Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280
- 299)
THURSDAY 8 JUNE 2006
RT HON
HILARY BENN
MP, MR JIM
DRUMMOND AND
MR PHIL
EVANS
Q280 Ann McKechin:
Do you now think we have the right tools to provide that degree
of development assistance and that degree of support given that
we are now the largest bilateral donor?
Hilary Benn: I think we have got
a very good team who, by coincidence I was having discussion with
this morning about what are the priorities now for our programme
in the DRC. I do think, however, we are about to enter a really
difficult period, as you will have seen and heard on your visit,
because the elections are very important. With them will come
this enormous expectation on the part of the people that after
they have voted life will begin to change, and yet the electoral
process itself will mean that it could be two, three, four months
before we know exactly what the shape of the new government is
going to be, and we are all going to have to work very hard to
make sure that problems do not occur in that vacuum.
Q281 John Barrett:
Can I expand on the issue of conflict prevention. We have taken
evidence about the cost of conflicts and the savings that could
be made if those same conflicts could be prevented, and a lot
of the discussion is hypothetical because we never know the cost
of the conflict until it takes place, but how effective do you
think DFID's conflict prevention work has been. Are they not able
to quantify the success and say where they believe they have been
successful and, if so, exactly which sort of tools in the conflict
prevention tool-kit are working best?
Hilary Benn: My answer, I suppose,
would depend on what stages of the conflict process you were talking
about. In the case of Sierra Leone, for example, it depends whether
you count the military intervention in the first place that was
the foundation for all that has been achieved subsequently. That
is nothing to do with DFID, that is down to colleagues in the
MoD. In my view, absolutely the right thing to have done, but
that was not really conflict prevention. It was the prevention
of yet further conflict, but it was about trying to bring to an
end the activities of the RUF[8]
and the Westside Boys who were causing so much havoc in the country.
I think what we have done, working very closely with FCO and MoD
subsequently, if you look at Sierra Leone now, has meant that
the chances of conflict recurring are less. In that sense it has
been successful to date in preventing further conflict and there
is some growth and stability in the country currently, but it
is a fragile process there, as it is everywhere else. I do think
our experience teaches us that it is about trying to understand
what exactly is going on in the country, doing things in the right
order and, if that means for DFID, as I indicated in answer to
the earlier question, doing things that some people might not
at first consideration think was development, we need to explain
very clearly why that is the right thing to do because otherwise
you are never going to get to the subsequent stage. Each conflict
is different. We have to learn the lessons, we have to do the
right things in the right circumstances, but I think, both in
relation to the DRC and Sierra Leone, since we are focusing on
them in particular, we have broadened our horizon.
Q282 John Barrett:
When it is seen post-conflict the amount of human and financial
resources that must pour into a country, is there therefore a
pressure on DFID now to say, "We must increase these resources
to try and avoid potential conflicts coming down the track"?
Hilary Benn: I suppose in a sense—
Well, with the DRC, we started from a very low base, but that
is exactly what we have been doing. Another example I give is
the one I referred to in relation to Rwanda when they announced
they were thinking of wandering back over the border. I think
that was a use of influence and encouragement that we had to say
that would not really be a very good idea in the circumstances
and, in the end, Rwanda did not do that, but actually they got
the same messages from lots of people in the international community.
I would point to that too. Having started make to effort, it would
really not be very sensible to then, for want of commitment and
money resources, to allow a country to slip back. It is a challenging
in Afghanistan too, where I spent Sunday and Monday of this week.
Chairman: Just to clarify, colleagues,
we have jumped ahead and I am coming back again. I am going to
ask John Battle to come in with a question on DFID's capacity.
Q283 John Battle:
I think it is probably a question for your colleagues from the
Department, in a way. It is about the resources of DFID. As you
rightly say, if things go wrong in DRC, then there are problems
in the whole region. I know you have gone up from three to 33.
If I am right the staff is the same number as in Kenya, but it
is actually lower than in Rwanda, and the post for the DRC when
we were there, it is not a senior civil servant's post that is
heading up DFID, but it is in Kenya. How do you adapt, if there
is a real priority in the DRC, to make sure the staffing is up
to that? The other thing is, I am reminded of other situations.
