Examination of Witnesses (Questions 85-99)
MS AFSHAN
KHAN
13 JUNE 2006
Q85 Chairman: Ms Khan, thank you very
much for coming here. I know you have come specifically to give
evidence and we appreciate that. You have heard the earlier exchanges
and obviously the role of the United Nations, and the reform of
the United Nations is something that we are going to be interested
in, but perhaps just by way of some scene-setting from your own
organisation's point of view, UNICEF, could you perhaps just very
briefly give us an indication of how your work and your budget
is divided between humanitarian work and development activities
and indeed, whether there are tensions, in other words with the
situation we have seen recently with an increasing number of humanitarian
calls. Has this caused pressure on your normal development activity
and how do they interact?
Ms Khan: Thank you. I think first
and foremost it is important to remember that the "E"
in UNICEF when UNICEF was first started stands for "emergencies"
so the organisation was founded on the basis of very much an emergency
response after World War II. Increasingly, the budget has increased
in terms of being able to commit more resources to emergencies.
In 2003-04 more than a third of UNICEF's operations were in so-called
emergency situations or emergency countries. In 2005 we responded
to emergencies in more than 180 different countries. What we are
seeing is a shift, in that we are being called upon to respond
more and more in terms of natural disasters in particular. We
have seen an increase: the tsunami, the Pakistan earthquake, the
recent earthquake in Indonesia. What we are also seeing is a very
clear and strong public response to fund-raising for UNICEF in
emergencies. What we saw was a real shift around the tsunami,
where more than 50% of the resources started coming in not so
much from government sources but from the public, and the national
committees being a key component in being able to raise resources
for that. There are tensions in terms of how much does UNICEF
put towards emergencies versus its normal development role. One
of the key points to bear in mind is that UNICEF's presence in
more than 150 countries means that often at the onset of a disaster,
particularly in the sense of natural disasters, we are often the
first UN agency on the ground. That came up quite a bit in the
discussion, and in terms of local capacity building and working
with governments, having existing agreements with NGOs, there
is a comparative advantage from having that development presence,
both in terms of what could potentially be done with respect to
preparedness as well as in terms of the local agreements, with
understanding how host communities work, having a cadre of people
that you work with, for example, in the ministries of health around
immunisation, so if there is a need to surge, provide additional
support, measles vaccine being one of the first things we do at
the onset of a big crisis, there is a comparative advantage there.
I think in terms of the humanitarian reform and humanitarian response
review, obviously there have been additional demands placed on
UNICEF in particular, as cluster lead in nutrition, water and
sanitation and datacoms, but I also think that it is very important
to bear in mind three particular things. First, that that cluster
lead will imply additional resources and the development of additional
tools, and UNICEF is committed to working with its partners to
do that. We started much of that work on water and sanitation
with Oxfam, where we are working closely on a common platform
for the needs assessment, some clear establishment of standards
and some clear performance benchmarking. There is a lot to be
done to improve predictability, performance, and we are not trying
to shirk that responsibility but it is something that will take
time. Secondly, I think there was a bit of a misunderstanding
on the cluster approach. The cluster approach first of all has
some global agreements with lead agencies but I think the second
thing that is very important to bear in mind is the decision to
adopt those clusters and the definition of cluster lead is made
at the country level. So you will not always see the same cluster
lead in each and every situation. Uganda is a case in point. UNHCR,
because they have a limited physical presence in Uganda, the HC
has requested UNICEF to assume cluster lead in health and protection.
In other instances we are seeing NGOs, particularly DRC was mentioned.
So in some of the provincial teams in DRC it is actually the NGO
community that is providing the lead. Because of security conditions
in Katanga and other places the UN may not have the same type
of field presence. So I think the adaptability at the country
level, the leadership provided by the humanitarian coordinator
to be able to define what works best in a country is the key component.
