Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 320 - 339)

THURSDAY 8 JUNE 2006

RT HON HILARY BENN MP, MR JIM DRUMMOND AND MR PHIL EVANS

  Q320  Mr Davies: The Hamas situation is very well aired in the press and I think we all know the facts there. The other cases are much less clear which is why I am taking the opportunity to ask you these questions. You had a very high degree of solidarity among donors in the case of Ethiopia. In the case of Uganda, it is not so clear. In fact, some donors have continued to drop out of support; other donors have not made clear on what conditions and what terms they would resume it, so the Government in Uganda is not getting, it seems to me, a coherent message on this occasion, is that right?

  Hilary Benn: From memory, it was not as universal as was the case with Ethiopia, that is right.

  Q321  Mr Davies: But you agree it is very desirable there should be joint action in these cases, particularly joint action, one hopes, among the EU, and if you cannot achieve that, the effectiveness of these kinds of sanctions is greatly reduced?

  Hilary Benn: Clearly, the more donors who take a view and act accordingly the more effect you think it might have, but I have to say, in the case of Ethiopia, I could not say that it has resulted in the Government doing something differently. Even though it has not done something differently, it does mean that the international community has sent a very strong message about what we regard as acceptable conduct, and I think that is worthwhile in itself.

  Q322  Mr Davies: Yes, certainly. Can you assure the Committee that when you are considering triggering sanctions like this the procedure you always adopt is to try to get some equivalent supporting action from others and, if possible, a common front?

  Hilary Benn: We certainly will talk to other donors because the conversation clearly goes, "What are you going to do in response to this?" and the donors talk to each other and in the end either there is a collective decision taken or one takes a decision and then others think, "Well, now what are we now going to do?" It works in different ways in different circumstances, but the thing that I am ultimately responsible for is what we are going to do and in the end other governments are responsible for what they are going to do, but we would certainly encourage people to try and march in step. That assumes that they have the same analysis as us about what is going on.

  Q323  Mr Davies: Have you considered with your EU colleagues establishing some kind of agreed procedure or protocol as to how you might respond in situations like this so as to generate a common response, if possible?

  Hilary Benn: No.

  Q324  Mr Davies: Will you consider that?

  Hilary Benn: Can I reflect on that?

  Q325  Mr Davies: I would be very pleased if you would.

  Hilary Benn: Genuinely.

  Q326  Mr Davies: To move back to conflict, one thing that concerns me slightly about the stories coming through today is—let me use your word—the "separateness" of the response by yourselves and the MoD. I would have thought there was a very high degree of cohesion and co-ordination now. In relation to Sierra Leone, you said this afternoon—maybe it was just an excessive and very charming modesty on your part—"Oh, the re-establishment of order in Sierra Leone was nothing to do with us. That was my colleagues in the MoD." I would rather have hoped you would have been alongside those colleagues in the MoD right from the beginning and you would have had a plan for introducing the necessary DFID initiatives alongside and simultaneously as far as possible with a common objective. That was not the story that came out this afternoon. Perhaps you would like to correct that?

  Hilary Benn: You are very generous. I think I was referring to the fighting bit.

  Q327  Mr Davies: We do not expect you to do the fighting.

  Hilary Benn: I know you do not.

  Q328  Mr Davies: In so far as successful stabilisation requires a military contribution and an aid and development contribution, and you supply the latter, simply to say "the whole credit goes to the MoD" was a rather strange thing to say. You did say that, Secretary of State, unless there is something wrong with my ears.

  Hilary Benn: I am sure, Mr Davies, there is nothing wrong with your ears. If I expressed myself badly, I apologise. I was referring to the fighting. I was talking about the establishment of security and order.

  Q329  Mr Davies: In fact, you had a joint plan of campaign. The DFID role was established in the beginning and you began to deliver your contribution as soon as you could once the military had established some kind of security, is that right or not?

  Hilary Benn: I was not around at the time because we are talking, I think, about 2000, but what I can say is that in Sierra Leone I think it would be hard to find a better example of more joined-up activity between the different bits of government. I cannot speak for 2000 because, as I say, I was not in post at the time, but that has been a very strong feature of what we have done in Sierra Leone.

  Q330  Mr Davies: I was myself very positively impressed by the degree of joined-up action in Iraq between the MoD and DFID when I visited Iraq last year. Let us not take it that necessarily exists everywhere else. On that subject, in the DRC what was quite notable is that you are now the biggest donors, I understand it. You have given the figures of £60 million up to £70 million and I think that is something that there would be widespread support for, but we have not made any military contribution, as far as I know, to MONUC. We do not have any operational troops there, we may have one or two advisers or liaison officers. We are not even, unlike, say, the Germans, supplying a force to help stability temporarily in the elections next month. Why is there that lack of any contribution by the MoD in this case? Are you in favour of that or did you try to urge your colleagues in the MoD to make their own contribution?