East Timor in which DFID and the Foreign Office, in my own former
life, made a great effort to stop the violence with a separation
of the country, and the establishment of a new country. The UN
has now withdrawn to some extent, as have DFID and other aid agencies,
however it is still an incredibly poor country and the violence
has kicked off again. I tend to share the view that in difficult
conflict and post-conflict fragile states, we need the best, the
brightest, most experienced and capable people, not the starters,
to be there to manage that situation for the longer term. I think
other colleagues have mentioned in the past Sri Lanka, for example,
the tsunami. The conflict subsided during that crisis but now
is kicking off again. What can you do to ensure that your staffing
adjustments move fast enough to say the best are in the most difficult
positions and that they are at the appropriate rank and capability?
Hilary Benn: I think you are absolutely
right about that. That is an issue which we are grappling with
currently, and I think you will see some of that reflected in
the White Paper when it comes out. The truth is that those are
indeed the countries where you need more of your human resource,
more of your people to work, and in a sense the countries that
are kind of getting on okay, could we do with fewer staff there,
recognising we have got headcount targets that we have to meet,
like all government departments? Can we reduce the numbers there
in order to provide the space to put the human capacity into those
countries? You raise a very interesting point about the grades
at which offices are headed, which, in fact, we are currently
looking at as we speak. The second example you gave of East Timor,
the one thing that I think has been reassuring about the recent
events is the speed with which the regional powers who have an
interest—
Q284 John Battle:
Australia?
Hilary Benn: Australia. —piled
in there really quickly, and I think that should encourage us,
because I do believe that one of the ways in which we are going
to increase our capacity globally to deal with these kind of situations
is to encourage regional capacity and regional responsibility.
Fundamentally a divvying up of the world, so you have got the
African Union beginning to do work like this in Africa. It is
sensible that Australia and New Zealand, I think, have sent troops
(I think New Zealand have in addition to Australia) should come
in very quickly, the UN then getting organised in a sense to bless
that, because it is about doing something very practical when
conflict breaks out.
Q285 John Battle:
The first time the conflict was there it was the Ghurkhas, actually,
who were there within two days of the conflict the last time round,
but what the Australians are saying is that the situation is more
difficult, the conflict is internal, not between two countries,
and that more work needed to have gone on, on the ground, tackling
questions like jobs, unemployment, as well as making the Army
redundant, and that we needed more intensive work by people on
the ground, and I am now thinking including DFID's staff in those
situations in there in a more intense way and for longer. Is that
doable within the framework of the Treasury generally, the suggestion
that you reduce by 10% and all the rest of it? How can we put
together strategies to tackle the most difficult circumstances
when we are just fire-fighting and moving around here, there and
everywhere when there is a crisis, or am I being too pessimistic?
Hilary Benn: I do not think we
are fire-fighting moving around. In the case of East Timor, somebody
else is looking after that, not us. In the case of the DRC, Sudan,
Sierra Leone, or Afghanistan we have been there for some time
in different forms and we certainly are getting on with doing
it, and I accept entirely your point about that is where you need
to put more of your people. We cannot overstate the capacity of
one donor, however good or otherwise we are, to solve really complex,
deep-seated problems. Afghanistan, since it is very fresh in my
mind, is a really good example of that; just the sheer lack of
capacity in a country which is phenomenally poor. There you are
trying to do two things: one is to build the capacity of the state
in the end to do it for itself, but, on the other hand, there
are things that you need to do in the short-term. That will be
the issue in the DRC, and one of the things that we are working
on now is programmes that can deliver very quickly after the elections,
particularly in the east of the country, because of the reason
I gave earlier, the public will have said, "We have cast
our vote. Where is the benefit?", and in the DRC it is going
to take a lot of time for the Government to build its capacity
even to begin to do the kind of things that one would expect the
Government to be doing.
Q286 John Battle:
Especially if the election simply gives a democratic mandate to
those already in power?
Hilary Benn: I think there is
a lot to be said for democratic mandate, but the big fear I have
is will all the political parties that are participating in the
election have a stake in post-election DRC, and whoever wins the
presidential election has a really heavy responsibility, in my
view, to reach out to those other parties to, in effect, maintain
the transitional coalition, because if somebody thinks that they
can win and take all of the power, that will be the most dangerous
moment for the DRC. I think Jim Drummond wanted to add a point
on staffing resources.
Mr Drummond: We keep two kinds
of standing capacity, one for humanitarian emergencies, the operations
team that you met the other day, and the Post-conflict Reconstruction
Unit, which is a cross government unit which can draw in staff
in these kinds of emergencies. Within DFID we are establishing
a rapid response pool of people who might be deployed for three
to six months perhaps to help us get moving more quickly. I think
we also have to try and then change the incentives for people,
so that we have more people who have the right skills and are
keen to go and work in these difficult environments, which is
going to be the challenge for the next five or 10 years. We are
making some early progress on that but not enough yet.
