House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Second Report

5 The Abuja negotiations

13. Peace in Darfur requires a political solution. Talks between the rebels and the GoS have been going on (and off) in Abuja since August 2004. Both sides share responsibility for the lack of progress. The tensions which Suliman Baldo described — not only between the SLA and the smaller JEM but more recently between sub-groups of the SLA — have made it impossible for the rebels to develop a coherent position in the negotiations. Mr Baldo went so far as to suggest that a split between the groups might be a positive outcome in that it could create more cohesive and disciplined participants in the negotiations.[27]

14. DFID told us of the support which it has given in terms of training workshops, aimed at helping the parties to the talks formulate their negotiation positions and approach the talks with greater clarity.[28] Hilary Benn painted a chaotic picture of the negotiations, with different people claiming to be leaders and "40 people turning up, having to ring somebody who is living in Europe to find out what the line is and what they should be doing"[29]. It strikes us that the talks are bedevilled by a lack of urgency and that, though capacity building by donors is helpful, what is really needed is to persuade those African countries which have been providing assistance to the rebels to now put pressure on them to make progress. The Deputy Head of the Joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit described the Libyans as on side though not actively so[30]. We urge the UK Government to do more to persuade the relevant African countries, and in particular Libya, to bring pressure to bear on the Darfur rebels to take the Abuja negotiations seriously. The criticism of the rebels' behaviour at the negotiations does not detract from the primary responsibility which the GoS bears for failing to protect its own citizens. This is not a conflict between protagonists of equal strength; the government-backed militias continue to attack civilians, including those in IDP camps.

15. On the Government of Sudan side, there has been a question mark over whether the delegation representing the GoS at Abuja also represents the SPLM and reflects the composition and position of the new Government of National Unity. The difficulty has been that the ruling National Congress Party and the SPLM have not been able to agree on a common negotiating position. As a consequence, the rebels have found themselves being asked to negotiate with the same party that has been responsible for engineering the ethnic cleansing in Darfur.[31] Since our evidence session, DFID has told us of progress made by the GNU in formulating a joint strategy for Darfur and that the SPLM will be part of the current round of talks at Abuja. Nevertheless, pressure needs to be maintained to ensure the National Congress Party adjusts to the new reality — that it is now part of the Government of National Unity and needs to develop a joint position with its new partner, not only on Darfur but also on eastern Sudan where a similar emergency is developing.

16. Suliman Baldo contrasted policy on Darfur with the IGAD[32] process on the conflict in southern Sudan.[33] In the case of IGAD, there had been a very robust coordinated approach by the Troika[34] to back the process, and to provide logistics, expertise and political pressure to move the process forward. Although the key international players have their own Special Envoys for the Darfur peace process sitting in Abuja there was, in his view, nothing similar to "the Troika's organic integration with the mediators as had been the case with IGAD"[35]. Mr Baldo called for the establishment of a similar troika for the Abuja process, expanded to include the EU and France. We endorse this suggestion. We were pleased to see DFID respond[36] that it is working closely with its partners, but note that when HMG refers to "maximising the pressure on the parties", no mention is made of how this is being done. The history of lack of sanctions for non-compliance by the GoS does not inspire our confidence.