House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence

Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This submission is in three sections to correspond with the three main areas where the IDC has called for written evidence for this enquiry:

— how the UK can make its policies more conflict sensitive;

— how the UK can improve its peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction policies; and

— where the UK fits in with a "global" peace-building agenda.

To give weight to our argument, we use concrete case studies from Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Sudan, Uganda, Iraq and Afghanistan, based on the work of Christian Aid and its partner organisations.

The submission examines the role of international and regional organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union. It also looks at how the UK can effectively contribute, with other major international actors, to the global peace-keeping agenda.

Below is a summary of Christian Aid's key recommendations.

— The UK government must ensure that overseas development aid (ODA) does not support authoritarian regimes or impede democratic change.

— The UK government must take corporate accountability seriously and not rely on the goodwill of business through initiatives that are purely voluntary.

— The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) should be significantly strengthened and made mandatory.

— The UK should implement the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Companies effectively, promoting them vigorously to companies and committing significant resources to investigating complaints in an open and neutral manner.

— In "transitional" political situations, the UK government, the EU and other actors must demonstrate their commitment to building accountable and democratic states, by dealing robustly with human rights abuses.

— Coordinating with other members of the international community, the UK should work to ensure that provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs) focus their work principally on providing security in post-conflict situations, and do not interfere with the work of humanitarian organisations.

— The international community and the International Criminal Court (ICC) must ensure that any judicial proceedings take account of the interests of victims and work alongside traditional reconciliation processes.

— In Iraq—and anywhere else that they are active combatants—the coalition nations, and particularly the UK government, should respect and fulfil obligations under international law on conflict.

— The UK should actively support the New Partnership for Africa's Development's (NEPAD) African Post Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework.

— Programmes in the humanitarian, relief and development spheres should be coherent with those in the peace and security spheres.

INTRODUCTION

1. Conflicts across the world have killed hundreds of millions of people; displaced, maimed and traumatised many millions more; sowed the seeds of future hate and ethnic division; and impeded development and poverty reduction. Africa is particularly affected and has the world's highest number of refugees (approximately 3.5 million) and internally displaced people (approximately 13 million).

2. Each peace settlement brings its own particular challenges, which must be met if that peace is to last, poverty is to be eradicated and development delivered. More than half of current civil wars are thought to be the result of the collapse of a peace process. In the five years immediately after a conflict, the risk of returning to war is estimated at around 40%.[32]

3. It is essential that effective interventions are made speedily, not only to rebuild the economy and the infrastructure, but also to restore the rule of law and protect human rights. Such interventions are a crucial part of creating a sustainable peace and preventing a return to violence.

4. This submission, drawing on the experience of Christian Aid and our partners, argues that any post-conflict strategy must:

— address the related increased incidence of domestic violence, crime among young people or increased prevalence of HIV and AIDS;

— emphasise the needs of "special groups"—women, children, young people, the disabled, the elderly, ex-combatants, child soldiers, internally displaced people, people living with HIV or AIDS. (For example, without adequate protection and support, child returnees are more likely to be abducted again);

— include an effective disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme for all combatants, other than designated security forces, to substantially reduce the risk of further conflict;

— reform the security sector so that it comes under democratic civilian control and meets the population's security needs;

— provide a forum to provide reparations, end impunity and reconcile the victims of war through a transitional and restorative justice programme; and

— protect the impartiality and security of humanitarian agencies.

5. Conflict and post-conflict situations should not be addressed through a series of separate approaches (ie humanitarian relief work, followed by post conflict development and then normal development programming), but instead all approaches should coordinated and coherent, and be based on the ultimate objective of long-term equitable development

SECTION ONE: HOW THE UK CAN MAKE ITS POLICIES MORE CONFLICT-SENSITIVE

1.1 Addressing sources of conflict and building legitimate institutions through conflict-sensitive aid

6. The UK Government must ensure that its overseas development aid (ODA) does not support authoritarian regimes or impede democratic change. It can do this by improving monitoring and usage of specific, measurable and mutually agreed human-rights and accountable-governance benchmarks.

