Memorandum submitted by the
Northern Uganda Advocacy Partnership for Peace (NUAPP)
1. Executive Summary
1.1 This evidence
is drawn from our experience in working in peacebuilding activities
in northern Uganda, both directly and through the work of local
partner organisations, and from working with different arms of
the British Government, in Kampala, London and New York. It, therefore,
relates directly to the International Development Committee trip
to Uganda, which forms part of this inquiry.
1.2 The
Northern Uganda Advocacy Partnership for Peace (NUAPP) is a coalition
of 6 NGOs advocating for a peaceful solution to the conflict in
northern Uganda. Member agencies support a number of peacebuilding
initiatives in northern Uganda.
1.3 We
understand peacebuilding to mean all efforts to create, support
and strengthen structures, relationships and processes that contribute
to the establishment of a "positive peace". Peacebuilding
must not be viewed as a post-conflict activity, but rather as
an intervention appropriate before, during and after violent conflict.
The transition from conflict to peace is neither well understood
nor simple but it is recognised that peacebuilding should not
simply be targeted at internalising a peace agreement in the affected
regions and communities, but that this process can work in reverse
- where peacebuilding in the affected communities during a conflict
contributes to a "peace agreement" - and that the peace
resulting from this will naturally be of a more sustainable nature.
1.4 Peacebuilding
during the current ongoing violence in northern Uganda is essential
to help create the space for talks or other processes aimed at
creating a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Particularly
important are reintegration and reconciliation programmes for
former members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
1.5 Peacebuilding
requires engagement on multiple issues at multiple levels, so
that it deals with the resolution of the immediate conflict, the
root causes of the conflict and the community-level conflicts
that result from the poverty and displacement caused by the conflict.
There is an iterative relationship between these different aspects
of the conflict.
1.6 Peacebuilding
requires coherence between the different actors, to build on the
potential opportunities provided by an increased understanding
of the importance of peace and security for poverty reduction.
Coherence also refers to complementarity of actions and approaches
between different departments of the same actors.
1.7 Peacebuilding
must be culturally appropriate and rooted in local understandings
of conflict and its transformation and resolution. In the context
of northern Uganda, it is particularly important that local perceptions
of justice are integrated into any peacebuilding activities, specifically
the ongoing International Criminal Court intervention.
1.8 Recommendations
for the International Development Committee:
We would expect the British Government:
o To
ensure that the apparent thinking within DFID Uganda regarding
the importance of supporting peacebuilding initiatives that contribute
towards a sustainable peace is replicated throughout other appropriate
organs of the British Government, and strengthened through increased
funding.
o To
ensure that its bilateral and multilateral dealings with the Government
of Uganda complement its support of community-level peacebuilding
initiatives, by regarding the conflict as symptomatic of a failure
of good national governance and adapting its policies and practices
accordingly.
o To
use its influence and expertise to coordinate peacebuilding initiatives
amongst local, national and international actors and international
donors.
o To
use its influence and expertise to reconcile the judicial demands
of the international community (demonstrated through the ICC)
and those of the conflict-affected population (demonstrated primarily
through the Acholi legal institutions).
2. Background to the Northern
Uganda Advocacy Partnership for Peace (NUAPP)
2.1 This
evidence is primarily drawn from the long experience of NUAPP
members in working in peacebuilding activities in northern Uganda,
both directly and through the work of local partner organisations.
It is also drawn from more recent experience, particularly over
the last year, of working with different arms of the British Government,
in Kampala, London and New York. Whereas the evidence on "Peacebuilding
and its role in Resolving Conflict" (Section 3) is applicable
to all conflicts, the majority of this evidence is applicable
to the situation in northern Uganda, given the British Government's
historic and current influence in Uganda and the International
Development Committee trip to Uganda, which forms part of this
inquiry.
2.2 The Northern Uganda
Advocacy Partnership for Peace (NUAPP) was formed in January 2005,
and comprises Christian Aid, the Church Mission Society, Conciliation
Resources, Quaker Peace and Social Witness, Tearfund and World
Vision UK. Our aim is "to enable more effective advocacy,
primarily in the UK, to effect a positive peace in Northern Uganda,
informed by civil society organisations and networks in Uganda".