Finally, in terms of cluster lead, I would also say that a key
element there is also to ensure that it actually leads to results
on the ground. The litmus test for the approach will not only
be what is the coordination mechanism or how many meetings have
been held, but what difference does it make, and that is where
I think the whole issue of performance benchmarking is very key.
Q86 Mr Singh: I understand what the
"E" in UNICEF means, but there are two kinds of emergencies,
are there not? There are natural disasters and there are ongoing
crises. What proportion of your activities and budget are now
directed towards natural disasters as opposed to complex emergencies?
Is there a strain, a dilemma there for you?
Ms Khan: First and foremost is
to remember that natural disasters do not pick where they occur.
The last two, amongst some of the biggest natural disasters we
have had, the tsunami, two countries were impacted, Indonesia,
Banda Aceh and Sri Lanka. Both of those were also ongoing complex
emergencies in terms of military presence, ongoing fighting in
Sri Lanka between the LTTE[6]
and government forces. So I think while we say we respond, we
respond to many different types of disasters. We have not disaggregated
how much goes to natural disasters because, in a way, that would
be somewhat artificial since we cover many different types of
emergencies. I would say many of our natural disaster responses
are actually done within the context of where the country office
takes a lead. India and Bangladesh are clear examples. Every year
there are consistent natural disasters or floods and that is why
I think this whole issue of preparedness, ensuring that local
communities are well aware, children in schools are taught what
to do at the onset of a crisis, is quite important. Some of the
larger disasters we have also seen have meant additional resource
requirements. Yes, there are challenges in galvanising those resources
and being able to sufficiently generate enough money to respond
effectively and there I think the governments that form part of
our executive board have been very understanding that they would
like to see a certain part of resources go to helping to respond
to a crisis, but it is important also to maintain focus on the
Millennium Development Goals. There are two issues here. One is
building enough flexibility into the ongoing development programmes
with governments. India is a case in point. We have actually negotiated
that part of our funds will be earmarked to respond to disasters
wherever they occur because they occur so frequently. Some of
that flexibility is quite important.
Q87 Mr Singh: In terms of your approach
to natural disasters, do you see yourselves as going in, making
a short, sharp, necessary intervention or do you see your work
as longer term in disaster areas?
Ms Khan: For us it is definitely
longer term. UNICEF is there before a crisis, is there during
a crisis and they will be there after a crisis. So in a sense
we really see three key elements: prior to the crisis working
very clearly on preparedness in terms of early warning systems.
We recognise the investment in that part is nowhere near where
it needs to be and that is partially a fact that it is really
hard to mobilise resources for preparedness. Secondly, during
a crisis we are able to surge up to meet emergency response needs.
Partly, that is a result of having been present in the countries.
If I look at Yogyakarta as the most recent example, we were able
to use existing stockpiles to help within the first 24 hours to
work with local government committees, et cetera, to allocate
resources to respond. Partly that is due to the presence. Thirdly,
in terms of the longer term, we will see the whole approach of
post natural disaster transition and working more closely with
the local communities to build back better as a key component
of our ongoing programmes, which has been going on, particularly
with the tsunami in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives, and
we will continue with that type of work in Pakistan.
Q88 Mr Singh: My final question is
how is UNICEF funded? Is it from private donations from the public,
is it from donors like DFID? Has your funding had to increase
recently because of the number of disasters? Thirdly, are you
ring-fencing budgets now to meet the future natural disasters
which are expected?
