Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100-108)

MR PETER HARDSTAFF, MR MATT PHILLIPS, MR STEPHEN RAND, MR PATRICK WATT AND MR SIMON WRIGHT

25 OCTOBER 2005

  Q100  John Bercow: It may well be that this is a case of the irresistible force meeting the immoveable object, and, if that is the case, so be it, but, if I may put it this way, that, from the vantage point of somebody who is keen on freer trade and gradual liberalisation, it seems to me that you want to object to one-size fits all when it suits you by saying the policies of the World Bank and IMF have been deeply destructive because they have been based on the supposition that a rigid market fiscal probity approach must be applied in every case and on an indiscriminative basis without regard to local or national circumstances, but where, if I may say so, your ideological prejudice is in favour of policy space by individual developing countries, you seem to think that in a sense a one-size fits all perhaps approach is appropriate. I do not in any way wish to do violence to your argument, but could I put to you that it would be good if there were a consensus that overall the objective should be to create a situation in which developing countries would gradually open up their markets—for their own benefit, not just for ours; not for some rich western capitalist benefit but for their own benefit—fully accepting, of course, that the pace at which that can realistically be expected to be done would significantly vary between different developing countries. Is there then some sort of consensus? Yes, it may have to vary a lot, but it is surely a good idea to have some sort of end-date in mind, because otherwise you are simply saying to that country's domestic base, "Don't worry, you will never face competition. You will not have to reform your practices; you will have no incentive to become more efficient," and in a way that seems to me an unnecessarily soppy attitude because in the end those countries will suffer if they do not reform, develop, improvise, innovate and become more efficient in the way that the rest of the world will tend to do.

  Mr Hardstaff: What I am advocating is not one-size fits all. It is for policy flexibility, it is for countries to pursue their own development path, whatever that may be. There are countries that have gradually, in their own way, liberalised—often under no pressure from the WTO or the international community—because that government thought it was a useful thing to do and in some cases that has yielded benefits. I am not arguing against that. Those countries have in different ways formulated economic policies, liberalised in different ways and also regulated. I am not in any way arguing against that. I question whether or not the WTO is the place where the pressure has come to do that. The problem that we see with the WTO is that generally we have arbitrary timeframes of implementation. Developing countries must implement X agreement in ten years or five years, and that obviously takes no account of their development circumstances and what actually happens in the intervening period. If a system could be constructed whereby, based on a range of development criteria, you have countries changing their policies over time, that is a whole different ball game. At the moment we have an institution that imposes arbitrary timeframes, and our own government, within the EU, is pushing for a level of liberalisation and implementation that I think will damage these countries.

  Q101  John Bercow: Within the Doha development round, is the G20, in your judgment—and I ask the team—a help or a hindrance to developing countries? Whose interests do you think it is defending?

  Mr Hardstaff: The G20 is, I think, a useful development because it basically demonstrates that developing countries are clubbing together. I do not think any organisation within Make Poverty History would disagree with that. It is a demonstration of developing countries coming together and putting forward proposals and opinions. In terms of who they represent, then the G20 represents the G20. I think that is a relatively basic statement. I do not think the G20 would purport to represent the rest of the developing world. G20 represents the positions and interests that the G20 can agree to, and then other groupings of countries come together to represent those interests.

  Q102  John Bercow: I suppose really the subliminal part of the question was whether, in representing the interests of the 20, it is acting in a way that is adverse to the interests of, for example, the G90.

  Mr Hardstaff: It will vary for different policies. It is impossible to say that, yes, they always will benefit all developing countries or they will not. It is such a complex negotiating landscape across the different issues that you cannot really argue that the G20 either represents everyone or is benefiting everyone or is not.

  Mr Wright: We have seen some very positive examples where middle-income countries have stood up for the rights of developing countries to access medicines under TRIPS agreements. Because Brazil and India have the capacity for manufacture, then they also have an interest in supporting developing countries to get those imported, so we have seen them weighing in on those examples. There are positive cases.

