Memorandum submitted by ActionAid International
ActionAid is an international rights-based development
organisation working in 42 countries, a significant percentage
of these are in conflict. The Head Office of ActionAid is in Johannesburg.
1. How the UK can make its policies more conflict
sensitive
Countries emerging from conflict need more long
term commitments to funding. Donors should move to process-oriented,
rather than output or short term impact assessments to enhance
work and enable longer term funding. Longer term bi-lateral funding
requires development of stronger mutual accountability between
donors and recipient governments over both the governmental and
private sector. The UK government should develop mechanisms whereby
longer term funding is possible.
Conflict analysis is at the heart of any work
in or on conflict. HMG UK has recognised this but needs a more
bottom-up conflict analysis technique which channels local analysis
into the national analysis and utilises local analytical facilitators.
Policy-making should be subjected to more critical analysis from
below.
The UK should continue to encourage stronger
donor coordination by developing regular international joint donor/diplomatic
analysis meetings within conflict countries. These should be supported
by similar ad hoc analysis meetings of donor home ministries.
2. How the UK can improve its peace-building
and post-conflict reconstruction policies
Economic security is symbiotic with physical
security and cannot wait until the latter is established. Economic
regeneration should start as soon as violence begins to end. It
should be used to promote local income generation and training,
as well as develop community and social relationships—not
contracted internationally, and ensure consultation and involvement
of local communities.
Disarmament requires psychological and economic
change and should be viewed as a process not an event. Part of
that process must be minimum economic security, training schemes
must provide realistic possibilities of earning when they finish—not
just a lump sum.
Access to local markets and distribution networks
is key to the provision of earning opportunities. The UK should
prioritise, in collaboration with post conflict governments, the
establishment of marketing linkages at local, regional and national
levels. The UK should resist EU and other trade rules that inhibit
post conflict countries from exporting their goods.
The change from violence to politics requires
that unarmed actors be an integral part of country planning at
national and local levels. Civil Society must be included in planning
and implementation of post conflict developments. Weakened by
war, it will require moral support and resources. Publication
of information in vernacular languages should be encouraged to
aid transparency.
Ending impunity is critical for increasing stability
and security in a post conflict environment. The UK should develop
criteria for the implementation of the UNCHR recommendations on
ending impunity. Rule of Law can only be reinstated through an
effective national police force accountable at local level and
an independent justice system.
3. Where the UK fits with a "global"
peace-building effort
The primary focus of intervention for the UK
should be to support UN missions or regional bodies with universal
legitimacy. The UN should be encouraged to develop better lesson
learning from all its operations. Peacekeeping should focus on
community policing and community security networks. In-country
missions should ensure greater ownership by local people, including
the poor. Inadequate funding has dogged UN missions, adversely
affecting capacity and focus of missions. The UK should both fund
and encourage greater funding for UN peacekeeping.
4. How can the UK make its policies more conflict-sensitive?
A longer-term commitment
1. Currently long-term DFID funding is three
or occasionally five years. Yet, the South African peace process,
perhaps the most successful, took twelve years from initial contacts
between the parties to the first implementation of the new constitution.
Ten years after the constitution came into force, South Africa
is still dealing with post conflict issues. Of course, accountability
requirements preclude open-ended funding being given to organisations
for periods of 10 or 12 years. However, a deeper understanding
of developing processes and in principle commitments to following
processes through over a longer period of time, with suitable
reviews for accountability, allows development to become rooted
in local communities and is thus more sustainable.
2. The current focus on outputs and immediate
impact is inimical to successful conflict resolution, conflict
transformation or even development in conflict. Resolving conflicts
is not an event by event activity. Everything is a process—the
negotiations, constitution-making, restoring the rule of law,
disarmament, de-mobilisation, re-instating the infrastructure,
economic revival, and reconciliation. Whilst milestones can, and
should be identified, it should be clearly understood that they
are part of a much longer process.
