Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-235)

MR DAVID PEPPIATT

6 JULY 2006

  Q220  Joan Ruddock: So where you build on coasts is obviously an issue, and it seems to me not to have that built into the thinking now, when we know about it, really is some dereliction of duty?

  Mr Peppiatt: This is being addressed, particularly in the context of small island developing states. I know in the context of the Pacific that there is a real effort to integrate NAP, climate adaptation international development planning, and there are real efforts by a number of small island developing states in the Pacific and the Caribbean very much on land-use planning, on coastal planning, and so there are efforts underway. I just hope we do not have a growing community of climate change funds and climate adaptation NGOs and policies and the same on disaster reduction.

  Joan Ruddock: Precisely.

  Q221  Ann McKechin: You have criticised the PRSP strategies for failing to automatically incorporate disaster risk reduction. To what extent has the World Bank seized on the problem? Do they recognise it is a problem, is it something which they are trying to tackle, or is DFID just a lone voice at the moment saying, "You need to do something"?

  Mr Peppiatt: The World Bank certainly recognises the problem and is even benefiting from a little bit of DFID support to address that problem, and I think generally within the IFIs, the development banks, there is a recognition that development financing needs to really tackle disaster risk, hazard risk management. Where I see a real concern and, if you like, a dilemma—I think that this is a critical issue—is that the relief reconstruction and recovery industry is a booming, bustling business with more actors, not just the DFIDs and the NGOs and the humanitarian sector but the private sector, the military, and, as a result, I believe we are creating perverse incentives for many developing countries towards relief and reconstruction. I would perhaps challenge the view of the previous speakers. I think many of the poorest high risk countries do not have sufficient financial economic political incentives to invest in mitigation. The proof is that they do not borrow for it. If it was a priority, they would borrow money for it, but they do not. They do not invest in it. They do not see there are sufficient incentives.

  Q222  Ann McKechin: And they do not really tend to insure their properties anyway, because otherwise the insurance market would insist.

  Mr Peppiatt: I believe the international development system, particularly development banks, have a responsibility to provide more upfront financial incentives, whether that is better rates of development assistance, rewards for investment in mitigation, and so forth, just as there are incentives for insurance, and I think we need to look at a way, because at end of the day a poor country that is having to make tough development choices, long-term mitigation and prevention is seen as an unaffordable luxury.

  Q223  Chairman: I do not dissent from what you are saying, but it is true, is it not, that not all prevention mitigation costs money, so there would be some value in advising countries on things that are either low-cost or no cost. In Pakistan, clearly rebuilding with steel reinforcement in buildings costs money and is more expensive. Using lighter weight materials or changing a flat roof to a pitched roof does not necessarily cost any more money. Is there not some useful role in providing that kind of advice? If I take the tsunami or floods or whatever it maybe, saying, "Why do not you not build a little higher up and do your farming and your fishing at that level but do not live there", or whatever. Those do not cost money.

  Mr Peppiatt: Yes, and we need to provide more incentives like that. We also need to recognise, and I think it came about from some of the points in our earlier discussion, that a real challenge is that a lot of disaster risk reduction, the problem is it is a series of non events, it is not the high profile, high visible television capturing projects that will reward politicians, it is the long-term investment into reducing risk, and often that is very invisible, but we need to find, as a result, other incentives for politicians to really invest and take that responsibility for the safety of their own population.

  Q224  John Battle: I really want to follow up this thing about how to build in the whole business of investment in risk reduction. I am minded to reflect on the fact that in my constituency there is a prison; in real terms it is more expensive than the five-star hotel in the middle of the city per week for the people that are in there and I wonder whether we will ever get politicians, the process of political institutions, to invest in crime prevention, not as we usually use that term but investing in people to make sure they never end up in prison in the first place. Thereby, in the long-term, we would save money. Applying that analogy to risk reduction, if it is seen as a cost and not as an investment to get engaged in the whole business in anticipation to front-end load the money for the long-term, without it being spectacularly unpopular, how can you incentivise governments, political economic incentives, if you like? Do you see any way through that to gear up the systems?

  Mr Peppiatt: I think it goes back to what we were discussing earlier. We need to perhaps rethink, re-jig the way we do development to ensure that the proactive management of risk is factored into development, and we have to shift from reactive response in the way we deal with disasters to much more proactive prevention, and in that sense moving it away from the sort of disaster event to really factoring into development planning, into coastal planning, where people live, the way we manage natural resources. These are very much standard development practice, and I think you have to shift it away from the sort of disaster event which makes us more reactive in post.