Ms Khan: There are three components
there. Firstly, in terms of our funding, it has had to increase
to meet the number of natural disasters, so we have actually seen
the emergency income increase significantly in 2005. We almost
raised $1 billion for emergency response. The bulk of that was
actually for the tsunami. Secondly, I think we are also clear
that the emergency needs depending on the scale are not equitably
applied everywhere. UNICEF is 100% voluntary funded organisation,
which means when DFID gives money to UNICEF—which it does,
it is a significant and important donor for us—it gives
that money not in the same way it does to other UN entities, where
it may be an assessed contribution, the Department of Peace Keeping
Operations being a case in point. So those voluntary resources
determine our ability to respond as an agency as a whole. Our
income for emergencies is largely raised through what is called
"other resources" so it is based on the consolidated
appeal that we give out with other agencies but also, UNICEF has
a commitment as part of its core commitments to children that
within the first 72 hours of a crisis we will issue a pitch document,
which basically identifies within the first two-week period until
such time as an inter-agency appeal can be launched what are the
immediate needs. Internally, UNICEF also has some resources it
can re-programme. Within its own country ceiling about 10% can
be moved around, depending on the amount, to respond to crises.
We have an Emergency Response Fund internally. Our board has currently
endorsed approximately $25 million for that, over a two year period,
but that goes very quickly. This year we are almost fully drawn
down on that, so it will be important to try and buttress that
fund. Agencies and NGOs have a similar type of fund. With respect
to your last question on ring-fencing, we have often seen that
for us the best way to get resources is what is called a thematic
humanitarian financing, and this is very much part of the good
humanitarian donorship. We have a number of key donors—Norway,
Sweden and a few others—who have given us thematic humanitarian
financing. That means getting the money early, it means non-earmarking,
getting it used for what the agency feels it is best to respond
to at any given time. That allows us the flexibility to give resources
towards under-funded crises that may not be on CNN or BBC, which
have an equal amount of need, and it also allows us to give one
report at the end of the year as to how those resources have been
used and for us that is the most flexible and the best use of
our emergency money component.
Q89 John Battle: I am generally favourable
to your work, to UNICEF's work. I chair an all-party group on
overseas development, where people come from all the academic
institutes, as well as the NGOs, as well as parliamentarians,
and the most of the focus for the last six months has been on
what might be euphemistically called the reform of the UN architecture.
Can it be pulled together in a more coordinated way? I just want
to ask you your views of how UNICEF is responding to that really.
What are your views of the Central Emergency Response Fund, for
example? Do you go with that, common funds pulled together for
specific disasters, improved, coordinated leadership? Hilary Benn,
our Secretary of State, in March suggested that there should be
what he called the principle of the four ones: one UN office,
one UN representative, one programme and one budget. Are you set
against that?
Ms Khan: Let me start, first of
all, in terms of UN reform, UNICEF recently issued a position
paper on UN reform which we would be happy to share with you afterwards[7].
For us, it is clear that there are some important policy changes
that are being made at the UN to see improved response as a whole.
I think we are committed to the idea of working with teams. We
have committed over the last number of years several people to
assume both the resident coordinator and the humanitarian coordinator
function, recognising that it is important to have a variety of
backgrounds within those positions. We have also even helped identify
NGO candidates who could assume those positions. So I think there
are instances where, if the country office is small and the resources
that pass through are relatively modest, we would like to ensure
that administrative costs do not exceed the costs of the operational
budget of the UN, and therefore the idea of having a single UN
presence but representing the diversity of the needs of that country
would be important. We strongly believe that all UN agencies should
have a clear understanding of what children's issues are, and
we would hope that the idea of a single UN presence would not
detract from that mandate for children and the importance of children
being part of social budget processes, recognising that in disasters
children are often the first to suffer in terms of separation
from their parents or other situations, and it is extremely important
to keep that focus. With respect to the CERF, I think it is very
important that there is some common predictable early humanitarian
financing, so we are very supportive of the fact that the CERF
grant facility allows for that. UNICEF was initially the largest
borrower from the CERF loan facility as well, because we have
often seen that we do not have sufficient resources to respond
to that crisis at the onset of the crisis. So some predictability
is important but what we also understand is that CERF is not a
panacea; it is not going to be able to solve the fact that in
many crises there are currently insufficient resources to meet
those crises, particularly, again, there was quite a bit of discussion
on Niger and the Sahel Belt. These are chronic nutritional under-funded
emergencies that will require a fair amount of resources far beyond
the capacity of the CERF. Similarly, with respect to the common
humanitarian funds. I think the policy intent of the common humanitarian
funds is good. The idea of having a single plan to which donors
pool resources to give a contribution is not a bad thing. The
problem is that the ability to disburse those resources and the
mechanisms to allow for timely and early funding, the mechanics
have not caught up with the good idea yet. So in a way, we really
need to see early financing, early distribution of resources,
if the intent behind those common humanitarian funds is that they
are able to be a quick response early on in a crisis. So we have
got to get those disbursement mechanisms working better to ensure
that funds come in at the beginning of the year, when agencies
are planning how they will allocate resources, and not mid-year.