  Q103  Mr Hunt: I would like to move, if I may, on to HIV/AIDS. Obviously it as one of the great breakthroughs of the G8 summit that this 2010 goal was announced. Do you feel that DFID and the other G8 countries have any real understanding of the logistical challenges of getting anti-retroviral treatment out, particularly to Africa, and the fact that it is not just getting medicine out but you need to have a proper nutrition regime, a proper testing regime. Even that is difficult in a country like Kenya, but when you go to countries with less stable regimes it becomes even more of a challenge. Do you have confidence in UNAIDS as an agency that will be able to deliver on that? Do you have any sense about when they are going to publish their report and as to how they are going to get there?

  Mr Wright: I meant to jump in earlier really, when we were talking about the clear tangible successes from the G8 and those where certainly the campaign had contributed to their achievement. I think the commitment to AIDS treatment from the G8 was exactly that. It is something that was not strongly on the agenda before the campaign; at the end of the G8 it was there as a very strong commitment. That commitment has carried through. Some of the US amendments to the Millennium Summit Declaration appeared to try to take that out but it ended up in the final communique«, which was very good. Clearly, it is a very, very ambitious target and I think it is right to have set that ambitious target. One of the reasons why we could have some conflict about it has been that the "3 by 5" initiative from the World Health Organisation showed that it is possible to dramatically increase treatment access. It did not achieve exactly what it was working for—and we will find out at the end of this year exactly what their analysis of the year is—but the massive increase, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, in people having access to anti-retrovirals has been very successful and it has changed very much the whole environment of the debate. I did some work for this Committee about five years ago when it did an inquiry into HIV and the language we used about treatment then was entirely different. There was no conception that these life-saving medicines which were working in rich countries could possibly work in poor countries. Now it is very strong. The issue is about what they have put in place to make sure that the delivery follows that. We would see ownership coming from the World Health Organisation and from UNAIDS, but we also want to see the British Government carrying on the spearheading of this. It was a very important piece of work by the UK to make sure that it was in the G8 communique« and we would be concerned if we felt that maybe DFID were not continuing to take a very close interest in it. There is a blueprint being developed by WHO at the moment. They met last week and we would say that DFID's participation in that meeting was not adequate, it was not of the right level, it would not have shown the right interest in that meeting. There are a lot of questions. We are looking at funding, of course. We said the first test of that G8 would be the Global Fund Replenishment Conference held here in London at the beginning of September. Our view would be that that conference failed because it did not deliver the money that is needed, and is needed now, to set up the systems, to support healthcare infrastructures, in order to deliver that target. We have concerns about whether the G8 countries are going to follow through with that commitment and our campaigning is going to continue to push with that. You asked a question about UNAIDS and UNAIDS capacity. Particularly on treatment, it has been the World Health Organisation that has done a lot of the running on that—and that is probably right, that WHO take a particular interest in treatment. It must fit within a much wider package and UNAIDS from our point of view have given very good leadership, particularly on prevention, particularly on providing the evidence base for what works and the right approach. There are of course concerns at the moment that that consensus that existed for a long time about using evidence, about "harm reduction" approaches that were realistic about people's lives, is slipping somewhat under the influence of the US and what they call the PEPFAR[2] scheme, which has a lot of conditions attached to it for the 15 countries that have been identified as recipients of PEPFAR funding. We are starting to see some very worrying developments in particularly African countries that are responding to the very censorious moral agenda coming from the US around condoms, around sexual behaviour, the pushing of the idea of abstinence in a very simplistic way. What is worrying me most about that is that we are starting to see a response to that from African countries and African leaders who previously were listening to the UNAIDS consensus and we want to make sure that the British Government and the Europeans, along with other key allies, are continuing to be a counterbalance to what the Americans are doing through the international system. But the UNAIDS approach is one that we would back strongly, but I think they need support. Particularly for the treatment target, WHO will need funding from the donors, and they will need it put in place very early if the treatment target is going to be achieved.

  Q104  Ann McKechin: You mentioned your concerns about US policy in terms of prevention. Do you have a concern that the focus of the summits this year is on treatment rather than prevention? Could you give some comment about whether you think donors and also African nations are doing enough to tackle the gender issue in terms of sexual health.

