UK Government Response to questions submitted
by the International Development Committee
DARFUR: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Tracking/follow-up questions put by the Committee
to HMG in relation to the report (Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility
to protect, 5th Report of Session 2004-05, HC 67-I).
The numbers refer to the paragraph numbers
used by HMG in its response to the Committee [CM 6576].
4. The international community chose to ignore
the early warnings of NGOs and senior UN officials. Other factors—poor
access, continuing insecurity, a flawed humanitarian system, and
an unfavourable political context—played a part too, but
by ignoring the warnings, the international community helped to
ensure that the initial humanitarian response to Darfur was, as
Médecins Sans Frontières put it, "a staggering
failure". (Paragraph 15)
We agree that the international community was
too slow. It is important to learn lessons from Darfur to improve
the response there now and to future crises. In August 2004, the
UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland, in a joint effort
with agencies of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, commissioned
a real-time evaluation to strengthen the humanitarian response
in Darfur and future crises of a similar nature. We have looked,
and will continue to look carefully at the recommendations made
by the evaluation, and their implementation. The crisis and response
in Darfur prompted the Secretary of State for International Development's
proposals for reform of the humanitarian system. These were launched
in December 2004, and will be a key part of our Presidencies of
the G8 and the EU this year.
What mechanisms have been put in place, by the
UK and others, to ensure that the lessons of Darfur are learnt
and applied in future crises? What recommendations did the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee's evaluation make? When will these recommendations
be implemented? Can the IDC be provided with a copy of the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee's Report? What progress has been made with
reforming the international humanitarian system?
As demonstrated in Darfur, the humanitarian
community can only offer limited protection to civilians. The
primary responsibility for the protection of vulnerable populations
lies with the government. Where governments are unwilling or unable
to exercise their responsibility, the international community
should act to prevent or stop the worst atrocities. The 2005 Millennium
Review Summit endorsed this concept, and for the first time world
leaders agreed that they were prepared to take collective action.
This includes using political and diplomatic pressure, sanctions,
and, should peaceful means be inadequate, military action through
the Security Council. This agreement is not an end in itself,
but gives the international community another tool for tackling
gross human rights violations.
It was the crisis and response in Darfur, and
the need to learn lessons and apply them in future crises that
prompted the Secretary of State for International Development
to propose reforms of the humanitarian system.
— Darfur demonstrated that UN agencies
need access to rapid funding.
— The Millennium Review
Summit in September confirmed the transformation of the UN Central
Emergency Revolving Fund from a $50 million loan facility to a
more substantial grant facility to which $160 million has been
pledged so far—including $70 million by the UK. This fund
will enable UN humanitarian agencies to respond quickly to breaking
crises.
— Pilots to channel pooled
donor funding through the UN Humanitarian Coordinator are being
developed in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Please
see the Government's response to recommendation 27 below for further
details.
— It was clear from Darfur that better
coordination of humanitarian assistance is required.
— The Humanitarian Response
Review will lead to improvement of sector coordination. Please
see the Government's response to recommendation 16 below for further
details.
— DFID is also working with
the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
and the UN Development Group to improve the quality, recruitment,
training and retention of UN Humanitarian Coordinators. Proposals
on this will be made to the December meeting of the Inter Agency
Standing Committee (IASC).
— Lack of data hindered the humanitarian
response in Darfur.
— DFID is supporting work
by the World Health Organisation and OCHA to improve tracking
of key humanitarian outcomes, particularly mortality and nutrition
trends. These will be critical to enable improved needs assessment,
coverage and monitoring and evaluation. The work will be presented
at a major DFID-funded international meeting in Geneva in December.
The IASC real-time evaluation has produced three
reports over the last year. Copies of all three reports are attached
for the IDC[1].
The reports make a large number of recommendations. In particular,
DFID has followed up on the performance and staffing of the UN
Department of Safety and Security, the nutrition and health surveillance
system, and clarifying roles and responsibilities of different
UN agencies for protection of IDPs. Improvements are being made
in these areas.
5. The UK Government deserves credit for
its speedy and generous response to the crisis in Darfur. The
EC/ECHO and the USA deserve praise too. Particularly noteworthy
is the EC's early support for the AU's work in Darfur. Other donors,
including other European countries, should have done more. Arab
countries have donated 2.5% of the total, mainly through in-kind
bilateral humanitarian aid. This is disappointing. The donor response
to Darfur has, after a slow start, been very good. But huge needs
remain across Sudan and elsewhere. (Paragraph 16)
We welcome the IDC's recognition of the role
the UK has played in responding to the crisis. We agree that,
despite the UK's efforts to increase the international community's
response, many other donors could have done more. There are still
big gaps—the UN 2005 Workplan is now 40% funded, with US$617
million of the required US$1.6 billion pledged or received so
far. There were some successes however, and the UK was instrumental
in securing EUR92 million from the EU's Peace Facility for the
AU. The 11-12 April Oslo Donor's conference for Sudan was highly
successful with US$4.5 billion of new funding pledged by donors
over the next 2-3 years. Although we await final result, pledges
made at the Oslo Conference could raise UN 2005 Workplan funding
to US$1-1.1 billion.
What is the funding situation now, for Darfur,
and for the South of Sudan? Have commitments been delivered? Which
countries are failing to deliver what they promised?
