Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
HILARY BENN
MP, LORD TRIESMAN,
MS JESSICA
IRVINE AND
MR JAMES
THORNTON
8 NOVEMBER 2005
Q1 Chairman: Secretary of State, thank
you very much for coming to see us. I am very pleased to see you
here, given some of the rumours that were flying around last week!
Hilary Benn: I am pleased to be
here!
Q2 Chairman: We are pleased to have
you here. Perhaps you could, first of all, introduce your team
and your colleagues to us?
Hilary Benn: Yes, indeed. I have
Lord Triesman, the Minister from the FCO, on my right, and Jessica
Irvine, Head of the Sudan Unit, and James Thornton on my far right.
Q3 Chairman: Thank you, also, for
agreeing to give us a little bit of an update on the Pakistan
situation before we take evidence on Darfur. Just briefly, the
weekend news was that the death rate was heading towards 100,000,
or seems to be getting close to that figure, and the point of
concern was that the international agencies are saying they are
actually short of money to do things now. I know you have been
following the situation closely, and I wondered if you could give
us an indication, first of all, of what your current take on that
is and, I suppose, specifically, what we, the UK Government, are
doing? Also, in the Presidency of the EU, there seems to be a
shortfall amongst some of our EU partners who could be doing more
as the UK Presidency did to co-ordinate the EU response.
Hilary Benn: Thank you very much
indeed. The current situation is indeed that the death toll continues
to rise. I think it will be sometime yet before we finally know
exactly how many people were killed and injured in this terrible
catastrophe. We are, as many people have said, currently engaged
in a race against time to bring, in particular, shelter and warmth
to those who have lost everything—in particular their homes.
Although the numbers who are coming down from the hillsides is
reducing, there has been a very large operation, certainly in
the first couple of weeks, to airlift the most seriously injured
out to Islamabad and elsewhere to receive treatment. There have,
sadly, been a considerable number of amputations, people had limbs
that were damaged by the earthquake and then gangrene set in and
medical care is now being provided for the less severely injured
in areas that people can get access to. The task of trying to
get access to all of the parts affected continues (you have the
Jehlum Valley and the Neelum Valley), and the Government of Pakistan,
and the military in particular, are trying to clear those roads
and there is now this huge helicopter operation taking supplies
up to the main towns. As the Select Committee will know, I was
there two and a half weeks ago and went to Muzaffarabad and Rawalakot
and I must say it really brings home to one just how difficult
an operation it is because I saw with my own eyes just how difficult
the terrain is. As far as shelter is concerned, it seems now as
if there are enough tents in the pipeline, provided they can be
got to people where they are. The UN and the aid agencies, the
Government of Pakistan, are pursuing a number of different approaches.
One is to provide winter tents. The other approach is to give
people materials to enable them, if they are able—physically
capable—and if they can be reached, either to rebuild their
homes or to provide what is known as a "warm room" ie
somewhere that families will be able to live in and keep warm
in during the course of the very harsh winter which is on its
way, or, if that is not possible, to bring people down to camps
that are being provided at the lower levels, although because
of the topography there is not a lot of flat space on which to
build those camps, and there is also a problem of clearing the
rubble of the houses in the towns, as I saw for myself in Muzaffarabad
and Rawalakot. In Rawalakot almost every building has been destroyed;
in Muzaffarabad less so, but a lot of the houses and buildings
there have been severely damaged and people, understandably, are
reluctant to go in. As far as funding is concerned, yes, I wish
there was now more of a response. I briefed European Union Development
Ministers on my return with Jan Egeland when we met in Leeds for
the EU informal, and I am just in the process of writing again
to EU ministers to say: "Come on, we need more funding in
the international system in order to support the operation".
Britain, we have, as you know, pledged £33 million and almost
all of that is now committed in some shape or form and we will
do more if that is required. When, not last Friday but the Friday
before, the UN announced that their helicopters were at risk of
stopping operating because of a shortage of funds, the following
day I took a decision to provide £1.5 million for UNHAS (the
UN Humanitarian Air Service) and that has been helping to keep
the UN helicopters going. Frankly, if they run the risk of running
out of money again then I will do the same again in the absence
of anybody else in the international system providing funding
to allow that vital support to continue. There are about just
under 100 helicopters operating now, with some more in the pipeline,
but some need to come out to be serviced because they are working
very hard going up and down, and the weather conditions are extremely
difficult. So there is more capacity on the ground now. We still
need more money and we need to turn that into practical help.