2.3 We have formed
strong links with other coalitions based in Uganda (Civil Society
Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU)) and in New
York (the New York Working Group), and our members support a variety
of peacebuilding initiatives in northern Uganda.
2.4 We understand
peacebuilding to mean all efforts to create, support and strengthen
structures, relationships and processes that contribute to the
establishment of a "positive peace". A "positive
peace" encompasses not only the absence of direct physical
violence, but also means a society built upon social justice,
tolerance and appreciation of diversity, and an equitable distribution
of power and resources. When the word "peace" is used
in the following paragraphs, it is this definition of a "positive
peace" to which we refer.
2.5 Peacebuilding
is a process that has a transformative effect on the structures
and relationships that it seeks to address, and also on the individuals
involved in it. It means empowering people and organisations to
engage in processes of non-violent change.
3. Peacebuilding and its
Role in Resolving Conflict
3.1 Peacebuilding
must not be viewed as a post-conflict activity, but rather as
an intervention appropriate before, during and after violent conflict.
This definition does not appear to be generally accepted, with
the common usage of 'peacebuilding' referring to post-conflict
activity. See for example DFID's 2005 paper Fighting Poverty to
Build a Safer World, in which peacekeeping refers to post-conflict
interventions designed to prevent a relapse into conflict[71].
A similar viewpoint appears to be shared by the United Nations
Peacebuilding Commission, whose role is to "ensure that peace
agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner…..in
the immediate aftermath of war"[72]
3.2 Although
the Department for International Development (DFID) and the United
Nations (UN) place importance on activities that we would refer
to as in-conflict peacebuilding (and which the United Nations
refers to as "peacemaking"), this division threatens
to be more than simply semantic. The transition from conflict
to peace is neither well understood nor simple. Marking the shift
between these two states by the signing of a "peace agreement"
focuses on a notional peace at a governmental level - usually
the absence of fighting - without taking into account the importance
of that peace being realised at an individual, community or regional
level. It also implies that the focus of diplomatic or conflict
resolution efforts should be at the creation of such an agreement,
and that, following this, peacebuilding should be targeted at
internalising this peace in the affected regions and communities.
This does not take into account the situation where this process
works in reverse: where peacebuilding in the affected communities
contributes to a "peace agreement", which will naturally
be of a more sustainable nature.
4. Peacebuilding and its
Role in Resolving Conflict in Northern Uganda
4.1 Peacebuilding during the
current ongoing violence in northern Uganda is essential to help
create the space for talks or other processes aimed at creating
a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
4.1.1 Particularly
important are successful reintegration and reconciliation programmes
for former members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). These
have a number of functions, all of which are vital to bring about
a sustainable peace. Well-funded and well-communicated programmes
encourage further voluntary return, which diminishes the military
strength of the LRA. The gradual reintegration of former combatants
into their communities and into viable livelihoods is a less difficult
process than a large-scale Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR) programme, in which communities are forced to reintegrate
a large number of former combatants, many of whom may not be reintegrating
voluntarily, in a short space of time. Furthermore, if owned and
funded by local communities and the local and national government,
these programmes will build trust between both sides, building
confidence in a mediation process amongst those still engaged
in the conflict.
| 4.1.2 Eighteen out of twenty-six former LRA commanders interviewed by QPSW named the clear and demonstrated possibility of a better life, particularly economically, after their return, as a highly significant factor influencing their decision to leave the LRA
QPSW/Conciliation Resources research, Dec 2005
|
4.1.3 During
a conflict, particularly one as long-lasting and involving displacement
on such a scale as northern Uganda, it will not be possible for
the implementation of all aspects of programmes addressing issues
such as justice, reconciliation, economic development and governance,
which are vital for a sustainable peace. However, implementation
to an appropriate level should take place. This instils hope in
the affected population, which contributes to a negotiated end
to violence, and ensures that such a settlement addresses the
needs of all the war-affected population and thus minimises the
threat of a return to violence.
