DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND
REINTEGRATION
127. The integrated nature of security and development
means that material improvements are a necessary component of
both post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding. Combatants and
communities affected by the violence must see economic improvements
which provide tangible evidence of a peace dividend. In particular,
the presence of large numbers of demobilized combatants poses
a security risk which can derail reconstruction. Former combatants
must be shown that peace is economically advantageous in order
to stave off 'spoiler' violence or organized banditry. Demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programmes are key to this
process.[133]
128. The record of donor commitment to DDR programmes
across different countries is mixed. For example in the DRC the
pay-out for soldiers who disarm is quite high — US$410 —
while soldiers who remain in the army are only paid US$10 per
month.[134] In Uganda,
in contrast, we were told that returning LRA soldiers receive
very little from the Government or donors and that this was a
disincentive for soldiers, who may themselves have been abducted,
to come out of the bush. Retraining and re-integration programmes
are now under active consideration. The relatively large sum of
money received by ex-soldiers in the DRC provided a perverse incentive
for them to take the payment and use the money to purchase another
weapon with which they could rejoin a militia group. While the
content of DDR programmes will vary in different contexts, the
underlying principle must be to ensure that there are sufficient
incentives and opportunities for ex-soldiers to disarm permanently
and pursue civilian employment. This is a process which should
not end with the payment for disarming, but should be linked to
longer-term employment opportunities.
129. Our experience in Sierra Leone presents a good
example of how this reintegration aspect of DDR is often neglected
by donors. Apart from a one-off payment in cash or kind, there
is not much emphasis on long-term projects to create employment
for those who might otherwise pick up or return to arms. In Sierra
Leone we saw first hand the large number of unemployed young men
with few job prospects. Much of what we heard during our visit
convinced us that one of the most significant issues facing Sierra
Leone, one with the potential to contribute to future conflict,
is youth unemployment. We heard that donors had invested in skills-building
programmes for young people (carpentry, brick-laying etc.) without
giving sufficient thought to the availability of jobs for those
who have undertaken such training. It
seems clear that donors in Sierra Leone now need to give priority
to employment-generation initiatives, including agricultural schemes,
to provide an incentive for rural-urban migrants to return to
rural areas. This will mean simultaneously tackling some of the
local governance grievances that have led to discontent in rural
areas. At present a substantial proportion
of unemployed young men are tempted to try their luck in the diamond
mines, rather than invest their energies in gaining more secure,
longer-term employment. It
may not be appropriate for DFID to engage in this area directly,
but as the largest donor in Sierra Leone, the Department ought
to provide a lead for other agencies by highlighting the issue
and encouraging others to increase their focus on the issue.
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