The UN 2005 Workplan for Sudan is now 50% funded.
After revisions, the total required has risen to US$1.97 billion
(£1.1 billion). US$988 million (£558 million) has been
pledged or received so far, close to the level we expected following
the Oslo Conference. Of this total, US$524 million (£296
million) has gone to Darfur, US$300 million (£169 million)
to Southern Sudan, and the remainder to the rest of Sudan or national
programmes. The Workplan does not cover all requirements. For
example NGOs and the Red Cross have significant programmes that
are funded outside the Workplan.
Pledges made at Oslo were for funding over 2-3
years, and we have not analysed the extent to which other countries
have delivered on their promises. The UK is frontloading its disbursal
of its pledge of £288.7 million over three years. £70
million has been disbursed so far, and we anticipate this figure
will rise to over £110 million by the end of this first financial
year.
Very large humanitarian needs will remain in
Sudan through 2006. Ensuring sufficient funding levels will be
a big challenge, and we will continue to work with other donors
to ensure early and appropriate contributions are made.
10. All organisations tasked with the delivery
of humanitarian supplies, including the WFP, must be well-supported
by the donors at an early stage. If they are to deliver adequate
supplies at the right time, then this is essential. In return
for donor support, the organisations must deliver. The WFP must
do all it can to ensure that adequate food supplies are in place
before demand peaks in August this year. (Paragraph 23)
We welcome this recommendation. As of 25 April,
the 2005 WFP Emergency Operation for Darfur was 60% funded, facing
a shortfall of US$186 million. WFP have made progress pre-positioning
food in advance of the rainy season, and had some 26,000 MT of
food pre-positioned in West Darfur by the end of April. However
WFP are preparing to provide emergency food assistance for over
3 million people at the peak of the hunger period from July to
October—up from 2.1 million target beneficiaries in April.
The UK has provided around £11 million to WFP this year for
both food aid and logistics as part of its £45 million contribution
to humanitarian components of the UN Workplan.
What is the UK's assessment of WFP's performance
during the 2005 rainy season? Has WFP been provided with sufficient
resources?
WFP has performed well during the rainy season.
Despite logistical constraints (including fuel shortages) and
insecurity, WFP has established effective supply lines, scaled
up its capacity to move and distribute adequate food, and has
stockpiled food in predetermined areas. WFP distributed food to
2.5 million beneficiaries in September 2005 compared with 1.3
million in September 2004.
Fieldwork for the second annual interagency
Food Security and Nutritional Assessment for Darfur has been completed.
Preliminary results indicate a major improvement in the nutrition
situation in Darfur. Global Acute Malnutrition was found to be
11.9%, compared with 21.8% in 2004. Severe Acute Malnutrition
stands at 1.4%, compared with 3.9% last year. These improvements
can be accounted for in part by the improved WFP beneficiary rates.
The budget for WFP's 2005 Darfur Emergency Operations
Programme is US$562 million (£317 million). WFP has so far
received US$414 million (£233 million), and has taken an
additional US$15 million (£8 million) internal loan. While
this is still some way short of WFP's original budget, it has
enabled WFP to operate effectively in Darfur. We are concerned
however, that the loans WFP have taken could have knock-on effects
for funding next year. We are working with WFP to maintain donor
funding for its operations in Sudan next year.
14. Donors, NGOs and UN agencies should give
serious consideration to investing more in training and skills
development for humanitarian staff from the developing world,
so that the capacity of the humanitarian system can be enhanced.
(Paragraph 29)
We agree with the recommendation. We are open
to proposals that DFID can support in this regard, and are ready
to work with others to take this forward. We also look forward
to the Humanitarian Response Review, commissioned by the UN Emergency
Relief Co-ordinator, which will look at improvements in humanitarian
response capacity, and which we are co-funding.
Has DFID received any proposals—and supportable
proposals—along the lines mentioned? What work has DFID
done with others to take this forward? Has the Humanitarian Response
Review concluded? What did it recommend? When will its recommendations
be implemented? Can the IDC be provided with a copy of the Humanitarian
Response Review?
This year DFID has established a Conflict and
Humanitarian Fund to support NGOs working in the conflict and
humanitarian sectors. Through this fund, DFID is providing £2.5
million core funding over five years to the NGO RedR, whose work
includes training humanitarian staff from the developing world.
RedR is currently training NGO staff in Sudan, for which we are
providing over £500,000 additional funding. We have not received
any other proposals to fund training of humanitarian staff, but
would consider applications to the fund for such work.
The Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) report
was issued in August 2005. The report identifies a number of significant
gaps in the international humanitarian response system. It notes
that a number of initiatives are underway to address these gaps,
and is broadly consistent with the Secretary of State's proposals
for humanitarian reform (please see the Government's response
to recommendation 4 above for further details).
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is taking
forward the HRR report's recommendations. The most significant
recommendation is that individual agencies will take responsibility
for delivery in certain key sectors. Please see the Government's
response to recommendation 16 below for the division of responsibility
amongst agencies. Lead agencies are now developing plans to strengthen
human resource capacity in their sectors.
Other key recommendations of the report cover
humanitarian response performance benchmarks, assessment of response
capacities by sector, strengthening UN Humanitarian Coordinators,
and improved timeliness and predictability of humanitarian funding.
A copy of the Humanitarian Response Review report
is attached for the IDC[2].