  Q225  John Battle: Again, it is perhaps a rather anecdotal example, but there was a meeting in my constituency a few weeks ago of older people at which 60, 70 people, mainly over 75, were most worried about knives, because that was the headlines. I asked at that meeting, "Has anybody got any evidence? Has anybody ever been stabbed in this neighbourhood in the last 10 years?" Nobody knew of anybody that had been stabbed. A person at the meeting, a gentleman—there were only five gentlemen but many older ladies—said, "No, you are absolutely right. We have to get real about risk assessment and realise", and he turned to a whole group of older women and said, "You must understand that you have got a bigger risk of getting HIV/AIDS round here than you have of ever being stabbed with a knife!" I simply say to you that our assessment of risk so is far out, so skewed, do we ever get to the basics, and have you any evidence where development is starting to shift the agenda, can you give me any examples at all, to move the agenda on?

  Mr Peppiatt: No, there are. You talk about risk assessment. I think there is a greatly improved practice in assessing and identifying risk. Most disasters are foreseeable, and that is a very important fact, and if disasters are foreseeable, and most risks globally are concentrated in particular parts of the world, but also in terms of slow-onset, we know where many slow-onset disasters are occurring and will occur. If it is a fact, that disasters are foreseeable, they can be calculated for and factored into development. Going back to your point, there are countries that have acted on that. We can cite Bangladesh as an example of a country that has been very proactive over the last 25 years to really look at the way that development is planned and that risks are managed, even within impossible situations, with 30 million people living on the coastal belts in high-risk areas that will be flooded year in year out, but still taking proactive strategies to minimise the losses and protect the livelihoods within that situation. I also think, in your example, having a much better understanding and awareness of risk is a very important one. I think the practice of assessing and analysing risk is very well applied in the business sector, and I think we need to really improve the way we identify, analyse risk and then, if you like, take a much more prognosis approach to dealing with disasters rather than waiting always for the impact and then diagnosing the malnutrition or the damaged school. We need to have a much more prognosis way in the way we deal with assessing risk.

  Q226  John Battle: Where in Bangladesh is it getting bedded into the system? Is it among popular participants' groups, people's groups on the coastline, is it in the structures of the bureaucracy, and I do not mean that pejoratively, is it in the institutions of government, local and national, is it in the minds of politicians and the leaders of departments and ministers? Where is it bedded in?

  Mr Peppiatt: I think the two signs of encouragement are particularly the coordination between line ministries, and this area of disaster risk reduction is not just the responsibility of the Disaster Management Authorities or the Ministry of Planning, it is very much across department. I know that UNDP and DFID and a number of other international development actors are very much focused on trying to improve that coordination between line ministries. Then civil society is particularly strong at working at the local level. Where there is a gap is in the middle at local government and provincial state level, and I think across the board on many of these countries that is where we have not really made much impact and that is where so many of the decisions are made, within municipalities of major cities, within local governments, and there is a big challenge there.

  Q227  Mr Hunt: You started to answer what I was going to tackle you on, which is that if we are going to address having proper risk reduction strategies, you are talking about reaching essentially civil servants in really quite difficult places, the environment part of the state government in Brazil or the coastal agency in Kerala in India. I wonder whether ProVention has actually had success in reaching those kinds of people, what lessons you have learnt about the best way to reach them and what lessons the international community could learn about how to get the message through?

  Mr Peppiatt: To clarify, we are not an operational agency; we are a consortium and just provide a function as a global partnership involving the World Bank and other IFIs, a number of international development organisations, the private sector and academic institutions of whom perhaps many are acting at that level. So, I cannot say that ProVention has been at work at a country level with governments, but we support the work of the World Bank or the Red Cross and others who do. One interesting thing is the deliberate decision within the financial institutions to particularly target ministries of finance. I think for a long time in the subject of managing disasters we have tended to work with disaster management authorities and said, in terms of institutional building and civil servants, those are the ones we should target, but actually the key decisions are made within ministries of finance to prepare and plan potentially for disasters, and I think there needs to be a much more across the board approach. In the Americas there are some very encouraging success stories of the way the Inter-American Development Bank has worked with a number of countries, similarly across Bangladesh, as I cited, South Africa but beyond that in Africa I would really struggle. I think that an absolute priority is supporting the institutional building and good governance on disaster risk structure in Africa. It is a very alarming situation, the lack of progress on dealing with disaster risk in Africa. Yet, if we look at the last five years alone, the number of people affected by disasters has doubled from the previous five years, and that is set to escalate.