3. It is perhaps even more critical that
the commitment to country level bilateral and multilateral support
is not withdrawn or runs out because a country appears to reach
a fragile post-conflict situation. It is at this moment that support
should be strengthened to try to ensure that conflict countries
do not fall back into war. So many have and it is even more difficult
to move towards stability the second or third time when the population
have become disillusioned even with peace processes. However,
this must also be linked to mutual accountability and post conflict
countries must either comply, or show realistic plans to move
towards compliance, with legal and fiscal international standards
and human rights norms, including transparency. The Government
of the UK should encourage vigilance with regard to curbing unethical
and criminal activities by private companies.
4. In January this year there is a donor
conference in London on Afghanistan to decide upon the level of
commitments over the next three to five years. At the time of
writing, the outcome of that conference is not known. However,
commentators are predicting a lessening of support. ActionAid
Afghanistan have stated: "Without long term commitment the
ability for Afghanistan to build a functioning democratic state
will not be possible. Being hosts of this conference Britain can
play a positive role". If the worst fears of colleagues in
Afghanistan are realised, then the massive investment already
made there is wasted.
Recommendations:
— That more long term commitments to
funding in conflict countries is developed
— Process- oriented project and programme
assessments should be encouraged
— That long-term bilateral and multi-lateral
funding becomes the norm for conflict affected countries
— That the UK should encourage development
of greater mutual accountability between donors and recipient
governments in both the governmental and private sectors
Listen to the conflict experts
5. Conflict situations are highly sensitive,
dynamic and often locally variable. The issues and parties may
look very different in a provincial area than in the capital cities,
in which the population are often more protected than other areas.
Aid and development agencies need to have sharp and timely information
about the issues at stake and develop a rolling analysis. The
conflict analysis should illuminate the interests and agendas
of all parties, armed groups and unarmed political parties, enabling
both donor and diplomatic intervention to be appropriate and coordinated.
In the absence of good conflict analysis, aid agencies, donors
and diplomats can have little idea of the impact of any of their
actions.
6. There are many tools of analysis and
many good analysts. However, the real conflict experts are the
conflict survivors. The local people not only know what their
needs are, but also have an acute awareness of the political space
available and the threats to that space. It is that awareness
that has enabled their survival. Failure to take the local knowledge
into account may result in inadvertently exacerbating the conflict.
Whilst these local dynamics may seem unimportant at the macro
level, if ignored, they can prolong violence or ignite a return
to war and there are many examples of countries falling back into
conflict that people have struggled so hard to leave behind. DFID
is ahead of many other donors regarding analysis, for example
the DFID Conflict Assessment Tools which have been adapted by
other countries. However, there is too much dependency on the
analysis of outside consultants and not enough on ensuring that
there are channels through which poor people can enable their
understanding of their own situation to be known. Furthermore,
policymaking should be regularly critiqued through a comparison
with local, provincial conflict assessments.
7. ActionAid have pioneered Participatory
Vulnerability Analysis (PVA) whereby poor communities, with the
help of local facilitators and outside experts, collectively articulate
those factors contributing to their own vulnerable situations.
They also identify what can be done about them—not what
only others can do, but firstly what they, as a community, can
achieve. This local level information can make a weighty contribution
towards developing predictive national conflict analysis. The
usefulness of analysis must be in its ability to be predictive.
In addition, PVA begins to assist community rebuilding, and even
reintegration in some cases, thus bolstering community conflict
resistance.
Recommendations:
— Develop a more bottom-up conflict
analysis technique.
— Initiate more training schemes to
encourage local analytical facilitators.
— Critically examine policymaking from
the perspective of local analysis.
Developing coherence between donors, diplomats
and multi-lateral institutions
8. This requires, first and foremost, the
development of a shared analysis between donors and diplomats.