16. If the international community is to
be able to fulfil its responsibility to protect, it must act now
to ensure that it is able to deal effectively with crises involving
IDPs. Ad hoc arrangements will not see duties adequately fulfilled.
To respond to IDPs' needs with excuses about institutional mandates
would be laughable if it did not have such tragic human consequences.
(Paragraph 32)
It is clear that we need to find a better way
of assisting and protecting IDPs than we have collectively achieved
in Darfur, where the lack of clear responsibility has led to confusion
and poor delivery. The key issue must be effective provision of
humanitarian assistance to IDPs, not the official mandate of any
particular organisation. The international community must be able
to provide coordinated humanitarian assistance tailored to people's
needs, irrespective of whether they are refugees, IDPs or residents.
The international community has agreed that a coordinated, collaborative
approach where different agencies and NGOs work together under
an OCHA lead (see below) is the most suitable way of dealing with
IDP situations. We are working with the UN and others on how to
make this approach more effective, and will monitor its effectiveness
closely to see where additional work needs to be done. We cannot
afford the same sort of incoherent and slow response we have seen
in Darfur to happen elsewhere. OCHA's Internal Displacement Division
and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator should lead the overall coordination
of a collaborative response for IDPs. We are working with OCHA
to improve their capacity to provide this coordination role. We
are also funding the UN Representative on the Human Rights of
IDPs, and the Global IDP Project, which provides information on
IDPs across the world. These should contribute to a better understanding
of the needs of IDPs, and how these needs should be met.
The UK's humanitarian reform initiative will
lead to a more effective collaborative approach through promoting
stronger leadership and coordination, and providing more ready
access to funding. We will continue to monitor how the collaborative
approach evolves, and to keep the need for more radical change
under close review.
What progress has been made with improving the
way in which the international humanitarian system addresses the
needs of IDPs?
Following the Humanitarian Response Review,
UN agencies have agreed—subject to approval by their governing
bodies—to take lead responsibility for particular clusters
of work. While lead agencies will not necessarily implement the
work themselves, they will be responsible and accountable to the
UN humanitarian system for ensuring that the work is done. The
list of lead agencies is as follows:
| Cluster | Lead Agency
|
| Health | WHO |
| Protection | UNHCR |
| Water and Sanitation | UNICEF
|
| Camp Co-ordination and Management | UNHCR
|
| Emergency Shelter | UNHCR |
| Early Recovery (Return, Reintegration or Resettlement)
| UNDP |
| Nutrition | UNICEF |
| Emergency Telecommunications | OCHA
|
| Logistics | WFP |
| |
This division of lead responsibilities amongst UN agencies
is positive and significant step towards better-coordinated and
more accountable support to IDPs.
17. The UK Government should—on behalf of the UK
taxpayers who help to fund the agencies—find out why UNHCR
and UNICEF were unwilling to take on the responsibility for the
management of IDP camps in Darfur. (Paragraph 33)
We agree with the Committee's recommendation and are following
up with UNHCR and UNICEF. The proposals we have put forward for
reform of the humanitarian system would help to address this.
What response did HMG get from UNHCR and UNICEF?
When UNHCR increased its presence in Darfur in August 2004,
many agencies were already managing IDP camps. UNHCR therefore
opted to focus its work on filling protection gaps affecting IDPs
inside and outside of camps. It said that while camp management
is a necessary temporary measure, protection and assistance are
even more important, particularly for IDPs who are outside camps,
residents hosting IDPs, and the few refugees returning from Chad.
UNHCR's approach is to try to reduce the levels of displacement,
to look for a durable solution, and to help avoid the long-term
dependency on camps. However, since July 2005, UNHCR has increased
its operations in IDP camps in West Darfur, and has taken on joint
responsibility of camp coordination with OCHA.
UNICEF is the technical lead in four sectors: child protection,
nutrition, education and water and sanitation. Effectiveness of
camp management depends in a large part on how well these sectors
are coordinated. However, UNICEF's performance, particularly in
water and sanitation, has been poor. It does not have the technical
competency, capacity or experience for camp management, and we
would not want UNICEF to take on the additional burden. We are
working closely with UNICEF to improve its performance in the
sectors where it does lead.
20. Security and progress on the political front are the
pre-requisites for voluntary return. Agreements on Voluntary Return
will not in themselves bring it about. Nevertheless, the international
community must ensure that the Sudanese government sticks to the
agreements it has reached and stops its practice of forcing IDPs
to return home or to move to other camps. Rather than waiting
for security to improve, the UN should be putting plans in place
now, for the informed and voluntary return of IDPs to their homes
over the next year. (Paragraph 38)
In North and South Darfur, returns protocols that bind the
GoS are set out in the Management and Coordination Mechanism,
drafted by the International Organisation on Migration. In West
Darfur a Letter of Understanding between UNHCR and the GoS sets
out responsibilities. These have improved communication between
the various organisations involved in the movement of IDPs. The
GoS continues to act in violation of both agreements, though there
are no recent examples of forced movement of large numbers of
IDPs. This issue was raised at the most recent Joint Implementation
Mechanism meeting in Khartoum, and a joint GoS and UN mission
will visit South Darfur to address it. We agree that the UN should
have an integrated plan for returns. They are working on this,
and should also have a new head of Returns and Reintegration in
place by the end of this month. We expect the new personnel will
lead to a more vigorous and transparent approach to planning for
returns.
