1 INTRODUCTION
1. The International Development Committee began
this inquiry in October 2005. The intention was to follow-up two
reports of the previous Committee on the Cancún Ministerial
Conference which took place in 2003.[2]
The Cancún Ministerial, intended to be a stocktaking
exercise to enable the Doha Development Round to progress toward
its scheduled end in January 2005, collapsed early with very little,
if any, progress. The Ministerial in Hong Kong in December 2005
was consequently billed as a crucial stage in the Round - necessary
to prevent failure, and timed to ensure an agreement could be
reached before the fast-track authority of the US President expires
on 1 July 2007.[3]
2. We therefore started our inquiry with a specific
focus on the Hong Kong Ministerial intending to publish our report
soon after the conference. However, even before the Ministerial
began it became clear that insufficient progress had been made
to enable a framework agreement with specific numerical formulas
(or modalities) for tariff cuts to be agreed at Hong Kong. Thus
in November we were informed, on a visit to the World Bank, that
the WTO's Director General had 'recalibrated' (i.e. lowered) expectations
for the Ministerial.
3. The Ministerial Declaration[4]
which emerged from Hong Kong reflected the fact that trade negotiators
remained too divided on key issues to enable the Ministerial to
produce more than a statement of general principles and directions.
While Hong Kong did not collapse, it did not make a significant
amount of progress, and it still remains to be seen whether Doha
will deliver a development round as promised. The challenge set
in Hong Kong is considerable - members must agree the numerical
formulas to reduce tariffs in agriculture and industrial goods
by 30 April and also submit comprehensive draft schedules of commitments
based on these by 31 July. For services, collective, or 'plurilateral',
requests made by the end of February this year must be considered
by 31 July. A time-line has been agreed and meetings are in progress.
4. As a result of this new timetable, we revised
our inquiry timetable so that our report would be published before
the end of April deadline. The deadline is significant because
until modalities are agreed, it is impossible to determine whether
or not the round will succeed in its objectives. The purpose of
this report is not to revisit issues raised in our previous reports
on the process and progress of the Doha Development Round. Instead
we wish to look specifically at the Hong Kong Ministerial - the
process leading up to it, and the outcome - and to make policy
recommendations to the UK Government and the Commission about
how to best ensure that the Doha Round can live up to its title
of a 'development' round. The time table is tight and the implications
of failure are great. Nevertheless, we think that there is still
a small possibility that, with sufficient political will, and
a strategy to effect it, a positive and ambitious outcome for
the developing countries can be achieved. This report represents
our contribution to that process.
5. In the course of the inquiry we received written
memoranda from Government Departments, the European Commission,
Non-governmental Organisations, academics and business and industrial
organisations. We held five oral evidence sessions - three in
the lead up to Hong Kong, and two following the Ministerial.
6. We are grateful to all those who gave evidence
to the Committee: the Secretary of State for International Development,
the Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP; Ian Pearson MP, Minister of State for
Trade, Investment and Foreign Affairs; officials from the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department for International
Development (DFID); Pascal Lamy, Director General of the WTO;
Roger Liddle, Directorate General for Trade in the European Commission;
representatives of the Trade Justice Movement from Christian Aid,
War on Want and the World Development Movement, Professor Robert
Wade of the London School of Economics (LSE) and Sheila Page from
the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). We also held informal
discussions with L. Alan Winters of the World Bank and, when we
were in Brussels, African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Ambassadors
from Barbados, Jamaica and Fiji. We would like also to thank Sheila
Page from ODI for acting as our Specialist Adviser on the inquiry.
7. We have not covered all aspects of the negotiations
but have focused on those issues which we consider to be a necessary
starting point for a development round. The Report begins by
looking at the idea of a development round and the extent to which
there is a coherent approach to this on the part of the UK Government
and the European Commission. In chapter three we summarise what
happened in Hong Kong and assess the implications of the outcomes
for the developing countries. Chapter four looks at what needs
to be done now to ensure an ambitious outcome for the development
round. Our recommendations are directed primarily at the UK Government
and the European Union, represented at the WTO by the European
Commissioner for External Trade and Competitiveness, Peter Mandelson.
This reflects the fact that we are a UK Parliamentary committee
and our primary responsibility is to scrutinise HMG policy.
2 International Development Committee, Seventh Report
of Session 2002-3, Trade and Development at the WTO: Issues for
Cancún, HC 400-I and, First Report of Session 2003-4, Trade
and Development at the WTO: Learning the lessons of Cancún
to revive a genuine development round, HC 92-I. Available at www.parliament.uk/indcom Back
3
Fast track authority allows the President to pass legislation
through Congress on a take it or leave it basis. Congress is unlikely
to renew this authority after July 2007. Back
4
Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(05)/DEC,
22 December 2005. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.pdf Back
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