Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
RT HON
HILARY BENN
MP, LORD TRIESMAN,
MS JESSICA
IRVINE AND
MR JAMES
THORNTON
8 NOVEMBER 2005
Q20 Joan Ruddock: We will come, I
think, to the peace talks in a moment. Just on the point of the
Government of Sudan, I think the estimate is between $7 and $11
billion for the value of Sudan's oil production. What is happening
to those oil revenues and how does the oil revenue profit that
that country is making compare with the amount of money that the
international community is having to put in?
Lord Triesman: I think that links
with the last question as well, because the amount of aid that
goes particularly to the South is going, to some extent, to be
affected by the other sources of revenues that can be got to the
South. Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement the agreement is
to split the oil revenues 70% to the South and 30% to the North.[2]
I will check that that is what Salva Kiir said and there were
similar arrangements over timber and other minerals. The big difficulty
when we were there was that one of the commissions that was to
be established under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the petroleum
commission, had not been set up, although I now understand that
it has been. Whilst it was not established nobody knew how much
oil was being pumped or bunkered, or anything else, so you never
knew what 70% of anything was because you did not know what the
baseline sum was. The petroleum commission ought to be able to
provide objective evidence and we offered objective help in doing
that. The measurement of these things is not a mystery; it is
done all over the world and in all sorts of environments. If it
comes off then the prospects of there being significant revenue
flows to the South, I think, improve very considerably. They need
to feel confident they are getting what they are due. That is
very important as well, otherwise tension would increase. The
other vital thing that then becomes very important, and Hilary
has been mentioning it in talking about some of the other forms
of dealing with assistance, is the capacity in the South to absorb
that kind of income and use it to the greatest possible effect.
You need to be able to step up its capacity. I was in Juba—it
is a big country but relatively close to where we were—and
as you go round it is very clear that they are very threadbare
in governmental resources, let alone other resources, to be able
to absorb significant changes in their income flows, whether it
is from aid or anything else.
Hilary Benn: Can I just add, in
terms of transparency about the budget, I discussed this, I think,
on my first visit to Sudan with the Finance Minister, and that
is something that the international community is looking for and
will continue to look for because that provides the answer to
your question: what is happening to the money? We will want to
know that, in particular, in making progress on debt relief that
there is not going to be any promise (I made that very clear as
far as the UK is concerned—we offered to chair a group to
progress it) until Darfur is sorted.
Q21 Joan Ruddock: Do you know what
the Government is actually spending on the military to pursue
its fighting?
Hilary Benn: I think the honest
answer is we do not really, because, as sometimes happens in these
circumstances, there is expenditure on the budget and there is
other expenditure which it is very hard to know how much and what.
Hence the point I made about transparency.
Q22 Richard Burden: Most of what
I would like to ask you continues on the same line as the North/South
issue, but before moving on to that, if I could just take you
back to what you were saying about the possible use of forces
in the South, if things were relatively quiet in the South and
there were real problems in Darfur, could there be an adjustment
there to provide a better use of resources, which seems to me
to be quite sensible? Does that, in your view, have any implications
for the questions we were asking earlier about the AU mandate
and how far that would need to change?
Hilary Benn: I pose the question
because it seems to me, at some point someone is going to ask:
"Hang on a minute". That is the first thing. The second
reason is because Kofi Annan himself has talked about whether
in time there is a way in which the UN might be able to provide
support and, frankly, there is discussion and debate going on
about this because the questions that we are discussing this afternoon
have also been debated by the AU and others in the international
community. In the end, because this is an AU operation, the point
that David has made is really important; they have invested a
great deal in this practically in terms of troops, some of whom
have been killed, and in terms of the reputation of the AU I think
they have done a very, very good job in very, very testing circumstances
and in circumstances where no one else was prepared to come in
and do something. They deserve a huge amount of credit for that.
We have been pressing to do a further assessment mission, which
goes back to the original question that Mr Bayley asked about
numbers because the plan always was when you got to the 7,700
and you then said "Should we go further? Should we be looking
at another way of dealing with the problem?" and, in those
circumstances, I think the AU and the rest of us should be open
to looking at all the potential options, frankly, which might
provide a solution to the problems of insecurity in Darfur. What
the AU thinks about this is going to be hugely important.
Q23 Richard Burden: On the question
of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the significance
of getting the petroleum issues sorted out, that certainly links
with some of the evidence we have had from elsewhere, could you
perhaps tell us a bit more on how you think the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement is moving forward—the process itself—and
how much of a blow is the death of John Garang?