Does the UN now have an integrated plan for returns, and a
new head of Returns and Reintegration?
Robert Turner is now in place as the UN Director of Return,
Reintegration and Recovery for the whole of Sudan.
The UN has only recently developed a framework for the movement
phase of spontaneous returns to Southern Sudan, following pressure
from donors and the governments in Khartoum and the south. However,
the UN lacks a coherent reintegration plan for resettlement and
immediate recovery. During the coming dry season it will be particularly
important that the UN prioritises and targets areas where the
pressures of returns could result in a worsened humanitarian situation
and possible re-displacement. We are pressing them to do so. There
are indications (though no confirmed figures) that re-displacement
has already occurred.
In Darfur, planning for returns is underway in West Darfur.
The UN has mobile teams and satellite offices scattered across
the State, and is monitoring return movements. It is starting
to provide small-scale community based reintegration and rehabilitation
projects in areas of return. Such a process is also getting started
in North and South Darfur.
24. There is a strong case for initiating an inter-governmental
review of the humanitarian response, along the lines of that which
took place after Rwanda, led perhaps by an African country. The
UK Government should consider supporting such a review. (Paragraph
43)
There have been two key reviews of the humanitarian response
so far: the Inter-Agency Standing Committee real-time evaluation,
which was commissioned in August 2004 by Jan Egeland to strengthen
the humanitarian response in Darfur and future crises of a similar
nature, and is still ongoing; and the Joint UNICEF-DFID evaluation
of UNICEF preparedness and early response to the Darfur emergency.
We are still following up on the findings of these reviews, and
will consider in due course whether any additional reviews, such
as an inter-governmental review as suggested by the Committee,
would be appropriate.
Has HMG considered whether an inter-governmental review would
be appropriate? What was the decision and why?
We agree with the Committee that this would be appropriate,
and we would support a proposal to conduct an inter-governmental
review of the humanitarian response in Darfur.
27. We endorse strongly the suggestions made by the Secretary
of State for International Development for reforming the international
humanitarian system, particularly as regards funding and giving
UN-OCHA a stronger role in coordination. More broadly, we share
his concern that there are no clear means of holding humanitarian
donors and agencies to account. In the absence of accountability,
the provision of humanitarian relief will be slow to improve.
(Paragraph 46)
We welcome the Committee's comments, and are piloting this
approach in Sudan this year. In order to empower the UN Humanitarian
Coordinator (UNHC) in Khartoum, DFID has provided an un-earmarked
£45 million contribution for humanitarian components of the
UN Workplan. The UNHC has allocated this money to activities in
the Workplan and it is being disbursed to operational agencies
and NGOs. For the 2006 Workplan we are looking to establish a
funding mechanism though which all donors can contribute, and
where the UNHC would both allocate and disburse to UN agencies
and, if they are included in the Workplan, NGOs. DFID is also
considering whether a similar approach could be taken in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and possibly also Ethiopia.
How has the piloting in Sudan of the new funding approach gone?
DFID's £45 million un-earmarked contribution for humanitarian
components of the UN Workplan was allocated and disbursed to operational
agencies and NGOs in the first half of 2006. The Humanitarian
Coordinator allocated around £23 million of the contribution
to projects in Southern Sudan; £17 million went to Darfur
and the remainder to other parts of Sudan and national programmes.
This distribution of funds reflects the relative lack of donor
interest in Southern Sudan compared to Darfur, even though in
Southern Sudan humanitarian indicators are in places commensurate
with or worse than Darfur. The Humanitarian Coordinator's ability
to address this and channel funds to where they are most needed
represents a big advantage of this approach.
DFID is now working with the Humanitarian Coordinator in
Khartoum to put a common funding mechanism in place for the 2006
Workplan. This would allow the Humanitarian Coordinator to both
allocate and disburse funds to operational agencies and NGOs in
the Workplan. We expect the fund will be in place by December,
and that several other donors will join the UK and use it to channel
their contributions to the 2006 Workplan. A similar mechanism
is being established in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
We will undertake rigorous monitoring and evaluation of both
the Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo pilots over the course
of 2006.
36. We believe that the UK Government has had honourable
intentions throughout; but mistakes were made. Strategies for
dealing with governments to move dual peace processes forward
will be needed again. Lessons must be learnt. In its response
to our report, we invite the Government—not solely DFID—to
outline the lessons, which have been learnt about sequencing and
prioritisation as a result of the experience of Darfur. (Paragraph
58)
There are always lessons to be learned following any crisis.
We have not yet done a formal lessons learned exercise in terms
of two peace processes in one country or Sudan in particular,
but agree that this is something we should consider. Reviews of
the humanitarian response are being carried out. Please see the
response to recommendation 24 for further details.
Has HMG considered and conducted a lessons-learned exercise
relating to dual peace processes in one country and the implications
of such situations for the practice of international diplomacy?
We agree that a lessons-learned exercise would be valuable,
and will explore how best to do it. We will keep the Committee
informed of how we take this forward.
42. Decisions about mandate are for the AU's Peace and
Security Council to make, in consultation with the wider international
community. However, if security does not improve in Darfur within
weeks, and if large-scale killing continues, then the mandate
of the AU must be revised to enable it to use force to protect
civilians, and to disarm militias. As a first next-step, the AU
should do more pro-actively to police the no-fly zone, agreed
to by the parties as part of the 9 November Security Protocol.
