Memorandum submitted by the Government
of Sudan
GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN MEASURES UNDERTAKEN REGARDING
THE DARFUR SITUATION
Any evaluation of the situation in Darfur over
the past 12 months should be measured against the commitments
made by the United Nations and Government of Sudan in the joint
communiqué signed on 3 July 2004. These commitments included
humanitarian, human rights, security and political issues.
THE SEARCH
FOR PEACE
IN DARFUR
The Government of Sudan has actively pursued
a peaceful solution to the Darfur crisis from the very start of
the violence. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
in January 2005, ending the long-running civil war between the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA),
also provided considerable political space within which all sides
to the Darfur crisis can move towards a peaceful solution to the
conflict. The new Government of National Unity in Sudan, bringing
together Sudan's former north-south combatants, has restated its
commitment to peace talks. Southern Sudan's new leadership in
the shape of Sudanese First Vice President (and President of an
autonomous Government of Southern Sudan) SPLA leader Salva Kiir
Mayardit committed itself to work for peace in Darfur. In September
2005, Sudan's new foreign minister, SPLA southern politician Dr
Lam Akol, outlined a new plan to end the Darfur conflict. While
the Government of National Unity has been welcomed internationally,
it is a matter of regret that the Darfur rebels have chosen to
attack Sudan's new government. In early October, Vice-President
Kiir urged the international community to press the Darfur rebels
to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.
The Government has fully supported the African
Union-sponsored peace process and has attended several rounds
of peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. While Government negotiators
have arrived with every intention to seriously negotiate an end
to the conflict, and welcome the signing of the Declaration of
Principles in July 2005, it is a matter of record that the two
rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and
Equality Movement, have generally either prevaricated or been
non-cooperative. The Government feels that the power and wealth
sharing formula which brought the civil war in southern Sudan
to an end—and which are entrenched in the January 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement—could provide the basis for a fair and just
solution to the conflict. The Government repeats its calls upon
the international community to bring pressure to bear upon the
rebel movements to enter into negotiations in good faith and end
the tragedy in Darfur.
The Government has cooperated and continues
to cooperate with the United Nations and African Union with regard
to the ceasefire and security protocols signed over the past two
years. Sudan has welcomed and actively assisted the African Union's
ceasefire and peace-keeping forces. The Government has provided
details of government military positions and locations essential
for African Union separation of forces. We note that despite repeated
calls by the international community, the rebel movements refuse
to do so. The Government has also withdrawn certain military aircraft
from Darfur, and refrained from using others, at the request of
the African Union. Government forces have also withdrawn from
contested areas at AU request. The Government is deeply shocked
at the recent rebel murder of AU peacekeepers—killings which
are themselves the culmination of a pattern of rebel attacks on
and obstruction of AU peacekeepers.
In tandem with the peace-making efforts of the
African Union, the Government is also actively encouraging inter-tribal
reconciliation at local and state levels. The Government believes
that inter-tribal reconciliation will provide the essential cement
surrounding the peace architecture provided by the African Union
and international community.
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES
In September 2005, the United Nations stated
that the overall humanitarian situation in Darfur has continued
to improve. The Government has sought to facilitate humanitarian
access to Darfur. As of October 2005, the number of humanitarian
workers in Darfur was around 13,500 and that they were working
for 81 NGOs and 13 UN agencies. (This compares with a few dozen
aid workers in 2003.) By July 2005, the United Nations stated
that it was able to access approximately 88% of the target affected
population in Darfur, as compared to only 10% a year previously.
The Government has assisted in whatever way possible to assist
with this outreach. The authorities have established regular meetings
with humanitarian organisations in Darfur. These have included
weekly coordination meetings between aid workers and relevant
Government officials. The Government continues to fast track visas
for humanitarian workers. The Government has also continued to
clear humanitarian goods through customs as fast as possible.