7. Specifically, the UK Government must mitigate against the associated risks of direct budgetary support, which the Department for International Development (DFID) has identified as ". . . reinforc[ing] the status quo and mak[ing] transformational change more difficult".[33] The Government must ensure that appropriate mechanisms, such as a clear memorandum of understanding, are in place and adhered to, which reflect the commitments DFID has made "to ensure their development assistance is not used in ways that abuse human rights".[34]

1.1.1 Case study: Rwanda

8. More than 10 years after the genocide in Rwanda, the country has made great strides in its economic, administrative and political reconstruction. In 1993 a new constitution was ratified by popular vote and, today, the country is relatively safe, with newly paved roads and expensive buildings. But, amid these changes, restrictions on civil and political rights, characterised by the campaign of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Rwanda's government, against "divisionism" and "genocidal ideology", has led to a climate of fear and intimidation.[35] This threatens the country's economic and social achievements. The Government's approach and its monopoly on power are storing up problems for the future and risking a return to violence.

9. The joint UK-Rwandan mechanism to monitor aid, the 2004 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),[36] has failed to serve one of the purposes for which it was conceived. Specific commitments and indicators of progress agreed by the two governments to protect and promote human rights are ineffective. They are too broad, difficult to measure and fail to address the root causes of the problems. Despite a principle of accountability to each government's parliament and citizens,[37] there has been a lack of parliamentary scrutiny and limited consultation with civil society.

10. The Review Report,[38] which covers progress on the areas agreed in the MoU, is the key tool in the monitoring process and the annual Partnership Talks, where the UK and Rwandan governments negotiate their relationship.[39] This report has several caveats, which undermine the credibility and value of the final document. The most notable of these were:

— the acute time constraints;

— the failure to visit provinces outside of Kigali; and

11. The report documented numerous human rights violations and the closing down of political space, although crucially its conclusions failed to reflect this. The body of the report underlined how the 2004 Rwandan Parliamentary Commission into the Ideology of Genocide lead "to intimidation and a climate of fear, with some named individuals reportedly fleeing, and pressure for organisations to dissolve, without thorough investigations having been held."[41] This has left LIPRODHOR, Rwanda's leading human rights organisation, effectively unable to monitor human rights. The document reported cases of politically motivated "disappearances" and stated that ". . . few doubt that ultimately the RPF remains in control,"[42] but it still ultimately concluded that "the Government of Rwanda has contributed well to political inclusivity".[43]

1.1.2 Recommendations

12. DFID must provide appropriately resourced mechanisms to implement its commitments to:

13. The impact of ODA on human rights and accountable governance must be monitored through specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, time-bound and mutually agreed benchmarks that ensure the protection and fulfilment of rights, not only their promotion.

14. The process of drafting, monitoring and reviewing such benchmarks must be adequately resourced and subject to public and parliamentary scrutiny throughout. Benchmarks should be based on international standards and norms, thereby facilitating objective judgement and negotiation in the aid partnership.

15. The UK government must be transparent about how it measures breaches of ODA agreements and how it responds if breaches occur. Recipient countries can then plan on the basis of predictable aid flows and know the consequences of breaking aid agreements.

1.2 Encouraging conflict-sensitive business

16. The exploitation of natural resources often fuels conflict. So it is vital in post-conflict situations that private-sector mining and oil and gas extraction are monitored and scrutinised, and that companies are held accountable. In a 2003 report, Fuelling Poverty: Oil, War and Corruption, Christian Aid highlighted the dangers of poorly regulated national and transnational extractive companies operating in unstable, corrupt and poorly governed countries. The report examined the potential for Kazakhstan to suffer from the natural-resource "curse", and analysed how conflicts in Sudan and Angola had been prolonged and worsened because of their natural resources.[46] There is also evidence from a wide range of academic studies indicating that where fault-lines between communities already exist, such as in a post-conflict environment, the extraction of natural resources may exacerbate these divisions.[47]

17. For various reasons, countries with large mineral deposits tend to be more prone to conflict, corruption, poor governance and lower levels of human development, than those that do not. The World Bank's Extractive Industries Review (EIR) concluded that the Bank ought to "radically alter its approach to supporting extractive projects—and even stop supporting some altogether."[48] Although much of the substance of the EIR was acknowledged and, in some areas, adopted by the Bank, its key recommendation of a radical shift away from using public money in extractives projects was ignored. DFID, as the UK's representative department at the World Bank, signed off on this approach.