4.1.4 Our
reintegration and reconciliation programmes [that focus on relationship-building]
are good, but they need to be supported by income-generating activities
and small-scale development programmes. Helping the returnees
and community members come together in support groups has enabled
them to access funds for the development of small businesses and
enterprises. For them, this makes the reconciliation work more
meaningful.
Members of Empowering Hands, a women's
community group
4.1.5 Post-conflict
recovery programmes should be grass-roots driven, where the people
are consulted. The programme must take into consideration the
community's interests rather than being Government driven, like
the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme or the current Northern
Uganda Social Action Fund, which were imposed on the people rather
than contributing to the alleviation of poverty. Post-conflict
programme should be coherent with people's needs rather than government
driven.
James Odong, World Vision Uganda
4.1.6 Careful
advocacy programmes, both nationally and internationally, ensure
sustained pressure on both sides to engage meaningfully in efforts
to end the conflict. Although these shifts are by no means complete,
advocacy programmes regarding northern Uganda have helped to shift
national opinion away from the sense that the conflict is a "northern"
or "Acholi" problem, and international opinion away
from the sense that the conflict is an internal problem.
|
4.1.7 Advocacy is an important approach for us. It helps reinforce the need for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the role of amnesty in bringing peace. It is instrumental in reminding the government of Uganda of its responsibility to protect its citizens, and in providing alternative approaches to resolving the conflict.
Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI)
|
4.2 Peacebuilding requires engagement
on multiple issues at multiple levels.
4.2.1 In
northern Uganda, efforts must be made to end the armed conflict
between the LRA and the Government of Uganda. Looking upwards
from this violence, it can be seen that this conflict is rooted
in tensions between the north and the south of Uganda. Looking
downwards, it can be seen that this conflict creates socio-economic
conditions (particularly poverty and displacement) that lead to
new community-level conflicts. For a sustainable peace, it is
vital that these issues are all addressed through a comprehensive
approach that seeks to resolve the conflict in its wider context
- both the causes and the effects of the current conflict. An
iterative process is in effect, such that historical causes drive
the current conflict, which drives new community-level conflicts.
These, in turn, hinder the resolution of the current conflict
and thus of the historical causes.
4.2.2 Ever
since the overthrow of the regimes of Obote II and Tito Okello
by the NRM [National Resistance Movement, which Museveni led to
power in 1986], the North has not been able to trust the government,
and the majority have an attitude that this government is all
out to revenge on the North. This is because there has been no
attempt toward a government led national reconciliation amongst
the various ethnic tribes or region. As long as this mistrust
exists, some elements of the population will continue with subversive
activities.
Concerned Parents' Association
4.2.3 Justice
is a key element of this aspect of peacebuilding. On an immediate
level, this will pertain to atrocities committed by both sides
to the conflict. This is essential to building the trust that
is an integral part of a positive peace, but it must find ways
of engaging with the difficult issues of truth and past events,
to deal with the historical causes of the conflict. At the community-level,
reintegration packages are seen as a vital ingredient in the resolution
of the conflict (see above). These, however, raise questions of
economic justice, which must be considered both at the community-level
and the national-level. If a cause of the conflict in northern
Uganda is the economic and political marginalisation of the north,
addressing these issues is key. Also of paramount importance is
the way in which these issues are addressed. If the impoverished
population of northern Uganda regard the World Food Programme
(WFP) as their "government", as research has shown,
because of its role in distributing humanitarian assistance, trust
will not be built between the population and the Government of
Uganda, with its consequent effect on resolving the conflict's
historical causes, as would be the case if the Government of Uganda
undertook this activity.
4.2.4 At
the highest level, peacebuilding involves addressing issues of
power. On a governmental level in particular, it thus requires
coherence between developmental and more political responses to
conflict. Locally based efforts focusing on reconciliation, human
rights monitoring or civil society engagement will achieve little
in a conflict where powerful vested interests favour the maintenance
of the status quo, unless they are supported and supplemented
by parallel efforts to address questions of power and commitment,
particularly at the level of the national government and armed
forces.
