Main conclusions
1. It
is clear to us that the reason for the decline in the type of
attacks seen in 2004 is that the de facto ethnic cleansing
has succeeded and people have fled their homes for the protection
of the camps. (Paragraph 4).
2. The increase in
the number of people dependent on humanitarian assistance is all
the more worrying since the ability of aid agencies to deliver
assistance — and not only in West Darfur — has been
seriously affected by the increase in banditry and violence. (Paragraph
5).
3. The GoS has not
fulfilled its commitments. The UK Government should propose to
the UN Security Council that it should apply credible sanctions
until the GoS has complied. (Paragraph 9).
4. The overriding
priority for the International Community must be to end the bloodshed.
Given the capacity and funding issues being experienced by AMIS,
the Committee believes that the UN should mobilize additional
resources for the AU Mission's work and reinforce its role with
a UN mandate. This would allow for the AU Mission to be blue-helmeted,
make greater resources available and thus speed up deployment.
This needs to happen immediately. (Paragraph 11).
5. We urge the UK
Government to do more to persuade the relevant African countries,
and in particular Libya, to bring pressure to bear on the Darfur
rebels to take the Abuja negotiations seriously. (Paragraph 14).
6. Pressure needs
to be maintained to ensure the National Congress Party adjusts
to the new reality — that it is now part of the Government
of National Unity and needs to develop a joint position with its
new partner, not only on Darfur but also on eastern Sudan where
a similar emergency is developing. (Paragraph 15).
7. We endorse the
suggestion of a troika for the Abuja process similar to that used
for the IGAD process, but expanded to include the EU and France.
(Paragraph 16).
8. We note when HMG
refers to "maximising the pressure on the parties",
no mention is made of how this is being done. The history of lack
of sanctions for non-compliance by the GoS does not inspire our
confidence. (Paragraph 16).
9. If the UK Government
and the international community are determined on an African solution
to an African problem then they have an obligation to give practical
help to make the AU Mission work. This is an area where political
will is paramount. Until there is a change of heart, despite the
endorsement of the concept at the 2005 Millennium Review Summit,
the Responsibility to Protect will remain just an aspiration.
(Paragraph 19).
10. We favour African
solutions to African problems, but at present, despite the best
efforts of the African Union, the AU Mission in Sudan is not providing
adequate protection for people in Darfur. The Responsibility to
Protect, agreed at the UN Millennium Review Summit, should
be a responsibility that falls on all UN members, not just on
neighbouring states. Given the expiry of the AU's mandate at
the end of March, we are convinced of the urgency of the need
to put resources in place, whether through the AU or the UN, to
ensure effective protection for people in Darfur. This needs to
happen immediately. We request that the UK Government, in its
response to this report, sets out the actions which it has taken
to put this into effect. (Paragraph 21).
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