We need to get to people where they are and ensure that they do
not die of cold and respiratory tract infections, and there is
less and less time in which to do it. That is, in quick summary,
where I think we are.
Q4 Chairman: The President of Pakistan
made a fairly angry statement, really, that demonstrated some
frustration—not at the United Kingdom but perhaps at the
wider community in the European Union. He made a comparison with
the Tsunami and said that of course that was a holiday resort
for a lot of Europeans and maybe Pakistan was not. Do you feel
that there is more that we can do to generate a better international
response? I think what people are concerned about is the proximity
of winter. International agencies say they need money now to get
to people and yet the international community seems to be somewhat
passive.
Hilary Benn: I heard the interview
and, in fact, what President Musharraf said—although it
was reported as criticising the overall response to the immediate
crisis—was that on the relief side he said (from memory)
something like "broadly satisfied", and what he was
really talking about was support for reconstruction. There will
be a conference in Islamabad in just over a week's time to talk
about support for the reconstruction. My view is the immediate
priority is the relief effort, frankly. Reconstruction will be
hugely important. He has previously talked about a figure of $5
billion, as I recollect, being required for that but, frankly,
if we do not save people's lives then people will not be alive
to have their homes reconstructed. So, in my view, it really is
a case of first things first. To be honest, I wish I understood
why some in the international community have not responded in
a more generous way, because I do not think anybody can be under
any illusions about the scale of the challenge and the fact that
we have a very short amount of time. When winter comes and those
places are cut off and the temperature drops to below freezing,
if people do not have somewhere warm out of the elements to live,
then they are going to die. I think we have to continue to do
what we have done, both as the Presidency supporting the UN's
effort to raise the profile of this, and to tell it like it is,
so that people realise what the stakes are and how they can contribute
practically. It would be helpful, actually, if some of the non-European
states which have contributed quite large sums of money for reconstruction
were in a position—and this is something I was talking with
the team about this morning and I intend to follow up—to
provide some of that to support the on-going relief operation.
When one looks at the total sums being committed you always have
to distinguish between what is for relief and what is for reconstruction.
The other thing, if I may just make the point, is that there has
been a lot of focus on contributions in response to the UN flash
appeal. We have given our money in three different places: in
response to the UN flash appeal, to the Red Cross movement and
to the NGOs—so when Oxfam recently very unfairly criticised
Britain and said we have only given a little bit to the UN, they
were not counting all that we have done; they were not counting
what we have given to Oxfam, which I thought was rather strange.
Q5 Chairman: Is there more we can
do to directly appeal to other Members of the EU?
Hilary Benn: I will continue to
do all that I can. That is why I am writing around to them, again—I
do not know whether the letters are going out today—saying
this continues to be extremely serious. Any ideas, any suggestions
or any support that anyone can give to try and persuade others
that they need to contribute with the same generosity and speed—because
it is now a matter of speed—as they did in response to the
Tsunami would certainly be much appreciated.
Q6 Chairman: Thank you very much,
Secretary of State. I think we are all just anxious to ensure
that what is a bad situation does not become impenetrably worse
in the next few weeks. You actually came before us initially and
principally to take follow-up evidence on the situation in Darfur
and the report that this Committee produced in the last Parliament[1].
I was not a Member of the Committee but a number of the Members
of the Committee from that time are here today who participated
in that report and the visit to Darfur, and they will clearly
be pressing their experience home. I just wonder if I could perhaps
start by saying that my only update on that was a meeting with
Juan Méndez who was in London within the last couple of
weeks. He indicated that the situation has deteriorated. El Geneina,
he said, was effectively a no-go area and, to my concern, said
that there were at least 200,000 people whose circumstances were
almost unknown: they did not know where they were or how they
could get to them. Perhaps the first question, really, is how
do you see the situation, the deterioration, at the moment? Perhaps
you could answer that question first.
