Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 109-117)

MS JOANNA MACRAE AND MR MICHAEL MCCARTHY

13 JUNE 2006

  Q109 Chairman: Thank you, both of you, for your patience. There are some important issues that we want you to share with us. The Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, which is beginning to take effect, is one that is of interest to us. I suppose the first question we need to address is why was there a need for such an initiative, and why do we need to have agreed principles? It does imply that there is something wrong with a system that requires the creation of this. Perhaps you can first of all answer that.

  Ms Macrae: We have been hearing quite a lot this morning about how donor behaviour matters, and it matters in terms of how individual bilateral donors behave, so when DFID decides to respond to an emergency, it matters how much it is going to give and when it is going to give the money and on what terms it gives it. So individual donor behaviour matters but also the collective donor behaviour matters. I think Afshan has described very well how we have to look at not only what DFID decides to do but how DFID's decisions relate to those of the US and ECHO and Japan and Sweden or whatever. I think during the late 1990s and the early part of this century we were becoming very aware that donor decisions had a really big impact on both the quality and the quantity of humanitarian action in any place and at any time. What was interesting is that, in contrast with donor behaviour in other areas, it was basically unregulated. There were no standards or guidance that said "This is good donor behaviour and this is bad donor behaviour." And whereas in the development side the Development Assistance Committee to the OECD has huge swathes of guidance that exist with regard to how you mainstream gender and environment and how you engage in fragile states, there was nothing on humanitarian assistance. I think what donors came to realise in the lead-up to the conference in Stockholm in 2003 was that the volume of ODA being spent on humanitarian assistance was rising very, very sharply but there were no norms against which donor performance could be measured, on the one hand, and I think also whole agendas around harmonisation of donor procedures were getting greater currency more generally, so there was a kind of moment then when donors came to the view that it would be useful to have such principles to guide their behaviour both bilaterally and collectively, and by initially incorporating these principles into the DAC peer review process and, more recently, having them agreed as a reference point for DAC members, I think there has been an attempt made to make sure that humanitarian assistance is basically subject to the same level of scrutiny as the main part of development assistance.

  Q110  Chairman: It was endorsed by DAC in April of this year, which presumably has some significance, that DAC have picked it up, but to what extent are they encouraging or reflecting the way governments are buying into it? Is that trying to put more pressure for more to buy-in or is it an indication of the amount of buy-in we have achieved so far?

  Ms Macrae: I think it is a bit of a two-way street. I think what happened was that after the Stockholm conference there was . . . I think you have to understand humanitarian donorship objectively as being two things. One is a set of principles which were agreed in Stockholm and which we have been trying to get embedded into the normative regulatory framework of aid, and at another level it has existed as a forum for the discussion between donors of shared areas of concern, and that is really where issues around this alignment of donor procedures has been happening. For various reasons, that forum for debate has not been in the Development Assistance Committee in Paris. It has tended to happen much more from a Geneva base and as a series of ad hoc meetings at headquarters, I think in part because one of the achievements, I suppose, of the GHD initiative was to say that, although we think humanitarian assistance should be subject to the same expectations and professionalism that we subject development assistance to, it is by definition different, and so the perception has been up till now that there is a need for a slightly separate parallel strand for the debate of donor issues relating to humanitarian action, and that has largely been happening outside of Paris, with the exception of the peer review process.

  Q111  Chairman: What I find interesting is that of the countries that have bought in, it includes the United States, which is quite interesting because on development issues they definitely follow their own agenda. Is that partly because it is a fresh approach and a relatively blank script, or is it because the United States has a more genuinely common approach to the humanitarian response than it does to development?

  Ms Macrae: I think ultimately that will be a question that you would need to address to them, but I think maybe some of the answers to that will come out . . . One of the big wins out of the Good Humanitarian Donorship process is that historically—it sounds small but actually it is big—if you looked at the peer review process of the DAC, there was maybe a paragraph, which was very descriptive, on emergency aid. Now what is happening is that in the DAC peer reviews there is a huge ten-page annex which reviews in great detail donor governments' performance against GHD criteria, and in fact, next week I will be part of the DAC peer review team that will be investigating the US's compliance with those frameworks, so I will be in a better position to at least give a personal reflection on that in a few weeks' time. But their report will be available in December.