18. Based on the evidence, investment in natural resources in post-conflict countries or regions is likely to threaten peace. The World Bank is attempting to buck this trend in the case of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline by building into the project a process for local communities to scrutinise how some of the income generated by the pipeline is spent. A recent report has cast doubt on whether this will be sufficient to avert the curse being visited on Chad. The Bank itself has recently suspended aid to Chad after the country's government refused to enact a new law governing the spending of its oil revenue.[49]

19. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the starkest cases of natural resources fuelling conflict. In 2003 a United Nations panel of experts listed 18 British-based companies as helping perpetuate the conflict and human rights abuses there. The UK government was given a dossier on the UK-based companies which were, in the view of the panel, in breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The UK government's response has been sluggish and inadequate given the seriousness of the allegations, as is set out in a recent Christian Aid report.[50]

1.2.1 Recommendations

20. The UK government must take corporate accountability seriously and not rely upon the goodwill of business through initiatives that are purely voluntary. It must become a legal responsibility of business to avoid practices that lead to or exacerbate conflict.

21. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which is a positive step, should be significantly strengthened. It should be incorporated into international financial reporting standards so that companies are subject to the same level of scrutiny abroad as they would face in the UK. The EITI should then be made mandatory.

22. The UK should implement the OECD guidelines effectively, by promoting them vigorously to companies and committing significant resources to investigating complaints in an open and neutral manner.

SECTION TWO: HOW THE UK CAN IMPROVE ITS PEACEBUILDING AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICIES

2.1 Supporting the building of accountable states

23. In "transitional" political situations, the UK government, as well as other international actors, including the EU, must demonstrate its commitment to the building of accountable and democratic states by dealing robustly with human rights abuses and guaranteeing the security of human rights activists and civil society actors.

2.1.1 Case study: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

24. In July 2005, Pascal Kabungulu Kibembi, executive secretary of Héritiers de la Justice, a Christian Aid partner organisation, was brutally murdered by three armed men in his home in Bukavu, eastern DRC. Mr Kabungulu was one of the DRC's most prominent and committed human rights campaigners and a key civil society leader.

25. Apart from being a tragedy for his family, friends, colleagues and the wider community, his assassination is indicative of a more general trend on the part of government authorities and armed groups to target, intimidate and ultimately remove those who speak out to challenge injustice in the DRC. Mr Kabungulu's murder has intensified and spread fear, not only among human rights activists and members of civil society, but throughout the wider civilian population in the Kivus regions of the DRC.

2.1.2 Recommendations

The UK government should:

26. raise its concerns about human rights abuses through all possible avenues

27. call for prompt and impartial investigations into such cases

28. contribute to the protection of human rights defenders by supporting and funding countries to fully implement the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms[51]

29. ensure the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, including practical support and protection measures, are fully implemented and funded in EU Delegations in country. For example the delegation should appoint a liaison office for human rights defenders and include information on the status of human rights defenders when reporting to the European Commission.

2.2 Financing post-conflict recovery

30. While the responsibilty of sustaining peace in post-conflict situations rests with a state's leaders and citizens, experience shows that peace is more likely to succeed if international donors and other external actors remain engaged, both financially and politically.

2.2.1 Case study: Angola

31. It is almost four years since the end of the war in Angola and the country is at a critical stage, with national elections planned and reconstruction efforts underway. But Angola remains one of the poorest countries in the world and there are major concerns about its democratisation processes and governance. Countries such as the UK now have a window of opportunity to support processes likely to consolidate peaceful transition and democratisation.

32. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and, significantly, the Department of Trade and Industry are increasing their roles in Angola. But the resources DFID can allocate to Angola are diminishing, both in human and financial terms, with the overall country programme being subsumed into a regional programme. UK development aid now mainly goes through multilateral partners, such as the European Union and the World Bank. This, together with reductions in human resources, is likely to end the technical and financial support for key targeted initiatives that DFID can offer.

33. The reason for DFID's change in strategy is unclear. Consultations with Angolan and UK non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have not been followed up, and the results of these meetings have not been circulated. There are strong arguments for DFID to continue its work in Angola for a further limited period during this critical post-war period.

2.2.2 Case study: Sudan

34. In Sudan, UK government policy is to provide most of its funding through a multi-donor trust fund. But this trust fails to provide targeted funds for people living with HIV, women or internally displaced people—all groups that need particular support following a conflict.