  Mr Wright: I have mentioned this Committee's report[3] that was done five years ago. For a long time the consensus was that the only thing that is cost-effective, that is possible to be done, is prevention, that the only thing is to try to keep the next generations free from infection and that is all that can be done. Since then, there has been a worldwide movement for treatment, led on the whole by people with HIV in developing countries and responded to, perhaps quite slowly, by some of our organisations, but taken up in time, and a recognition that in countries where we are talking about perhaps one-quarter or one-third of the adult population being infected and therefore going to fall ill in the next few years, and countries where life expectancy has plummeted as a result of HIV, to ignore treatment would be a massive failure and would also damage the ability of communities to withstand poverty, to find the strategies that have kept families and communities going. So I think the shift in emphasis this year—and it did need a strong push around treatment—was absolutely right. I hope we are going to be in a situation where we can start to say now that there should not be any false dichotomy between the two, because it is not a case of either or. Prevention does not work unless you have the possibility of treatments to make people come forward for testing, to give people some kind of reason to disclose that they have HIV, rather than the kind of silence about it that drives the epidemic in so many countries. Similarly, treatment will not work unless it actually has a prevention element. If we are going to continue to have a number of people infected and keep people alive, then that becomes unsustainable in the long-term. I think the balance is right. We need to look at what is coming out of international institutions, out of DFID and the UK Government, to make sure they are taking account of that balance. If there is going to be an EU Development Minister statement coming soon, we want that to be very strong about a European evidence-based approach to prevention but it must also make a commitment to Europe playing its part in the delivery of the treatment target.



  Q105 Hugh Bayley: I think we have made some important progress this year on aid and on debt. But what we have are pledges, and it is important to turn the pledges into action both from donor countries and in the South; compliance with the NEPAD Programme; making sure the Peer Review Mechanism is a useful tool to improving development success. If I have a criticism of Make Poverty History it is that it all seemed so simple: it was only a lack of commitment or will on the part of western leaders that was stopping poverty being made history, and, yet, if we stop to think about it, even if we had achieved everything we wanted from the various meetings this year, it still would have been a 20-year haul to make poverty history. One of the things we need to do as politicians is to campaign, to go back to the lobbying, saying, "If you really want to make poverty history, you are in it for 10 or 20 years." I am interested in how we create mechanisms which hold the feet of our governments in the North, and of the developing countries, African governments, in the South, to the fire, to make sure they deliver on what they have promised. The executive branches' forum is the Africa Partnership Forum and I am not sure it has the teeth to hold governments to account, but it is the vehicle we have to build on and strengthen because it is the one that is there. What would you like to see the forum doing in terms of reporting and publishing information in its annual report which it says it will produce? What role do you think parliaments North and South should have in calling debates and holding their own ministers to account for performance in relation to the goals set? What role can your organisations play, particularly in developing countries, to build the capacity in African parliaments to get these debates happening more often than they do now. Some countries in Africa are doing a good job, but others really have a long way to go.

  Mr Phillips: That is quite a rich question, with quite a few angles in it.

  Chairman: You need not pick up on the first half, because we have had that discussion already.

  Hugh Bayley: I beg your pardon.

  Mr Phillips: Yes, we did talk about that.

  Hugh Bayley: Starting from what should be required of a partnership forum and what role can parliamentarians play in strengthening that.

  Mr Phillips: We are coming from a perspective of requiring governments to be held to account, and that is by both civil society and by representatives such as parliamentarians. That is our starting point. With my Save the Children hat on, we are dealing with empowering children to be part of that process. Children are very much excluded routinely from those kinds of processes—indeed, there are very few children who are parliamentarians: I do not see any around the table here!

  Hugh Bayley: We just behave like that!