Also, there is a real need to improve the whole processes around
how those pools of funds are managed, because right now they are
fairly complex. So if the idea behind it is good humanitarian
donorship of early predictable funding, then let us focus on early
predictable funding.
Q90 John Battle: With all organisations,
if there is a sense of merger, there is a fear that you lose your
character and identity, but in a word, would you say that UNICEF
is championing change or are you really hesitant and a brake on
change?
Ms Khan: I would say we are helping
move that change forward in a way that is predictable, in a way
that serves the best interests of children. I think we have had
some remarkable ideas in UNICEF. The whole idea of national committees,
being able to draw in public awareness around the development
issues—there is not a single UN agency that has that asset.
That makes sure that we have the ability to inform the public
on what is being done on development issues, it means we are able
to gain public support for a children's agenda and it means we
are able to influence government policies around what is important
for children. So I think there are some important lessons to be
learned from what UNICEF has done to help deliver and feed into
the UN reform process. I think that is very much recognised by
both the Secretary General and the high-level panel that is currently
working on UN reform. UNICEF has been asked to address that group
on a number of occasions, both in the humanitarian response context
as well as in the development context.
Q91 Chairman: When the Committee
was in New York visiting the United Nations there was an acknowledgement
that the organisation is 60 years old and there was a proliferation
of agencies, and they never seem to be rationalised or re-invented.
You said yourself: UNICEF's origins were post the Second World
War. Things change, and in the process of reform people say "Is
there not a time to organise things differently?" One gets
the impression that the bigger organisations, the ones who are
stronger on the ground, are actually saying "We are not very
keen on having our independence and autonomy diluted. We are the
experts", instead of saying, "Yes, let's reorganise.
Let's be prepared to put our expertise in the pot but do it differently."
In other words, there is a sort of imperial protection.
Ms Khan: I would hesitate to perhaps
use those words. I think what we have seen is a movement, perhaps
not as rapid as others would like. I think of UNICEF in terms
now of in southern Africa in particular, we have worked on a regional
alignment and a series of regional directors' teams that have
pooled assets and resources in terms of advisory groups around
UNAIDS, for example, around the whole AIDS agenda. So we have
seen some pooling of resources in terms of technical expertise.
We have seen some closer working together. I think, like any reform,
there is always some resistance. There are always some who feel
that perhaps things need to go more slowly, but I think what we
can say with respect to the humanitarian reform agenda is we are
committed to the process. We have helped by assuming a cluster
leadership role. We are working with others to help develop some
of the key tools that were felt were missing in a coordinated
approach to humanitarian response, the needs assessment, making
sure people understand and use the Sphere standards, better monitoring
of what is going on on the ground and better information sharing.
That it has not always been at the speed that has perhaps been
required by some of the key drivers of the UN reform agenda is
agreed, but for any institution that has existed as long as UNICEF
has, the reform process takes a little time.
Q92 Mr Hunt: May I start by saying
I am a strong supporter of the work that UNICEF does. But I hope
you will also understand that our job on this Committee is to
ask the difficult questions in order to scrutinise particularly
how UK taxpayers' money is spent. This morning we have heard quite
a lot of comments, quite muted comments but nonetheless comments,
where people have reservations about the effectiveness of the
UN. For example, we have heard about how in the cluster system
WHO and UNHCR are reluctant to be the provider of last resort.
