6 Responsibility to protect
17. In our last report we described the Responsibility
to Protect as an emerging legal norm. The adoption of "the
responsibility to protect" was regarded as perhaps the
success of the UN World Summit in September. Paragraph 139 of
the Summit Outcome document states that Member States are:
"prepared to take collective action, in
a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case
by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations
as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter
and international law." [37]
18. This is a huge step forward; it shows that there
is, in theory, a political endorsement of the Responsibility to
Protect. That, in itself, is important legally as well. State
practice and intent are crucial components when identifying legal
norms and codifying international law. From a legal perspective,
Paragraph 139 is also important because it does not limit Member
States' actions to intervening only in cases where the problem
has spilled over from one state to another. Therefore, the Responsibility
to Protect could apply to violence solely within one state.
19. Hilary Benn pointed out that political will and
legal base were one thing, but having the capacity to intervene
was what really counted. At present there was not "sufficient
of the right capacity to make a difference"[38]
and "that is why we have to ensure that we do build that
over time, including supporting, in this case, Africa's efforts
to provide some of that capacity"[39].
But the dispossessed of Darfur cannot wait that long. One option
would be to call on those who have the capacity, but Lord Triesman
thought a NATO intervention might be seen as an act of war and
resisted strongly by the GoS.[40]
What does remain is the possibility of NATO and the EU helping
to provide the tools for the job. This means: force preparation,
deployment, sustainment, intelligence, command and control, communications
and tactical (day and night) mobility. The AU made many of these
points to us during our visit back in February including
the suggestion of intelligence communication equipment. What has
been on offer since has been limited to the Canadian armoured
personnel carriers, some of which, at the time of our evidence
session, were still waiting on the quayside at Dakar. If the
UK Government and the international community are determined on
an African solution to an African problem then they have an obligation
to give practical help to make the AU Mission work. This is an
area where political will is paramount. Until there is a change
of heart, despite the endorsement of the concept at the 2005 Millennium
Review Summit, the Responsibility to Protect will remain just
an aspiration.
20. China holds a 40% stake in Sudan's oil industry.
In our previous report we commented on China's role on the UN
Security Council in blocking effective sanctions against the GoS.
We were therefore encouraged to hear from Lord Triesman that,
in relation to Sudan, he recently had what he described as "a
more open and fruitful discussion with the Chinese Ambassador
than perhaps one might have expected"[41].
We have to be realistic as to the level of influence which the
UK Government can bring to bear on China. But, at the very least,
we would expect to see concerted diplomatic pressure within the
Security Council to persuade China that it is in its long-term
interest to become a partner in Africa and to help create greater
security and a durable peace in all of Sudan.
37 http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html Back
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