Q287 Mr Davies:
The same rapid response team who you would deploy either in the
disaster emergencies or in the post-conflict reconstruction operation.
Is that right? You want to have a pool of people you can deploy
at short notice for either of those purposes. Is that right? The
same pool.
Mr Drummond: We want to supplement
that by having a pool of people from DFID's main staff who can
be moved out of their existing jobs for a short period to a higher
priority activity.
Q288 Mr Davies:
Into either of those areas?
Mr Drummond: To any kind of crisis,
yes.
Q289 John Bercow:
Secretary of State, you said you are grappling with these issues
at the moment, as will be reflected in the White Paper, but in
a sense it constitutes work in progress and, significantly, you
added the rider that one could not or should not overestimate
the capacity of any one donor, no matter how well-intentioned
or generous spirited to do it all or the bulk of it. Nevertheless,
I think that in a sense what we need today is a progress report
and, dare I say it with reference to Mr Drummond's last remarks,
a form of rapid response if you like. Perhaps I could ask you
on the subject of starting commitment in the DRC, what has been
the increase in the number of personnel in the DRC this year by
comparison with last?
Hilary Benn: I cannot tell you
the answer to that. I would have to check.
Q290 John Bercow:
What has been the change in terms of the seniority of the designation
or the specification of the skill in the DFID staff commitment
for this year by comparison with last?
Hilary Benn: I am afraid I do
not know the detail on that either. I am sorry. I will happily
find out.
Q291 John Bercow:
I would be very grateful.
Hilary Benn: I will, of course[9].
Q292 John Bercow:
You did, interestingly, hint to us that consideration was being
given at the moment to the question of the seniority of status
of the head of DFID/DRC. Is there a reasonable prospect that within
a short period of, say, three months the position of head of DFID/DRC
will be on a par with that of the counterpart in Kenya?
Hilary Benn: No, I would not say
that. What I would say is that we are looking at the senior management
structure of the organisation more generally and ask ourselves
precisely these questions. Have we got the right people at the
right level with the responsibility for the task that we are taking
on, and, as we look as if we are going to be moving more of our
people into the places that are more difficult to work, how we
are going to reflect that in the staffing structure? I can also
say in relation to the office in the DRC, we have had some difficulties
in recruiting, which I am sure you picked up during the course
of your visit.
Q293 John Bercow:
What has been the change in recent times—let us take the
period of the last 12 months or, if you prefer, a slightly longer
period, in the level of financial provision or person hours, however
it is best or most readily calculated—in language training
for the staff designated there? I do at this point look in the
direction of Mr Drummond, because I recognise that these are points
of detail. Can I just say, Chairman, the Secretary of State knows
the great interest that the Committee takes in the work of the
Department and very much appreciates the frequency with which
he appears as well as the detail in which he seeks to reply to
our questions, and so this is simply to try to establish the facts.
I do feel that we are now so clear, Chairman, about the Department's
overall intentions and commitment and also quite clear about the
quality of a lot of its work, but we do often have to probe these
rather specific details which, I accept, ministers cannot always
be expected to have at their fingertips, but they are rather important.
Hilary Benn: I accept that entirely.
I take responsibility for everything and I am sorry I cannot help
the Committee and you, Mr Bercow, with the answers. Had I known,
I would very happily have come with the facts and I will, of course,
dig them out and provide them to you as soon as I possibly can.
Q294 John Bercow:
I have got a feeling that Mr Drummond might be able to help in
the meantime.
Mr Drummond: I do not think I
will be able to help you in the detail that you are looking for,
but I think we have probably underprovided for French language
training, as you implied, and we have recently agreed that we
will increase from about a month to six months or thereabouts.
Q295 Chairman:
That, if I may say so, is a very pertinent point. We were told
it was three weeks for DFID staff, six months for Foreign Office
staff. It meant that the High Commission very often had to carry—
Mr Evans: It has now gone up to
a minimum of two months of French language training. The requirement
will depend on the competence of the person at the start, but
there has been a change of policy very recently; so all the new
staff now going to DRC will get considerably more language training
support than they had before. As far as the issue of the office
is concerned, over the last eighteen months the head of the office
position has gone up by two grades and is now at the level appropriate
for a unit or office head. There are two grade levels running
offices, which are adjacent to one another, and the DRC is consistent
with several other offices in Africa at the moment in the seniority
of leadership[10].