We have heard how the UNHCR is in competition with UN OCHA over
their role in northern Uganda. There is a perception that the
UN is often very bureaucratic and slow to act through its agencies
in humanitarian situations. I just wondered what your view was,
whether that criticism was justified.
Ms Khan: I think our humanitarian
performance can be improved. There is always scope for improvement
in all of the things we do. I would hesitate to say that anybody
has got it right, otherwise no single child and no single person
would have died in any humanitarian crisis. I think the latest
crisis in the United States in New Orleans around Hurricane Katrina
showed that nobody is immune to having problems in responding
effectively to disasters, even one of the richest countries in
the world and which has the most powerful assets available to
it. Having said that, I think we have seen a concerted improvement
in the UN response. I think many of the colleagues that spoke
here spoke to a resource gap in terms of being able to adequately
address that crisis, whether it was UNHCR in northern Uganda or
others. I think equally that, if we get predictable financing
on an early basis for all crises, you would probably see less
hesitancy around provider of last resort. In fact, you remember
that the provider of last resort phenomenon is for up to 500,000
people in any one given situation, and it is not just the UN that
has hesitated. IFRC[8]
also spoke about it, IOM[9]
is also hesitating, because to be accountable for that without
being given the resources to be able to respond to that crisis,
nor the flexibility internally to move your own budgets around
to swing that kind of money in to respond to a crisis, is political
suicide, for lack of a better word.
Q93 Mr Hunt: Could I just follow up on
one specific comment that was made by the representative from
Medecins Sans Frontie"res? He felt that one of the things
that he would like to see much more of from UN agencies was much
more focus on actions and much less focus on meetings and discussions.
Ms Khan: Absolutely.
Q94 Mr Hunt: Could you tell me some
specific measures that you think could improve the focus on actions
by UN agencies on the ground in humanitarian situations?
Ms Khan: I think we could focus
one on the new humanitarian roll-out of the cluster reform process.
When we looked at the first evaluation of the cluster approach
in Pakistan, it was very much done on the basis of how many coordination
meetings were held, who was coordinating where, and was there
sufficient coordination in Balakot as well as in the context of
the capital, Islamabad. I think ultimately the cluster response
should be how well were we able to bring assets together to respond
to crises. I come back to the issue of clear standards, clear
performance benchmarks. I think the whole issue of performance
benchmarking in emergencies, having certain standards for what
will be done, is particularly important. So UNICEF has what it
has called its core commitments to children in emergencies, what
will be done in the first 24 hours, the first 72 hours, the first
six weeks. That kind of core commitment then allows us to be judged
against what we said we would do versus what we have done. In
not each and every case have we always been able to meet those
commitments, but at least we have set ourselves some very clear
targets to which we can be held accountable. So I think clearer
targets, clearer accountabilities, clear demonstration of resources
by donor partners to be able to meet those accountabilities will
improve humanitarian response performance and action.
Q95 Chairman: We heard before the
concern about doing that, particularly if you do it in one centre,
shutting out or making it difficult for smaller local NGOs. How
do you do it in a way—this is a bureaucratic point—if
you are a small NGO and you are on the ground you cannot be at
a meeting 700 miles away? How do you make sure those people are
not shut out?
Ms Khan: There are two ways of
doing it. One, you have seen in many developing countries the
use of NGO consortia, particularly in the south. The recognition
that perhaps the processes that are laid out not just by the UN
but by northern NGOs are far to difficult for some of the southern
NGOs to use in a way that is effective, so they have pooled assets
and resources to allow an NGO representative of the variety of
groups—and I think India and Bangladesh are perhaps some
of the best examples of this—to actually bring forward people
who will participate in the meetings, then go back to their constituency
and say "This and this and this can be done." I think
in natural disasters in particular local community assets, local
community NGOs, particularly after the immediate emergency phase
is over, are critical, because they are the ones that are going
to be present in those remote locations afterwards to help ensure
that there is sustainability and building back better, that local
priorities are clearly set. There will need to be some working
around perhaps using representation consortia, also some capacity
building in terms of what UN and other bilateral donors do in-country,
and some streamlining and simplification of our own procedures.