Hilary Benn: If I go back to February,
which is when I last appeared before the Select Committee on this
subject, what has happened since then is that the security situation
overall improved. I think there is no doubt about that. In terms
of the clashes between the Government of Sudan and the rebels
(the Arab militia and Janjaweed activity) there continued to be
a level of banditry. Then as the year progressed the rebels became
responsible for more violence and attacks. The African Union (AU)
force (and of course we will no doubt come on to that), in my
view and that was what I heard when I was last in Darfur in June
of this year, had undoubtedly made a difference in improving the
security situation. Then, however, in the last couple of months
there has been a upsurge in violence and, in particular, there
have been three incidents: the attack on the Aro Sharrow camp
by militia, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) attack on Sheriya
and the killing of the AU peacekeepers by persons unknown. In
the last couple of weeks it has been slightly quieter but banditry
continues. Clearly, this has had an impact on the humanitarian
situation and, you are right, in West Darfur that is particularly
acute and that has affected the ability of NGOs and others to
get out and about, although the World Food Programme is now getting
food to more people than was the case in the past and are using,
if I recollect, private truckers in the west to get the food distribution
out. If one looks at the latest World Health Organization (WHO)
mortality survey, which has come out, the situation has improved
compared to where it was when the last WHO survey was undertaken.
So, in summary, it is a mixed picture. Now the question is whether
the recent upsurge in violence is a spike associated with jockeying
for position around the peace talks in Abuja? Is this the beginning
of a return to an upward trend? Frankly, I do not know because
I think it is rather early to say. Of course, David has been there
even more recently.
Lord Triesman: Yes, in El Geneina.
I had a meeting with all of the organisations based in El Geneina
during the course of a two-day visit there and they were quite
clear that they could not get out and about, in exactly the way
that you have described, and were uncertain when they would be
able to. That was plainly, in part, due to the general violence
but the banditry was a key factor in that. I think that the last
five or six weeks, with the possible exception of the last 10
days to two weeks, have unquestionably shown a significant upsurge
and West Darfur has probably been among the worst areas affected.
Q7 Chairman: One of the things that
comes across pretty regularly from reading both our own report
and other reports is, frankly, the downright obstructiveness of
the Government of Sudan who seem to be putting all kinds of obstacles
in the way—never mind the role they may be playing in some
areas: insisting on a variety of conditions that make it difficult
or impossible to function on the ground. What can and should be
done to bring the Government of Sudan into a co-operative frame
of mind? In other words, to accept their responsibilities, if
they cannot co-operate, at least not to obstruct the activities
of the international forces to create a situation where displaced
persons might begin to think about the possibility of going back
to their land, which at the moment seems to be not in prospect.
Hilary Benn: It certainly is not
in prospect, with two very small exceptions. One was the returns
that took place, as I recollect, to Labado and Kor Abeche, after
there had been a problem in the past and the AU had gone in to
provide security there. There have been very small amounts of
returns in parts of the west. However, overall, no the bulk of
the 1.8 million in the camps are not going to move until they
think it is safe to do so. In direct answer to your question,
Chairman, the answer is by keeping up the pressure, because the
evidence so far demonstrates that it is only by persistent pressure
from the international community that one is able to see progress.
One of the issues that we discussed in December 2004 was the demand
that had been made by the international community that the Government
of Sudan would cease to use its military aircraft in offensive
attacks. They have ceased doing so and there has been one incident,
I think, recently which is still under investigation, but when
I was in El Fasher in June and met commanders of both the SLA
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) I put that question
to them and said: "Is the Government of Sudan honouring the
commitment they had entered into eventually, after a lot of pressure,
to cease air attacks?" and they said yes, that was the case.
I just give that as a for instance. I think our immediate concern
at the moment, in terms of obstruction, relates to the armoured
personnel carriers which the AU are waiting to arrive (and we
can go into that if you like) and the problems they have had with
fuel. That is organisational and we are trying to take some steps—I
think the Canadians are helping to deal with that. It is pressure
that makes the difference. I am sure, David, you will have discussed
these things when you were there most recently.