Q296 John Bercow:
I am very grateful for those answers, and any further details
will be appreciated. Can I finally put what might seem a rather
prosaic but I hope relevant point. It seems to me that the Department
needs, on the one hand, to increase capacity and particularly
the types of relevant capacity in the short-term, but also to
give some steer as to the extent to which it is committed for
the long-term and what in the Department's view constitutes the
long-term. What I mean by that is this. When ministers say, "We
are looking at this, we are looking at that; we are considering
this, we are considering that", we understand that the wheels
of government do not move that quickly, but the fact is that people
are dying in very substantial numbers and people need help now.
So, in a sense, even more so than in respect of domestic policy,
there is a premium on these considerations taking place relatively
quickly and decisions being made. Secondly, as far as the long-term
is concerned, whilst I accept, Secretary of State, that you cannot
speak for the Government or even necessarily yourself for a period
of many years hence, would I be other-worldly or unrealistic if
I were to suppose that you might be envisaging an involvement
by your Department in the DRC for a period of at least another
10 years.
Hilary Benn: The short answer
is we are in the DRC for the long-term, and I hope that gives
you the reassurance. I think to be a bit fair, which you always
are, Mr Bercow, if you look at where we have gone from in relation
to the DRC, which is basically not a lot apart from humanitarian
relief, to what we are doing now and the programme (at least I
have got some figures I can give you) which was in 05/06 about
£56 million, this year around £63 million, next year
£70 million, around half of which humanitarian, I do not
think anyone could look at that from a very low base not all that
long ago when there were only three members. The first time I
went I think there were only three members of staff. There are
now 33. I think that is indication of a pretty strong commitment
both to the DRC and to doing more and increasing our effort pretty
darn quickly, if I may say so.
Q297 Chairman:
I may recall that, having cut the turf of the new offices, the
first question the press asked me was which Congolese companies
were getting the contract for building the DFID offices? I tried
to point out that there was a much more ambitious purpose for
these offices than just awarding the contract. However, I am glad
to say the answer was acceptable.
Hilary Benn: I am very relieved
to hear that.
Q298 Chairman:
Actually Simon Arthy, who is a conflict adviser with remit, made
a very specific point about language, although we thought he was
doing extraordinarily well with the French while we were trying
to struggle along with our schoolboy French; but he said that
there were occasions when you were negotiating with ministers
or with top civil servants where, frankly, a three-week fast training
course was not good enough to be able to really deliver what DFID
is about.
Hilary Benn: An absolutely fair
point, and I am glad you did not ask me about my capacity with
the French language, otherwise I would have disappointed you once
more.
Mr Hunt: I was just reflecting whether
any questions asked my colleague John Bercow could be described
as prosaic, because the words used "other-worldly" are
poetically much closer to the mark!
John Bercow: The cheque is in the post!
Mr Hunt: Could I move the discussion
on from DFID staffing and the DRC to ask a more general question
about the relative generosity of funding for conflict situations
and post-conflict situations. This is not something that is in
any way directed at DFID, but one specific example when I visited
Panzi Hospital in Bukavu, which I know DFID is funding a building
for, they said that ECHO and the US were withdrawing their funding
from this month because it was no longer considered a humanitarian
situation, even though, just to look around you, it was obvious
that the most appalling atrocities were going on and were being
treated by Panzi Hospital. To give the other side to that coin,
when we, as a committee, visited the IDP camps in northern Uganda
one of the concerns we had was that it might, perversely, be in
the interest of the Ugandan Government to maintain IDP camps because
they are very good at attracting international funding (the World
Food Programme, et cetera, et cetera). I wonder whether
you think there is a problem where sometimes certain types of
donors pull out of situations too soon instead of the adequately
making sure that the foundations are put in place properly in
a post-conflict situation?
Q299 Chairman:
Can you give assurances to the Panzi Hospital, because we were
all concerned that the money could not stop, we did not think
that could happen.
Hilary Benn: May I look into it?[11]
You tell me that we are funding Panzi Hospital, which I am of
course very glad to hear, and I shall look into the issue and,
in particular, as you describe, the impact that what other donors
are planning to do will have on its capacity to operate. I think
from memory about 50 % of our programme is humanitarian, and I
foresee that it will continue to be a significant proportion.
There will be a rising programme in terms of the money, as I have
just described. Exactly what the balance will be, whether it will
fall as a proportion slightly or not, frankly remains to be seen,
but it will continue to be a very important part of what we do
because the emergency needs—. Well, you saw it for yourself.
8 Revolutionary United Front. Back
9
Ev 123 Back
10
Ev 124 Back
11
Ev 124 Back
|