Hilary Benn: Can I just add, on
public expenditure, that the World Bank is currently undertaking
a public expenditure review, which might provide part of the answer
to the question that Mrs Ruddock asked. What about the GNU? It
was formed on 20 September, so it is now one of the most representative
governments Sudan has had for 50 years, and the Government of
Southern Sudan was formed on 22 September. Clearly, John Garang's
death was a huge blow because he had led the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM), he had led the negotiations, and with him on
the SPLM side and Vice President Taha on the Government of Sudan
side, the relationship they had established and their willingness
in the end to negotiate their way through these very tricky, difficult
questions, it was that with support and encouragement that delivered
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. To be honest, there was enormous
nervousness when this tragedy occurred about what would then happen
to the political process. I have to say that Salva Kiir has stepped
into his new responsibilities with great effectiveness, and the
worries that some people had that it might all fall apart have
not come to pass. That is the first point. The second is that
we have seen some progress very recently with the formation of
the assessment and evaluation committee, and that was agreed on
30 October. There had been concern that it was taking time because
that plays a particularly key role in the process to get that
up and running, and that is now in place and Tom Vraalsen will
chair it. We are providing support to a number of the key national
commissions. So there is that, there is the Government of Southern
Sudan getting itself in place and the first tranche, as I understand
it, of money to the Government of Southern Sudan, under the wealth-sharing
agreement that formed part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
has now come. As I say, it has taken a bit longer than people
hoped but I say so far so good, but people have to demonstrate
they are going to continue to use these new mechanisms and work
together. I think one of the big tests for the new government
is: how does it then hope to deal with the problem of Darfur?
Q24 Richard Burden: What you said
about Salva Kiir and the seriousness with which he is taking this
role is encouraging. Is there an issue, though, about, in a sense,
his authority and, in a sense, the SPLM's authority in the absence
of John Garang, in terms of exercising leverage over some of the
rebel groups in the South?
Hilary Benn: David met him during
his visit, so is in a very good position to answer.
Lord Triesman: I have to say I
was impressed by his approach to all the questions. Given that
he perhaps seemed to have less of an argument for a united Sudan
than John Garang had it was very important to see how he was going
to respond to the Government of National Unity and what level
of responsibility he felt he would have for influencing former
allies or associates in Darfur. He made several points which I
think were important. The first was that he had to give a huge
amount of his energy to the formation of the Government of National
Unity to make sure that ministerial portfolios were fairly distributed,
they were operating and, as Hilary said, that the commissions
that were going to be set up were set up and that they function.
The second point that he made, and we heard it also in Juba in
the South, was that because he had spent so much time, following
John Garang's death, doing that he had not had as much time to
deal with the issues of forming a government in the South. That
was, consequently, taking rather longer. Regrettable or not, that
was where the priorities lay and he then got on with the formation,
as he said he would, of the government in the South. The third
point he made, which was really the one to do with allies, was
that he was completely willing to take part in discussions with
any of rebel the groups in order to try to bring about a sensible
negotiating position at Abuja. But he was insistent that it was
the Government of Sudan, the new Government of National Unity's
position that he was not somehow out on a limb doing something
wholly separate from everybody else, and he was still in the formation
period when he was being brought into that. But he was quite clear
that as soon as he had clarity as first Vice-President for those
responsibilities he would get into that with some real enthusiasm
and energy. I will not say that he was totally optimistic about
outcomes, but he was going to try.
Q25 John Barrett: Secretary of State,
I am sure that you, along with the Committee, share a deep sense
of frustration at the lack of progress that there has been over
the last year in Sudan and in Darfur. While there have clearly
been some successes since the Committee was out there at the beginning
of this year, coming to the end of this year one of the key problems
is the lack of cooperation of the Government of Sudan. That is
one of the key problems. They seem to be continuing things as
they are—and there is also conflict in regions of the country
in getting the oil revenues. If this continues well into next
year and we all get contacted by our constituents and that sense
of frustration continues, how do we change the relationship with
the Government of Sudan, to say that we have tried the carrot
and the stick and the carrot has not been effective? What sticks
can be used to make sure that things do not continue as they are,
because my fear is that we go into 2006 and then we say that the
AU Presidency is not nearly as strong as it could be, and possibly
we are waiting on more logistical support and the mandate cannot
be strengthened until we have that at the beginning. How long
can we sit and say that the current dealings with the Government
of Sudan have to be on the same basis as they have been for the
last year, or do we change gear at some time?