It is critically important that this should be based upon what
the situation is on the ground, not a mediation of interests by
foreign governments. It is only at the information sharing and
analysis level that national interests can be ignored as they
will always dominate policy-making. However, developing a shared
analysis will promote greater understanding between diplomats
and donors. Unfortunately, it is not only between foreign governments
that coherence is needed. Diplomats and donors of the same country
do not always work to the same agenda and the UK does need to
ensure that the aid programme and diplomatic intervention are
complimentary.
9. In Sri Lanka this issue has been given
prominence by DFID. Post ceasefire challenges exposed the extent
to which differences between different international actors were
allowing the conflict parties increased leverage. DFID sponsored
attempts at a shared analysis did meet with some limited success
but rather too late to affect some of the earlier critical policymaking.
10. Several African conflicts might have
benefited from this approach being taken at an early stage. Currently,
in West Africa, the region is divided by Francophone and Anglophone
approaches, yet is threatened with the development of regional
guerrilla recruitment. The fragile peace that has been established
in Liberia and Sierra Leone could well be threatened by spill-over
from Cote D'Ivoire and Guinea. Joint regional analysis by the
diplomats and donors of all countries involved could be beneficial.
Recommendations:
— The establishment of regular fora
for international joint donor/diplomatic analysis in country.
— Establish similar fora on an ad hoc
basis for home ministries to also develop sensitivities to a bottom
up analysis.
5. How can the UK improve its peace-building
and post-conflict re-construction policies?
Economic development cannot wait for stability
11. Immediate post ceasefire, all attention
is on the security situation and it is usually not until the security
situation has been somewhat stabilised that economic regeneration
begins. However, any delay in beginning to kick-start the economy
threatens stability. Economic security and physical security are
symbiotic. As long as food, water and basic needs are widely unmet
then those with guns will be forced to use them and poor populations
will be forced into serving the agendas of the gunmen. So, economic
activity should start as soon as possible.
12. Even at these early stages there should
be an emphasis upon regeneration of the local economy to stimulate
independence and coherence of communities. Reconstruction offers
many opportunities for the training and employment of the local
population, but all too often the work is done under contract
by foreigners and the goal is seen simply in terms of how much
has been built. This happened in Liberia where the goal was seen
as providing schools as soon as possible so that education could
restart and a contractor undertook the work and completed the
buildings. However, many of these schools were built in areas
where the local population are in dire need of some income and
training and so an opportunity to consolidate the peace process
at a local level through economic underpinning was lost.
Recommendations:
— Promote economic regeneration at
the earliest possible date.
— Ensure that local workers and local
contractors are used—training them if necessary.
How regeneration occurs is as important as what
occurs
13. To continue with the example from the
previous paragraph: the schools were built to government specifications
and government teachers will be hired. There has been no consultation
with the local communities in this whole exercise. They do not
feel ownership of these schools—though they are pleased
to see them there.
14. Engaging local communities in such exercises
is not a matter of political correctness. Communities coming together
to discuss the rebuilding of their environment, sometimes to contribute
their labour to that rebuilding, engages them in a peaceful activity.
It helps to re-ignite community activities and may also be important
in reconciliation. In addition, it can help break any dependencies
that have arisen through reliance on humanitarian food aid etc.
Recommendation:
— Ensure that local communities are
engaged with regeneration in their localities.
Reintergrating combatants into local economy
15. Disarmament may have already have taken
place but it must be remembered that disarmament is a process
not a one-off event. In African conflicts, where arms are abundant,
it can be supposed that even after disarmament, which is a very
delicate and sensitive process, some guns will be retained and
hidden. But, the important thing is to take the guns out of peoples
minds, not just their hands. To do that there has to be alternative
ways of surviving.
16. Too many disarmament schemes rely on
a one-off cash payment for a gun, followed by some training without
thought of future employment and financial security. Furthermore,
there tend to be many different uncoordinated projects offering
training to ex-combatants.
17. In Freetown one can see young men walking
around carrying joinery tools. They have received training in
carpentry from a variety of organisations and all confidently
went out as journeymen. Nowadays, if you want joinery done in
Freetown, it will be done within hours and cost very, very little.