Lord Triesman: We did. We saw
both the first and second vice-presidents and the foreign minister
during the final day of the period that I was there, in a meeting
between the EU Troika and the Government of Sudan. Javier Solana
was there on behalf of the European Commission. The critical things,
in my view, from what I saw, were that if people are to be protected
effectively, whether it is civilians who might one day go home
and plant their own fields—and Hilary is absolutely right,
nobody at the camps had any intention of doing that—or whether
it is protecting the NGOs and the UN people in distributing food,
the African Union are trying to do the very best they can. I felt
for them. They unquestionably need the equipment to fulfil their
mandate. The 105 Canadian armoured personnel carriers are critical;
I doubt (though it is hard to tell) that the African Union troops
would have been killed if they had been in hardened vehicles rather
than soft vehicles. There were two civilians killed, incidentally,
as well in that attack—at least two, I heard three at one
stage. They unquestionably need to be able to get around an area
which has no real roads—not in any sense that we understand.
They need to be able to get around that area, which means flying
helicopters and being able to fly them, not being obstructed on
the flight plans, having the fuel to put in the tanks and getting
to places quickly. I think it is a very hard to know just how
effective a force they could be in the absence of the equipment
to be a really effective force. The Government of Sudan can unlock
those doors. We told them in terms that that was the requirement
of them and that their obligation to the international community,
having invited the AU in, was to do what they pledged themselves
to do. We must just keep up that pressure, as we did indeed try
on the occasion when I was there.
Q8 Hugh Bayley: There are something
like 11,000 unarmed humanitarian workers in Darfur, and Jan Egeland
has warned that if the violence continues to grow they may find
themselves unable to do the job they are there to do. He has even
drawn a parallel between the safe areas approach in Bosnia and
what is happening currently in Darfur. How real is the danger
that humanitarian workers will not be able to provide protection
to those in the camps, and what can be done to guarantee their
safety?
Hilary Benn: If I may answer first,
clearly it depends very much on what happens to the level of violence
from here on. The AU force had undoubtedly made a real difference.
I remember in Nyala meeting the representatives of all of the
NGOs and the UN, and without exception they said the AU had made
a real difference. It was very striking. This was back in June.
Both because there is greater presence now, they had more bases,
they were beginning to provide protection in some of the camps
where there had been difficulties; in some cases they were providing
patrols to help women in going out to collect firewood outside
of the camps and that had helped, in cases where they were able
to do so, reduce the number of attacks on women, because the women
I spoke to in the camps I visited were obviously very frightened
about going outside because they knew from experience and from
what they had heard from elsewhere that they could fall prey to
those who would harm them and attack them in a number of ways,
including rape. There had been a number of reports of that. So
it really does depend on what the rebels, the militia and the
Government of Sudan choose to do in those circumstances. There
is no doubt in my mind, however, that the AU had made a real difference.
Lord Triesman: I think there is
some variation between the different sectors. Sector commanders,
when you talk to them, obviously spoke of it being more dangerous
in some areas than others. El Geneina was particularly dangerous
at that time and probably still is. There were any number of heavily
armed people wandering around; quite who they were or what they
were doing was never wholly clear. What I do think is true is
that the AU forces where their bases are close to camps are able
to produce a pretty good level of protection. The police in the
areas are having a real impact inside the camps as well. The recruitment
of a number of Ghanaian women in the police is also giving confidence
to some of the women in the camps that they have got somebody
who they can feel they can talk to. Those are all very important.
Of course, the more remote you are, as a force, from the camp
the less that protection is there. If there is to be any disarming
of all these people who are wandering around with weapons, or
any attempt to do that, which is, after all, what the Government
of Sudan has undertaken to do, then the AU force—to repeat
the point I was making a little earlier—has got to be equipped
to be able to fulfil its mandate so that the confidence increases
in a significant way and the next steps, which are going to be
much more hazardous steps, can potentially be taken.
Q9 Hugh Bayley: What needs to be
done, both in terms of broadening the mandate and in terms of
the number of troops and equipment available to the AU mission,
in order to be able to enable them to fulfil their role and protect
civilians in the camps?
