Examination of Witnesses (Questions 34-39)
MR JOHN
GORDON, MR
RICHARD CODRINGTON
AND MR
PETER HOLLAND
13 DECEMBER 2005
Q34 John Battle: Thank you very much
for coming along this morning. May I start by giving apologies
for our Chairman, Malcolm Bruce, who is in Hong Kong along with
other members of the Committee. We are a little bit depleted,
but while they are there our intention as a committee is to keep
a focus on Afghanistan. We have done previous reports. Our last
report was in January 2003, and two of us, Joan Ruddock and myself,
have visited Afghanistan since then, so we hope to keep our attention
on Afghanistan and get regular updates, if we can, see where we
are now, get a snapshot and take things forward in our recommendations
as well. Thank you for coming this morning. I wonder if I could
start the conversation by asking you in particular, do you see
any challenges coming, particularly from the role of our involvement
as DFID, because DFID has certain priorities focusing particularly
on poverty, but at the same time in the context of the real issue
of security that I experienced when I visited Afghanistan, which
would perhaps be a Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office/MoD
priority. Are we still able to keep a focus on poverty reduction
within the whole issue of stability (stability, security and,
indeed, reconstruction) or are reconstruction and development
really falling behind the efforts to just try and maintain security?
Mr Gordon: The two things are
inextricably linked together. The whole debate about how development
works in insecure environments has shifted in the last five years.
Our objective will continue to be poverty reduction, but we have
to recognise the constraints that apply in situations like Afghanistan.
These require us to look very closely at security as a constraint
to achieving those objectives, which means we have to do two things:
reflect that in our own planning about how we work and what we
do and then relate very closely to others. In Whitehall, with
some of my colleagues in the Foreign Office and the MoD, we have
to be in constant dialogue about how we can work together to overcome
the constraints that are in place to achieving DFID's objectives,
as well as other objectives within Whitehall.
Q35 John Battle: DFID's objectives,
which generally in development refer to the Millennium Development
Goals, are they even on the agenda in Afghanistan? Even before
the present circumstances and before the Taliban, it was the poorest
country in the world; so presumably Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) should apply there more than anywhere else. Are we even
able to think in that kind of framework?
Mr Gordon: I think there is a
two-phased process. One is creating the conditions for sustainable
development, which we are in now, but the long-term objective
will continue to be how we help Afghanistan to achieve the MDGs.
In situations like Afghanistan there is a two-step process. One
is that you create the security which you need to enable development
to happen and then you start working towards the MDGs more specifically;
and our strategy, as defined in our Interim Strategy document[14]
which we produced about six months ago, states that our objective
now is to create those conditions, but our objective five years
hence is to try and work very closely with the Afghan government
to achieve those MDGs. You will have seen that the government
produced its own MDG report a few months ago for the Millennium
Review Summit, and that recognised that the MDGs in Afghanistan's
case were further away than most other countries, so they have
set a series of targets of their own for 2020, rather than 2015.
Q36 John Battle: So you have put them
all back five years?
Mr Gordon: They have put them
back and they have nuanced them and added a couple to reflect
security as an example of something which other countries might
not have in their particular MDG construct. Yes, we are working
towards the MDGs, but we recognise that there are a couple of
things we need to put in place before we can get there, and that
requires issues like security to be addressed, because if in very
insecure provinces development agencies cannot operate, it is
very difficult to work towards those MDGs.
Q37 Mr Singh: I was not on the Committee
when they made their last report on Afghanistan in 2003, but in
their wisdom, I assume, because I was not here, they did debate
with DFID about the issue of how DFID aid should be distributed,
and the Committee recommended that more of it go through the Afghan
administration, temporary or transitional though that was at the
time, and DFID made a robust defence against that position. Yet
three years on, I think, is it, 70% of the DFID budget is now
being distributed through the Afghan government. What has happened
to change the DFID position there? Are you accepting the wisdom
that was given by the Committee then or have you had a genuine
change of heart from some other direction?
Mr Gordon: We would be fools not
to accept advice from the Committee! And that is probably very
much part of it, but what we have seen is recognition that without
the Afghan government having available the resources to sustain
itself, then development cannot happen. We have made the choice
that investing in government systems and procedures and processes
is a prerequisite for effective development to happen; so we have
channelled much of our resources, as you say, through the government
system. Seventy per cent at the last count, but that partly reflects
the fact that other donors are not particularly keen to do that,
and, as one of the handful of donors who are, we are effectively
sustaining the government and, without that, anything that anybody
does would have less impact. I cannot speak for the people who
appeared in 2002, but our position as of now reflects the position
in Afghanistan as of now, which is that we believe the government
needs more direct support than might have been the case then.
Q38 Mr Singh: Is that because it
is now an elected government?
Mr Gordon: There are a number
of reasons. There is greater legitimacy, for sure, in the Afghan
government which we can support, there is a much stronger sense
of ownership from the government. President Karzai continually
offers what may be seen to be directives but are often quite helpful
in how he thinks we should be doing our business, and if we genuinely
believe in sovereignty and ownership and authority, then we should
be responsive to that and, therefore, that is one of the main
choices we have made in the last couple of years, that we should
be doing more of that and less of the bilateral activity that
may have been the case in 2002. It was a very different position
then. As your report talked about the move from a humanitarian
to a development programme, I think we have now almost lost the
humanitarian tag, we are in a more stable development process,
and with the government producing its own national development
strategy over the next 18 months that gives us something which
we can buy into and work with other donors to implement effectively.
Q39 Mr Singh: DFID is also spending
a considerable amount of money, £240 million, I believe,
and giving that to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
This is a considerable amount of money to give to a multi-donor
body without earmarking those funds for any specific purpose.
Is there a precedent for that? If there is not, why are we doing
this? Is it a good thing to do? If it is a good thing to do, have
DFID any plans for doing it elsewhere?
Mr Gordon: I think there are precedents
in other countries. I cannot really speak for them honestly, but
I know of examples in Eastern Africa, where DFID does direct budget
support, which is one step further than we are doing here. What
we have here is a mechanism managed by the World Bank to provide
fiduciary risk protection. In Tanzania and Uganda DFID is paying
money directly into the budget unearmarked; so there are precedents
for this, but we believe that without doing that the basic functions
of the state will not be able to take place and by doing so we
are actually empowering the government to become responsible and
accountable for its own actions and it will, we pre-suppose, shorten
the time through which development assistance is required in Afghanistan,
whether that be 40 or 50 years. It will be less if we allow the
government to build its own capacity by supporting its own processes
and mechanisms.
14 DFID Interim Strategy for Afghanistan 2005-06,
www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/afghanistan-interim-strategy.pdf Back
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