Hilary Benn: The first thing I
want to say in answer to that is that we do need to recognise
the progress that has occurred because we only have to go back
a year, 18 months, with real concern that we were looking at a
humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, continuing attacks, people
continuing to flee their homes. And what we have seen in the last
year—and the WHO mortality survey shows it, the increasing
number of people who are being fed by the WFP shows it—the
decline in one type of violence, ie attacks on people in their
homes and the ending of aerial bombardment and the use of helicopters
for offensive purposes. It is a complex story but we need to recognise
that all of those things have happened during the course of last
year and that represents unquestionable progress. Why have those
things happened? Because of a lot of effort, money, international
pressure and so on. If one looks back at the five points which
the Prime Minister put to the Government of Sudan during the visit
just over a year ago: cooperation with the AU force, I would say
is pretty mixed and we have discussed this afternoon the recent
example of lack of cooperation; revealing the location of their
troops, yes, they have done that; confining them to barracks,
no; concluding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the end of
2004, yes, that was done; implementing the humanitarian protocol,
I would say a kind of mixed report. That is how I would summarise
their progress on those fronts. The frustration is actually about
the political process. My sense is that I think the Government
of Sudan is willing to negotiate. The real problem actually has
been the rebels because the rebels have been responsible for an
increasing proportion of the attacks and insecurity. The rebels
are divided and, to be blunt, unless the rebels get their acts
together in the negotiations, know what it is they are trying
to achieve, and use the political opportunity which the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement provides—and that is why it is so important
to get it through to completion. And it was a false argument to
say that that was at the expense of what we were doing in Darfur
because having the Comprehensive Peace Agreement gives those,
if they want to use it, politically the best opportunity to find
a political solution to the problems of Darfur because all the
elements are in there, sharing power, sharing wealth and so on
and so forth, and I think my biggest frustration is about the
failure of the political process. The question: what can we all
do to get the parties to those talks, to take them seriously and
actually to do the business because that is the only long-term
solution to this? My continuing frustration in relation to the
Government of Sudan is particularly about the things we have already
discussed, obstructing the AU getting, frankly, the tools they
need to do the job.
Q26 Joan Ruddock: I would like to
ask the Secretary of State to answer his own question. What can
we do to help the rebels to get their act together? To come up
with a coherent programme, a set of demands, to end their leadership
struggles; is there anything that you believe can be done?
Hilary Benn: We have a Special
Representative at the talks. There has been a process of taking
people away to sit away from the talks to think about what their
position might be; encouraging all of the parties to turn up to
the talks; encouragement to the SLM in particular to sort out
themselves out so that it is clear who is actually representing
the movement, because when you have different people both claiming
to be the leaders, in different places, some coming and some not
coming to the talks, 40 people turning up, having to ring somebody
who is living in Europe to find out what the line is and what
they should be doing, you have a bit of a problem on your hands.
We have done all of those things but so far the talks proceed
pretty slowly and with difficulty.
Lord Triesman: I think that is
absolutely right. The only that I would add to it at the moment
is this. The rebel groups are plainly fragmented, they do not
stay as cohesive groups and, as Hilary says, it is very far from
clear that people who turn up at any talks when they do turn up
actually represent the people on the ground. There is no cabling
between the leader at one end and whatever is at the other end,
and that is a significant problem and we are trying to work on
that as has just been described.
Q27 Joan Ruddock: When you say, "We
are trying to work on that", who is "we" and how
is it being done?
Lord Triesman: The Special Representative
who we have there is trying to build the links and to make sure
that we are talking to people who are capable of taking part in
a meaningful negotiation. We have specific people doing that work.
The only other thing I wanted to add in general is this. There
is some evidence—not conclusive but some—that there
is an upturn in violence every time any discussions take place
in Abuja; that there are people who believe that shooting each
other is more of a way of achieving leverage than talking. That
is why I come back to the effectiveness of the AU troops. If it
were to be much less likely that committing acts of violence was
likely to yield any kind of political progress, when compared
with talks, I suspect that those people who have not resolved
the question about who is talking for them would begin to resolve
that question because it would be the only thing that would be
of any use to them.
Hilary Benn: Mr Thornton has been
involved in this and might like to add something.
Mr Thornton: I have attended parts
of both the last two rounds of talks in Abuja along with the UK
Special Representative for Darfur and another colleague in the
Sudan Unit. It has been slow. I think we have seen a slight picking
up of the pace in the last round with negotiations proceeding
steadily, if not especially rapidly on one of the three clusters
that have been identified as one of the three sets of the topics
that will form part of the final peace settlement: that is the
political line, power sharing. The parties have been negotiating
for upwards of eight hours a day on those issues and the two rebel
groups have been acting relatively well together. Having said
that, there is still a long way to go and we need to find ways,
if we can, of accelerating the process. One thing we could do
is to ensure that when the talks restart in November that they
go into permanent session and they do not break after three weeks
or a month, which has become the pattern. To date there have been
sessions of a month or so followed by a break. We do need to try
and bring the two wings of the main rebel movement, the SLM, together,
and one of the things that is happening on that is that today
in Nairobi there is a meeting brokered by the Americans but with
our strong support, and with the attendance of the UK Special
Representative to try to get the two main leaders of the rebel
group, the SLM, talking to each other and on a path to resolve
their differences, because so far only one of the SLM factions
has been attending talks in Abuja and they both need to be there
and they both need to give their active support to the crisis.