  Q112  Ann McKechin: Clearly, the GHD initiative needs to be widened out to a much broader constituency if it is going to be truly as effective as you hope. I just wonder to what extent it is a problem that non-DAC donors, you have to interact with them in terms of humanitarian responses, and also how you try to engage the NGO and civil society into this initiative as well.

  Ms Macrae: I think there is a recognition amongst those 23 governments who are now signatories to this process that we do need to broaden them out, to broaden out ownership of them. I think this is a relatively young initiative still. It was only signed up to in 2003 and here we are in 2006, so it is a relatively young process and I think the main effort till now has been in terms of making sure that there is understanding of what those principles are and ability to roll those out within that initial group. I think also, as the initiative, in other words, as the standing forum, we have been aware of the need to make sure that we are not duplicating effort and, for example, the OCHA donor support group has been doing a lot of work on reaching out to so-called emerging donors and part of that work is around trying to promote a more multilateral approach.

  Q113  Ann McKechin: I think there might be some concerns in the perception of the OECD as the voice of the northern countries of the world primarily, who would be seen to be setting the agenda without involving the integral voice or the southern voices in it. I am trying to see to what extent are southern voices able to be heard and contribute to that process?

  Mr McCarthy: Through the OCHA donor support group there have been some discussions with the G77 countries in Turkey and in Abu Dhabi recently this year. What we are trying to do is explain to countries such as Middle Eastern countries, which are significant supporters of humanitarian assistance, how we do it and to do it collectively around a single plan so that we are more effective, and the UAE are listening and considering these issues, as are India, Pakistan and Turkey and these other countries. Pakistan, for example, although it is all in its own country, is this year a significant supporter of humanitarian action, so it understands the benefits of a common plan because it has happened in its own country now. The OCHA donor support group is working with non-traditional donors to bring them inside the tent so that they at least look at what we are doing collectively. Whether they decide to join or not is another thing but it is a start. They have not been approached before and OCHA are leading this kind of momentum now, and as the Chair of the OCHA donor support group, we are taking over the process from the Americans. Sweden started it, the Americans have taken it forward, and we will take it further again with these non-traditional donors.

  Ms Macrae: Just to add on in terms of civil society, I think one of the things that we see this framework as doing is actually providing a framework against which the official donor community can be subject to scrutiny by civil society and by other bodies, including public scrutiny bodies. It is interesting, for example, that the National Audit Office in its report on DFID some years back was using part of that GHD framework in its analysis. I think in some ways it has been slightly disappointing perhaps that civil society has not more actively used these principles as a basis for dialogue. I think maybe the fault is both ways, that maybe donors need to be reaching out more to civil society but also whether or not civil society might be using this framework more actively. In some countries that has happened. I know, for example, in Canada there has been a very lively discussion between the Canadian NGO community and Canadian CIDA using a lot of the language in this.

  Q114  John Battle: It is one thing adopting the norms but the other thing will be measuring the progress really. How do you measure the progress? I wondered if the DAC consolidated peer review of humanitarian assistance threw up any significant issues that would take us down that road, so you can actually have a framework that not only adopts norms but actually tells us how we are making progress.

