26. Memorandum submitted by the Norwegian
Refugee Council (NRC)
1. THE ROLE
OF DFID
NRC's largest donor
DFID was NRC's largest donor (emergency shelter,
transitional shelter and camp management projects), while NRC
was one of the largest NGOs—assisting 500,000 earthquake
affectees and IDPs in the emergency phase. All NRC's core activities
were implemented: 1) Shelter 2) Distribution 3) Camp Management
4) Education and 5) Information, Legal Aid and Counselling.
Decision-making in initial phase
DFID quickly had professional staff present
who engaged with NRC on collection of information to base decisions
on. The inquiries from DFID staff were many and exhaustive, leaving
us with an impression that they stressed the importance of double
checking their information with multiple sources.
Decision-making on funding to NRC—our
ability to input and have frank discussions with the DFID team
left us with a feeling early on that we would engage with DFID
as partners, not just pursuing a regular distanced donor-relationship.
Donor coordination (between donors) in the initial
phase seemed erratic, it was not evident to us that it took place.
Key decisions and their impact on humanitarian
delivery/effectiveness
The main challenges to delivery in the initial
phase were logistics and that Cluster coordination did not work,
especially regarding the critical sectors such as Emergency Shelter
and Camp Management. UN helicopters were not operational for the
first couple of months. All NRC delivery took place with the support
of the Pakistani army and their helicopters, as NRC only worked
in very remote areas and above 5,000 feet—where we were
operational for up to eight weeks before we saw any UN or other
NGO staff.
DFID decided to second staff to strengthen the
Emergency Shelter cluster—which quickly improved the situation.
A caseload of one million people whose emergency shelter delivery
was delayed for two months because of lack of coordination were
addressed and could be dealt with in a systematic manner (UNOCHA
is the agency with a mandate to monitor functionality of the clusters
and support with secretariat if not working, the RCHC reports
directly to the Humanitarian Coordinator (Jan Egeland) on this
matter, NRC raised the problems of the clusters with the RCHC
in October and November 2005. Qualified OCHA staff did not arrive
in several field locations until January 2006).
DFID took steps to resolve the standstill in
the Camp Management cluster, engaging NRC, UNHCR and IOM in a
meeting to resolve our differences and get an agreement on strategy
which respected the IDP Guiding Principles and agree on terms
of reference for UNHCR as Cluster Coordinator removed from their
programme mandate which was at that time limiting the scope of
the cluster, excluding the majority of the internally displaced
living in camps. This agreement enabled NRC to take on camp management
responsibilities. Follow-up with funding and tight deadlines enabled
camp management agencies to deliver in time. (UNHCR and UNOCHA
are the principal UN agencies mandated to advocate applicability
of the IDP guiding principles, UNOCHA is mandated to coordinate
protection of IDPs and functionality of Clusters).
Further, DFID took decisions at a time where
logistics and pipeline problems threatened to delay delivery,
to engage directly on procurement. NRC and other NGOs distributed
shelter and NFI items directly procured by DFID, coordinated by
the clusters, utilising capacity in periods where our own pipeline
was delayed.
Coordination
NRC seconded a substantial number of staff to
the UN during the earthquake response, including WFP, UNICEF,
UNOCHA, UNHCR. NRC's policy of supporting the UN and coordination
mechanisms is also reflected in NRCs regular programmes, and significant
human resources and time from programme staff was used to support
the cluster coordination in the field. Unfortunately, on several
occasions, where UN Cluster heads had not been able to set up
effective mechanisms in the field hubs and NRC offered to take
on extra responsibilities, we did not receive positive feedback
from Islamabad level. Our cooperation with the Cluster heads in
the field was later very good and productive.
Support to UN agencies in their role as Cluster
heads soon became crucial, there was a general lack of resources,
staffing and knowledge. Lessons learnt on secondments is that
NRC continued seconding regular programme staff to its UN partner
organisations, and secondments did not reflect the need for support
to their role as Cluster heads. This because their requests for
secondments through Geneva did not reflect the situation and need
for staff, and NRC's own analysis of the effectiveness of our
secondments in the situation came too late, except for one secondment
to the Camp Management cluster. A dialogue at an earlier stage
between donors, UN agencies and NRC should have taken place in
the field to agree on a strategy for how to strengthen the Cluster
coordination bodies through more strategic NRC secondments. As
NRC cannot entirely dictate to UN agencies what staffing resources
they should request in a given situation, advocacy from a donor
such as DFID can be crucial.
The main donors (DFID, ECHO, USAid etc), decided
to continue their informal donor coordination and not institute
a formal donor coordination mechanism. Serious problems regarding
sector strategies and policies on Islamabad level, dysfunctional
relationships within the clusters between field level and Islamabad
and a range of other issues that should have been dealt with on
a higher political level such as the Cluster Head meetings in
Islamabad, with the DHC and the RCHC + UN country team, was not
dealt with in the proper fora. A monthly donor coordination meeting,
with a regular monthly consultation with the UN Cluster Head meeting
in Islamabad could have assisted in dealing with the lack of decision-making
on key policy and strategy issues. Because of the choice to keep
donor coordination informal, organisations like NRC, and the UN
agencies, were forced to approach the donors with issues one by
one. An informal structure also undermines the impact smaller
countries/ smaller donors could have through their advocacy compared
to ECHO, DFID and USAid. NRCs experience with donor coordination
mechanisms from other countries, such as Sudan, is very positive—especially
regarding keeping UN cluster leads and key stakeholders accountable
ie, DFID stressed the importance of the NGOs they funded to participate
and support coordination mechanisms without finding it useful
to hold themselves accountable to any.