Few of these carpenters are able to earn a living wage. They are
disappointed, and with recruiting sergeants in town from Cote
d'Ivoire and Guinea they are going to have to be very determined
to avoid picking up a gun to earn again.
Recommendations:
— Disarmament requires psychological
and economic change and should be viewed as a process.
— Ensure coordination of training projects
and that there is a realistic chance of earning a living as a
result of the training.
Re-establishing internal markets
18. Lack of internal markets is an acute
problem in almost every conflict country within which ActionAid
works. Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Somaliland, Nepal and Afghanistan
all report the frustrations of local entrepreneurs being unable
to develop their businesses because of lack of proper marketing
and distribution systems.
19. In Sierra Leone, an agricultural project
involving ex-combatants harvested its first paddy harvest just
before Christmas. That rice will be sold as seed rice to NGOs
in the area who also have similar projects. One does not have
to be a trained economist to predict market saturation within
a year or so. The project leader is very interested in developing
the scheme and he is enthusiastic to move into cash crops. But
this ambition is currently frustrated by a lack of local markets.
In an urban project in Sierra Leone, disabled people have been
trained in blacksmithing. They have undertaken a series of commissioned
projects and they have also manufactured several thousand agricultural
hand tools. These excellently crafted tools are in storage as
there is no demand for them in Freetown and no market linkages
that would enable them to distribute them in the countryside where
they are needed.
20. Similarly in Somaliland, with which
the UK has a long relationship, the lack of markets for agricultural
produce is a huge problem and the market for halal meat across
Europe is increasing. However, EU protectionism obstructs the
Somaliland access to this market. Meanwhile, in Somaliland, the
value of livestock decreases and, as this is the major produce
of the country, this can only result in excess grazing, environmental
degradation and greater poverty.
Recommendations:
— The UK government should, in collaboration
with post conflict governments, establish marketing linkages at
local, regional and national levels.
— The UK should also resist EU and
other trade rules that inhibits post conflict countries from exporting
their goods.
— The UK government should not encourage
directly, or through project funding, the manufacture or production
of goods without ensuring that there is a market through which
they can be distributed.
Who will shape the post-conflict environment?
21. Ceasefires are, by necessity, negotiated
between armed forces. However, it should be remembered that ceasefires
are a temporary lull in violence in order to create the space
for a pacific political settlement. The temptation to move from
a ceasefire to peace negotiations on the narrow basis of the relationships
already established between the armed actors is often strong but
extremely undesirable. The future social compact of a country
should not, indeed cannot sustainably, be decided by armed actors
alone. Similarly, in the post conflict environment it is important
that the role of civil society, as an essential ingredient of
democratic practise, should be recognised and honoured. Participation
of communities at the local level is essential to bolster peaceful
community development. At the urban level, it is civil society
which takes over this function. Civil Society has a crucially
important catalyst and watchdog role over the post conflict governance
systems.
22. ActionAid has shown that participation
is possible, even in difficult situations, in DRC, Nigeria and
Sierra Leone. The organisation has developed REFLECT as a system
of literacy and empowerment based on Frierian principles. In rural
Liberia Action Aid has supplemented REFLECT circles with "peace
circles". In urban areas, where there may be several organisations
working and where at least nominal local government will be in
place, REFLECT and peace circles are important components of civil
society. However, in parts of rural Liberia where there is no
government or governance, these community groups prove their empowerment
potential to the full. They come together at the village level,
make community decisions, and in some cases are able to articulate
those demands to district level government. They are thus developing
the rural-urban political links, acting as community advocacy,
performing a civil society watchdog function on district level
government and strengthening the rural community.
23. Civil society is a wide sector including
print and electronic journalists and editors, academics and lawyers
as well as community groups. All have an important role to play
in post conflict development. The press, in particular, can make
information available in vernacular languages to ensure maximum
exposure.
