UGANDA
16. In Uganda there has been a 20 year conflict in
the north of the country involving in the main, the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA). The conflict has resulted in the displacement of approximately
1.7 million people, who now live in internally displaced persons
(IDP) camps, which are maintained largely by UN agencies. We visited
two camps in Gulu district. The accommodation is basic
mud huts with thatched roofs, built close together, which frequently
catch fire. There are schools but insufficient teachers and health
centres but few doctors. The police presence is minimal and wholly
inadequate. The water supply is erratic, and the public health
statistics are among the worst in the world. A 2005 survey by
the World Health Organisation (WHO) found that the crude and under-five
mortality rates among children were well above expected emergency
rates. Malaria, AIDS and violence are the three main causes of
death in under-fives, but there are also high levels of water-borne
and transmittable diseases, as well as malnutrition.[17]
In recent months there have been outbreaks of cholera in a number
of the camps.
17. According to the Civil Society Organisations
for Peace in Northern Uganda, the conflict causes up to 130 deaths
per day.[18] WHO estimates
that 12,000 children have been abducted by the LRA since June
2002.[19] The boys are
trained to become soldiers and the girls are taken as wives and/or
slaves. Girls are also made to fight and commit atrocities. During
our visit we met some returned abducted children and heard their
harrowing tales. These children were being reintegrated into their
families and communities despite the likelihood of their having
participated in atrocities against their own people.
18. We were told that the security situation has
improved over the last year. In particular, the LRA has lost its
safe haven in southern Sudan since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
brought the civil war there to a formal end. Unfortunately, this
has led the LRA to seek refuge in northern DRC, itself a conflict
affected area. The Government of Uganda and the UN are overseeing
the voluntary decampment of some IDPs to smaller camps which are
nearer to the IDPs' original villages. The process is not without
its problems and camps in Teso had to be disbanded following attacks
by the LRA. In the past six months improved security has enabled
IDPs to reach land further away from the camps and around the
satellite camps, and to cultivate crops and livestock.
19. The level of fear brought about by the conflict
has also created the phenomenon of 'night commuters' children
who leave their homes at nightfall to sleep, together with other
children, sometimes up to a hundred in a large room, in order
that they may be protected from abduction by the LRA. Improved
security has dramatically reduced the numbers of night commuters
although some children still do so for social reasons.
20. The cost of running the IDP camps in northern
Uganda is largely borne by UN agencies. We were told that the
cost of running the camps was US$200 million a year. Although
the camps clearly meet a need, their continued existence brings
with it the risk of institutionalising those who live in them.
Northern Ugandans are at risk of losing their agricultural skills
and other livelihood strategies as they have become more dependent
on the international community to provide for them. In addition,
with the international community continuing to provide resources
for the camps, the pressure is taken off the Government of Uganda
to provide for its own citizens. In effect the international community
is paying US$200 million per year to provide services which the
Government of Uganda should either be providing or for which there
would be no demand if the IDPs could go about their normal daily
lives.
21. In Uganda DFID is supporting a government which
is making reasonable progress in poverty reduction, education
and health in the south of the country, but which is not able
to exercise effectively key governance functions in the north
of the country. In addition we were concerned about the attitude
of some Ugandan Government officials towards the DRC. Uganda also
has a history of involvement in the conflict in the DRC. A senior
Foreign Ministry official expressed to us, in strong words, the
view that the DRC was a failed state and that it had effectively
forfeited its sovereignty. Another member of the Government of
Uganda said that hot pursuit of the LRA into the DRC was permissible.
22. We consider that insufficient international pressure
has been put on the Government of Uganda to work towards either
a negotiated or a military solution to the conflict. In January
2006 the UK Government withheld £15 million of its 2005-6
Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) to the Government of Uganda,
because of concerns about the way in which the first multiparty
elections were being handled, and diverted £10 million of
this to assist with the humanitarian crisis in the north. Following
our visit, in July 2006, the UK Government announced that budget
support for 2006-7 to the Government of Uganda would be kept at
£35 million, the 2005-6 level.[20]
23. We accept
that the continuing conflict in northern Uganda is not the fault
of the Government of Uganda. Nevertheless the Government of Uganda
has responsibilities to its population in the north which hitherto
it has failed to fulfil. Instead of meeting its responsibilities,
the Government of Uganda has been relying on donors to provide
core functions such as health and education. This is costing donors
US$200 million per year money which could make a huge
development impact if the conflict was resolved and the resources
were spent on post-war reconstruction and on resettling displaced
people in their villages.