Hilary Benn: Can I say this on
the mandate, because we have discussed previously this very question:
was the mandate sufficient? When I went in June I asked the question
in my discussions with the Brigadier General Kazura, the AU Deputy
Force Commander. By and large, the answer I got from those I asked
(and I also asked others that I met) was that the mandate was
sufficient. The answer to the question, in the end, is the AU
sets its own mandate and if the AU feels it is necessary to change
the mandate then they are free to do so. My perception is that
(and I think I made this point previously) the AU, certainly in
places, was prepared to put themselves about, but what Brigadier
General Kazura said to me was: "If we are going to continue
to do that I need to make sure that our troops are protected."
That is why the armoured personnel carriers are so important,
and that is why the obstruction of their entry into the country
by the Government of Sudan—because that is what has been
going on—is unacceptable and that is why I welcome the fact
that the Canadians have said most recently, as I understand it,
that we are planning to bring them in because we do not want to
put up with this obstruction any more. I think that is a real
test for the Government of Sudan. You cannot say you are co-operating
with the AU force—and that was one of the five points which
the Prime Minister put to President Bashir when he visited in
October of last year. For me, for us, this is a real test of the
willingness of the Government of Sudan to demonstrate its co-operation
with the AU peacekeeping force: is it going to stop now obstructing
the AU troops getting the protection that they need to be able
to carry on doing their job?
Q10 Hugh Bayley: Secretary of State,
who, in your assessment, within the AU is blocking an extension
of the mandate, and who supports it?
Hilary Benn: I do not think that
is the case. As I understand, they have discussed this in time.
I do not think there is an issue of anybody blocking it. The AU
has set the mandate itself, if the AU wanted to change it—all
I am doing is to report back the answer to the question that I
asked when I was there in June, both of the AU force and of others
that I spoke to: "Do you think the mandate is the problem?"
I went with a genuinely open mind and I did not know what answer
I was going to get and I report back to you the answer that I
did get, which was, from those I spoke to: "The mandate is
not actually the burning issue".
Lord Triesman: I certainly ran
into local commanders who believed that they would benefit from
being able to chase after people who had attacked them and to
engage them, and they were not certain about whether an extension
of the mandate would support their need to do that, although they
certainly said they thought it was a possibility. Let us be very
clear about that: they thought it was a possibility. What they
have not been able to test out was whether they could fully use
the mandate they had currently got. That was the unknown. They
need the hardened vehicles, they need the helicopters and they
need the fuel for the helicopters. They need some quite basic
things which we talked about whilst I was there, and I am going
to see what might be done, which is more reliable base radio stations
rather than the small hand-held kits which meant you could not
really run the risk of operating in the hours of darkness. There
were some very significant problems, particularly with the militias.
So there were some very practical things that were tested out
and in every single case getting the import permissions from the
Government of Sudan is necessary, and that is why pressure on
them had to be very, very strong. I must say I think we told them
in no uncertain terms what the expectations of the international
community would be in each of those areas.
Q11 Hugh Bayley: Finally, Lord Triesman,
you said that where you had an African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) base close to a camp you had a better level of protection
than where they were more remote from those who they were seeking
to protect. What are the current troop numbers? What are the build-up
plans? What troop numbers are expected by early next year? Do
you think those troop numbers are going to be met and do you think
they are adequate? Jan Egeland has talked about a need for 15,000
troops to protect the civilian workers in the camps.
Lord Triesman: There are about
7,700 at the moment deployed. People have talked about various
numbers above that, and one figure I know was discussed in some
detail was about 13,500. It is quite difficult to see where the
extra troops are going to come from, at the moment. There is a
battalion of South African troops they were hoping to add to the
force to be deployed rapidly, and those are very good quality
troops as well, which is of great significance. The South Africans,
who have been very willing to look at that, are also now considering
whether that battalion would best be deployed in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) to ensure that the elections take place
there and they disarm marauding forces in the east of the Democratic
Republic of Congo. So there is a question there. I do not know
if there is a dignified word for it and I do not mean to demean
it, but there is a "trawl" going on to try and find
another force that might replace the South Africans in the event
that they go to the DRC. We are keeping very closely up-to-date
with that. We have obviously provided very considerable financial
support for those troops who are there so that, even if the numbers
have not reached the numbers we want, their capacity and their
deployment is as effective as it can possibly be.
