Memorandum submitted by International
Alert
KEY POINTS
— Although it is a laudable goal, poverty
reduction per se is the wrong primary objective in conflict-prone
and conflict-affected states. In these contexts, the simple pursuit
of poverty reduction targets can be destabilising and is often
self-defeating.
— Peace-building needs to be the number
one priority for all assistance in conflict contexts. This requires
the elaboration of a coherent and context-specific over-arching
strategic framework that guides engagement in conflict prone/affected
countries.
— This primary focus on peace, and
on how to lay the proper foundations for long-term stability and
development, will demand significant behaviour change within the
International Community. This must go beyond technical measures,
such as adding a "conflict prevention" component to
an already-formulated strategy.
— Much more attention needs to be given
to understanding the implications that the existence or threat
of widespread violence has for external actors in conflict settings.
Realities on the ground require fundamentally different techniques
and channels of assistance.
— The UK should provide the lead in
ensuring that there is the will, knowledge and capacity to prevent
violent conflict. Given the thousands of deaths and widespread
suffering that continue to result from conflict, it shares the
responsibility to ensure that peace is built more effectively.
THE CONTEXT
1. The current international aid framework
is overwhelmingly focussed on poverty reduction. Development is
conceived largely in terms of economic progress and is measured
in terms of statistical targets. This is epitomised by the Millennium
Development Goals which set targets on reducing poverty and hunger,
protecting the environment, improving health and sanitation and
tackling illiteracy and discrimination against women. DFID's strategic
aim for its disbursement of UK development assistance is the halving
of world poverty by 2015.
2. Yet assistance[78]
very often takes place in extremely unstable environments, many
of which are characterised by the continuation or threat of widespread
violence and a total absence of trust among sections of society
and/or between society and its government. Moreover, where violent
conflict exists, it is rarely the traditional type in which the
professional armies of sovereign states confront each other. It
is, rather, driven and prolonged by a myriad of factors where
motives, interests and fighting forces span borders and connect
into international flows (both legal and illegal) of finance,
arms and commodities.
3. It needs to be more fully recognised
that multi-billion pound flows of development assistance are highly
political. They have, in themselves, profound impacts on societal
relations and wealth distribution in the countries that they are
intended to help. Aid, like diamonds, involves the introduction
of a valuable commodity into weakly governed environment, and
so depending on who benefits and who does not, it can inadvertently
fuel existing conflicts or be factor driving (renewed) outbreaks
of violence.
4. Assistance can be undermined by competing,
incoherent and even contradictory strategies and activities. In
determining how to provide assistance, for example, the straight-forward
poverty reduction objectives of donors may not be coherent with
a declared intention to focus on state-building. Moreover, national
security interests (notably prominent in the "War on Terror")
and declared commitments to human rights can complicate the picture
further.
5. Fundamental changes are needed to the
policy frameworks and geographic strategies that determine the
way assistance is conceived, offered and given by national governments
as well as international organisations.
CHANGING THE
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM
6. In conflict prone and conflict affected
contexts, assistance often remains, despite some recent UK initiatives,
alarmingly detached from realities on the ground. In these settings,
the objective of all assistance must become, first and foremost,
the laying of the foundations of long-term peace and stability.
7. Our central message, therefore, is that
the UK should lead on international efforts to change the way
assistance is planned and implemented. Peace-building must be
made the highest overarching priority, squarely placed at the
centre of all international engagement. This has implications
for the design of macro international frameworks as well as regional
and country assistance strategies comprising a range of programmes
and projects. Within donor governments and multilateral organisations,
it requires, within and across departments, a much fuller understanding
of what peace-building involves and how to engage in it effectively
over the short, medium and long term.
8. Some progress has already been made to
strengthen the UK's ability to prevent the outbreak and recurrence
of violent conflict. The Conflict Prevention Pools show a willingness
to share funding between government departments; cross-Whitehall
committees exist to try to co-ordinate strategies; a Post-conflict
Reconstruction Unit has been set up; and "conflict-sensitivity"
has begun to feature in policy discourse. At the local level,
peace-building tools have begun to be used, such as Do No Harm
criteria and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments.