24. Since the Committee's visit in February there
have been peace negotiations brokered by the Government of South
Sudan taking place in Juba. Peace talks have failed before but
for a number of reasons these appear more promising than at any
time since the LRA started its campaign 20 years ago. There is
a general belief that peace will allow security to be re-established
more comprehensively than a military solution. If security is
re-established in northern Uganda we understand that the population
would prefer to return to the land rather than to decongestion
camps as previously proposed by the Government of Uganda. These
would only find favour if peace was not fully established.
25. Peace in northern Uganda would require the current
aid budget to be diverted to development as people re-establish
their livelihoods on the land. Aid would be needed for clean water,
tools, seeds and re-establishing livestock on a well-watered and
fertile part of Uganda that has the capacity to feed itself and
export cash crops to the benefit of the whole of Uganda, which
faces a population explosion.
26. Rivalry between the north which supports the
opposition and the south would require the donor community to
ensure that development aid is concentrated on building livelihoods
in the north and not diverted for political favours in the south.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
27. During our visit to the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), only two months before the delayed elections, we
experienced a country, larger than Western Europe, with an ineffective
Transitional Government. We spent two days in Kinshasa before
flying east to Bukavu in South Kivu district. It was clear that
the Transitional Government was unable to control large parts
of the country, particularly the east, where militia groups still
operate. DRC is host to the largest ever UN peacekeeping mission,
MONUC, with a force of 17,000. Unfortunately, and despite some
good efforts, MONUC has been plagued by accusations of improper
conduct.
28. The DFID programme in the DRC has grown from
£7 million in 2001-02 to £55 million with a projected
increase to £70 million in 2007-08. DFID is now the largest
bilateral donor in the DRC. Nearly half of the DFID programme
is directed at humanitarian assistance, reflecting severe and
ongoing needs in this sector. Most of the remainder of DFID funding
currently goes on attempts to establish security, the rule of
law, and a functioning state. Support for preparations for the
July 2006 elections falls into the latter category. After the
elections DFID is planning to produce a full Country Assistance
Plan which will include more emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction
and the management of natural resources.
29. The Government has announced its intention to
develop a conflict policy and this report sets out many of the
key issues which we think should be considered in the writing
of this policy. Chapter Two looks at DFID's current policies
and its approach towards conflict-prone and conflict-affected
(CPCA) states. In Chapter Three we ask the question how can the
UK Government make its development policies more conflict-sensitive
and contribute towards sustainable peace in CPCA states? We are
aware that no matter how conflict-sensitive the UK Government's
policies, they will not have an impact unless they form part of
a global effort. Coherence within the international community,
including multilateral donors, is a prerequisite for successful
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. This is the subject
of Chapter Four. Chapter Five focuses on the role of the newly-formed
UN Peacebuilding Commission.
1 Ev 151 (SaferWorld) Back
2
Jeffrey Sachs, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan To
Achieve The Development Goals, 17 January 2005, pp 28-29. Back
3
A US magazine published by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington DC Back
4
Lord Triesman, Democracy and Security in Africa, Speech
at Chatham House, June 21, 2006. Back
5
Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission
for Africa, March 2005, Chapter 5 Back
6
Ev 151 (Saferworld) Back
7
Memorandum submitted by Professor Robert Picciotto, printed in
International Development Committee, Conflict and Development,
HC 464- i, 15 March 2005. See also Collier, P and Hoffler, A ,
On Economic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers
50:563-73, 1998. Back
8
Paul Collier, ibid. Back
9
www.globalissues.org using figures from the OECD. Back
10
For a more detailed discussion about the economic and political
causes of civil wars see Chapter 3 of this report, Building the
Peace. Back
11
UNDP Human Development Report 1994, New Dimensions of Human
Development, Back
12
Robert Picciotto, et al Global Development and Human Security:
towards a policy agenda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden
2005, p iv Back
13
Robert Picciotto, et al Global Development and Human Security,
p 1 Back
14
Mark Duffield, Human Security: development, containment and
re-territorialization, Chatham House ISP/NSC Briefing Paper
05/02, October 2005. Back
15
S. Eizenstat et al Rebuilding Weak States, Foreign Affairs,
vol 84 no 1 January/February 2005. Back
16
Stewart Patrick, Weak states and global threats: assessing
evidence of spillover. Working Paper no 73 Centre for Global
Development, January 2006. Back
17
World Health Organization, Health and Mortality Survey among
Internally Displaced Persons, Geneva: WHO, 2005. Back
18
HC Deb, 20 June, col 388 Westminster Hall. Back
19
World Health Organisation, 2005 op cit. Back
20
Hilary Benn MP, DFID Written Ministerial Statement, Uganda:
Poverty Reduction Budget Support, 3 July 2006 Back