The AU must also be provided with the logistical and technical
support to enable it to fulfil its mandate. (Paragraph 67)
Response to recommendations 41 and 42.
We agree that it is for the AU Peace and Security Council
(PSC) to decide the mandate of its mission. The current mandate
requires the mission to carry out "proactive monitoring"
and to "contribute to a secure environment for the delivery
of humanitarian relief." It is also mandated to "protect
civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the
immediate vicinity, within resources and capability". A recent
AU-led assessment mission, including UN, UK, EU and US military
representatives, unanimously agreed that the mandate was sufficiently
broad, but that greater numbers were needed to implement it effectively.
The AU PSC subsequently decided to expand the number of military
personnel to 7,731 by the end of September. The AU is currently
in discussions with the international community over support for
its expansion. This is likely to include both further logistical
and technical support, and the UK will play its part. In February
2005 the Sudanese Foreign Minister told the Secretary of State
for International Development that the Government would withdraw
all its Antonov aircraft from Darfur. This has been done and,
although helicopter gunships remain in Darfur, the UN Secretary
General reports that there have been no hostile military flights
since this commitment was made.
Has the deployment of the additional AU troops and civilian
police been completed? What delays have there been and why? Have
there been any GoS hostile military flights since April? When
there have been hostile military flights, what sanctions have
been imposed, or pressure brought to bear, on the GoS?
The deployment of the expanded AU mission has continued.
There are now approximately 6,440 military and civilian personnel
in Darfur—still short of the 7,731 total. It is likely that
South Africa will now be unable to provide a military battalion,
and it has proven difficult to generate appropriately qualified
civilian police. There was a three-week delay in deployment in
September for infrastructure improvements to be made, and due
to Sudan-wide fuel shortages.
When the Secretary of State for International Development
met rebel commanders in El Fasher in June this year, they confirmed
that the GoS had stopped military flights. We are concerned however
about recent reports of hostile GoS helicopter flights. The AU
is investigating though has not yet substantiated the allegations.
We continue to put pressure on the Government of Sudan and
the rebels. During its visit to Sudan earlier this month, the
EU Troika—including Minister for Africa Lord Triesman—pressed
the parties to make immediate improvements to the security situation
in Darfur, and to rein in their fighters and act with restraint.
46. Helping the AU Mission, and bringing pressure to bear
on the Government of the Sudan, to improve policing, is a matter
of considerable urgency; the UK and the EU must do more to provide
support, more quickly. As discussions continue, and action follows,
attention must also be given to ensuring that there are sufficient
numbers of women police officers and civilian specialists so that
reports of violence against women and girls can be dealt with
appropriately.(Paragraph 71)
Improving the rule of law in Darfur through better policing
is important in finding a sustainable solution to the continued
insecurity. We welcome the recent decision by the AU PSC to expand
the number of its police in Darfur, and the emphasis it placed
on the importance of policing, including recruiting more women
police officers, for the longer-term security of Darfur. The UK
is supporting the AU policing mission through the provision of
vehicles as well as providing advice on AU policing matters to
the Darfur Integrated Task Force (the Addis Ababa-based AU management
team) Police Commissioner and the Darfur Commissioner. We have
also provided funding to UNDP for their human rights training
programme for GoS police. Within the EU, we have also been pressing
for support to AU policing and for the EU to look at possible
direct support to improve GoS policing. The EU is currently considering
how it may best do this.
What conclusions did the EU reach about possible direct support
to improve GoS policing, and what action followed?
The EU has agreed to provide civilian police support to the
AU. It is seconding police advisors and trainers to work with
the AMIS II Police Chain of Command and to train AMIS's own police
trainers. The initial deployment of police experts started on
15 August. The UK is filling seven positions, including Police
Head of Mission, and we are looking to see what further contributions
the UK could provide.
49. The UK and the EU have been particularly generous
with financial support for the AU, but as Hilary Benn acknowledged—and
the Commission for Africa reiterated in its recommendation that
donors provide 50% of the AU's peacekeeping requirements—there
is a need to find a mechanism that will allow funding to support
AU peace support operations on a more consistent and long-term
basis. (Paragraph 74)
We agree with the Committee's recommendation. We fully support
the AU and recognise the need for both predictable and flexible
funding for the AU's peace support operations. The UK is working
with the EU and other partners to identify funding mechanisms
that will meet this need. In addition EU programmes have already
begun to build financial management capacity at the AU. We anticipate
this will encourage more donors to provide direct funding to the
AU.
Have the UK, the EU and other partners identified funding mechanisms
for the AU which will provide for predictability and flexibility
for peace support operations?
The EU currently funds peace and support operations through
the African Peace Facility, which provides a flexible and rapid
response to AU requests for financial assistance. It is a major
supporter of the AU mission with
92 million (£62 million) provided so far, and a further
70 million (£47 million) soon to be made available. The Facility
is drawing to a close and we are working in our capacity as Presidency
of the EU to ensure that a long-term flexible and sufficient funding
mechanism is secured for the future.