Q12 Mr Hunt: Secretary of State,
you have rightly got stuck into the detail of what is happening
on the ground in Darfur, but can I ask you to step back for a
moment and look at the bigger picture? I think the perception
of a lot of members of the public, and it is one that I share
as a new Member of this Committee, is that with respect to Darfur
the West has fiddled while Rome has burned. I just wonder whether
you could respond to that and tell me in particular, if you were
to go back to 2003 when the whole situation started, should we
have been more willing to intervene directly? Was it over-bold
to go for an African solution to an African problem? Are there
any things you would have done differently and, if a similar situation
arose in the future, are there any ways that you would want the
international community to respond differently to the way it has?
Hilary Benn: Clearly, if we had
known then what we know now, of course we would have done some
things differently. I think, in particular, the slow way in which
the international community, as a whole, responded to what was
going on has meant that the people of Darfur have suffered a great
deal as a result of what has happened. I think it demonstrates
precisely why what was being discussing at the Millennium Summit
a couple of months ago—the concept of a responsibility to
protect—matters. However, I think Darfur also exemplifies
the practical difficulties that the international community faces
in trying to do something about it. As I am fond of saying, you
first of all need to take a decision to do something but then
you need to have people who are prepared to go and do the work.
That is why I have been, from the very start, such a strong supporter
of the African contribution to try and find a solution to this
because it is adding to the world's capacity to do something.
I welcome it unreservedly, it is why Britain was the first country
in the world to provide support to the AU force, why we have been
such a strong supporter and why we have contributed, so far, I
think it is about £32 million in financial support, which
is providing 450 vehicles and so on. They are prepared to put
the troops in. The second thing I would say is that there was
a period of time when the Government of Sudan worked very hard
to make sure that the international community could not see what
was going on. I think the third lesson I would draw is that the
humanitarian system can work more effectively than it has worked
in this case, and that the proposals I have made for reform of
the international humanitarian system were originally generated
by my experience in Darfur, because I saw what was working, what
was not and where the gaps where; the slowness with which we were
deploying as an international community and I came to the conclusion
that if we changed the way we went about it we could change things.
I think the final message is we have come belatedly, through UN
resolutions, sanctions, the reference to the International Criminal
Court (ICC), but I think that is hugely significant. There were
many people, and we discussed this last time, who thought: "Are
we going to get ICC referral through the UN Security Council?"
"Is Britain really going to push for it?" I simply point
out: look what happened. Britain played a very important part
in getting that referral in. I think that has had an impact because
it does, at last, demonstrate that those who have been responsible
for what has gone on are not going to be able to hide from justice
as provided for by the international community. This was very
significant because it is what has happened in Darfur that has
led to the first referral to the ICC, and I think when we come
to look back at this in many years to come we will see this as
a very important moment. Overall, the international community
could and should have done more, is the honest answer to your
very direct question.
Q13 Chairman: On the point about
the Canadian armoured vehicles, they have said they are going
in, which is in direct contrast to what the Government of Sudan
says is acceptable. How do you think the Government of Sudan will
react? It is an interesting test.
Hilary Benn: It is an interesting
test. I was informed of this yesterday when we were talking about
this, and they are having a meeting with the Government of Sudan
today or tomorrow in order to talk about this. We wait to see
what the outcome is, but I think those armoured personnel carriers
will be—
Q14 Chairman: Will there be Canadian
troops in them?
Hilary Benn: No, it is a question
of flying. It is transport, so that they can be used by the AU
force to protect them. If I could add one other thing in response
to Mr Hunt's question, having said all of that I think, not to
be defensive, that the part the UK has played both in supporting
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was the right thing to
do, and the part we played in the humanitarian relief—the
speed with which we have done that, because we were on the case
pretty early—and the effort that we have put in to try,
both through the UN and through visits to Sudan and Darfur, because
there has been a very large number of visits from Ministers from
the UK, I think demonstrates that we have taken this seriously
and we have tried very hard. It is a very, very complex problem
and, in the end, the fundamental problem is that people continue
to fight each other and are not prepared to use politics and dialogue
to find a way forward. That is the problem we are having to deal
with.
