Small arms and light weapons
(SALW)
136. The UK Government has committed itself to securing
agreement in 2006 to start negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty
(ATT) and to report to the UN General Assembly by 2008. This commitment
was reiterated in the DFID White Paper.[140]
137. International concern about the dangers posed
by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has tended to distract from
the greater threat to human security posed by the spread of conventional
weapons. "There is clear evidence that weak, failing and
post-conflict states play a critical role in the global proliferation
of small arms and light weapons" as either source, transit
or destination country. [141]
SALW played a significant part in increasing the duration and
intensity of the conflict in Sierra Leone. SALW have also been
the main weapons in the wars in Angola, DRC and Sudan.
138. The easy availability of small arms weakens
state capacity. DFID addresses the availability of SALW through
its security sector reform projects. For example the Global Conflict
Prevention Pool's Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons has
provided around £24 million over the past four years for
measures to restrict arms supply, reduce demand and take weapons
out of circulation.[142]
The UK Government has developed a policy on small arms trade which
states that it will not sell arms to known terrorists, or to governments
if it believes they will be used to repress the populace. This
is, however, often difficult to ascertain in advance. Weapons
stocks frequently end up in the hands of someone other than the
original purchaser — as when Siad Barre's weapons stocks
in Somalia were distributed among fighting clans in the 1990s.
The Ugandan government may appear 'responsible' in relation to
its development policy but not necessarily in relation to northern
Uganda or the DRC. Arms sales to a government may encourage it
to feel immune from criticism by its own people and may also encourage
arms acquisition by neighbouring countries. Strong common standards
for global trade in conventional weapons should be an international
priority. The Government's policy on not selling arms to governments
if it believes they will be used to repress the population must
be applied robustly.
139. In response to questioning about the likelihood
of agreement on an International Arms Trade Treaty, we were told
by Saferworld that:
"there are a number of obviously pretty important
countries which are either overtly opposed to the ATT or have
a more subtle approach, but we would assume that they have strong
misgivings about an ATT. The challenge to be faced this year
is tackling that opposition but also getting the people who have
signed up to statements of support to actually be active supporters,
pro-active supporters, because the UK Government can lead so far."[143]
140. It is also the case that where, for example,
state borders are porous:
"you have to build up the capacity both of governments
to deal with licensing their transfers and monitoring their participation
in the regional and international dimension of it, and building
up their border controls but also building up their legislation
on small arms."[144]
141. The
Government has made good progress in pushing for an International
Arms Trade Treaty.[145]
It must build on this and ensure there is no loss of political
momentum on this important issue in the UN. We also draw the
Government's attention to the recent Reports which the Quadripartite
Committee has published in relation to arms controls. The International
Development Committee is both contributor and signatory to those
reports and we hope that the Government will take on board the
recommendations the Quadripartite Committee makes.
Regional initiatives - the Africa
Peace Facility
142. Those countries and regions affected by conflict
are best placed to address peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.
Peacebuilding needs to be home-grown, rather than imposed by
outsiders. Successful outcomes are most likely to occur where
peacebuilding has the support of those affected by the conflict.
Because regional organisations operate in close proximity to
conflict they have a greater stake in the outcomes and are often
much more willing to become involved. In addition, many internal
conflicts have significant regional dimensions and, as a consequence,
require regional solutions.
143. The New Economic Partnership for Africa (NEPAD)
sees peace and security as preconditions for sustainable development.
To this end, NEPAD has developed a post-conflict reconstruction
policy framework intended to facilitate coherence in the assessment,
planning, coordination and monitoring of post-conflict systems.
The framework maintains that:
"external actors should systematically develop
the capacity of the internal actors and facilitate the scaling-down
of their own role and the scaling-up of the role of the internal
actors. Internal actors should be involved in assessment, planning
and monitoring processes to the greatest extent possible. As the
situation improves the participation of the internal actors should
increase until they eventually take full ownership of this function."[146]
144. Many regional organisations, especially in Africa,
have limited capacity and resources. Exceptionally, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been quite successful
in responding to conflict in the region. The donor community has
a responsibility to build up regional organisations to meet the
challenges of peacebuilding.
145. In 2004 the EU agreed to finance an African
Peace Facility (APF) for three years. The Peace Facility is based
on the idea of African ownership — it supports African-led
peace-keeping operations as well as capacity-building for the
emerging security structure of the AU. Although the APF, currently
a £250 million instrument, is mainly funded by the EU, African
countries have donated 1.5% of their allocations under the 9th
European Development Fund (EDF). They are thus making a significant,
if indirect, financial contribution. The APF was renewed this
year for a further three years, with up to 100 million euros per
year over the period 2007-10.[147]
146. The APF has been used to support AU peacekeeping
efforts in Darfur. In this respect it is fulfilling the important
function of supporting an African-led peacekeeping mission. In
spite of the mismatch between expectations about what the AU can
achieve in Darfur, and inadequate institutional capacity and financial
resources, the APF has encouraged Africans to step forward as
peacekeepers. Given the problems in amassing appropriately sized
and effective UN peacekeeping forces, the APF has made a significant
contribution to building up an African-led peacekeeping force.
We hope that the EU will continue to fund and build up the Africa
Peace Facility and urge further such partnerships to strengthen
regional capacities. We believe that African governments could
and should make substantial additional financial contributions
of their own to the AU's peacekeeping forces.
135 Q 162 (Prof Picciotto, Kings College, London) Back
136
DFID, Overview of DFID briefing for the International Development
Committee's visit to the DRC, May 2006. Back
137
UN SCR 1325 of 31 October 2000. www.un.org Back
138
Q 68 (Mr Evans, DFID) Back
139
Ev 118 (DFID) Back
140
DFID, Making governance work for the poor, page 36 Back
141
Stewart Patrick, Weak States and Global Threats, op
cit. footnote 15. Back
142
Ev 113 (DFID) Back
143
Q 26 (Claire Hickson, Saferworld) Back
144
Q 28 (Claire Hickson, Saferworld) Back
145
See Quadripartite Committee, Strategic Export Controls, Annual
Report for 2004, and Licensing Policy and Parliamentary
Scrutiny, First Joint Report of session 2005-6, HC 873 paras
181-183. Back
146
NEPAD, African post-conflict reconstruction policy framework,
www.nepad.org Back
147
Q 199 (Jonas Frederiksen, ECDPM) Back