53. What concerns us most about the international community's
delegation of responsibility to the AU is: first, that there seems
little sense of urgency; and second, that the support which the
international community provides to the AU Mission, does not seem
to be based on a strategy in which the risks attendant to different
options are assessed. Complex challenges are best tackled on the
basis of a clear strategy; muddling through, or waiting and seeing,
rarely works. Starting from the basis that protecting the people
of Darfur, and holding the parties to account for ceasefire violations
is the goal, we must have clear answers to the following questions:
— How is the effectiveness of the AU Mission
being assessed, on what basis, and by whom?
— What level of insecurity would signal that
the AU Mission—working in a context largely beyond its control—was
not being effective?
— How many months does the AU Mission have to
demonstrate its effectiveness?
— If the AU Mission proves unable to fulfil its
mandate effectively—monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire,
and providing civilian protection—what are the next steps
to ensure its success, who will ensure that they are taken, and
when? (Paragraph 77)
Support to the AU must be determined by its needs. The UN,
EU and NATO are all looking at what assistance they may be able
to provide to the AU as it increases its presence further. The
UN Secretary General recently reported that the UN should focus
on logistics and technical support to improve management structures.
This supports the recent findings of the AU-led assessment mission,
which included UN, UK, US and EU representatives, to look at current
performance of the mission, possible future expansion and how
partners can best support the AU. The AU PSC recently endorsed
the report and authorised an expansion in numbers to 6,171 military
personnel, with an appropriate level of civilian support personnel,
including 1,560 civilian police, by the end of September 2005.
We fully support the findings and recommendations of this mission
and have made clear that we will support the AU in achieving this.
Further assessment missions are planned for the future to look
at AU performance and donor support. The March assessment mission
recommended a further review in September to consider the effectiveness
of the AU mission against the situation then facing it, with a
possible further expansion to around 12,000 should this be necessary.
How is the effectiveness of the AU Mission being assessed,
on what basis, and by whom?
It is the responsibility of the AU to assess its mission
including its fulfilment of its mandate, through its Peace and
Security Council and Commission, including by examination of reports
from the AU Chairman and Joint Assessment Missions. In addition,
the UN Secretary General's monthly report on the situation in
Darfur indicates any progress that has been made.
What level of insecurity would signal that the AU Mission—working
in a context largely beyond its control—was not being effective?
The Committee is correct to note that the level of security
in Darfur is not solely a function of AU mission performance:
only a political solution in Darfur will result in lasting, improved
security. This is why the UK remains closely engaged in the AU-mediated
talks in Abuja. Meanwhile, the AU mission has made and continues
to make a significant difference to security on the ground.
How many months does the AU Mission have to demonstrate its
effectiveness?
The AU mission is doing a good job under demanding conditions.
In our assessment it has already demonstrated its effectiveness.
Until the most recent upsurge in violence in September, there
had been three months of relative stability in Darfur—the
AU mission contributed significantly to this.
If the AU Mission proves unable to fulfil its mandate effectively—monitoring
and reporting on the ceasefire, and providing civilian protection—what
are the next steps to ensure its success, who will ensure that
they are taken, and when?
The AU mission does not bear primary responsibility for protection
of civilians—this continues to rest with the Government
of Sudan. The international community will continue to work with
the AU to help it fulfil its mandate and achieve success, and
would determine an appropriate response together with the AU,
if any further steps were needed.
Have "further assessment missions" taken place? If
so, what have they concluded? Is an expansion to 12,000 (or more)
needed?
The UK and international partners have urged the AU to carry
out a further assessment mission. We expect one will take place
in the next few months, and should consider the future of the
AU mission, including whether any further troop expansion might
be needed. Such an assessment mission is for the AU to decide
and announce.
58. It is a scandal that interests in oil and arms exports
can prevent the Security Council from acting firmly on behalf
of the international community to protect the people of Darfur.
It shames those countries which, fuelling the crisis in Sudan,
are happy to turn a blind-eye to crimes no less serious and heinous
than genocide. And it demonstrates the impotence of the international
community to act to prevent such crimes and to fulfil its responsibility
to protect. (Paragraph 89)
We are firmly committed to the United Nations and to the
role of the Security Council. It is essential that the international
community works through the UN and the Security Council to confront
threats to international peace and security. Working for consensus
in the Security Council is the best way to achieve progress, particularly
when negotiating on a set of issues as complex as this. However,
it is the case that some UN Security Council members were unwilling
to countenance Security Council action during the early stages
of the crisis. The Security Council made good progress on Darfur,
notably through the adoption on 29 March 2005 of Resolution 1593,
which referred the situation in Sudan to the International Criminal
Court. This should act as a deterrent for future atrocities. Resolution
1591 extends the Darfur arms embargo to cover the Government of
Sudan. This followed the continued violations of the N'djamena
Ceasefire Agreement and the Abuja Protocols by governmental forces
and Darfur rebels. Additionally, the resolution allows for the
imposition of targeted sanctions on individuals who impede the
peace process, constitute a threat to stability in the Darfur
region, commit violations of international humanitarian law or
human rights law or other atrocities, violate the arms embargo
or are responsible for offensive military overflights in and over
the Darfur region. The Security Council also agreed on the creation
of a UN Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts to monitor
implementation and enforcement of the measures and make recommendations
on individuals against whom sanctions should be targeted. It took
the Security Council too long to reach these conclusions; we had
been pressing for stronger Resolutions for many months. We believe
it is important that permanent Security Council members use the
veto with restraint and in a manner consistent with the principles
of the Charter, as we have done ourselves. UN member states are
presently discussing a range of reforms to the UN system, in part
to overcome the divisions over Iraq. Heads of States and Governments
will commit themselves to these reforms at the Millennium Review
Summit in September. One of the issues presently on the agenda
is the responsibility to protect, which the UK strongly supports.
