Select Committee on International Development Second Report


3  The effectiveness of the AU force: African solutions for African problems, an international excuse, or the only option?

7. We said in our earlier report that, given the improbability of the UN Security Council authorising military intervention by other organisations, the AU has been the only realistic option. There are now approximately 6706 AU military and civilian personnel in Darfur[13] — still short of the 7731 total which the AU Peace and Security Council authorised on 28 April 2005, with a target deployment date of the end of September. This number is far short of the 12-15,000 suggested by the Crisis Group and Jan Egeland[14] as necessary to protect the IDP camps. There are two issues here: first, the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)[15]; and second, its capacity. The current mandate of AMIS includes some civilian protection but much is left to the discretion of individual commanders on the ground[16]. AMIS has had a positive impact on security in some areas by often going beyond the strict terms of its mandate, but its ability to protect civilians and humanitarian operations is hamstrung by limited capacity, insufficient resources and political constraints. In our earlier report we called for the mandate to be further revised if large-scale killing continued.[17] But the Secretary of State told us that it was for the AU to change the mandate if it felt it necessary, and denied that there was an issue of any country within the AU blocking change. Based on his discussions in Darfur in June, he maintained that the mandate was not the burning issue.

8. The Secretary of State quoted the AU Deputy Force Commander as saying that if AMIS had a wider mandate then it would need to make sure that its troops were protected and would need the delivery of equipment (armoured personnel carriers) which the GoS was obstructing[18]. So the issue of the mandate cannot be discussed separately from the practicalities of ensuring that the AU has the means to carry it out. Lord Triesman gave the strong impression that a lack of equipment restricted local AMIS commanders from exercising the mandate they already have. Once again, the discussion came back to the GoS obstructing the delivery of the armoured personnel carriers donated by Canada. Lord Triesman said that pressure on the GoS had to be "very, very strong" and that "we told them in no uncertain terms what the expectations of the international community would be"[19]. The importance of equipment and logistical constraints has been highlighted by the reluctance of the AU to undertake certain missions because of fears that it cannot protect itself from attacks.

9. Hilary Benn, referring to influencing the actions of the GoS, said "it is pressure that makes the difference". The Committee's concern is that pressure only works when there are credible sanctions to apply in the event of non-compliance. To quote the Crisis Group[20]:

    "The Government (of Sudan) has agreed to neutralise or disarm the militias it has armed and controls or influences in five separate agreements: the N'djamena ceasefire agreement of 8 April 2004, the N'djamena agreement of 25 April 2004, the 3 July 2004 communiqué signed with the UN, the 5 August 2004 Plan of Action signed with the UN, and the 9 November 2004 Protocol on Security Arrangements signed at the AU-led Abuja talks. The government has also agreed to identify militias under its control or influence in the Plan of Action and the Protocol on Security Arrangements. It reiterated its promise to disarm militias in the 19 December Ceasefire Agreement signed with the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD). UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564 also demanded that the government disarm the Janjaweed militias. It has fulfilled none of these commitments."

Simply making the GoS meet the commitments it has undertaken would be a first in Sudan for the international community. The UK Government was right to tell the GoS "in no uncertain terms", as Lord Triesman said he had done, that it had to fulfil its commitments, but the GoS has not done so. The UK Government should propose to the UN Security Council that it should apply credible sanctions until the GoS has complied.

10. Lord Triesman denied that funding was a problem for the AU[21]. The UN Secretary General clearly disagrees and in his October report stated that despite donor generosity, AMIS has not been receiving the (cash) funding required for it to carry out its mandate effectively[22]. Dr Smith (of the Aegis Trust) told us that, rather than proactively supporting the mission, donors had waited for the AU to plead with them that they were running out of helicopter fuel or couldn't meet their payroll requirements[23]. During our visit to Darfur we were told that pledges and donations from the partners are mostly in kind but there is need for enough cash in the mission to meet contingencies and timely payment of salaries/allowances of staff and monitors. On several occasions lack of funds has delayed transfer of funds to the mission area, which in turn leads to delay in payment of salaries and allowances to the troops. The impact of this on the morale and credibility of the AU cannot be over-emphasised. The Committee is concerned that existing funding for the AU mission will be exhausted by early 2006, thus preventing the AU from fulfilling its mandate and leaving civilians ever more vulnerable to attack. We support statements by Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the UK Permanent Representative to the UN, who urged stronger world support, including greater EU funding for the AU force[24].

11. The overriding priority for the international community must be to end the bloodshed. Given the capacity and funding issues being experienced by AMIS, the Committee believes that the UN should mobilize additional resources for the AU Mission's work and reinforce its role with a UN mandate. This would allow for the AU Mission to be blue-helmeted, make greater resources available and thus speed up deployment. This needs to happen immediately.


13   UNSC, Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, 16 November 2005.  Back

14   UN Under-Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator Back

15   Communiqué of the Seventeenth Meeting of the [African Union] Peace and Security Council, 20 October 2004 - available at http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/homedar.htm# Back

16   Crisis Group The AU's Mission in Darfur; Bridging the Gaps. 6 July 2005 Back

17   op cit paragraph 67. Back

18   Q9 Back

19   Q10 Back

20   Crisis Group The AU's Mission in Darfur; Bridging the Gaps. 6 July 2005, footnote 11 Back

21   Q16 Back

22   UNSC, Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, 14 October 2005, paragraph 29 Back

23   Q53 Back

24   Sudan Tribune, 5 January 2006 Back


 
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