Q15 Ann McKechin: Lord Triesman,
you have obviously talked about the need for better quality equipment,
and various agencies working in Darfur together with the UN Secretary-General
have identified that there are still problems with funding the
EU Mission there. What are the problems with funding the AU force?
Where are the problems coming from?
Lord Triesman: Just before I answer
that question directly, can I just correct a figure that I provided
for the Committee? I mistakenly added the police on, so the total
should be 6,700 not 7,700. I do apologise. I counted the police
separately and should have counted them together. So far the funding
that the Secretary of State has referred to has been one of the
key sources of funding. There has been a European Union funding
and whilst we were there in early October the European Union was
looking at and, I think, has subsequently come up with something
in the order of
70 million in additional funding to support the force
that is there. That will get them through the immediate period.
However, that is not long-term funding. If the AU forces stay
there for any length of time there will have to be new sources
of funding identified, and as yet they have not been. I would
only add one point to that, and that is that our discussions and
the AU discussions certainly have been very open to trying to
find that funding, but no one has been able to commit budgets
that have not yet been voted.
Q16 Ann McKechin: Given how fragile
the situation is, do you think the international community has
been complacent in not tackling the issue of funding now, given
that we could face an escalation of violence in the immediate
future?
Lord Triesman: I suppose it would
always be better if everybody could tell where, long term, the
funding was going to come from for an operation of this kind,
but I do not think it is complacency and I do not think the current
lack of security of that force is because of a current lack of
funding. There have been some issues about getting things like
helicopter fuel very rapidly, largely because a donation of that
did not come through exactly when everybody was expecting, but
generally speaking I think it is true to say the whole of the
funding has been available when everybody said it would be. The
genuine problems in security, I believe, are the inability to
get hold of equipment which is available, which has been donated,
which has been funded but which cannot be got, at the moment,
to the African Union troops—unless the Canadians and others
do exactly what they have said and that is just bring it in and
make it happen.
Q17 Ann McKechin: I think that comes
neatly into my next question, because I think people are worried
that if the current EU Mission is unable to contain the violence
and it escalates, what is the Plan B for the international community,
and when is it going to be put into operation? You have mentioned
the fact about Canadian forces bringing the equipment direct as
a possibility. Is there any possibility of NATO taking a part
if need be, to boost AU forces if we need to have an immediate
response?
Lord Triesman: I am going to start
with the last bit first, if I may. I think the Government of Sudan
would react very, very sharply to a NATO intervention. They might
regard it as being an act of war, I think. There are strong possibilities
that it would be resisted very strongly. It is, however, true
that moving some of the heavy lifting equipment from the African
brigades into Darfur has been undertaken with help, and that has
been significant and that has been allowable because it is under
the terms of the AU mandate and the invitation to AMIS to come
in and do the job. There are real reasons, because this is the
first AU operation of its kind, to try to make sure that it succeeds.
If the AU can provide the rapid response in Africa to problems
in Africa then the problems are owned in Africa and the chances
of success are a huge amount higher. So we do want, really do
want, them to be successful. In the long term I am sure there
will be discussions about whether other additions to command control
logistics may be desirable but I think that that is only really
likely to succeed if the AU itself can show that it has an appreciable
level of success. That has got to be our first aim.
Q18 Ann McKechin: I think most of
us would agree that having the AU mission as the front leader
is important, but given, as you have indicated, that the South
African military is having to consider whether it goes to the
DRC or Sudan and given the scale of both these potential conflicts
happening at the same time, my concern is that if there is an
escalation in both for different reasons the capacity of African
troops and their ability to cope is going to be very, very severely
tested and it will mean an effective solution can be found only
if other international troops are available.
Lord Triesman: There is a very
serious point in that, and I acknowledge it. We have not been
talking about the south of the country because we are concentrating
on Darfur, but it is certainly true that the deployment of international
forces in the south of the country along with the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement has brought a very, very much larger degree of
settlement to the south of Sudan. That has been one of the great
gains over the last period. It may be that that gain would have
been driven through to an even better point had John Garang lived,
but, nonetheless, it is certainly true now. I think it is early
to talk about this, but there are reasons to think that if the
stability in the south can be sustained and the resistance army
do not become more of a problem (certainly if it is containable)
then there may well be African nations who feel that they have
forces on the ground and relatively near where those forces might
be available. That is not, I assure you, fanciful thinking or
an unrealistic hope; it is a real reflection of the successes
that have been achieved in the south.