Recommendations:
— Ensure the inclusion of civil society
in planning and implementation of post conflict plans.
— Encourage the development of civil
society through diplomatic insistence for political space for
its operation and funding of its activities.
— Facilitate the publication and translation
of plans and information concerning post conflict developments.
Establishing "Rule of Law"
24. The most important aspect of establishing
"Rule of Law" is the ending of impunity. The population
are entitled to expect that a ceasefire will mean that they can
enjoy some physical security immediately. Only if they feel that
will they believe that peace may be possible some time in the
future and only if they see the possibility of that peace will
there be active popular support for the process. People try to
protect processes in which they believe.
25. The United Nations Office of the High
Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) has produced guidelines for
the ending of impunity which provide a basis of international
norms. The most immediate imperative to ending impunity is to
ensure that criminal acts and human rights abuses are not allowed
to continue and that perpetrators are apprehended and prosecuted.
Internal security should be handed over to civilian police, under
local democratic accountability, as soon as possible.
Recommendations:
— Develop criteria for the implementation
of the UNCHR recommendations on ending impunity.
— Assist in funding and training the
development of a national police force including fostering accountability
practise at the local level.
— Encourage the adoption of a system
for the independent appointment of judges. Fund the restoration
of courts and, if necessary, provide training for judges and lawyers.
3. Where does the UK fit in with a "global"
peace-building effort?
Global peacekeeping should be through the UN or
EU auspices
26. The current review of the UN has thrown
questions regarding the effectiveness and accountability of UN
across its range of activities. Whilst welcoming the review process
and the creation of the Peace-building Commission, ActionAid supports
the continued central role of the UN in peacemaking and peace-building,
with support and cooperation with Regional bodies when appropriate.
It is extremely important that peacekeeping missions have legitimate
mandates which are recognised universally. Nevertheless, this
is critical support as our partners experience of UN missions
has been extremely variable and lesson learning regarding operational
matters appears to be very slow.
27. A stronger focus on the policing aspects
of missions, rather than the military, would also enhance the
security of communities and poor people. Civilian policing, particularly
if the personnel are trained in community policing, creates a
more people-centred emphasis which augments the whole security
arena. Project partners in Sierra Leone and Haiti have strongly
made this point during PVA exercises. The objective must be trust-building
with the public—not simply restraint of the public.
28. Under-funding of UN missions is a recurring
problem. Under-funding not only limits the capacity of the mission,
it can also distort the balance of a mission as funds are switched
to cover deficits. For example, in Haiti, funds for disarmament
ceased when MINUSTAH arrived, and since then the UN in Haiti have
been struggling to deal with armed gangs in Port-au-Prince. As
the date for the postponed election nears in Haiti and criticism
of the operation mounts, it is worth looking at the problems that
have beset this mission in more detail. The attached appendix
was prepared by ActionAid Haitian staff. They believe that the
UN response has been extremely inadequate and have made realistic
recommendations as to how to improve the mission. Their recommendations
also have utility in other situations, particularly those urging
local ownership of processes.
29. Despite the problems outlined, ActionAid
urges the UK to step up support to the UN and encourage the UN
to increase their accountability to civil society in the mission
countries. There are also success stories. The overall success
is recorded in "The 2005 Human Security Report: War and Peace
in the 21st Century", commissioned by five governments including
UK (see www.humansecurityreport.info). This records a decline
in conflicts and crises since the end of the cold war and credits
the conflict resolution efforts spearheaded by the UN for this.
There are also mission successes. The elections in Liberia were
an inspiration for observers and provided a solid benchmark in
the progress away from war for Liberians. In Sierra Leone, the
handover to the national security forces as the final UN forces
withdrew appeared to be a carefully calibrated success. The East
Timor Missions, particularly the 1999 mission, were considered
to be a huge success both internationally and within East Timor.
Recommendations:
— Peace keeping missions should be
undertaken by the UN or by regional bodies which have universal
legitimacy.