  Ms Macrae: Indeed. At the moment there are at least two ways in which progress at a collective level, if you like, can be measured. One is that, as part of the initiative, members—I keep using that word but you know what I mean; there are 23 governments that have been working on this—have as a group identified a number of indicators that it is using to measure progress against these objectives. For various reasons, the main focus of those indicators has largely been confined to the financing elements of the principles, partly because they are the most easy to quantify, as you can imagine, and what we have done is to commission an independent consulting group, Development Inititiatives, to use these indicators and to do two things: firstly, to comment on the robustness of those indicators from a technical perspective, is it possible to collect the data and how meaningful are they, and then the second thing that we have asked them to do is to plug in those data for the years 2004 and 2005. Their report on that will be published in mid-July as part of their annual report called Global Humanitarian Assistance. That looks at things like this issue of time limits, for example. There is an indicator about how much money was allocated to chronic emergencies in the first three months of the year, for example, and clearly, if what you want to see is a more timely response, we want early response to the consolidated appeals that are launched in January because money that is pledged in October is much, much less useful. So it is possible to measure those things. Part of the roll-out of GHD at a country level, which is very much what we are trying to do now, having tackled a lot of the kind of headquarters and big institutional issues like the DAC, at the country level we are also going to be working to refine more indicators about how donors should be working there. In terms of the DAC peer review, as you know, DAC members are reviewed every four years. Up until now we have had Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Portugal, the UK, Australia, and what has been very interesting about those is that there has been this very interesting synthesis document, and I think it shows quite a lot of commonality in a number of the issues. Part of what it is trying to do is both to identify areas for improvement but also identify areas of good practice. One of the things it has done is to encourage donors to develop new policies, to articulate how they are going to translate these quite high-level principles into their daily work, and we have seen quite a number of countries develop more GHD-compliant policies. I think there have also been quite strong recommendations to address the issue of inadequacy of humanitarian aid, to which a number of colleagues have referred this morning, and a number of governments were advised that it would be ideal if they could improve their total volume of humanitarian assistance. Quite a lot of thought about streamlining of budgeting. Again, I think this morning we have heard that one of the challenges for many agencies is that they are having to appeal to many different budget lines often. In the UK we are lucky because it is pretty consolidated within DFID but in many governments you have a bit here and a bit there, across government departments, so issues about streamlining of budgetary systems. I think in every single DAC peer review there has been an issue about how to increase our beneficiary involvement in the whole humanitarian cycle and how donors could increase leverage on that, and I think it is very interesting that that keeps coming up. So through that process I think there is quite a lot of leverage for addressing that issue more.

  Q115  Joan Ruddock: You were talking there quite a lot about process, and I realise this is all relatively new, but I wonder to what extent the principles of good humanitarian donorship actually result in good humanitarian outcomes.

  Ms Macrae: I think it is quite a complex causal chain that goes between the decision-making processes in an organisation like DFID and what is happening in Darfur. In some ways it is a fairly straight line about have we given any money or not, which will make a very big outcome. I think the question is how we measure those outcomes and what those outcomes are, and it is difficult to say precisely what the outcomes of the GHD initiative have been as a whole, but I think, for example, the GHD as a forum was very important in establishing CERF, for example. If you look at it in terms of an outcome to have a global fund which we hope will end up with more timely and better proportioned responses, that will make a difference. A lot of work we are doing at the moment is about, there is a big commitment in the GHD principles to so-called needs-based resource allocation, and it is to try and prevent, if you like, the tsunami effect, where you have massive concentration of resources in one part of the world, which, do not let us forget, that is not only money but when you have all that money, you are then sucking people and other kinds of assets from across the system. So what we would like to see is more equitable distribution of humanitarian action. So quite a large part of the work that we are doing is to try and think through how do we deliver that in practice, and we know that there are a number of the constraints to achieving that, and we want to work through those both bilaterally and collectively to make sure that we are living up to that commitment to more impartial resources. I think we do have some existing outcomes in terms of instruments, for example, in terms of CERF and the common funds. I think we have outcomes in terms of increased donor accountability. How we translate that on to the ground is still very much work in progress and is very much at the forefront of our agenda at the moment, as we try to roll this out more at a country level, and I think the outcomes should be about more timely, predictable and efficient funding, and I think, in a way, one of the problems at the moment is that—and I think you have all touched on it in your questions this morning—it is quite easy to blame poor performance in the humanitarian sector exclusively on donor behaviour. Our challenge is really to make sure that we are doing our bit and getting our behaviour as good as we can, and then the rest will have to come out of that partnership with the operational organisations.