35. A strong and representative civil society has a critical role in helping to build a fair and equitable Sudan. Donors have called on civil society organisations to be good watchdogs, advocates and service providers. However, the funding donors provide is insufficient to allow civil society to perform these functions effectively.

36. Civil society can play a unique role in articulating the voices of the marginalised and holding decision-makers and budget-holders accountable. But the way donors provide funding may jeopardise the independence of NGOs. The Governments of National Unity and South Sudan control the funding-selection process and may deny funds to the organisations that are working to hold them to account.

2.2.3 Recommendations

37. The UK government should remain engaged both politically and financially in post-conflict countries and should ensure its policies are coherent.

38. Post-conflict development funds, or "peace dividends", and the way they are distributed, must be transparent, accountable and agreed against benchmarks on progress towards sustainable peace and accountable governance. Civil society and parliaments should play an important role in determining and monitoring agreed benchmarks.

39. Donors must recognise the role of civil society as watchdogs and advocates, not only as service providers, and should provide appropriate financial and political support.

40. Peace dividends must support smaller community-based programmes and marginalised groups, as well as funding large infrastructure programmes.

SECTION THREE: THE ROLE OF THE UK IN THE "GLOBAL" PEACE-BUILDING EFFORT

3.1 The role of the UN

41. The UN must take strong and prompt action to fulfil its responsibility and mandate to maintain international peace and security.[52] The UK government, with its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, has a critical role to play in fulfilling the UN's newly defined "responsibility to protect" role. This involves helping to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity through all appropriate means available, in accordance with chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter.[53] The credibility of the British government as a permanent member of the Security Council and the international community has been greatly undermined by its failure to implement the UN's resolutions and agreements with resources or vigorous and meaningful action.

3.1.1 Case study: Darfur

42. The failure of the international community to take strong action against the warring parties in Darfur has seen the escalation of violence in the region. Despite a series of resolutions dating back to June 2004, Christian Aid is concerned that little has been achieved. More than nine months after a sanctions committee was established—to implement the provisions of UN resolution 1591 to identify individuals who may be subject to travel bans and asset freezes as a result of their roles in Darfur—Security Council members themselves are using procedural rules to block the committee from reporting fully. The failure of the UN to enforce its own resolutions has allowed perpetrators of human rights abuses to continue acting with impunity.

3.1.2 Recommendations

43. Members of the UN security council (UNSC), including the British government, must:

— ensure the work of the sanctions committee is not hindered through the manipulation of procedural rules

— translate the conditions of relevant UNSC resolutions—for example, on disarming warring parties and humanitarian protection—from rhetoric to action, through a process of reporting and monitoring, with built-in time-bound agreements for action in the face of further violation.

3.1.3 Case study: Afghanistan

44. The relatively small number of NATO peacekeepers in Afghanistan (approximately 9,000)[55] has made it difficult to ensure comprehensive security throughout the country during the initial reconstruction phase. The escalation in militant violence since 2003 (last year up to 1,600 Afghans were killed) has shown the limitations of this "light touch" approach to peace-building and security.

45. Nowhere is this problem of limited force demonstrated more clearly than in the case of the provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs). These are teams of military and civilian personnel engaged in security, intelligence gathering and reconstruction work, designed to bring stability and extend central government authority to provincial areas. However, in many cases the number of soldiers in the PRT has been too low to make a substantial difference to security. For example, the 70-strong British PRT deployed to Meymana in Faryab province in April 2004 did not create a secure environment for the population or humanitarian aid workers. Evidence of this instability is shown by the fact that in October 2005, an employee of one of Christian Aid's partner organisations operating in the area was killed in a roadside ambush in the area. The staff of Christian Aid and our partners are now unable to move freely in Meymana. A powerful regional commander is still operating there without sanction from the authorities.

46. We welcome the fact that the UK is planning to increase its commitment to NATO strength in the country. However, the role of the PRTs needs to be clarified if they are to be effective. Are they principally for peace-keeping and strengthening the Afghan police and army so that they are able to provide security themselves? Or are they units whose task is to reconstruct? If they are the former, then their name and remit should be altered accordingly to make this much clearer.