  Mr Phillips: There are points about those who are not included through traditional structures who also have to be part of scrutinising governments in the South, as well as here, about the commitments that they have made. We definitely see that implementation gap between the high-minded paper commitments and the actual delivery. We do not look at the G8, for instance, as having a very strong track record of delivering their policies. We saw a whole debate opening up about the MDGs in the course of this year and have not seen an action plan which is going to be sufficient to achieve those goals. That is a real key implementation issue. Our whole purpose from the campaigning point of view has been to mobilise people to hold governments to account, and to press them to move forward as they need to on poverty eradication. Whether all those answers are going to be wrapped up in the Africa Partnership Forum, I very much doubt, frankly. That may play a specific role in terms of the specific components of what the G8 talked about, the Commission for Africa talked about. We will keep an open mind on that. If we are part of the process of civil society North and South, alongside parliaments, working with parliaments and challenging parliaments, if we are in there being part of that scrutiny and part of that is the report-back process, then we will have a lot more confidence in it than if we are not. We will be able to expose it to the light of public scrutiny and get communities to hold their governments to account much more closely if we are part of the process and part of the process of transparency. That is really one of the big asks of civil society in the South, that money flows from the North, that decisions that are taken North and South are in the end exposed to their ability to hold their governments to account and our ability to hold our government to account. As organisations, we are not going to go away. Make Poverty History is a very diverse set up, made up of unions, faith groups, NGOs, youth groups. A whole range of organisations are involved. Some organisations are present in the developing world; some are just acting in solidarity and partnership with the developing world. That leaves us a great deal of ability to exchange views, to keep track of what is going on. We are part of the process of holding to account and we certainly are going to be here for the long-run. But we do need to see real solid mechanisms coming from governments, and governments introducing those kinds of mechanisms which really are scrutinising progress.

  Q106  Joan Ruddock: Obviously you are talking about being around for a long time, but, if we think about next year, 2006, what would be your top five things that DFID ought to do and what might be your five top things that you ought to do?

  Mr Phillips: Perhaps I might ask colleagues to intervene on this as well. There are a number of key points. We have not yet had the big progress that we need on the trade issue. We have got the big ministerial coming up. We have yet to see what progress will or will not be made on that, so there is bound to be a whole range of issues around government approach to trade policy and about what the EU does in terms of trade policy and about what international progress is. I think that is going to be a package of issues which is going to come out there. In macro terms, looking at the financing side, we have not seen enough money in the course of this year being pledged and therefore the money that has come through has to work incredibly effectively for poverty eradication. If DFID now starts to concentrate wholeheartedly on pulling together international consensus on making aid much more effective, on tackling issues like conditionality issues, then it would be making sure that the resources that are there can be used effectively for poverty eradication and we can start to get that investment package in place to allow developing countries to have sufficient numbers of their population who are literate, healthy, able to be productive members of international business and so on and so forth. We will see progress made through the investment package coming through. We are going to need that strongly focused on effectiveness. I think there are going to be other macro issues in terms of looking at what could be done now, given that the international community has not pledged the policy change and finances sufficient to deliver the MDGs. That is going to be quite a big structural issue that we will want to look at. Perhaps I could ask for one key thing from each of my colleagues.

  Mr Watt: I am not sure how far we are towards five things for DFID to do and five things for us to do. However, one thing DFID could do—and it has taken the lead so far, but it has not really managed to secure the backing of a lot of the other major donor countries—is to build momentum and give teeth to the aid effectiveness agenda in the OECD DAC[4]. There was a series of commitments for the year 2010 made earlier this year—to improve aid effectiveness on a range of issues, from aligning aid with country budgets and procurement systems, to better coordinating aid, to untying aid—but those targets at the moment lack teeth. We have to move forward on that agenda in terms of tightening up the targets, ensuring that there is effective monitoring of those targets, and the data is published in a disaggregated way that enables civil society to hold donor governments to account for what they are doing in terms of the quality of the aid they are providing. I think that is going to be doubly important in the coming years, that if we do see an increase in aid, that we have an aid system fit for purpose that can ensure that aid gets to the right destination.


  Q107 Chairman: More aid effectiveness?

  Mr Watt: In terms of what we should do, I would suggest that we need to do more work in terms of building the campaigning capacity of the partners of the South, working with the partners in the South to ensure that there is a very strong campaign in countries, particularly in Africa, to hold governments and donors to account.

  Mr Rand: I am going to cheat, because my one point is that we need to make more progress on debt, and then I can very quickly list what that would mean. It means delivering the current aid; extending it (more creditors, more countries, more debts); ending economic policy conditions; a new process for dealing with debt for the future which takes human need into account rather than financial criteria; thinking about issues about odious debt and the repatriation of stolen assets needs to be moved on. Those are all in my one.