Donor partnership
NRC has interacted with DFID, and thereby influenced
DFID's decision-making in several ways, through formal reports,
informal reports, frequent phonecalls and meetings on specific
issues as well as policy issues. On our requests, DFID has raised
some burning issues with key stakeholders, including the Pakistani
authorities. NRC appreciates that the relationship has been collegial
and one of sharing information, which promotes transparency both
ways (ie DFID being aware of problems in our implementation allows
a honest discussion of solutions).
2. HUMANITARIAN
REFORM AND
FUNDING APPEALS
We are yet to see a complimentary reform proposal
from donor countries that recognises the strengths, roles and
responsibilities of key humanitarian stakeholders. Lack of funding
to key UN agencies like UNHCR in an emergency situation can effectively
cripple implementing NGOs although the NGOs programmes are fully
funded. We rely on the UN for effective coordination, negotiation
and safeguarding of humanitarian space in which to operate, implementation
of their protection mandates, and UNOCHA to maintain their role
of supporting NGOs, in order to be fully operational ourselves.
Key factors in life saving sectors such as shelter, camp management,
water and sanitation, food should not compete for funding in a
manner that affects the UNs key functions in a negative way.
Lack of commitment and sense of duty to support
the Cluster model among a number of international NGOs has to
be managed. NRC believes that the Clusters can only function if
NGOs with capacity and expertise engage fully and comprehensively,
especially with a view to fill the gaps that will always be there
with regard to sector coordination. A joint strategy among the
donor countries to allow for a funding policy which supports organisations
who are willing and capable to engage constructively with the
UN on both Clusters and humanitarian reform is recommended. Such
policies could encourage strategic partnerships between the UN
and Non-UN to assist in overcoming some of the main challenges
of the cluster approach.
3. THE ROLE
OF THE
MILITARY
PAKMIL was made the responsible government body
for the humanitarian response, and effectively, our counterpart.
NRC distributed emergency shelter to 80,000
people with the assistance of PAKMIL the first months, before
we saw any evidence of an operational UN on the ground. PAKMIL
supported NRC with logistics (helicopters, trucks, animal and
human transport), security, coordination and information on remote
areas that had not yet received assistance, which was of crucial
importance to our operation.
With some initial resistance, NRC trained PAKMIL
on assessment and distribution methods and the Camp Management
Toolkit (developed by NRC in cooperation with UNHCR). They received
and used this training to good effect.
In several areas of operation, PAKMIL was essential
in promoting the presence of female aid workers, in other areas
no such support was given.
The presence of PAKMIL and the broad scope of
their decision-making undermined local authorities involvement,
and in the emergency phase NRC managed to have solid interaction
directly with beneficiaries, but not enough with the union councils
and community leaders. This was only rectified by organisations
themselves after the peak of the emergency was over.
The absence of UN leadership and involvement
on a policy and advocacy level left a gap PAKMIL filled, which
they cannot really be blamed for. As a result, our government
counterparts in the field still believe "humanitarian space"
is the space between the tents in a refugee camp. From this example
to dealing with the issue of forced return of internally displaced,
advocacy on basic rights and principles has become extremely difficult.
4. CONCLUSION—PRINCIPLES
AROUND ROLES
AND RESPONSIBILITIES
In conclusion, DFID played a very proactive
role in the coordination of the emergency phase, seemingly because
the UN did not manage to take on their responsibility or provide
leadership. This lack of leadership also allowed the PAKMIL to
take control over spheres the UN should have managed, making it
difficult to argue effectively for the principle of "humanitarian
space" or raise protection concerns at a later stage.
In the case of the South Asia Earthquake, DFID's
decisions and actions saved many lives at a crucial time. However,
it is worrying that a donor has to take on such a role (or at
all find themselves in a position where they have to choose whether
to do so or not)—simply because the UN is unable, under-funded
or unwilling to perform outside their agencies' programme mandates,
confusing their coordination responsibilities with their own programme
responsibilities.
There is nothing "wrong" with the
cluster approach as such. UN agencies had competent staff working
very hard to find solutions and manage the clusters in the field,
but there was a lack of key decision-making on resources, policy
and strategy at a higher management level in the UN. Basic coordination
tools and existing knowledge in OCHA were not utilised to support
Cluster lead agencies at an early enough stage. INGOs (and thereby
their national NGO partners) withdrew from the mechanisms, and
UN agencies were left without much needed support, which often
forced unilateral decision-making.
NRC actively supports and engages with both
the Cluster and humanitarian reform process, and will continue
to do so. We have recently entered into a strategic partnership
agreement with UNHCR. We are aware of the many weaknesses, as
well as the current efforts in UN agencies to reform, train their
staff in coordination and leadership, adding it to their new appeal.
The question is whether this process is going fast enough, and
whether it is comprehensive enough, whether the NGO community
will be mobilised to provide the support needed, and whether the
donor community will engage in a coordinated and constructive
manner.
June 2006
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