3 The effectiveness of the AU force:
African solutions for African problems, an international excuse,
or the only option?
7. We said in our earlier report that, given the
improbability of the UN Security Council authorising military
intervention by other organisations, the AU has been the only
realistic option. There are now approximately 6706 AU military
and civilian personnel in Darfur[13]
still short of the 7731 total which the AU Peace and Security
Council authorised on 28 April 2005, with a target deployment
date of the end of September. This number is far short of the
12-15,000 suggested by the Crisis Group and Jan Egeland[14]
as necessary to protect the IDP camps. There are two issues here:
first, the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)[15];
and second, its capacity. The current mandate of AMIS includes
some civilian protection but much is left to the discretion of
individual commanders on the ground[16].
AMIS has had a positive impact on security in some areas by often
going beyond the strict terms of its mandate, but its ability
to protect civilians and humanitarian operations is hamstrung
by limited capacity, insufficient resources and political constraints.
In our earlier report we called for the mandate to be further
revised if large-scale killing continued.[17]
But the Secretary of State told us that it was for the AU to change
the mandate if it felt it necessary, and denied that there was
an issue of any country within the AU blocking change. Based on
his discussions in Darfur in June, he maintained that the mandate
was not the burning issue.
8. The Secretary of State quoted the AU Deputy Force
Commander as saying that if AMIS had a wider mandate then it would
need to make sure that its troops were protected and would need
the delivery of equipment (armoured personnel carriers) which
the GoS was obstructing[18].
So the issue of the mandate cannot be discussed separately from
the practicalities of ensuring that the AU has the means to carry
it out. Lord Triesman gave the strong impression that a lack of
equipment restricted local AMIS commanders from exercising the
mandate they already have. Once again, the discussion came back
to the GoS obstructing the delivery of the armoured personnel
carriers donated by Canada. Lord Triesman said that pressure on
the GoS had to be "very, very strong" and that "we
told them in no uncertain terms what the expectations of the international
community would be"[19].
The importance of equipment and logistical constraints has been
highlighted by the reluctance of the AU to undertake certain missions
because of fears that it cannot protect itself from attacks.
9. Hilary Benn, referring to influencing the actions
of the GoS, said "it is pressure that makes the difference".
The Committee's concern is that pressure only works when there
are credible sanctions to apply in the event of non-compliance.
To quote the Crisis Group[20]:
"The Government (of Sudan) has agreed to
neutralise or disarm the militias it has armed and controls or
influences in five separate agreements: the N'djamena ceasefire
agreement of 8 April 2004, the N'djamena agreement of 25 April
2004, the 3 July 2004 communiqué signed with the UN, the
5 August 2004 Plan of Action signed with the UN, and the 9 November
2004 Protocol on Security Arrangements signed at the AU-led Abuja
talks. The government has also agreed to identify militias under
its control or influence in the Plan of Action and the Protocol
on Security Arrangements. It reiterated its promise to disarm
militias in the 19 December Ceasefire Agreement signed with the
National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD). UN Security
Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564 also demanded that the government
disarm the Janjaweed militias. It has fulfilled none of these
commitments."
Simply making the GoS meet the commitments it has
undertaken would be a first in Sudan for the international community.
The UK Government was right to tell the GoS "in no uncertain
terms", as Lord Triesman said he had done, that it had to
fulfil its commitments, but the GoS has not done so. The UK
Government should propose to the UN Security Council that it should
apply credible sanctions until the GoS has complied.
10. Lord Triesman denied that funding was a problem
for the AU[21]. The UN
Secretary General clearly disagrees and in his October report
stated that despite donor generosity, AMIS has not been receiving
the (cash) funding required for it to carry out its mandate effectively[22].
Dr Smith (of the Aegis Trust) told us that, rather than proactively
supporting the mission, donors had waited for the AU to plead
with them that they were running out of helicopter fuel or couldn't
meet their payroll requirements[23].
During our visit to Darfur we were told that pledges and donations
from the partners are mostly in kind but there is need for enough
cash in the mission to meet contingencies and timely payment of
salaries/allowances of staff and monitors. On several occasions
lack of funds has delayed transfer of funds to the mission area,
which in turn leads to delay in payment of salaries and allowances
to the troops. The impact of this on the morale and credibility
of the AU cannot be over-emphasised. The Committee is concerned
that existing funding for the AU mission will be exhausted by
early 2006, thus preventing the AU from fulfilling its mandate
and leaving civilians ever more vulnerable to attack. We support
statements by Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the UK Permanent Representative
to the UN, who urged stronger world support, including greater
EU funding for the AU force[24].
11. The overriding priority for the international
community must be to end the bloodshed. Given the capacity
and funding issues being experienced by AMIS, the Committee believes
that the UN should mobilize additional resources for the AU Mission's
work and reinforce its role with a UN mandate. This would allow
for the AU Mission to be blue-helmeted, make greater resources
available and thus speed up deployment. This needs to happen
immediately.
13 UNSC, Monthly report of the Secretary-General on
Darfur, 16 November 2005. Back
14
UN Under-Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs and emergency
relief coordinator Back
15
Communiqué of the Seventeenth Meeting of the [African Union]
Peace and Security Council, 20 October 2004 - available at http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/homedar.htm# Back
16
Crisis Group The AU's Mission in Darfur; Bridging the Gaps. 6
July 2005 Back
17
op cit paragraph 67. Back
18
Q9 Back
19
Q10 Back
20
Crisis Group The AU's Mission in Darfur; Bridging the Gaps. 6
July 2005, footnote 11 Back
21
Q16 Back
22
UNSC, Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, 14 October
2005, paragraph 29 Back
23
Q53 Back
24
Sudan Tribune, 5 January 2006 Back
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