A UN mortality survey was undertaken in June
2005. The result of the survey indicated that the crude mortality
rate was 0.8 deaths per 10,000 people per day in all three states
of Darfur. This figure is below the critical threshold of one
death per 10,000 people per day. In mid-2004 a similar survey
showed crude mortality rates three times higher. As of July 2005,
there were 184 fixed health centres, and 36 mobile clinics, operating
in Darfur. Some 75% of accessible hospitals have been rehabilitated,
servicing some 70% of the conflict-affected population.
The Government remains deeply disturbed at what
can only be described as systematic attacks on aid workers and
humanitarian traffic in Darfur. It is clear that much of this
banditry has been, and continues to be, rebel-related.
HUMAN RIGHTS
The Government has implemented the January 2005
recommendations of the National Commission of Inquiry into the
situation in Darfur. Several commissions and committees were established
as a result of these recommendations. A National Judicial Committee
was established to investigate human rights violations in the
Darfur states. The three Darfur states have established similar
bodies. On 7 June 2005, the Special Criminal Court on the Events
in Darfur was established. It has held sessions in North and South
Darfur. Despite a lack of infrastructure, transport and other
facilities necessary to conduct investigations, legal investigators
have started their work. It is a simple fact that the rebel movements
deliberately murdered over five hundred policemen in Darfur, and
wounded hundreds more. The rebels also destroyed over eighty police
stations and dozens of courts. The judicial system in Darfur has
yet to recover from these losses in personnel and infrastructure.
In August 2005, the Special Criminal Court handed down its first
convictions for murder and other joint acts. The Court has also
convicted civilians and military personnel of armed robbery. The
Court is continuing investigations of military and security personnel.
The government committee investigating human
rights violations in North Darfur has identified 70 persons and
armed parties of involvement in crimes within the state. The charges
they will face range from murder, rape, looting and arson. The
Supreme Court judge heading the Committee has stated that warrants
of arrest have been issued for those indicted.
The Government has welcomed and facilitated
the deployment of human rights officers from the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). As
of July 2005, there were 65 UN human rights staff presents in
Darfur. The United Nations has noted good cooperation between
the Government and the human rights officers. The Government has
also cooperated with the United Nations Development Programme
and OHCHR in extensive human rights training courses for police
forces and the judiciary in Darfur.
In May 2005 the Government agreed to clarify
the procedures for the gathering of medical evidence regarding
gender-based sexual violence. The Government has agreed to simplify
or waive its normal investigative procedures, including the standard
form known as form 8. The Government has also agreed that persons
other than the victim can complete the form. The Government has
also established a National Committee on Rape. In August 2005,
the Government outlined a plan of action to eliminate gender-based
violence. The plan included awareness-raising activities on the
issue, special training for police, and the establishment of police
liaison officers. The Government of National Unity is also pursuing
long-term training of police in human rights issues, the provision
of legal aid to assist rape victims and the establishment of a
joint committee of the Government and UN agencies to review and
revise criminal procedure laws to bring them more into line with
international approaches. Many of these measures reflect key United
Nations and OHCHR recommendations outlined in a July 2005 report.
SECURITY
The Government has sought to provide security
for all its civilian population in the Darfur states. The Government
has deployed thousands of national policemen throughout Darfur.
The United Nations has noted an improvement both in and outside
of the many IDP camps in the three states. The Government has
sought to keep strategic aid corridors open throughout Darfur—and
has had to provide escorts for many humanitarian convoys. Several
policemen and soldiers have been killed in the course of rebel
or bandit attacks on these convoys.
One of the biggest obstacles facing those charged
with security in Darfur have been blanket demands that the Government
of Sudan immediately stop all "Janjaweed" activity and
disarm "Janajweed" gunmen. The simple fact is that no-one
has arrived at a working definition of the term "Janjaweed".
It has been used as a blanket term to describe any armed nomadic
tribesman in Darfur today, and particularly anyone involved in
attacks on "African" communities in the region. The
UN Special Envoy to Sudan, Mr Jan Pronk, has also noted that "the
IDPs call everyone Janjawid". It is a matter of record that
the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
adopted a typically questionable definition of "Janjaweed".