9. It remains vital, however, to make more
and faster progress towards a strategic peace-building framework
within which international actors would operate to prevent the
outbreak and recurrence of violent conflict in any given context.
Governments, and the parliamentarians that oversee them, must
ensure that all activities undertaken in that setting adhere to
a defined, coherent and integrated strategy. It is essential,
also, to harness the strengths and energies of the private sector
and civil society to the same purpose. Great care is also needed
to ensure that efforts to counter terrorism and organised crime
do not undermine the long-range objectives.
MACRO-LEVEL
POLICY FRAMEWORKS
The Millennium Development Goals
10. In 2000, the members and agencies of
the United Nations system committed themselves to meeting eight
Millennium Goals by 2015. At the 2005 Millennium Review Summit,
a massive increase in funding was agreed in order to propel further
efforts towards meeting those targets. Although laudable, such
commitments have no chance of being met unless violent conflict
is more effectively prevented.
11. Where conflict exists or re-emerges,
it has obvious and profound impacts on efforts to provide development
assistance. Just as importantly and lesser known, though, are
the significant negative effects that the pursuit of the generic,
externally defined MDG targets can have on conflict dynamics.
Poverty reduction activities per se are often inappropriate or
even damaging in such contexts. Yet this international policy
framework, and a lack of political will and funding to change
the overarching approach, creates perverse incentives to continue
with the wrong priorities.
12. The example of education is revealing.
Billions of dollars are aimed at increasing the absolute numbers
of children in primary education, irrespective of the flaws, faults,
biases and prejudices that may be inherent in the existing systems.
Yet, for long-term progress, the prevailing strategy needs to
target better education. In conflict-prone or affected contexts,
this generally means paying far greater attention to education
that does not impose religio-cultural or linguistic domination
over oppressed minorities. Too often, the curriculum perpetuates
a historical interpretation designed primarily to reinforce the
power and assumptions of the dominant elite. Too often education
systems reserve teaching and curriculum-development positions
for the ethnic group that benefited from the inequalities and
prejudices of the system when they were themselves students.
Aid effectiveness objectives in Fragile States
13. All development assistance efforts are
stated to be guided by principles of donor harmonisation, alignment
with partner country priorities and orientation to development
results. The 2005 European Consensus on Development[79],
for example, states that "the EU will support partner country's
poverty reduction, development and reform strategies, which focus
on the MDG, and will align with partner countries' systems and
procedures."
14. The reality suggests that quite a different
approach is required in between 40 and 50 of the world's states,
dubbed as being "fragile". Drawing on World Bank statistics,
a recent DFID paper, for example, indicated the scale of the problem.
It suggested that 46 states, containing 870 million people or
14% of the world's population, are "fragile—countries
where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions
to the majority of its people, including the poor."[80]
15. Driven by DFID's Policy Division and
the World Bank LICUS unit, the DAC Draft Principles for Good
International Engagement in Fragile States recognise this
challenge. They stress that international engagement in "state-building"
should maintain a tight focus on improving governance and capacity
in the most basic security, justice, economic and service delivery
functions. They also emphasise that, where alignment behind government-led
strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance,
international actors should nevertheless consult with a range
of national stakeholders in the partner country. They aim to establish
a long-term, and sensible, objective to increase a state's capacities
to provide basic services to its people.
16. In these contexts, however, efforts
to meet "state-building" and "alignment" objectives
may be inappropriate and even counter-productive. The vast majority
of "fragile states" are either conflict-prone or conflict
affected. They are also often characterised, to varying degrees,
by unjust power structures, economic domination of an "ethnic"
or religious elite, or the exclusion and oppression of marginalised
peoples. In these states, the poor often have no voice and no
influence over decision-making and the use of national revenues
and receipts. In other words, where government authorities are
not prepared to make a political commitment to genuinely develop
and implement pro-poor policies, the state (which is the "partner"
in standard approaches to development) becomes part of the problem.