UNICEF is working quite a bit on that now, because we recognise
sometimes things are too complex, and there is a need to make
it less bureaucratic, easier to use. So we are pushing very hard
as part of our support to UN OCHA to see clear templates, a single
form for working, so it becomes easier for NGOs both to get resources
from other UN agencies as well as collaborate with us.
Q96 Joan Ruddock: I think you have
given us a very clear picture of how you see your own accountability
and how you are trying to make a whole variety of changes to improve
things, but I wonder if we can move from the theoretical to the
very practical. Water and sanitation used to be regarded as a
strength of UNICEF, and I just wonder how you see your role in
the cluster lead for water and sanitation and nutrition in emergency
responses.
Ms Khan: I think you rightly pointed
out that water and sanitation and hygiene, I would say, used to
be something that was very much a part of UNICEF's standard response.
When I joined UNICEF 20 years ago it was often one of our largest
programmes. I think what we saw was a gradual moving away from
that as many of the developing countries took on their own local
capacity for water and sanitation and were able to move in that
direction. What we recognised as part of humanitarian response
was that both malnutrition, often linked to inadequate access
to clean water and absence of hygiene, as well as absence of adequate
feeding, was often the number one killer for children. So UNICEF
recognised that, particularly in humanitarian situations, we needed
to increase our ability to respond more predictably in those contexts.
What we have done thus far in water and sanitation in particular
is worked with a series of NGO consortia and a couple of UN agencies
as well as IOM and others to build up how we do rapid assessment
to address quickly, within the first 72 hours of a crisis, what
is the current situation, map out what are the needs, what are
the gaps and map out who can do what to fill those gaps. That
is the first thing, the common rapid assessment tool that is agreed
to by all. Secondly, we have started doing a little bit of work
now on training, particularly so people understand what are the
Sphere standards and what needs to be done within the context
of a nutrition crisis or a water and sanitation crisis. So the
rapid assessment tool and standards. The third thing we have done
quite a bit on in the last little while is really trying to improve
our systems for rosters in expertise. We recognise that in some
crises we will be able to deploy people internally from UNICEF
from other offices, so, for example, in the Pakistan crisis we
borrowed from people within the region exhaustively. We have also
increased our collaboration with standby partners in particular.
That means technical groups, sometimes even DFID, who may have
additional resources or expertise which we can draw down on for
that period of emergency crisis, that allows us to build up our
experts in a technical area for a particular period of time without
making a longer-term investment in increasing the numbers of staff.
Thirdly, we have also increased some of our staff in water and
sanitation and we have a particular proposal through to DFID now
on capacity building which really seeks to address how we ensure
that within each region and at headquarters level we have sufficient
staff to mobilise resources at the outset of a crisis in water
and sanitation and nutrition, recognising that in our 150 countries
we cannot have a water and sanitation person in every place, to
try and use this hybrid mechanism of some additional staff, some
standby partners, better use of rosters, to be able to respond
to a crisis.
Q97 Joan Ruddock: Can I just ask
you to direct your comments particularly at your role as the lead
in clusters?
Ms Khan: The lead in cluster,
and that is why I started with the needs assessment, the first
lead role requires the needs assessment. The second will require
better training. The third issue will be stockpiles, which we
have looked at supply and what stockpiles are available globally
on the markets. Does UNICEF need to start stockpiling some items?
What would be some of the needs of key partners within a crisis?