47. A very serious concern for the aid community is the effect of PRT reconstruction work on the perception of aid worker neutrality (nearly 30 aid workers were killed in 2005 in Afghanistan). Most local communities in Afghanistan cannot distinguish between aid delivered by the military, the UN or NGOs. When armed, but non-uniformed personnel, using vehicles resembling those of aid workers, enter villages to undertake reconstruction work, the confusion is total. Unlike aid agencies, PRTs are not neutral. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO they may be engaged in a battle against anti-government forces. PRT relief projects, therefore, pose a danger for aid workers because they tend to fuel local suspicion of NGO-military collaboration[56] and an assumption that NGOs are "taking sides".[57]

48. In addition, two recent PRT evaluations[58] showed that while many of their objectives in the area of peace-building had been achieved (for example, training and equipping local police), their record in delivering "quick impact" relief projects, such as school building, loan schemes and health and veterinary services, has been extremely poor. These have undermined existing development programmes undertaken locally, either by the government or NGOs. For example, a Christian Aid partner recently operated a small-loan scheme for families in Badghis province, charging a standard 10% administration fee. The PRT in the area implemented a similar scheme, but with no fee and the loans were often not recovered. This undermined our partner's work and its relationship with the community.

49. A recent evaluation by five European donors (including the UK) reports that these relief projects are not only poor value for money but also "appear incompatible with overall national policies" and that "time pressure for delivery promotes a just do it approach with limited concern for long-term impacts and sustainability".[59]

3.1.4 Recommendations

50. Together with the other members of the international community, the UK should ensure that PRTs focus on providing security. The UK must end its current policy of supporting relief projects under the auspices of PRTs (its 2005-06 interim strategy states that £5 million is committed to support the work of PRT development advisers).

51. Funds for PRT relief projects should be channelled directly to the Afghan government or given to local NGOs or the private sector for similar work.

3.2 The role of the EU and other donors

52. Beyond the UK's responsibility to ensure its ODA does not reinforce authoritarian regimes or impede democratic change, the UK must try to ensure that human rights constitutes the foundation of the EU's development cooperation, as per the principles of the Cotonou Agreement.[60] This is especially important because the EU is often the largest individual donor to a given developing county.

53. As with bilateral aid, benchmarking is a way of implementing commitments to human rights and accountable governance. Specific, measurable and mutually agreed benchmarks should be included in European Community country strategy documents and national indicative programmes as part of the EC's End-Term Review process for reviewing the impact and management of aid.

54. It is essential that civil society and national parliaments are included in the setting and monitoring of benchmarks. The EU must make funds available to support this. Parliamentary and public scrutiny will increase the accountability and effectiveness of aid.

55. Greater coordination between donors on benchmarking and sharing analysis is critical.[61]

3.3 The role of the International Criminal Court

56. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has a vital role to play in combating the most serious crimes committed against civilians, especially in situations of armed conflict. However, the international community and the ICC must ensure that any judicial processes take account of the interests of the victims; work alongside traditional reconciliation processes essential for long-term peace and security; and do not impact negatively on peace talks or amnesties, for example. The issuing of arrest warrants or investigative procedures must not further undermine the security of conflict-affected communities.

3.3.1 Case study: northern Uganda

57. Since President Yoweri Museveni referred the case of northern Uganda to the ICC, Christian Aid and its Ugandan partners have been concerned by the sequencing of ICC investigations and possible prosecutions. While the ICC has an important role in ending the culture of impunity, if badly managed its involvement could prolong and intensify the violence. Crucially, ICC engagement alone will not end the conflict, and if the international community is serious about its desire for peace it should also be supporting mediation, the reintegration of combatants and plans for reconstruction.

58. In October 2005, news broke that arrest warrants were to be issued for members of the LRA. Justice Peter Onega, the head of the Amnesty Commission that encourages Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) abductees to return home, and peace negotiator Ms Betty Bigombe announced that the warrants would hinder their work. The LRA has since increased its attacks on the civilian population and on international aid workers, and has increased its presence in southern Sudan and the DRC.

59. In an armed conflict where the local population is often exposed to violence and child abduction, murder, physical mutilation and sexual violence is common, the immediate priority for those affected by the war is peace.[62] However, lasting peace requires an end to the culture of impunity, to allow for reconciliation, security and the return of displaced people to their homes.

60. According to analysis by the Refugee Law Project, the lack of accountability and impunity following regime change, and deep regional divisions within Uganda are the root causes of the conflict.[63] The ICC must therefore address crimes committed by each of the warring factions. Any process that only addresses the actions of one side is likely to harbour future problems and would undermine the likelihood of securing a just and sustainable peace.