17. It is essential that the UK provides
the lead amongst donors and within the EU and IFIs to adapt assistance
to these types of more challenging situations. Stability in state-to-state
relations in the short term is no substitute for a long-term strategy
to help transform the inequitable structures of power and wealth
within society that can make it vulnerable to conflict.
NATIONAL STRATEGIES
18. At a national level, Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers are regarded as being the framework in which development
assistance should be provided because they are the product of
the IMF and World Bank's negotiations with national authorities
and stakeholders. As the name shows, the focus is squarely on
poverty reduction. The 2005 Millennium Project called for all
such strategies to be MDG-based.
19. The problem with this approach in conflict-prone
and conflict-affected settings is two-fold. Firstly, as with the
international MDG-based framework, the primary focus on poverty
is misguided. Currently, at best, issues of peace and security
and of governance are understood as merely one component of the
"strategy". Secondly, the consultations that take place
to define these strategy papers are too narrow. Very rarely do
the PRSP consultations actually manage to consult with the range
of societal groups required in order truly to get a sense of national
needs and concerns. All too often, the poorest remain marginalised,
without access to (or even interest in) these processes. Such
development strategies at the national level are exposed, therefore,
not only to the risks of targeting only the most accessible sections
of the population (and raising their expectations) but also of
perpetuating domination by a political and business elite.
20. Likewise, where development assistance
focuses too quickly on supporting elections and a loosely defined
idea of "democracy", it is likely to be ineffective,
at best. At worst, such approaches fuel instability and violence.
Though democracy is a political system that strives to deal peacefully
with conflicting interests in society, democratisation processes
can themselves have a negative impact on dynamics of conflict
and peace. Early multi-party elections in a post-conflict situation
and in weak states, for example, can drive conflict, due to the
risk of premature closure of the democratisation process and entrenchment
of existing power structures. There is plenty of evidence to suggest
that too much attention is often placed on particular democratic
political structures, rather than on key norms and principles
of democracy. Too little attention is paid to the time necessary
for democracy to "bed down".
21. Similar issues arise in respect of economic
models used by external actors in their development activities.
At the macro level, the impact of economic reform packages, such
as privatisation, can destabilise peacebuilding efforts. At the
micro-level, although a moderate but sustainable livelihood may
be a largely universal value, introducing the type of capitalist
economics that is the foundation of micro-credit into communal
or essentially socialist societies risks dangerously fuelling
tensions in potentially violent and destructive ways.
22. The bottom line is that external actors
must really know and understand the context in which they are
working. On the one hand, the actions of external actors of all
types challenge existing power structures and impact on societal
relations at multiple and overlapping levels. On the other, the
democratic and economic processes that they trigger are themselves
shaped by an array of context-specific factors which are linked
to formal and actual power structures as well as societal relations,
cultures and values. The importance of a thorough analysis of
the conflict (including its power structures and relations, formal
as well as actual) cannot, therefore, be emphasised enough.
CONFLICT SENSITIVITY
23. In partial recognition of some of these
challenges, conflict sensitivity has emerged as a conceptual and
methodological counter. The growing awareness, at least at a project
level, that development assistance can itself create or exacerbate
conflict, has led to a proliferation of tools and methodologies
such as Do No Harm, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIA)
and more recently, the broader conflict sensitivity agenda. Although
the increasingly widespread adoption of the principles of conflict
sensitivity and its expansion beyond traditional development projects
into the wider domain of development assistance should be welcomed,
there is a danger that it too is becoming distorted and misunderstood
as a result of this overwhelming focus on poverty reduction. Conflict
sensitivity risks being perceived as a means of continuing with
the same fundamental objectives, effectively "engineering
development space", rather than as a means of rethinking
the nature and objectives of development in conflict-prone or
affected regions. The fate of Do No Harm is instructive. While
Do No Harm has served an important function in raising awareness
about the unintended negative consequences of humanitarian and
emergency assistance, it has not been understood as a means of
contributing to the overall peace-building imperatives. In this
sense, its original intentions have been effectively hijacked
and undermined by the donor community. The UK should take the
lead in ensuring that the same will not be said of conflict sensitivity.
