Memorandum submitted by Peaceroots
BACKGROUND
1
Peaceroots is a small charity that grew out of Peace Direct (reg.
charity no 327947). Our objectives are to support grass roots
organizations that are attempting to resolve conflict by non-violent
means. Our current interest is in northern Uganda where we have
continuing contact with an indigenous organization called Peoples
Voice for Peace (PVP) - an organization that has shown commitment
and ability in pursuing such aims. We provide some financial support,
and take opportunities to make their views known to decision makers
in the UK where external intervention may have an impact on their
activities. Our comments below are based on the experience and
work of PVP.
2
We note with approval that the Conflict Prevention Pool finances
the kind of activities that we support: training of community
leaders in conflict resolution, supporting the non-violent protecting
and monitoring role of such organizations as Peace Brigades International,
financing of independent radio stations to cite just a few examples.
3
Our concern is that non-violent grass roots peace building
initiatives are often less effective than they might be, and may
even be undermined, because of policies at the national and international
level.
Military and non-military approaches
to civil conflict
4 Our
comments are made with reference to the conflict in northern Uganda.
Here, religious and community leaders place their hope in processes
of reconciliation and in the attrition of support for rebel forces,
but their work, in their view, is hampered by the Ugandan Government's
preference for an aggressive military strategy.
5 The
government of Uganda favours a military approach aiming to suppress
the LRA rebels by superior force. However, a group of religious
leaders from different faiths and denominations persuaded the
Government to introduce an amnesty programme whereby rebels who
were willing to give themselves up would be assured of freedom
from prosecution and offered a resettlement package enabling them
to return to civilian life. This programme has operated concurrently
with 'Operation Iron Fist'. PVP and other local groups have played
an important role in implementing this programme by using local
radio to encourage abductees to escape from their captors and
using traditional reconciliation processes to reintegrate them
into their communities. Potentially, a national policy embodied
in the Amnesty Act provided financial resources while local community
leaders provided the human resources to transform the conflict.
6
According to PVP workers and other observers the Ugandan Government's
preference for a military solution has worked against the amnesty
approach in several ways:
Intensified attacks by government forces
generally led to reprisals by the LRA in the form of further abductions
and atrocities against civilians.
The arming of local militias further
militarised the conflict without contributing to the protection
of the people in the camps.
The amnesty programme itself was under
funded and not consistently implemented.
Returnees were often coerced into fighting
with government troops instead of being returned to their communities.
7
We commend Hilary Benn for talking to the local people of northern
Uganda when he visited the country in 2004. He reported (in a
radio interview) that the local people did not believe that the
military approach was working. Nevertheless, the British government
continued to support President Museveni's policy indirectly through
its aid to the Ugandan government.
Impact of recent developments at
the international level
8
At the UN World Summit, in September 2005, member states signed
up to a collective responsibility to act to protect civilians
where a sovereign government fails to perform its duty. Our colleagues
in northern Uganda have welcomed this move. They also support
the suggestion by NGO's that their situation should be brought
to the attention of the Security Council.
9
The involvement of the International Criminal Court and the issue
of arrest warrants for LRA leaders has proved more controversial.
There are fears that such actions may not only remove the incentive
for rebel leaders to negotiate, but may run counter to indigenous
traditional conflict resolution processes and undermine the work
of the Amnesty Commission.
10 We
hear appreciative reports from people in Uganda of the financial
support that DFID has provided for grass roots peace building
initiatives. But there are questions to be asked about how aid
through governments can be co-ordinated with direct support given
to NGO's so that both are pulling in the same direction.
RECOMMENDATIONS
How can the UK improve its peace
building and post conflict reconstruction policies?
11
The question implies that we are looking at situations where the
worst violence is over and the work of reconstruction can begin.
However, in the case of northern Uganda, and many other parts
of Africa, 'peace building' needs to be part of the process of
actually bringing the conflict to an end. It is our belief that
in civil conflicts, non-violent processes - negotiation, offering
amnesties, and processes of reconciliation - are more likely to
produce lasting stability than outright military victory. If force
is necessary to protect non-combatants, it should support non-violent
processes rather than undermining them.
Implications for British foreign
aid policies
12
Most of the peace building work we have described can only be
done by indigenous organizations but there are ways that they
can be supported through foreign aid:
More generous funding and general
support for amnesty programmes
Directing aid specifically to enable
former combatants, whether 'victims' or 'perpetrators', to gain
skills and find employment
Making aid given to governments conditional
on encouraging non-violent approaches to the conflict and effective
protection of civilians. Where aid is likely to be used to finance
the military, there should be a provision that education in human
rights be part of their training.
We recognise the sensitivities, particularly
for a former colonial power, in dealing with sovereign governments,
and we are also aware of the dangers of 'conditionality'. Nevertheless,
where there are strong local initiatives for peace building there
would seem to be justification for pressuring the national government
into giving them support.
Where does the UK fit in with a 'global
peace building effort'?
The UN
13 The Government should take advantage
of the recent agreement concerning the protection of civilian
populations and bring to the attention of the Security Council
any situations where governments are failing to fulfil their obligations.
The African Union
The UK should increase its support to
peacekeeping and the peace building capacity of African forces.
14
The UK has, in recent years, developed a valuable reservoir of
policy and practice for our armed forces to follow up war fighting
with peace building in post conflict areas. Consideration has
been given as to how such skill can be effectively shared with
NATO and other forces deployed in similar operations. It is very
unlikely that the conflicts currently experienced in Africa can
be resolved by Africa alone. Both in the training of indigenous
peace-keeping forces and in joint operations with them or with
other countries, Britain can make a valuable contribution. Our
military expertise in this field should be complemented by the
knowledge and experience of organizations such as Peaceworkers
UK, Saferworld and International Alert.
The International Criminal Court
15
The support given to the International Court by the British Government
is to be welcomed. However, the Ugandan situation is not the only
one in which the indictment of rebel leaders as war criminals
while they are still at large may hamper attempts at non violent
resolution and even put the local population in greater danger.
Furthermore, western style criminal procedures may not be compatible
with traditional practices of reconciliation. We urge the British
Government to express these reservations to the ICC.
16
In conclusion, we urge the Government to give higher priority
to the funding of conflict prevention, (in view of
the fact that the good effects of economic and humanitarian aid
are often undermined by violent conflict) and to ensure that
policies at the national and international level are responsive
to the peace building initiatives at grass roots level.
January 2006
| 