61. The ICC is only one element of the work to end impunity. In a violent conflict where the victim is often forced to become the perpetrator, traditional reconciliation processes have an important role in reuniting families and communities. They are necessary for a sustained and just peace. The experience of Christian Aid and our partners emphasises how critical these processes can be.

3.3.2 Recommendations

62. Based on the experience of Christian Aid and our partners in northern Uganda, and more widely in Africa, we recommend that the ICC:

— ensures that the sequencing of any ICC action does not jeopardise negotiation processes—the most direct path to ending violence;

— recognises the need for mediation and reconciliation, and to ensure adequate time and space for traditional processes;

— clarifies publicly its legal interpretation of its jurisdiction on amnesties;

— clarifies the meaning of the cooperation provisions of the Rome Statute, which some commentators believe may restrict international engagement in mediation efforts, when arrest warrants are issued;

— interprets the Rome Statute broadly and draws upon the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to ensure that crimes committed by all parties to a conflict are addressed;

— ensures its processes complement, where possible, national judicial processes; and

— implements an effective civic education and communications strategy, which provides accurate and up-to-date information. These processes should also supplement a wider process of public debate about what justice means.

3.4 Coalition forces in Iraq

63. "Post-conflict" reconstruction work often takes place in situations of ongoing conflict and high insecurity, Iraq being the premier example. In such situations, international law and the neutrality of humanitarian organisations must be respected; and humanitarian organisations must be given access to those who need assistance.

64. Christian Aid and our partners continue to be extremely concerned about the failure of all parties to the conflict in Iraq to protect civilians or respect international law designed to protect non-combatants. Geneva Convention breaches have included:

— hostage taking

— suicide bombing against civilians

— the indiscriminate use of fire power in civilian areas

— perfidious use of humanitarian work for military purposes

— interference with civilian medical services and personnel

— blocking humanitarian convoys.

As in our submissions to the IDSC inquiry on Iraq of January 2005, we wish to call attention to the failure of coalition forces to respect the neutrality and mandate of humanitarian organisations, including the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, UN agencies and NGOs.

65. Since the intervention of spring 2003, coalition leaders have consistently tried to present the political-military mission in Iraq as a humanitarian one, to give humanitarian tasks to coalition military units, and to place coalition military officers in the position of coordinating humanitarian work. As a result, any distinction between the neutral role of humanitarian organisations and the role of the coalition military is now completely blurred for most members of the Iraqi public, many of whom now resent all international organisations, or even internationally funded organisations, as "occupiers". Humanitarian space, as aid agencies describe the ability to access those in need of assistance, has been severely compromised and may take many years to recover.

66. In late 2005, US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice announced that the PRT model of mixed civilian/military teams, which has proved so problematic in Afghanistan, will now be deployed in Iraq. This does nothing to reassure Christian Aid and our partners that there will be an improvement in the ability of neutral humanitarian organisations to access those needing help in an increasingly dangerous Iraq.

3.4.1 Recommendations

67. All parties, including the coalition nations and particularly the UK government, should respect and fulfil their obligations under international law.

68. All parties, including the UK Ministry of Defence, should respect the neutrality of humanitarian organisations and provide the space for them operate.

3.5 The role of regional organisations: African Union (AU)

69. The international community cannot defer its responsibility to protect civilians and to maintain international peace and security by mandating regional organisations to carry out ceasefire and security operations in cases when such organisations do not have the means, experience or capacity to successfully implement such mandates.

3.5.1 The situation in Darfur

70. In Darfur, the African Union is mandated to monitor compliance with the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and the Abuja Humanitarian and Security Protocols. It is also expected to protect civilians under imminent threat, and to contribute to a secure environment for internally displaced people and for the delivery of humanitarian relief.

71. However, with only 11 Ceasefire Commission personnel, 700 military observers and a protection force of less than 5,000 troops,[65] ceasefire violations continue. Insufficient resources and other constraints mean that not all reports are published promptly or transparently enough to ensure follow-up by the African Union, the Ceasefire Commission or the wider international community, including the UN Sanctions Committee and the ICC.