  Q116  Chairman: Just on that, we have discussed international reform and we have discussed UN reform. How is this going to feed into that? If we want to use these principles to be, as you say, predictable but flexible, and we have a situation not earmarked, which is what UNICEF wanted, and we have a situation where DFID is expanding its budget but with reduced staffing levels, so inevitably having to use more agencies accountable through principles. How are these going to fit together, from your point of view inside DFID? Is this going to help shape a reform that will enable us, that is, the United Kingdom, to deliver our humanitarian aid efficiently and effectively and accountably?

  Mr McCarthy: I think the cluster system is an attempt to get away from this proliferation of UN agencies and focus on how to deliver, because there are nine clusters, and they are clear about what they are trying to deliver. The fault at the moment seems to be that you can have a cluster appeal but the response is to a UN agency. So it is a bit awkward in that you cannot fund the cluster; you have to fund the UN agency, and maybe there are two of them. In health, for example, it might be UNICEF and WHO who are making appeals through the cluster system. But I think these reforms and GHD, it is an attempt to try to give some coherence and make it a more manageable humanitarian response, because if you started with a blank sheet of paper, clearly you would not end up with the number of UN agencies that you have today. You would have something a little bit different, I would hope. So we are trying to work from the back end really by changing our behaviour and automatically require different behaviour from the UN system.

  Ms Macrae: I think that is right, and, just to add on to that, I think, in a way, with the reform agenda it is quite easy. There are lots of different elements of reform going on, and if you take one step back and say what are those trying to achieve? You have mentioned a lot of the key words around predictability and I think also increasing equity of response, this sense of the system not being driven by a variety of pressures, financial and otherwise, to act in some places more than in others, and this whole idea of delivering on needs-based, predictable but also coherent and more coordinated. The way in which we finance the humanitarian system will affect our capacity to deliver those. So just to give you an example, part of the reform agenda, as you know, is to strengthen humanitarian coordinators. One of the huge in-built weaknesses at the moment to the humanitarian system is that we are requiring that humanitarian coordinators deliver the consolidated appeal behind which is the common humanitarian action plan. So we are asking them to deliver a strategic plan, but at the moment the way that we fund that is we say "Thank you very much for the strategic plan. Now we are going to cherry-pick all these little bits that we do like and fund those" in a completely project-ised way. Part of the thinking behind the Common Fund is to reverse that trend and to say "No, actually, we actually want to try and keep the integrity of that strategic plan" and to empower the person who is responsible for delivering it, the humanitarian coordinator, with the ability to exert some real leverage over the operational partners, in other words, to influence resource allocation. So I think there is a very strong connectedness between the financial incentives that exist for certain type of behaviour and the ability to deliver those reforms and of course, part of what we are doing within the context of the GHD initiative as a forum is to think about those connections. As Mike has implied, we have, for example, used that forum as a mechanism for donors to exchange views about how to respond to the cluster appeals, because there are shared donor concerns around the way that those clusters have been designed.

  Q117  Chairman: If I may turn to my final point, is it the GHD leading towards helping to secure the right UN reform outcome, so that we are all working together and are the UN buying into that or are we in danger of finishing up with two parallel and competing directions?

  Ms Macrae: The objective is certainly not to end up with two parallel things. I think there is a recognition that donors have a very wide portfolio of which the UN is but one pillar, therefore we need to be able to manage that portfolio as a whole, but the idea is that we are identifying these areas where there is a lot of . . . The way in which donors behave will influence the UN's capacity to deliver on reform, on the one hand, but also donors have shared concerns around this agenda, and I think, just as in the development field we are trying to move away from 12 different donors pitching up and telling the government what it does or does not think about its development plans, part of what we are trying to do is to use the GHD forum to make sure that donors are sending more consistent messages to other Jan Egeland colleagues in the UN about our comfort levels, about where we would like to see certain improvements and also to communicate plans around funding.

  Chairman: Thank you very much for that. As you know, Jan Egeland will be appearing in front of the Committee, so we may be able to hear his views as well. I am sure we will. Thank you very much, and thank you for being so patient. That has been extremely helpful.





 
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