24. This is particularly important as the
concept of conflict sensitivity spreads beyond the traditional
development community to encompass, amongst others, the role of
the private sector. In the absence of more thorough understandings
of the contexts in which investment takes place, companies can
inadvertently fuel or exacerbate structural causes of conflict—through
the range of their business activities. Thus, greater awareness
on the part of UK companies investing in fragile states should
be promoted—ensuring that they build conflict risk and impact
assessments into due diligence procedures. This is the subject
of increasing NGO attention with tools and methodologies now widely
available (see, for example, International Alert's "Conflict-Sensitive
Business Practice: guidance for the extractive industry)".
At present, however, the UK government's engagement with industry
on this issue is limited—despite the lead and promise shown
through the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative—both remain
underfunded and broader dialogue and follow-up with UK companies
to capitalise on progress made, and to engage relevant HMG departments,
is lacking.
25. Meanwhile, development policy interventions
in the economies of fragile states remain to a large extent conflict-blind.
Although progress has been made to prioritise better natural resource
governance in fragile states, promotion of privatisation and macro
level economic reforms, and support to local private sectors,
fails to understand the complex links that business and conflict
can have. Competition for access to economic opportunities can
mirror conflict lines, business elites can have interests that
threaten peace and stability, and at the macro level, the impact
of economic reform packages can destabilise peacebuilding efforts.
At the same time, the local private sector in conflict-affected
countries can have a positive role to play in reconstruction,
confidence-building, and peace advocacy. The UK should take the
lead internationally in developing higher levels of conflict awareness
and conflict-sensitivity best practice in this area.
RECOMMENDATIONS
26. There is no question that progress towards
greater equity and better governance needs to be driven from within
that society. Yet the primary focus of international actors (whether
bilateral or multilateral) must be to support actions at the local
and national level that act to reconcile communities and establish
principles of accountability and responsiveness between those
that govern and the people they serve. For the UK Government,
this means leading international efforts to:
Establish peace-building as the primary focus
of all assistance in conflict-prone and conflict-affected contexts
27. International engagement in these contexts
must be guided by an overriding commitment and priority to laying
the foundations of peace and stability.
Elaborate and adhere to a strategic framework
for peace-building
28. For all activities in conflict-prone
and conflict affected societies, Parliament and Government must
demand that all relevant ministries (for the UK, primarily the
FCO, DFID and MOD) adhere to a joint and coherent peace-building
strategy. This needs to be informed by a contextual analysis conducted
upstream of the delivery of assistance, with all programmes and
projects implemented within this overarching strategic framework.
Monitor and evaluation on an ongoing basis how
well institutions and officials adhere to this process
29. A baseline study, the establishment
of organisational indicators and the systematic rigorous monitoring
and evaluation of those indicators against the baseline will help
organisations measure their progress on integrating conflict analysis
and other aspects of conflict into their procedures. A training
programme implemented across government and encouraged among international
partners will help increase the necessary skills of staff in capital
and in the field.
Widen involvement in peace-building
30. The conflict-sensitivity concept and
best practices need to be taken beyond the level of individual
development projects and applied in other sectors and spheres
of activity. These include the private sector where greater awareness
on the part of companies investing in conflict-prone and conflict-affected
states should be promoted—ensuring that they, and the project
finance institutions that support them, build conflict risk and
impact assessments into due diligence procedures. The UK should
take the lead internationally in harnessing positive roles that
the local private sector can have to play in economic recovery
and growth, confidence-building, and peace advocacy.
January 2006
78 Assistance is taken to include activities in and
across the development, foreign affairs and defence spheres. It
may also involve certain parts of finance, interior and trade
ministries as well as export credit agencies. Back
79
The European Consensus on Development is a joint statement agreed
by European Council and the Representatives of the governments
of Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament
and the Commission. Back
80
Why we need to work more effectively in Fragile States (2005). Back
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