4.3 Peacebuilding requires coherence
between the different actors
4.3.1 The
globalisation of peacebuilding initiatives, and the growing realisation
of the importance of peace and security as pre-requisites for
development and poverty reduction, bring potential benefits connected
with increased awareness, research and funding, but potential
challenges connected with the importance of coordination and the
avoidance of cultural imperialism (see Section 4.4).
4.3.2 Coherence
also refers to complementarity of actions and approaches between
different departments of the same actors, for example, the United
Nations or the British Government.
4.4 Peacebuilding must be culturally
appropriate and rooted in local understandings of conflict and
its transformation and resolution
4.4.1 The
focus of the efforts by the international community and of the
Government of Uganda on delivering justice in northern Uganda
is the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation. However,
in northern Uganda, many people feel that efforts to prosecute
members of the LRA through the ICC fail to adequately consider
local justice and reconciliation mechanisms, and local preferences
for addressing the perpetrators of atrocities. Although we have
found that many of the core concepts at the heart of reconciliation
are shared cross-culturally, in particular the components of truth,
justice, mercy, forgiveness and peace, differences have arisen
when considering how these goals can best be achieved.
| 4.4.2 In a workshop with Acholi traditional leaders, we discovered that there are at least four ways of translating the word 'reconciliation' into Acholi.
Acholi elders and chiefs who were participating identified the following as essential elements of a reconciliation process:
o Cessation of hostilities
o Mediation
o Apology & acknowledgement of wrong
o Truth
o Acceptance
o Justice
o Forgiveness
Workshop on Reconciliation. QPSW & Ker Kwaro Acholi, May 2005.
|
4.4.3 Justice
has to be delivered in such a way so that those for whom justice
is being delivered regard it as justice. It is not yet clear whether
the ICC process in Uganda will do this, for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the trials of those indicted by the ICC are planned to
take place in The Hague. Although these will be communicated in
some way to the population in the north, it is not clear what
the mechanisms for doing this will be, nor how effective they
will be. Secondly, international justice places a greater emphasis
on producing a punishment to fit the crime than on "putting
things right". The Acholi concepts of justice reverse this
emphasis.
4.4.4 Traditional
[Acholi] justice demands of a criminal his own moral and spiritual
apology, and his own participation in a process of reconciliation
and reparations. Let Kony admit his own guilt and participate
in the restoration of what he has destroyed. This uproots the
whole LRA philosophy of destruction. Western approaches to justice
may scorch the snake but they do not kill it. By failing to deal
with the whole of the problem, they cannot guarantee that another
Kony will not rise. Traditional approaches to justice aim to destroy
the whole system that produces violence and not just the individual
who heads that system.
Latim Geresome, Elder & General
Secretary to the Acholi Cultural Institution
4.4.5 Thirdly,
although there will be a measure of truth-telling during the trials,
the ICC process is not designed to deal with the root causes of
the conflict, or with "institutional crimes". The ICC
selects its cases on the basis of gravity, which it measures primarily
in terms of number of deaths, and will investigate individual
crimes that have taken place since July 2002. For this reason,
it will address raids on displaced people's camps ordered and
carried out by LRA commanders, but is unlikely to address crimes
committed by the Ugandan armed forces (the UPDF - Ugandan People's
Defence Force), as these are of a less "grave" nature,
although they contribute greatly to the lack of trust between
the affected population and the Government of Uganda.
5. An Analysis of UK Support
for Peacebuilding Initiatives in Northern Uganda
5.1 Peacebuilding during the
current ongoing violence in northern Uganda is essential to help
create the space for talks or other processes aimed at creating
a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
5.1.1 The
role of peacebuilding during armed conflict, and as a preventive
measure, is acknowledged in the two goals of DFID Uganda's conflict
reduction and peacebuilding programme[73].