It noted that there were two "precisions" in a definition
of "Janjaweed", that attackers were Arab and armed with
modern weapons. The Commission further noted that outside of these
"precisions" it is "probably impossible to define
the "Janjaweed". It is clear that the Commission, by
its own admission, followed a muddled and subjective rather than
an objective definition of what constituted "Janjaweed".
Unfocused international pressure notwithstanding, the Government
has engaged in several disarmament programmes in Darfur and urged
all armed groups in Darfur to refrain from acts of violence and
to ignore any provocation to which they may be subject. There
are also clear logistical constraints on the Government's ability
to pursue and disarm organised groups of armed criminals in Darfur.
The ceasefire strictly curtails the activity of the Sudanese military,
including the airforce, and it is clear that the police force
is inadequately equipped or armed to do that sort of job—and
is over-stretched in protecting civilians and securing IDP camps
across the Darfur states.
CONCLUSION
The Government of Sudan remains committed to
a peaceful solution to the Darfur crisis. While it is a crisis
that can ultimately only be resolved by the Sudanese themselves,
the Government welcomes the assistance of the international community
in trying to end the conflict. At the same time it must be noted
that unrealistic international demands, based upon inaccurate
or distorted images of events in Darfur—or on the demands
of partisan pressure groups—will only serve to prolong the
crisis. One example of this has been the unseemly arguments that
have surrounded crude mortality estimates in Darfur.
In March 2005, Professor Guha-Sapir, Director
of the WHO-affiliated Centre for Research on the Epidemiology
of Disasters, at the Catholic University of Louvain, noted that
the Complex Emergencies Database (CEDAT), which monitors conflict
mortality from surveys, reviewed more than 30 survey results from
UN agencies and non-governmental organizations: "These show
that death and malnutrition rates in most parts of Darfur improved
over the latter half of 2004 despite insecurity and political
stalemate. Death rates for the displaced have halved since June
2004. All this is thanks to an efficient and effective donor response
supporting an increasingly professional community of private and
voluntary organizations and to the U.N. World Food Programme,
the U.N. World Health Organisation and the UN Children's Fund,
Unicef." In May 2005, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology
of Disasters estimated that between 63-146,000 people had died
since March 2003 and January 2005 in the conflict-affected areas
of Darfur and eastern Chad. Their deaths could be attributed to
violence, disease and malnutrition because of the conflict during
this period.
The report examined previous mortality surveys
and found that some had been misused. Referring to interviews
which formed the basis for claims by the Coalition for International
Justice (CIJ), and anti-Sudan activist Eric Reeves, the Centre
noted that: "These interviews . . . were not designed in
any way to function as a mortality survey not was there an overall
systematic sampling methodology used that could make it representative
of the roughly 200,000 refugees that fled to eastern Chad, much
less of the entire 2.4 million people affected of Darfur . . .
The inappropriate misuse of these interviews . . . as a proxy
for the aggregate Darfur population for the entire conflict (despite
the availability of other more reliable data) has been a major
basis of overestimation of deaths (common in most estimates)."
In May 2005, Professor Guha-Sapir commented
upon the "unseemly fight" that "has broken out"
regarding estimates of how many people had died in Darfur. She
noted in a letter to The Financial Times, that: "The
advocacy powers of Professor Reeves and CIJ are clearly stronger
than their statistical ones. Deaths of 300,000-400,000 are now
quoted by the UK House of Commons, the UN Office for the Co-ordination
of Humanitarian Affairs and a series of respectable newspapers—including
yours—making those who plod systematically through evidence
and come up with less sensational figures look like uncharitable
scrooges . . . Using badly constructed numbers for sensational
attention does not help the cause . . . unsubstantiated figures
and exaggerations are easily discredited and do the beleaguered
Darfur population a great disservice." The need for caution
with regard to sources on Sudan, and particularly Darfur, is clear.
October 2005
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