  Hilary Benn: The straight answer to the question is because British forces, as you know, Mr Davies, are rather busy in one or two other places[14].


  Q331  Mr Davies: You accepted from the outset there was no point in asking for a military contribution, or you made a case for a military contribution by this country but accepted the arguments against on the grounds of overstretch?

  Hilary Benn: No, I am realistic enough to recognise that our forces are already heavily committed in a number of places and, therefore, we make a contribution to MONUC through our assessed contribution through the United Nations but not in the form of people on the ground.

  Mr Davies: You never thought there would be any merit in such a contribution? You never attempted to persuade your colleagues in the MoD to make a contribution?

  Chairman: I am going to have to contain you, Mr Davies.

  Mr Davies: I think we must have clear answers, sir.

  Q332  Chairman: I know, but four members of the Committee went to the DRC and had the opportunity to ask these questions.

  Hilary Benn: Did I have a conversation with the MoD about "Could you make a contribution to the forces in the MONUC or the European presence to support the elections?" The answer is no, I did not. That is a straight answer to a straight question.

  Q333  Ann McKechin: Secretary of State, I am always surprised in a way about the different approaches in terms of the timing and sequencing of elections in post-conflict countries. If we look at somewhere like Bosnia, we have taken a great deal of time to try and build up structures in government, particularly justice networks and civil society, before we have tried to approach the issue of elections. In comparison, we have somewhere like the DRC which we all admit has been a very fragile state. It has been a failed state for many years, but yet we are rapidly moving towards full-scale elections later this year. Is there any particular policy which DFID is trying to follow in terms of providing advice about the timing and sequencing of elections, or do you think this reliance on elections as one of the key elements early on in the post-conflict situation, is necessarily always the best option?

  Hilary Benn: I think the first thing I would say is we do not determine the answer to that question, after all, it is the federal process in the country itself which will ultimately decide when and how elections are going to feature. In the case of the DRC, the transitional government has been in being now for, I think, almost three years. I would not regard that as particularly swift, but the fact is they have allowed time to try and get institutions in place, to get the constitution through and to agree on the framework. The elections are a little bit later than people had thought might otherwise be the case and in the DRC when they first announced that there was going to be a bit of a delay, there was a bit of a public reaction. I would say in the case of the DRC, they probably got it about right. In the case of Afghanistan, I think it has been very important you have an elected government. I would say in the case of Iraq, it is particularly important to have an elected government. If the argument is put that you should wait a bit longer, I do not think that I agree with that, first, and, secondly, it is for the people, hopefully, who are making the peace to determine how, as part of that peace, elections are going to figure in the process.

  Q334  Ann McKechin: We took a very different approach on Bosnia, where we still do not have full elections and where we do not have a government fully taking control after a very long period of time, and it just strikes me that we, as an international community, because obviously we make policy and aid commitments conditional on the issue of governance, that is clearly important, but certainly the international community took a much more hands-on approach in Bosnia in terms of moving through to a transitional phrase which we have not done in other areas. I am wondering why; was it a question of resources, was it a question of what would fit or a question of the fact that we could not offer the same level of resources as we did in Bosnia or a level of engagement in other countries?

  Hilary Benn: To be honest, I do not know a lot about the circumstances in relation to Bosnia. Jim Drummond might want to say something about that.

  Mr Drummond: I am not a great expert on Bosnia either, but what happened there was the peace agreement froze the country into a number of entities for a while and it imposed an international government on top of those entities. They have had frequent elections in Bosnia in recent years, but it has not been for a full, autonomous government. Some people might think they have had excessive numbers of elections in Bosnia in recent years.

  Hilary Benn: All I would say is different countries, different circumstances; the Kimberley Process is going to lead. I do not think it is a huge problem. I do not think we have a fixed view about it is has got to be then as opposed to later.

  Mr Drummond: We certainly do not walk away thinking elections fix the problem.

  Q335  John Battle: It is a comment really. Sometimes I think we treat elections as the answer to the problem rather than the start of the problem. Another thing that I felt in the DRC—and I am not too worried about the elections being delayed—was all the questions were about how the voters would line up, whether they get the right stand, be in the right place, fill in the paper properly and we were talking about the processes of people voting. I think what we were not talking about was what are elections about, which are also about politicians, their accountability, their transparency and so I think we have turned the elections business into a technical business that organises voters. Perhaps what we need to be doing much more of—and I say this as someone who has not done enough of it—is we, as MPs and parliamentarians, perhaps ought to be working more with our counterparts and not treating it as a separate science, because otherwise we are asking the people to vote right and then missing out on the real bit, the performance of politicians. It may be worth us sitting around the table as politicians, dare I say, and comparing notes about how we fill in our expense forms, how accountable we are here, how we work on select committees and things in Parliament, how we work cross-party occasionally, because some colleagues in other countries have no experience of that at all. It is a big piece of the jigsaw about democracy that we are not passing across.