72. Security continues to deteriorate, violence is commonplace and a climate of fear results in heavy restrictions on movement. The latest report from the UN secretary general documents "attacks on more than a dozen Massalit villages south west of Gereida between 6 and 17 November, resulting in an estimated 60 deaths, the highest figure recorded in the last year for a single incident. Huts were set on fire, fields and harvested crops were burned, and a total of 15,000 people were displaced." The attacks occurred over the course of more than a week in area where the AU is present. As the secretary general concludes, it is ". . . a shocking indication of the collective failure of the international community to prevent these horrendous crimes from occurring."[66]

73. Christian Aid supports the principle of African solutions to African problems. But with the situation continuing to deteriorate and affecting regional security, it can no longer be perceived solely as an African problem and the international community must assume responsibility for the protection of civilians in Darfur.

3.5.2 Recommendations

74. An adequate protection mission:

— must be big enough to fulfil its mandate effectively and provide security in the first instance, and then create an environment that allows for safe and voluntary return of displaced people and refugees

— should include numbers of civilian police and female personnel that are adequate to meet the needs of people affected by conflict

— should be trained and must know how to appropriately respond to cases of gender-based violence

— must be given predictable and long-term funding and logistical support, based on needs and environmental conditions.

75. All obstacles to a mission must be removed by the host state.

3.6 The role of regional organisations: African Post Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework

76. The African Post Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework was developed in 2005 through a broad consultative process by the African Union, and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) secretariat.[69] It sets out an African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction, which aims to address the crossover between peace, security, and the humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

77. It is an African initiative that aims to make the planning, coordination and monitoring of post-conflict reconstruction more coherent by providing a common frame of reference for a broad range of actors. The framework recognises that peace and security, together with democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management, are all conditions for sustainable development.

78. The AU commission and the NEPAD secretariat support the framework by helping the AU, African leaders and AU member states to implement the framework's overarching goals.

3.6.1 Recommendations

79. The UK, through the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) and other mechanisms, should support NEPAD's work in this area, with both funding and expertise.

80. The UK should back the position of the African framework on putting the focus of evaluating post-conflict reconstruction on the long-term impact of interventions.

81. All parties must appreciate that each country's transition from conflict to peace should depend on its own particular circumstances.

3.7 International coherence in addressing post-conflict needs

82. The World Bank and UN Development Project (UNDP) research discovered that if a typical African country manages 600 projects, this would translate into 2,400 quarterly reports a year submitted to different agencies in different formats, and approximately 1,000 annual missions, appraisals and evaluations, each of which will require meetings with key officials and official responses.[70] Foreign assistance is critically important for countries emerging from conflict. But the UK should realise that it has unintended consequences, including absorbing high-end human and administrative resources that could otherwise have been used to serve the local community. Coherence and harmony is vital in minimising these unintended costs.

83. The Utstein Study analysed 336 peace-building projects implemented in Germany, the Netherlands, UK and Norway in developing countries over the last decade and identified a lack of coherence as the most significant obstacle to creating a sustainable peace. The study discovered that more than 55% of the programmes evaluated did not show any link to a larger strategy for the country in question.[71]

84. While the UK government's ACPP is a tool for joint analysis, financing and coordination in areas of collaboration between the Ministry of Defence, DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,[72] most of the UK's collaborative action has taken place independent of the ACPP. For instance, the development and monitoring of the G8 Africa Action Plan does not depend on the ACPP mechanism, although the three key officials who coordinated that policy are also three key members of the ACPP steering group. The way the ACPP might be used to mobilise key international partners needs clarification.

3.7.1 Recommendations

85. There is need for coherence between humanitarian, relief and development programmes and peace and security programmes.

January 2006

www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts—230404.pdf

32 P Collier and A Hoeffler, The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War, 2004. Back

33 DFID policy paper, Poverty Reduction Budget Support, (May 2004). Back

34 Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality, pages 8-9, DFID, March 2005. Back

35 See Christian Aid's It's Time to Open Up Report available at www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/403rwanda/rwanda.pdf (Christian Aid, March 2004). Back

36 2004 Memorandum of Understanding on the Development Partnership between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the Republic of Rwanda (MoU), signed 29 January 2004. Back

37 Ibid, paragraph 1, MoU. Back

38 T Killick, M Katumanga, L H Piron, Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of Rwanda and the United Kingdom: Report of Independent Monitors, Review Report, DFID, 2005. Back

39 Paragraph 7, MoU, supra n 5 Back