Q28 Joan Ruddock: That is a very
interesting answer. I notice it is the US and Europeans again
who are trying to do this. Is there no African country that has
any leverage in this situation and could influence their thinking?
Mr Thornton: The Nigerians step
in from time to time. Obasanjo has turned up to the talks in Abuja
from time to time to talk to the rebels in particular. I think
we need to encourage them to be more active; we need to encourage
the countries which are providing material assistance to the rebels
to weigh in and to bang their heads together. But so far the West
has been very much taking the lead on this.
Q29 Joan Ruddock: Do you think there
is any prospect of those who are helping them in the military
sense doing the task that is clearly necessary to make them become
diplomats and not aggressors?
Mr Thornton: We have to try. I
do not think we are going to convert those countries overnight;
they are not necessarily countries with whom we had strong links.
Q30 Joan Ruddock: Do they include
Libya?
Mr Thornton: The Libyans and the
Eritreans, but particularly the Libyans. In general they are on
side but they are not very actively on side, and we need to push
them to take rather more robust action with the rebels.
Q31 John Battle: I think while appreciating
the patient and positive efforts of the peace process, it strikes
me that there is a larger political context. An actor we have
not really talked much about is the UN Security Council, which
sometimes strikes me that it tends to be a spectator at the massacre.
I say that because in the Secretary-General's July report there
is a reference to the fact of the Government of Sudan's efforts
to rein in the Janjaweed, and it says, "Government officials
have recently made it known that the disarming of the militias
will commence only after a political settlement is reached,"
putting conditions on it, which were not agreed at the Security
Council. The Secretary-General's August Report, "The Government
still shows no intention of disarming these militia and is yet
to hold a significant number of them accountable for the atrocities
in earlier months." The Crisis Group comment on the AU Mission
in Darfur, "UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564
also demanded that the government disarm the Janjaweed militias.
It has fulfilled none of these commitments." Are the UN Security
Council resolutions making no impression whatsoever?
Hilary Benn: I would not say that.
I do not demure from the passages you have read out from the Secretary-General,
but we have had five in all—1556, 1564, 1574, 1591 and 1593.
I think the first lot of resolutions undoubtedly upped the pressure
on the Government of Sudan and I go back to the earlier answer
that I gave, that in my experience it is only by consistent international
pressure that you see progress, and I think the UN Security Council
has played a part in that. I would say that the adoption of the
resolution on sanctions was important. We wait to see the final
report of the Sanctions Committee. It is very important that those
who are on the ground—and it really falls to the UN and
to the AU, who are closest on the ground—to put names into
the Sanctions Committee so that those sanctions can be applied.
We would like to see the arms embargo, for example, extended to
cover the whole of the country. I think the ICC referral was important,
for the reasons I gave earlier, and I think it has had an effect.
So the UN's contribution has been to demonstrate the international
concern to up the pressure but we are sitting here having this
discussion about Darfur precisely because although while some
things have improved some things have not changed.
Q32 John Battle: So you would say
that the ICC reference, for example, has had a deterrent effect
and you think that the arms embargo is going to bite?
Hilary Benn: The reason we are
in favour of an arms embargo to cover the whole of the country
is because it is quite difficult to operate an arms embargo as
it is currently constituted and it would be sensible and logical
to go the whole way. The ICC referral, I think there is no doubt
that when the 51 sealed names were produced by the International
Commission of Inquiry they were passed to the ICC prosecutors,
and they are investigating. I do not know who is on the list.
I think it was said when I was in Sudan in the summer that there
are 51 names on the list and there about 400 people who think
they are on the list. I think that does have an effect and in
the end if people realise that they are not going to escape and
if the evidence can be found they will be called to account, then
I think that must have some impact in relation to this particular
problem. I think in the longer-term it also has a much bigger
impact because it shows that this thing we created, the ICC, which
Britain has been such a strong supporter of, can actually be used
to deal with crises like this.
Q33 John Battle: When will the Sanctions
Committee report be ready?
Hilary Benn: Early December, I
understand.