  Mr Hardstaff: Matt has summed up very well on trade policy and all conditionality. In terms of a sub-set on trade policy, hopefully this year, but if it carries over to the next year, the key thing is to drop the European Union's proposed benchmarking proposal in GATS and also greater flexibility in industrial tariffs in poor countries. In terms of what we should do, obviously scrutinising the UK Government as we have already tried to do, and then, as Patrick has mentioned, working with campaigners in the Global South.

  Mr Wright: Particularly for HIV, apart from playing a role in sorting out things like TRIPS[5], I think DFID need to balance their present country ownership with the extent to which they could be accountable for delivery of internationally agreed targets. It would be wrong to see DFID saying, "We got the target and then we handed it over to international institutions and you cannot judge us by its delivery. We will play a part." DFID is very, very powerful, very influential, and, particularly on the treatment target, because it is so new and so ambitious, it needs to get behind it, bring all the UK Government behind it, to try to make it deliverable. For us, it is what has already been said really: we need to keep taking the campaigners with whom we can communicate on a journey that deepens their understanding about how development must be achieved, how the changes can be achieved. They are not quick wins. At the end of this year poverty will not have been made history, but steps are made, steps will be made next year, and we need to take them further and keep them engaged, rather than it just being a fashionable one-year "white band" thing.


  Q108 Hugh Bayley: Chairman, may I go back to my question because I do not think there was any answer at all. The question was: What role should parliamentarians North and South play in progress chasing? Could we look, perhaps, just at the South. I am slightly surprised at your agenda but you have not mentioned parliamentarians at all. They are the people elected to represent the people of these African countries. What role should parliamentarians in Africa be playing to check on how aid is used; to check at whether it is used effectively; to look at conditionality, whether these are appropriate conditions or not?

  Mr Phillips: I am glad you reminded us on that, because I put a note down and forgot to answer it directly. In the North, one of the key things we would like to see is the continued momentum of parliamentarians behind the campaigning and using the platform that campaigning represents to keep the issues high and to keep the pressure on what the rich countries and donors can do. You as parliamentarians supported Make Poverty History in unprecedented numbers, frankly, in the period before the election, for which we are hugely grateful. One of the key things we would really like to see happen is for parliamentarians to be working with other parliamentarians, working together to demonstrate to the governments that parliamentarians are talking to each other and strategising with each other and holding them to account and sharing information. Those kinds of things are really crucial. Secondly, it is linking with civil society and making sure that civil society voice has the opportunity to get through, so that the parliamentarians make sure that the voices of the poor get heard in the debates in their own countries and that those voices are facilitated through their parliamentarians, getting directly through, and that those parliamentarians actually listen to those voices and they hear the incredibly strong weight of mass popular opinion that has been expressed in the course of this year. If it does not happen every year, you are not allowed to forget it. You are allowed to say, "In 2005 we heard this voice and that sustained us for an extended period," because it takes an awful lot of effort to get this number of people who have heard their voice expressed this year mobilised in a coherent way. We cannot do it every year, it has to be something exceptional, but we want you to continue using that and we want you to be building those links in connection with others. We do see parliaments as having an absolutely fundamental role in scrutinising in particular and in holding governments to account. We want to reinforce that, but we want to make sure the civil society voice is in there along with it, that they are not a forgotten part of the population, like children, whose voices get ignored in the course of the adult politicking.

  Chairman: It is the job of this Committee to ensure that it does not end at the end of 2005, and we do not intend to let it. We have had some fairly robust exchanges. There is agreement in this Committee that we want more aid and we want it to be more effective and we want to get solutions, but there is a clear need to ensure that we understand the mechanisms and the arguments and the intellectual rigour and the follow through. I think this exchange has been helpful to us. One particular thing I pick up from this is that you want us to put more pressure on DFID to put more pressure on international institutions to follow the lead that this government has initiated. I think that is something that we will want to take forward. Certainly when we are visiting these institutions I rely on my colleagues in this Committee to take some of your arguments to them and either get answers or get signs that we are helping to shift where we think it is relevant. The exchanges we are having with you and I am sure we will continue to have are really important to add into that. Could I say thank you all very much indeed.





2   The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Back

3   International Development Committee, HIV/AIDS: the impact on social and economic development, Third Report, HC 354-I and II, Session 2000-01 Back

4   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Development Assistance Committee Back

5   Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Back


 
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