  Hilary Benn: I would simply say it is one thing to have the institutions, the mechanism; it is a whole other thing to have the culture that comes with it and that takes a long time, as our experience as a country demonstrates.

  Q336  Richard Burden: There was no lead donor in the DRC when we were there. Some people said, "Well, just the scale of the country means that it is difficult to have one lead donor", but everybody that we came across that was involved in any capacity with any donor country or any institutional donor country, was saying, "There needs to be more co-ordination", and lack of co-ordination is a real problem. Interestingly, they were sometimes saying that in forums where they were all there in the same room and we asked them the question, "Why is it not happening? If you are all here and you are all in the same room, why are you not co-ordinating and why are you not deciding who does what?" I do not feel we got a complete answer as to why it is not happening. Do you know why it is not happening?

  Hilary Benn: I do not think that is unique to the DRC, to be honest. If we had a pound for every time people talk about co-ordination we would have a much bigger aid budget. It is the doing that really counts. I think CIAT[15] has done a pretty good job in trying to stand alongside, nurture and cajole the transitional process forward, and I do think that has been a reasonably co-ordinated effort. When it comes to co-ordinating donor programmes we have a long way to go. One of the things that I now want us to do alongside other donors in the DRC as we come to the period after the elections is where might we be able to pool our effort. I was talking to the team about that this morning and asking that very question, "Where might we be able to have more donor co-ordination in the DRC?" They said, "We are talking with other donors in a number of areas", but it still seems to me like the beginning of a process. If we could agree that we are going to come together and work on education in particular, say something like free primary education, going back to the point about the election dividend, answering the question, "What changed as a result of 23 million of us registering to vote?", it would be great if we could make that happen. I wish I knew. I think because the circumstances have been rather difficult it is not a kind of normal development country. There are relatively few donors, although you might argue that should make it easier for people to come together, and people, as ever, end up doing very different things. I do think it will be a priority after the election is out of the way, particularly with the pressure to demonstrate delivery for donors to get their act together better than they have in the past.


  Q337  Richard Burden: You say that is an initiative that you are exploring; take the example of the DRC, who do you think should be taking the initiative to try to bring that co-ordination together? Does it fall to us? Should the UN be kicked into doing it?

  Hilary Benn: In relation to the humanitarian effort, obviously it is the UN's responsibility to lead. Traditionally a country will chair the donor group and will try and bring people together, and in some countries they have greater success in doing it than others. To be honest, at the moment I am not entirely sure who is chairing the donor group in the DRC, and I will have to check, but that is the way it tends to work. Even if you are chairing the group, it does not mean you can drag everybody else along and make them do what you think is the right thing because it depends on where it is people are prepared to go.

  Mr Evans: If you talked to our colleagues in Kinshasa about this, which I am sure you did, they would have suggested that part of the solution may lie with the EU because of the role the EU is already playing in developing the strategic reform agenda and the political processes. I think we would claim some credit in trying to push forward better donor co-ordination in the DCR, although I recognise there is an awful lot still to be done. We would see a role for the EU in legitimately taking some leadership in trying to do this.

  Q338  Chairman: That may be a problem. The United States may be a little bit of a problem.

  Mr Evans: Donor co-ordination is a problem everywhere, but even more importantly so in a place as complicated as the DRC.

  Q339  John Battle: Can I ask about something that we have not done. We have elections and, again, it is a bit like crime and the causes of crime, what about the grievances that cause the problem in the first place? I worry more about this, the carpet theory of history, if you press down the problem here and do not deal with it, it comes up further down the room. Also, I was quite impressed by the way that DFID worked on defence matters with MONUC and we got good stories back on that, but I am worried about addressing the real causes of conflict, the real grievances that people might have and how much you can get into that so we do not end up with situations tipping back into conflict and violence a few years down the road. What strategies are in place? What thought and foresight are given to that in the Department?

  Hilary Benn: Going back to the conflict analysis, understanding what is going on, why this happened and what incentive people have for it to continue is vital to us doing the right. In the end, I would say it is for the parties to the conflict to try and sort out those grievances and for us to try and support a global process as a way of doing that as opposed to people continuing to fight each other. In the end in the DRC that is what happened when the transitional government came into being. Only they can sort that out. We have to make sure that we back that process and do not do things in the course of that which unintentionally add to those problems. That is why conflict analysis is quite helpful in going through the checklist and making sure that you are doing sensible things and not things which make it worse.


14   Ev 124 Back

15   International Committee Accompanying the Transition (CIAT). Back


 
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