We believe that the international community has a responsibility
to act when governments are unable or unwilling to protect their
citizens against genocide or crimes against humanity.
What progress is the International Criminal Court making with
its investigations? How cooperative is the GoS being with the
ICC?
Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1593, the
Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court must report
to the Security Council every six months. He presented his first
report before the Security Council on 29 June and said that following
a preliminary examination, he had determined there were sufficient
grounds to open a formal investigation into the situation in Darfur.
The Court will carry out its investigations into Darfur independently,
as with all other investigations. The timing of the indictments,
like the names and numbers of those to be investigated or prosecuted,
is solely within the Chief Prosecutor's discretion. The Chief
Prosecutor is due to update the Security Council on the status
of the investigation in December. He can use that opportunity
to report any concerns in relation to co-operation between the
Court and the Government of Sudan and other involved states and
organisations.
Has the referral acted as a deterrent for subsequent atrocities?
In his August report, the UN Secretary General noted a decline
in the level of violence. The ICC referral may have contributed
to this in part. However, the situation has since deteriorated,
and the level of violence in Darfur has increased.
Have targeted sanctions been imposed on anyone? If so, who,
for what crimes/violations? Has the UN Sanctions Committee and
Panel of Experts been established? What recommendations has it
made?
The Sanctions Committee, composed of representatives of all
UN Security Council members has met several times. It appointed
a Panel of Experts on 30 June to assist the Committee's work.
As yet, no individuals have been designated by the Committee.
The UK comprehensively briefed the Panel of Experts when they
travelled to the region.
The Panel of Experts submitted its interim report to the
Security Council on 7 October. The interim report encouraged full
information sharing with the African Union; noted that the Committee
may wish to consider future modifications to the arms embargo;
recommended that the Government of Sudan update its information
in the UN Arms Registry on arms imports into Sudan; and recommended
that the Sanction Committee consider designating individuals based
on information from sources other than just the Panel of Experts.
The Panel also made preliminary findings about ongoing breaches
of the arms embargo.
The Panel of Experts will submit its final written report
in early December 2005. We hope that this will include recommendations
regarding sanctions against individuals. It will be important
for the UN Security Council to take these recommendations forward
promptly.
64. Some simple guidelines for dealing with regimes like
the Sudanese government are: do not trust what they say; demand
hard evidence to back up what they say they have done; establish
clear benchmarks and timetables against which their actions can
be judged; and, specify what consequences will flow, and when,
if the government fails to meet its commitments. Dealing with
the rebels has its own problems too, with a lack of clarity as
regards their organisation and their demands at the top of the
list. Efforts must be made to engage with the rebels, not least
to identify their demands. (Paragraph 95)
Bilaterally, and through the UN and EU, we continue to insist
that both the Government of Sudan and the rebels abide by the
commitments they have already made and engage in finding a political
solution to the conflict. We were closely involved in the recent
three UN Security Council Resolutions, which clearly set out the
obligations placed on the Government of Sudan and the SLM/JEM,
and the measures, including targeted sanctions, which will be
taken should they fail to comply. We fully support the AU-mediated
peace process for Darfur, and are pressing the parties to engage
in the process at a suitably high level. The international community
is also providing support, in the form of workshops, to the rebels
to help them formulate a coherent and cohesive political position,
ahead of the next round of talks. The Government of Sudan is aware
of this support and recognises its benefit.
What support has the international community provided to the
rebels to help them to formulate a coherent and cohesive political
position? Why has this objective not been achieved?
The NGO Saint Egidio has run capacity building workshops
with the rebel movements, and the UK has provided experts to the
AU to run workshops to help all sides ahead of the sixth round
of talks. These workshops helped the parties formulate their negotiation
positions and approach the talks with greater clarity.
The greatest obstacles towards coherent and cohesive position
have been the divisions within the SLM, and between the SLM and
the JEM. We welcome the cooperation agreement between the SLM
and the JEM of 13 September and the coordination demonstrated
between them at the sixth round of talks. We have continued to
press the rebels to ensure they co-ordinate their positions, and
are supporting the meeting of the three main rebel leaders in
an effort to resolve their differences ahead of the seventh round
of talks. We will also provide experts for further AU workshops
ahead of the resumption of negotiations, planned for 21 November.
69. We do not accept that there is a trade-off, or choice
to be made, between justice and peace. If the aim is a sustainable
peace, then justice and accountability are required. Political
negotiations with those responsible for crimes against humanity
are hardly a sound basis for a sustainable peace. (Paragraph 104)
We agree that accountability is essential to achieving long-term
stability. This is one of the reasons we have promoted justice
and the rule of law on the international agenda since September
2003. It is also the reason why the UK sponsored the Security
Council resolution, which referred Darfur to the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Should the ICC indict individuals for crimes
against humanity or any other crimes within the Court's jurisdiction,
those individuals must be brought before the Court.
Have any individuals been brought before the ICC? What discussions
has HMG had with the USA regarding Salah Abdallah Gosh?