Q34 Chairman: Just on that particular
point, given that the President of China is in town and given
that China have been blocking initiatives of the Security Council,
has anybody raised this matter with the Chinese President?
Hilary Benn: Today, or while he
is here?
Lord Triesman: I do not know if
it is going to be raised today, although there is a possibility.
I have had detailed discussions with the Chinese Ambassador on
these issues about two days ago now, and it was a more open and
fruitful discussion than perhaps one might have expected because
I think he accepted that the levels of their trade with Sudan,
particularly about 40% of the oil business that is conducted with
the Chinese, does give them some possibilities of being influential,
if they are willing to be influential. I put the argument to them
that they are a major player in the country, as they are in several
African countries, and if they chose to have a more dynamic impact
they could achieve that. He said that he was willing to discuss
ways of doing that.
Q35 Chairman: That sounds like a
very inscrutable Chinese answer.
Lord Triesman: Probably so.
Q36 Mr Davies: Lord Triesman, I think
you said to the Committee a few moments ago that there is a tendency
for people taking part in the Abuja talks to think that they will
get some leverage in those talks if there is violence on the ground
in Darfur. Is that not a bit naive? Is it not the case that the
only reason why anybody is invited to these talks in Abuja or
any other peace talks is because they are engaged in violence?
Had it not occurred to you that the major driver of violence in
Darfur is that violence was obviously successful after about 20
years in Southern Sudan in getting the Naivasha Agreement and
achieving autonomy and the prospect of statehood?
Lord Triesman: I understand the
argument that people have got to the negotiating table because
they conducted a war of violence. But I think my point is slightly
different, with respect; it is that some people think that violence
is an alternative to getting to the negotiating table, that they
would prefer to see a result from that rather than from coming
along and talking. We have to dissuade them from thinking that.
Q37 Mr Davies: What you are saying
is that we have to change the rules of the game so as to make
sure that in the future the balance and advantage to them is not
engaging in violence, that I very much agree with you. I also
wondered whether you are not being a bit naive about the Chinese.
The Chinese are only in the Sudan because they need the oil, that
is why they are getting involved in so many African countries
with primary resources that they want. So the idea that they would
be willing to forego the oil in order to achieve some political
changes in the Sudan, again, I fear is a little naive. You may
not be able to comment on that.
Lord Triesman: Mr Davies, one
of the things that I do not think I suggested was that they would
forego the oil. I am just saying that as a major partner in the
area it would be good to be able to engage them in discussions
about how that country can come out of war in all parts of that
country. They may also have some interests in there being greater
security and greater and more durable peace. I do not know until
that discussion proceeds a bit further whether that will be the
case. I do not think it is a matter of foregoing anything; it
is a matter of them potentially a becoming partner and a major
international player with significant influence if they want to
avert it.
Q38 Mr Davies: You said that China
is involved in the obtaining of 40% of the oil in Sudan and that
might give them a special influence. The only way in which that
will give them a special influence is if they were prepared to
forego that oil if some quid pro quo was not secured, but
I think you have agreed with me that that would not be a sensible
or a realistic way of looking at the matter, whatever the Chinese
Ambassador diplomatically may feel that he wants to tell you to
keep you happy. I wonder, Mr Benn, if I could just take up a little
of your relative optimism which you have expressed this afternoon.
You said that there had been good news this year, that some types
of violence have declined, and particularly violence against people
in their homes. Is that not because so many more people in the
Sudan, or particularly in Darfur, do not live in their homes;
they have been driven into these camps? There has been de facto
success in the Sudanese Government's policy of ethnic cleansing.
They have been removed, there is no prospect of them coming back,
so therefore inevitably there is going to be less violence against
people in their homes.
Hilary Benn: Undoubtedly that
is the case. But it is not about optimism. I have tried to describe
the situation as I see it, and there was real concern about the
continuing levels of attacks on people. It was partly because
a lot of people have left their homes, that is true; it is partly
because there has been more effective protection of people in
the camps than was the case in the past, and that is because of
the AU presence and because of the patrols that they are undertaking.
Q39 Mr Davies: It does not relate
to the point you made about less violence against people in their
homes. If it is because they are all in the camps we agree it
is just a statistical result of the fact that there are fewer
people in their homes, and you should not therefore take comfort
from that.
Hilary Benn: Overall, whether
people are in their homes or in the camps there has been less
violence against people during the course of this year than the
case previously.
2 Witness correction: Under the terms of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), following payments to an
Oil Revenue Stabilisation Account and to the oil producing states,
50% of revenues derived from oil produced in Southern Sudan will
be paid to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and 50% to
the National Government and States in Northern Sudan. Back
|