Would those then be supplies and equipment that UNICEF would either
help provide or, if not provide, procure on a rapid basis? That
is the third element. The fourth element would be on helping define
some of the standards and performance to monitor more effectively
who is doing what. So as cluster lead, am I able to say that the
gap in Katanga province in the Democratic Republic of Congo is
sufficiently addressed to meet the minimum standards for water
or nutrition or supplementary feeding, and if not, who are the
additional partners that could come in to support that crisis?
That means an understanding of who are the NGOs that are operating,
what are the local resources and assets that area available and
if there is not anyone, would UNICEF have to scale up its own
operations to be able to meet that demand?
Q98 Joan Ruddock: It sounds impressive,
and it sounds, obviously, as though you have a very clear vision
of how to do that task of leading a cluster on water and sanitation,
but I have to tell you that the Committee is very concerned by
the degree of criticism that has been made by international organisations
of UNICEF's role as the lead for these issues. If I just indicate
to you the Humanitarian Response Review, which is UN OCHA of August
2005, said "UNICEF has not always fulfilled this role at
the expected level." The report on DFID's response to the
Indian Ocean disaster in March 2006 said that there was a patchy
sectoral coordination with particular concerns in the area of
water and sanitation, the UNICEF lead. Finally, the Joint UNICEF/DFID
evaluation of UNICEF preparedness and early response to the Darfur
emergency said that UNICEF was not fully prepared for or adequately
staffed to meet the magnitude of the needs. I am sure you are
familiar with all of those reports. I wonder how you actually
evaluate your own contribution, whether you recognise those criticisms
or whether you think they are valid?
Ms Khan: I think we recognise
those criticisms. In all of those contexts those criticisms need
to be taken within context. How would you like me to do it? One
by one? Because I think different contexts require a different
explanation. What is your preference?
Q99 Joan Ruddock: I am conscious
that the Chairman will be very concerned about the time of the
Committee, but I think if you give us perhaps some more generic
response as to how you rate your overall performance in this field,
which seems to us to be poor, to say the least, and then to add
to that, if you are able to without taking too much time, obviously,
what you are trying to do to put it right.
Ms Khan: First of all, you have
pointed to three different crises. I would think in Darfur you
are absolutely right. It took us a long time to scale up and,
once we did scale up, we were able to mount one of the largest
water and sanitation operations in emergency that has been mounted
in the last decade. So I think you need to distinguish between
early start and the ability to respond. Secondly, there is a clear
issue of absence sometimes of resources. I think in the Indian
Ocean tsunami, the resources were there. What we saw was probably
a very good response in Sri Lanka, where we had an existing water
and sanitation response, and not a strong response in Indonesia,
where we had no pre-existing water and sanitation programme. Thirdly,
I think the whole issue of being patchy in response is a very
fair one. When I spoke to the issue of what we are doing in the
cluster approach, it is partly to address that gap. When we talk
about why the cluster approach in the Humanitarian Response Review,
it was put in place because things were not perfect. If everything
was fine, we would not have needed the Humanitarian Response Review.
The Humanitarian Response Review clearly also identified areas
that needed strengthening. As I said, we have put out a global
cluster appeal now. We have put forward financing requirements
to some of our key donor partners, DFID among them, to see what
would be needed to be done to improve the predictability of UNICEF's
humanitarian response in water and sanitation, and part of that
is part of this capacity building proposal that is before DFID
now.
John Battle: UNICEF took the lead for
years on water and sanitation, and I think it was under the leadership
of Richard Jolly that UNICEF was the lead agency, not WHO, in
tackling polio, associated with water and sanitation. I just wonder,
is it a priority, water and sanitation, still or are you falling
back on it as a priority? That would be my impression actually;
that you think it has been done now.
6 Liberation Tigers of Tamal Eelam. Back
7
UN Reform: What it means for children, UNICEF, April 2006. Back
8
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Back
9
International Organisation for Migration. Back
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