— The UN should be encouraged to develop
better lesson learning from operations across the organisation.
— Peacekeeping should be focussed around
community policing and community security networks.
— The UK should both fund and encourage
greater funding from others for UN peacekeeping. In particular
the UN should be encouraged to resist distortion of their activities
purely due to funding limits.
— In country missions should ensure
a greater ownership of the processes by local people, including
poor communities.
January 2006
APPENDIX: THE
UN IN HAITI
1. BACKGROUND
The Haitian crisis is multidimensional with
important social, economical and political components. Decades
of social exclusion and political and economic failure have created
a tense situation in Haiti's poorest and most vulnerable neighborhoods.
In this context, political manipulation combined to drug trafficking
has progressively increased the level of violence in slums. In
the last decade, Port-au-Prince has been characterized by growing
armed gang activities.
Following the trouble surrounding the departure
of President Aristide in March 2004, an international coalition
force came to Haiti in order to ease the situation. This force
was soon replaced by a United Nation mission (MINUSTAH) aiming
to bring back stability to the country.
Today, Haiti, specifically the capital Port-au-Prince
is far from stability and security. It is important to look at
some important facts related to this mission:
2. MINUSTAH IN
HAITI
— The Interim Cooperation Framework
aimed at easing the economic crisis showed serious weaknesses
in its architecture, transparency and participation. Few positive
results have been registered.
— The military component of MINUSTAH
is involved in some humanitarian operations that don't address
the main problems of the poor.
— MINUSTAH and the government have
launch a limited and weak social reinsertion program. There is
no effective disarmament program being implemented across the
country. MINUSTAH presence didn't actually lead to a reduction
of weapons circulating around the country. As a result of this
fact, the capital Port-au-Prince and some main cities are characterized
by growing violence. In Port-au-Prince, high number of kidnapping,
killings and vandalism are important signs showing the country
is going deeper into chaos.
— The situation in Port-au-Prince is
marked by the ambiguity noted in the position of MINUSTAH with
regard to the armed gangs. According to the International Crisis
Group, "a truce resulted from a dialogue between MINUSTAH
and local Lavalas Party Leaders, who have decided to participate
in the elections and requested and requested MINUSTAH/OAS to open
registration sites in the center of Cite Soleil. Those party representatives
apparently contacted gang leaders who agreed to halt attack on
international and Haitian officials. Still, insecurity remains."
High numbers of Haitian and foreign citizen are kidnapped or killed,
sometimes in the presence of MINUSTAH's soldiers. Troubling testimonies
from kidnapped people previously detained in Cite Soleil create
doubts about the soldiers' behavior.
— The UN should be helping reinforce
the Haitian National Police and the legal system. Some measures
to "clean" and to increase the size of the National
police (even though they're not enough) have been undertaken.
However, the support to the legal system, improvement of the police
equipment and the reinforcement of its intelligence are still
missing.
— The election process controlled by
the Organisation of American states (OAS) has not been appropriated
by the Haitian Society. This fact added to permanent conflict
between the Electoral Council's members has damaged the process.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
The UN should use a holistic approach aimed
at improving the economic conditions of the poor. Political adjustment
programs that don't fit this goal must be questioned. Action Aid
reiterates the recommendations it has advocated over the last
eight months calling on the UN to:
— Launch an effective and immediate
disarmament program;
— Work in partnership with civil society
on security issues;
— Provide training and support programs
for the Haitian National Police.
ActionAid Haiti also recommends:
— A real participation of the civil
society in the preparation and implementation of the national
reconstruction plan;
— UN support for the reinforcement
of civil society;
— The development of conflict resolution
mechanisms;
— The implementation in the poor neighborhoods
of human security programs which address the causes of insecurity
and bring about short and long term solutions;
— A UN will to help reconstruct the
country instead of a protectorate approach;
— Reinforcement of police intelligence;
— Meaningful participation of the population
in an effective disarmament program.
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