Hilary Benn: If I may add, what
your question puts a finger on is this question of capacity: take
a decision to do something, who is going to do the work? There
is increasing demand because we recognise, from a development
point of view, that unless you have got peace and stability it
is very hard to get going. That is why there is such a large MONUC
[UN Mission in DR Congo] force in the DRC, helping to bring some
stability so that, hopefully, the political process, the elections
and the 20 million people registered can make progress. There
are, I think, 2,500 UN peacekeepers as part of UNMIS in Southern
Sudan, and they are due to get up to 10,000. If you end up with
10,000 UN peacekeepers in Southern Sudan—and David is absolutely
right, they are an important part to guaranteeing the peace but
it is relatively peaceful there if the politics holds—and
you have got, hopefully, 7,700 if the final brigade can be found
from somewhere, depending on whether South Africa decides to come
or they can find someone else, in a part of the country where
security is worse, it seems to me a question that very quickly
would be asked is: have we quite got the balance right? There
needs to be an open and, frankly, an honest debate about this.
On financing, which was your original question, I agree with David;
I do not think that the way in which the financing has been spatchcocked
together has got in the way of the AU's capacity because the EU
has been very generous (we have given a lot); it has been the
practical questions of finding the troop-contributing nations,
building the accommodation, getting the equipment, radios that
work, deploying around difficult territory and this is the first
big operation of its kind—in fact it is the first, apart
from what the AU did in Burundi—and it takes time and experience.
Part of the support that we have offered has been trying to help
them to do this so they can actually make a success of it. They
have undoubtedly had an impact—there is no question in my
mind about that whatsoever.
Q19 Joan Ruddock: Obviously the Secretary
of State has been dealing with the problem up to the present time.
I wonder, going forward, whether it is your view that the pledges
made by the international community will be long-term commitments,
both in terms of Southern Sudan, the UN peacekeeping requirements
and the AU, and the funding of all of those operations, especially
if they have to increase and provide better materials and so on
and so forth. If I can just ask you to respond to that and then
I want to look at the issue of the Government of Sudan itself
and what it is up to with money.
Hilary Benn: The great benefit
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is that for most of Sudan,
but not all and certainly not Darfur, it opens up the new political
arrangements, the formation of the national government, the government
of Southern Sudan, people beginning to return to the South. I
went to the South for the first time in the course of my visit
in June and went to Rumbek. If you just look around you can see
(a) the consequences of 25 years of civil war and (b) how desperately
needed the support from the international community and others
is. As far as our humanitarian programme is concerned, we are
giving £75 million to Sudan, including Darfur and including
eastern Chad this year. This includes £45 million for the
UN Work Plan of which around £25 million will be sent to
the South. We are trying, through some of that, to test out one
of the proposals I made in my speech on humanitarian reform, namely
giving the money to the UN co-ordinator so that they can distribute
it amongst the different agencies having regard to the needs.
We have got that pilot in Sudan and we are working on one in the
DRC to test out, in particular countries the proposal I originally
made. I hope that the international community will continue to
provide support. The UN work plan is about 50% funded, so far,
but I tell you what would really, really help: an end to the conflict
in Darfur. If people felt that right across Sudan everybody was
now committed to the path of peace—and they have done it
to end the civil war—the real answer to all of the things
we have discussed so far this afternoon is: are the parties to
the conflict at Abuja prepared to use debate, dialogue and politics
to reach an agreement, because that is the only real solution.
In the end, the parties to the North/South conflict in Sudan realised
that and through a very painful and difficult process—which
Britain played a hugely important part, when history comes to
be written, in supporting—it happened. The final thing I
would say to the Government of Sudan is not all the benefits of
the peace deal and, in particular, debt relief are going to flow
until Darfur is sorted out.
1 Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect,
Fifth Report of Session 2004-05, HC 67-I and II. Back
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