It has been successfully demonstrated through the variety of interventions
supported by the UK during an ongoing conflict, including a community
radio station (Mega FM), a peace initiative headed by religious
leaders (ARLPI - the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative),
an advocacy coalition (CSOPNU - Civil Society Organisations for
Peace in Northern Uganda), the Amnesty Commission, and a mediation
process led by Betty Bigombe.
5.1.2 Whilst
this is to be applauded, it is not clear whether this apparent
view that peacebuilding is required throughout the continuum of
conflict and peace is shared by DFID in London. It is also not
clear the value placed by the British Government on the support
of such measures. Considerably more is given to help relieve the
humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda, through, for example,
support to the WFP, than is given to conflict reduction and peacebuilding
activities. See, for example, the comments below on the redeployment
of £15 million of British Government aid to WFP, UNICEF,
WHO and UNFPA.
5.2 Peacebuilding requires engagement
on multiple issues at multiple levels
5.2.1 Programmes
supported by DFID in Uganda clearly recognise the interconnectedness
of many aspects of the conflict, supporting as they do a wide
range of interventions. The support given to Mega FM and the Amnesty
Commission, which encourage the voluntary return of LRA combatants,
has bolstered peacebuilding efforts at the community-level. The
support given to the Bigombe initiative, as one of a troika of
governments, sought to contribute to peacebuilding at the level
of resolution of the immediate conflict.
5.2.2 At
the national level, UK support of peacebuilding initiatives has
not been so effective at influencing the behaviour of the key
players in this conflict - the LRA, the UPDF and the Government
of Uganda. The DFID-funded Defence Review helped address some
issues around the role of the UPDF, but there are clearly outstanding
areas of concern, as evidenced by the recent killing of seven
civilians by the UPDF following a protest over the killing of
another civilian suspected to be a member of the LRA, and the
involvement of the military in the arrest and imprisonment of
Kizza Besigye, a prominent opposition politician. A stated policy
action of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan is the implementation
of the Defence Review recommendations. Although recognising that
implementing defence reviews is a lengthy process, keeping the
Government of Uganda to account over this is an important part
of the British Government's peacebuilding in Uganda.
5.2.3 Although
the British Government cannot be expected to play a major role
in influencing the behaviour of the LRA - a joint statement issued
in August 2005 by a number of governments, including the British,
urging the LRA to re-establish contact with the Government of
Uganda, is to be applauded - the same cannot be said for the Government's
influence on the Government of Uganda. Of greatest concern in
the British Government's dealing with the Government of Uganda
in the resolution of the conflict in northern Uganda, has been
its failure to adequately recognise that the conflict is symptomatic
of a failure of good national governance, despite being willing
to recognise this failing in other aspects of Government of Uganda
policy and practice.
5.2.4 £5
million of the £40 million allocated to the Government of
Uganda by the British Government in 2005/06 budget was withheld
in May 2005 because "insufficient progress had been made
towards establishing a fair basis for a multi-party system".
In December 2005, as a result of "concerns about: delays
in putting in place the legal basis for multi-party elections;
the continuation of state financing for the Movement system in
a new era of multi-party politics; and …… particularly
worryingly, about issues associated with the arrest and trial
of the leader of the Forum for Democratic Change [Kizza Besigye],
one of the main parties that plans to contest the election",
£15 million from its total 2006/07 budget of £50 million
was reallocated to aid agencies working in northern Uganda, and
£5 million was held back until after the elections in February.
5.2.5 While
it is to be welcomed that the British Government has used its
leverage with the Government of Uganda in this way - albeit through
using the necessarily blunt instrument of, in effect, economic
sanctions - concern is raised about the means in which is was
done. As has been mentioned above, the failure of the Government
of Uganda to provide even the basic structures for supporting
life and livelihoods in the north - through humanitarian aid,
or a protection strategy that enables greater access to farmland
and markets - has diminished the levels of trust between the government
and the population of northern Uganda, and added to the sense
of marginalisation it feels. As with any relief operation, on
a small or large scale, there is clearly a tension between keeping
people alive and encouraging them to meet their own needs (or,
in this case, encouraging the Government of Uganda to fulfil its
duty of meeting its population's needs), but a more nuanced and
strategic approach to this redeployment of aid could have been
taken.