The ICC is conducting an independent investigation into events
in Darfur. We do not know whom it is investigating. As far as
we are aware, it has issued no indictments, though we might not
be informed if it had issued sealed indictments. Sallah Abdallah
Gosh is the head of the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security
Services. We have had occasional discussion with the US about
him in this capacity.
73. Sudan's international partners, including the UK,
must insist that all oil related transactions—payments by
outside companies, as well as flows of finance within Sudan—are
published in line with the highest international standards of
transparency. Specifically, they should comply at least with the
guidelines promoted by the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative and consult openly with civil society. A full, independent
audit of the state oil company should also be carried out, and
the results published. (Paragraph 112)
We agree that transparency on oil related transactions will
be essential for the success of the CPA. The agreement recognises
this by proposing to establish relevant institutions. Establishment
of these institutions is ongoing and we will look to play a positive
role where we can.
The UK, along with a number of other countries, called for
Sudan to adopt Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
in a recent discussion in the IMF. We will continue to do so bilaterally
and in appropriate fora. The issue has also been raised with the
Government of Sudan in the context of a World Bank Public Expenditure
Review, in which the UK will participate. Representatives from
the Government of Sudan and SPLM were invited to the EITI conference
in London in March 2005, but did not attend. We hope that this
issue will get more attention in coming months from both the Government
of Sudan and SPLM.
Has Sudan signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative? Has the issue of transparency re oil revenues received
more attention from the GoS and the SPLM?
Sudan has not yet signed up to the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). The initiative remains on the
workplan for the World Bank's Public Expenditure Review (PER)
but substantive discussions have not yet begun, partly due to
delays forming a Government of National Unity, and partly due
to delays in the PER process. We will remain engaged with this
work.
Interest has been expressed by the SPLM in EITI. In the last
few weeks, some specific interest has been shown by GoS and we
are following this up in Khartoum. Progress on EITI should link
with actions taken by the commission to deal with petroleum issues,
which is to be established under the CPA. This commission, like
several others under the CPA, has yet to be established.
74. The UK Government should make its financial support
to the Government of the Sudan conditional on a substantial and
rapid decline in military spending, and encourage other donors
to do likewise. (Paragraph 112)
It is important to commence development activities in Sudan
quickly, so people can see the benefits of peace. In some cases,
these will be best done with or through the Government of National
Unity when it is established. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Northern
Sudan will allow donors to scrutinise, in a joined-up way, the
overall spending patterns of the Government and decide together
on appropriate courses of action if the Government does not allocate
acceptable levels of funding for poverty reduction. It is worth
noting that the Government of Sudan has allocated $3.1 billion
of a total requirement of $4.3 billion towards the reconstruction
and development needs identified for the North in the Joint Assessment
Mission report for the next two and a half years.
We are also supporting the World Bank to undertake a full
Public Expenditure Review (PER) including an analysis of military
and other spending. It is expected that the PER will provide analysis
for improved allocation of public finances and accountability
and transparency mechanisms.
What conditions has HMG attached to UK aid, including debt
relief, to Sudan? Can you confirm that the Debt Support Group,
mentioned in HMG response to para 117 of the IDC report has not
been established? Has the World Bank concluded its Public Expenditure
Review? What were its findings, and how are the findings being
acted upon?
Following the CPA, DFID is supporting initial work on the
delivery of basic services, and reform of the justice and security
sectors, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
of combatants. We have also talked to the Government of Sudan
about future prospects for debt relief. We have, however, made
clear that it will not be possible for us to engage in this area
without a substantial improvement in the situation in Darfur.
The Debt Support Group has not been established.
The World Bank Public Expenditure Review has started more
slowly than we had anticipated. The Review comprises a series
of sector-specific modules and will take several years to complete.
The results from the first module on finances at the state level
are not yet available.
75. The humanitarian response must be integrated with
plans for longer-term development. Working with the new Government
of the Sudan, donors including the UK should consider how Reconstruction
and Development Funds, such as those provided for in the CPA,
might be used to support the rebuilding of livelihoods in Darfur.
And, whilst the focus of livelihood rehabilitation will be on
agriculture and related activities, the looming threat of HIV/AIDS
must not be forgotten. (Paragraph 114)
The UK's humanitarian and development work is fully integrated
in the Sudan Unit, and will be integrated in a DFID office in
Khartoum once established. One example is that we are working
towards a pooled fund for contributions to the UN Workplan (mainly
for humanitarian work), which will be complementary to the Multi-Donor
Trust Fund (MDTF—for reconstruction and development). The
MDTF will allocate expenditure according to a needs assessment
carried out by the SPLM, the Government of Sudan and international
parties across both North and South Sudan; the Joint Assessment
Mission (JAM). Darfur was excluded from the JAM due to the security
situation there; but planning is underway for a JAM in Darfur,
to be undertaken as soon as the security situation allows. In
the meantime, the current JAM budget sets aside a specific allocation
for longer-term reconstruction in Darfur, although without going
into specifics at this stage.
Has a Joint Assessment Mission in Darfur taken place? If not,
when is it thought that one might be possible?
A Joint Assessment Mission to Darfur has not taken place.
The UN and World Bank would need to be assured that security was
sufficiently improved before any mission happened. It is difficult
to predict when this might be, though it is unlikely to happen
in the near future.
October 2005
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