwards should be prioritised over beneficiary
accountability. There is a real concern about the overall capacity
of the "humanitarian system" to deliver and organisations
are often stretched, particularly at times of major disasters.
Ensuring that resources are not only used for reinforcing bureaucracies
and taking full account of local capacities appear important in
this context. Similarly, there are real concerns that funds are
committed mainly through the UN system, and that the two other
pillars (the NGOs and the RC/RC Movement) may not receive a timely
and adequate flow of funds.
14.3 As mentioned earlier, we welcome DFID's sustained
concern for forgotten emergencies. Supporting the CERF is a step
in the right direction—however, it is only up to a third
of CERF funds that may be dedicated to "forgotten emergencies"
and it represents a small portion of the overall humanitarian
aid flows. In 2005, more than half the allocations from DREF were
to fund response operations to small or minor emergencies for
which no emergency appeal was launched, often in situations where
donor interest is not forthcoming. The number of minor or silent
emergencies funded through DREF rose from 29 to 61 in 2005. Support
to DREF is vital, to allow the fund to continue supporting forgotten
emergencies, as well as to start up immediate response.
15. What should be the role of the military and civil
defence actors in humanitarian responses?
15.1 Hilary Benn's speech at the United Nations in New
York in January 2006 on "Humanitarian and conflict reform—an
emergency service for the world" refers to the vital
role of military assets in the provision of humanitarian assistance
after recent disasters. We are observing a trend towards increasing
use of military assets in response to natural disasters, for instance
in the responses to the Asian tsunami and the South Asian earthquake.
While recognising that it is appropriate in particular circumstances
to reinforce the humanitarian capacity, we have concerns over
the use of military assets becoming a "default" position.
We urge that this should be exceptional and a last resort, as
stated in the IASC Reference Paper[2]
and the OCHA "Oslo guidelines".[3]
The most important danger we see is that the neutrality (or perception
of neutrality) of humanitarian assistance may be compromised,
and as a result, humanitarian access may be jeopardised. This
is particularly true in situations of conflict or internal tension
such as Afghanistan, where the provision of humanitarian assistance
by some Provincial Reconstruction Teams may blur the distinction
between humanitarian and military action.
15.2 An argument sometimes used to justify the use of
military in relief operations is that of cost effectiveness. There
is to date no supportive evidence that demonstrates that aid by
the militaries is more cost-effective than by humanitarian agencies.
This is a matter that has been repeatedly documented in the NGO
Military Contact Group, hosted and chaired by the BRC, and we
have asked HMG to provide such evidence, but no data has been
made available so far.
VULNERABILITY AND
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
16. How do donors ensure that humanitarian assistance
is delivered equitably (in terms of gender, ethnicity, caste etc),
and does not exacerbate existing inequalities?
16.1 Impartiality is a fundamental principle of the RC/RC
Movement. It is clearly stated in the Code of Conduct and in the
Humanitarian Charter. This principle entails that aid "be
given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients
and without adverse distinction of any kind" (as stated in
the Code of Conduct), ie without discrimination. Similarly, the
Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative commits donor governments
to adhere to the humanitarian core principles of humanity, impartiality
and neutrality. It is the responsibility of both humanitarian
aid agencies and donors to ensure that these principles are adhered
to in practice. We support the use of the Code of Conduct as a
reference framework in recent DEC evaluations.
16.2 Humanitarian assistance has been criticised for
exacerbating inequalities, and sometimes conflict, and for "doing
more harm than good". The RC/RC Movement has developed the
Better Programming Initiative tool, inspired by Mary Anderson's
"Do no Harm" work, to analyse the potential impact of
programming interventions on social cohesion. This tool has been
applied in local programming in a number of contexts including
Nepal and Bangladesh. The "Securing Safe Access framework"
developed by the ICRC is also used in conflict-affected areas
to analyse how the Red Cross is perceived by various groups, and
the independence and neutrality of the assistance it provides
in order to ensure that national Red Cross societies can secure
and maintain access to those affected by conflict.
17. How can donors deliver humanitarian assistance in
ways which support the disaster response capacity of recipient
country governments?
17.1 Humanitarian organisations often overlook the importance
of the local responses, particularly in the case of sudden onset
disasters, as discussed in the World Disasters Report 2004. In
most cases, local populations, organisations and/or local government
are the first to respond to situations of natural disasters. It
is therefore very important to emphasise the need and challenge
of disaster preparedness at the local level. The 183 Red Cross/Red
Crescent National Societies around the world are key players in
strengthening the local response capacity. There are several success
stories that demonstrate that mitigation and preparedness pay,
as documented in the 2002 World Disaster Report: in four drought-affected
Indian states, the building and restoration of rainwater-harvesting
structures (check dams, and community and household tanks) has
rejuvenated local water courses and helped an estimated 20,000
villages to grow crops and maintain water supplies; the Bangladesh
cyclone preparedness programmes have successfully reduced the
number of victims as detailed below under 12.2; and in the 1999
floods in Vietnam, only one out of 2,450 flood- and typhoon-resistant
homes, built by the Red Cross, succumbed (WDR 2002 p 15). The
2005 IFRC South Asia Floods Participatory Action learning Study
showed that in Nepal, in villages supported by the Nepalese Red
Cross Society with community-based disaster preparedness, community
disaster funds were used to purchase food for up to two weeks
for those affected, which lasted until outside help could reach
the stranded villages; the same study showed that in India, investments
in stocks of basic household items and regional warehouses allowed
rapid despatch to 40,000 families in Assam and Bihar states.