5.2.6 The
British Government has not withheld aid because of the Government
of Uganda's conduct regarding the conflict in northern Uganda.
This is not the setting to explore fully the role of the Government
of Uganda in the beginning and continuation of the conflict, but
concerns surround its failure to engage fully in finding a peaceful
solution to the conflict; its failure to protect its population
from LRA raids, but rather to pursue an aggressive military strategy
which puts the abducted children amongst the LRA ranks at greatest
risk; its failure to adequately respond to the humanitarian crisis
amongst the displaced population; its failure to fully support
the process of reintegration and reconciliation, through, for
example, adequately supporting the Amnesty Commission[74]
or engaging meaningfully with those advocating for a peaceful
solution; and, its failure to address the marginalisation and
under-representation of the Acholi population in the country as
a whole.
5.2.7 Concerning
the conflict, the Donor Democracy and Governance Group (DDGG)[75],
of which Britain is an influential member, expects the Government
of Uganda to:
o Demonstrate
political support for dialogue and reconciliation
o Work
with CSOs, faith based groups and traditional leaders in conflict
resolution and peace building processes
o Approve
conflict resolution policy and institutional framework
o Strengthen
capacity and provide adequate resources for Amnesty Commission
and other conflict resolution institutions
o Disseminate
information about Amnesty Act to all parts of the country and
in cross-border areas
o Strengthen
diplomatic ties and cooperation between Uganda and neighbouring
countries, especially Sudan
Accountability mechanisms already exist,
therefore, regarding the Government of Uganda's conduct in relation
to the conflict. If the DDGG placed greater significance on these
actions, it would enable it to create incentives for increased
political engagement on the part of the Government of Uganda to
end the conflict.
5.2.8 The
DDGG does therefore link the conflict to national governance,
but the attitude of the British Government seems to remain that
summed up by Hilary Benn in March 2005, who, whilst recognising
the impact of the LRA on Northern Uganda stated that "LRA
activity has had minimal effect on the stability of Uganda's central
government".
5.2.9 A
significant obstacle encountered by NGOs with an interest and
expertise in peacebuilding, including NUAPP members, has been
in persuading the British Government to take a proactive role
in pursuing the northern Ugandan conflict at the UN Security Council.
Failure to do so is perhaps indicative both of a disconnect between
London, New York and the programmes within Uganda, and also of
a more general failure by the UK to use its substantial political
weight to complement and enhance its in-country peacebuilding
programmes.
5.2.10 This
process also raised questions about the links between the FCO
and DFID in both London and Kampala. The traditional division
between the two departments has to some degree been addressed
by the formation of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (which
also includes the Ministry of Defence) but evidence of more effective
joined-up action about the conflict in Uganda would be welcomed.
Withdrawing or withholding aid clearly has implications on parties
wider than those which were to be served by the aid, not least
on the relationship between the British and Ugandan governments.
5.2.11 As
long as the British Government fails to acknowledge the conflict
as a crisis affecting Uganda as a whole, fails to see the conflict
as symptomatic of poor national governance in Uganda and fails
to reproduce its community-level peacebuilding activities at the
national level through its bilateral or multilateral dealings
with the Government of Uganda, it will not adequately engage with
peacebuilding at multiple levels on multiple issues.
5.3 Peacebuilding requires coherence
between the different actors
5.3.1 The
formation of the "troika", of which the UK government
was one member, offering support to the Bigombe process, was a
good example of coherence and cooperation between different governments
and their missions in Uganda. However, at least initially there
was stiff competition between political actors and some NGOs as
to who should play a role in that process. Although ultimately
resolved, it appeared a little ugly at the time, did not set a
good example to the local and national political elites, and it
is not clear how those not eventually included feel about it.
5.3.2 Although
initially limiting membership of the 'Bigombe' group was probably
justified, in the long term this group failed to open up to other
actors, and in particular to Ugandan and Acholi civil society.