  Q228  Chairman: Ann McKechin made reference to insurance, or the lack of it, in poor countries. Certainly when we were in Pakistan, obviously we witnessed people who had had their houses destroyed and nobody had any insurance, and then there was a kind of, "Well, who would then be responsible for helping us?" The Government, probably not unreasonably, said, "We will give you all a bit of money and you can go back and build your own houses." They felt that would give people a focused resource. We met, for example, one gentleman in the camp who said, "I think the Government should build the house. I am not going back unless they build me a house." We tried to explain to him that that was not government policy. It raises the issue that, if there is a cost plan in it anyway, governments should be doing more about individuals who are poor actually getting into that kind of provision, because you might also, of course, make them a little bit more willing to pressurise their governments to build at that end if they are having to pay for it. Do you think that there is potential in this? We have information on the World Food Programme announcing that AXA Re has got the insurance contract, which I find rather intriguing. It says it is a $930,000 contract providing seven million dollar contingency funding to provide coverage in cases of extreme drought during Ethiopia's 2006 agricultural season. I am not an actuary, but that sounds like quite a risk. I wonder how successful it might be as a pilot scheme, but also how you think these things could work or could develop.

  Mr Peppiatt: I think insurance and risk transfer mechanisms can play, and particularly in transition economies already are playing, a very key role. In Mexico, Honduras, Turkey there have been a number of international support initiatives which have been very successful. The Turkey catastrophe insurance pool in response to the earthquakes is seen as a good example of an insurance solution to addressing seismic or earthquake risk. The real challenge for me on risk transfer schemes is in poor countries, where insurance is simply unaffordable. You will remember that in low developing countries less than 1% of households have insurance and less than 3% of businesses have insurance. The coverage at the moment is extremely low, so insurance schemes, or risk transfer schemes, need subsidising. However, it is interesting, seeing some of the experiences coming out of India on micro-insurance, where there has been very high uptake, and also across the Philippines, directly related to insurance for natural disaster losses, and I believe that insurance does have a key role to play. It is an area that the World Bank is investing in heavily in the Caribbean through an insurance pool. It is very complex when you start doing them regionally, but there are some success stories out there and it is one very obvious way to engage the private sector, who is an actor that we desperately need in this area of reducing and minimising risk.

  Q229  Chairman: Do you happen to know about this in Ethiopia?

  Mr Peppiatt: I know a little.

  Q230  Chairman: Who is paying the premium? Is it being paid for by individuals?

  Mr Peppiatt: Donors, bilateral donors.

  Q231  Chairman: Donors are paying?

  Mr Peppiatt: Yes.

  Q232  Chairman: What they are really saying—in a sense they are almost covering their own liability—"If there is a drought, we will have to fund out money, but actually by paying this premium the international insurance market will pay for it and we can use the money for other things"?

  Mr Peppiatt: It is a smart way of dealing with a predictable financial aid burden on an annual fiscal basis. I do not know how successful. I could not comment on its success rate.

  Q233  John Battle: I am picking up that there are insurance schemes that have operated in Turkey, which you have said is a model one, and also in Mexico and Honduras?

  Mr Peppiatt: Honduras.

  Q234  John Battle: Micro or macro?

  Mr Peppiatt: Those are more macro. On micro-insurance there are many emerging projects. A lot of these are recent developments in the last five years which have very much come from demand mainly on micro-finance institutions to extend their services to micro-insurance.

  Q235  John Battle: We could get information on that because it has been supported by the World Bank. They are funding that?

  Mr Peppiatt: Yes.

  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. I think it has been an interesting aspect, which, if I am honest, was not at the front of my mind when we started this inquiry, but that is why you conduct inquiries, to increase your knowledge. I know you have come here especially to give evidence and so thank you for doing that. If you feel you have any further comments to make, please feel free to get in touch with the Committee. We certainly value your input. Thank you very much for answering our questions.



 
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