17.2 It is recognised that inappropriate humanitarian
responses may negatively affect people's capacity to cope with
future disasters. For example, people are exposed to risks if
they are re-housed in unsafe places like flood planes instead
of more appropriate locations. Customarily funds come in two tranches
(relief/recovery). We believe that donors such as DFID should
plan for funding in three tranches (relief/stabilisation/recovery)
to ensure that recovery properly planned in consultation with
beneficiaries and national government and to ensure that issues
such as land rights properly addressed.
17.3 We believe that resource allocations from the international
humanitarian aid system tend to favour emergency responses, sometimes
to the detriment of longer-term recovery needs. This may reduce
people's capacity to cope with future disasters. Both Donors and
agencies need to demonstrate longer term commitment to recovery
and appropriate exit strategies.
18. Has an appropriate balance been found between investment
in disaster preparedness and disaster response?
18.1 We welcome DFID's commitment to mainstreaming disaster
risk reduction in DFID development assistance as outlined in the
recently launched Disaster Risk Reduction Policy paper. In particular
we welcome DFID's commitment to provide 10% of its funding to
disaster preparedness/risk reduction post-disaster Currently,
much more funding goes into disaster response, while only an estimated
5% is spent on preparedness.
18.2 In particular, we recommend that DFID provides support
to strengthen international and national capacity to mainstream
DRR as well as sustain and increase support to civil society organisations
that are supporting local disaster resilience.
18.3 In many countries, the RC/RC Movement is very active
in community-based disaster risk reduction work through its networks
and activities at the community level. The World Disasters Report
of 2002 references initiatives in Bangladesh, Nepal, Guatemala,
Mozambique, the Pacific islands, Vietnam and Iceland through a
range of mechanisms including early warning, appropriate housing,
mangrove planting and first aid and with a range of partners including
communities, community based organisations and local government.
The sustaining of such initiatives is a constant challenge and
requires continuing support from Donors.
19. Have early warning mechanisms effectively informed
decisions about intervention?
19.1 Great progress has been made over the past few decades
in national and regional early warning systems (EWS) for food
crises, including Fewsnet and VAM. Generally accurate predictions
of impending crises at national and district levels are translated
in to increasingly accurate recommendations for appropriate preparedness
measures and response interventions in times of crisis. However,
our experience is that early warning mechanisms generally fail
to trigger appropriate and timely humanitarian responses, particularly
in the case of slow-onset disasters. As experienced in the 2005
Niger food crisis, the response was not informed by the early
warning mechanisms or available information in place (the locust
invasion followed by a high food insecurity situation gave early
sign of a degradation) but by increased media attention.
19.2 This relative failure of early warning mechanisms
is due in part to the quality and type of information (often macro-information
that does not capture the specificity of particular sub-national
areas, or does not capture the complexity of livelihood systems),
and in part to the lack of willingness from the international
community to react in a timely and appropriate manner in some
parts of the world. It is also often related to the emergence
of new factors, such as HIV/AIDS in the 2002-03 Southern Africa
Crisis, which can complicate the analysis and lead to hesitation
about what an appropriate humanitarian response should be. This
is further complicated by the complexity of the international
system with a lack of shared understanding as to where the ultimate
responsibility for lack of timely response lies.
19.3 However, EWS are not only meant to trigger donor
response. They prove very useful in some circumstances to warn
populations of potential natural disasters. In the Caribbean forecasting
by meteorological offices for hurricane strikes is well developed.
In many cases this is well connected to national preparedness
systems to disseminate the information to the local level and
ensure that people are evacuated to safe places. For example during
Hurricane George in Cuba in 1999, a Category 5 hurricane, there
were only a handful of deaths due to a highly organised response
led by the government at national and local level. In Bangladesh,
deaths from cyclones have been drastically reduced mainly due
to the joint government/Red Cross early warning system which links
meteorological forecasts through an independent radio network
to local level volunteers who spread the message "the last
mile" to those affected and help them to evacuate. Deaths
have fallen from 500,000 in 1970 to 140,000 in 1991 and a few
thousand during the 1997 cyclone.
DEVELOPMENT AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
20. How appropriate is the balance between donor spending
on immediate relief work and longer-term reconstruction and development?
How successfully are transitions between relief, reconstruction
and development managed?
20.1 Generally, we believe that significant improvements
have been made in terms of responding to immediate needs, with
live saving responses, partly as a result of better and more systematic
assessment of immediate needs and as a result of better technical
response and logistics. We now intend to apply the same concentration
to improving the quality of recovery assessments, consultations
and response through capturing and communication lessons learnt
in real time in Bam, the Tsunami and Pakistan. Recent trends in
funding have allowed agencies more flexibility in recovery response
and will facilitate an increased quality of response. In neglected
emergencies the transition to recovery can prove challenging for
agencies as new partners with the required skills and experience
fail to arrive and the appropriate funding streams with the required
flexibility do not come on time or at all.
20.2 Donors are often constrained through their budget
lines and there is little room for flexibility to support recovery
work. Innovative financial models for resource allocation, with
budgets going beyond the constraints of financial years, would
be a useful way to give greater flexibility to the humanitarian
response in transitional phases. Often, there is not sufficient
flexibility in terms of allowing sufficient time for transition:
for instance, reconstruction work takes minimum of three years,
as experienced in the Asian tsunami response. The DEC Tsunami
evaluation noted that we ought to think of three phases, with
greater emphasis on recovery/reconstruction phase.
May 2006
1
Eide E B, Kaspersen A T, Kent R, von Hippel K, 2005, "Report
on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations.
Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group". Back
2
"Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies-an IASC
Reference Paper", 28 June 2004. Back
3
"Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets
in Disaster Relief", United Nations, DHA Geneva, May 1994. Back
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