This has proved damaging to the long-term strength and viability
of the process. Local civil society actors were unable to offer
their expertise and experience in a manner that could have strengthened
the process. Failure to involve other actors has also meant that
now that the UK government and other governments have withdrawn
their initial substantial support, Bigombe and the process have
been left significantly weakened. Engaging a greater variety of
actors earlier would have strengthened the long-term sustainability
of the approach as well as helping contribute to a broader vision.
5.3.3 Donors
in Uganda have been keen to become associated with NGOs in northern
Uganda that have demonstrated apparent success in peacebuilding
initiatives. As a result, several NGOs and institutions have been
swamped by too much support and attention which has detracted
from their key goals, and has at times threatened to destroy the
organisation. Although DFID has generally proved to be well aware
of this dynamic, it could do more to influence less sensitive
donors.
5.3.4 The
involvement of staff from the FCO, DFID and the MoD in supporting
the Bigombe initiative was a good example of a coherent approach
in-country. However, this document points out (Section 5.2) deficiencies
in coordination and coherence at other levels of the British Government.
5.4 Peacebuilding must be culturally
appropriate and rooted in local understandings of conflict and
its transformation and resolution
5.4.1 The
British Government, like many other actors, has struggled most
with the question of cultural appropriateness of engagement in
its attitudes towards the ICC intervention. Support to the Amnesty
Commission, which pre-dates the ICC intervention, is an excellent
example of a process and institution that grew out of the clearly
articulated desires of the Acholi population. However, DFID has
never offered significant support to the traditional institutions
of the Acholi, whose approaches to justice and reconciliation
are potentially highly complementary to that of the Amnesty Commission.
Instead, the UK has found itself in a difficult position regarding
the ICC.
5.4.2 Some
DFID staff with responsibility for the north clearly understand
how problematic and contentious many aspects of the ICC intervention
are in the current context[76].
These complexities have led to the creation of a situation in
which peacebuilding has become more difficult. However, the FCO
in London, because of their strong support of the ICC as an institution,
aware of the importance of a "successful" outcome to
the case in Uganda, the ICC's first, and conscious of preserving
the independence of the ICC, has been less willing and able to
explore the risks and complexities of the ICC intervention.
5.4.3 Furthermore,
the reaction of the British Government has been stronger than
that necessitated by the Rome Statute[77].
Despite differences in understanding between the ICC's Office
of the Prosecutor and those involved in the mediation of the conflict
regarding the pace and fragility of a "peace process",
the ICC has stated that its investigation should not prevent peace
initiatives. It is thought that the British Government has retracted
further than is necessary from, for example, the Bigombe initiatives,
as a result of fears that its position as a State Party to the
Rome Statute prevents it from supporting efforts to negotiate
a peace with indicted war criminals.
5.4.4 The
British Government has also not given sufficient attention to
the vital issue of reconciling the judicial demands of the international
community (demonstrated through the ICC) and those of the conflict-affected
population (demonstrated primarily through the Acholi legal institutions).
Its political and financial support of both sets of institutions
demonstrate a commitment to them both, and puts it in an ideal
position to be able to work with both sets of actors to create
a framework for justice that contributes significantly to peacebuilding
in Uganda.
January 2006
71 "Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: a
Strategy for Security and Development", DFID March 2005 Back
72
"In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human
Rights for All", Report of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for decision by Heads of State and Government in September
2005" Back
73
a sustained reduction in the number of peoples' lives affected
by violent conflict; a reduction in the potential sources of future
conflict
Back
74
The Amnesty Commission has only a renewable six-month lifespan
and its DDR activities have not been adequately funded. Back
75
The Donor Democracy and Governance Group states its objectives
to be to "deepen democracy and facilitate the transition
towards greater political pluralism in the period leading up to
and during the 2006 elections" and to "promote human
rights and good governance". Back
76
See Section 3.3 for a brief analysis of the risks and complexities
of the ICC process in Uganda Back
77
The Rome Statute is the treaty which established the International
Criminal Court (ICC). It entered into force on July 1,
2002 Back
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