Memorandum submitted by the Northern Uganda
Advocacy Partnership for Peace (NUAPP)
1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1.1 This evidence is drawn from our experience
in working in peacebuilding activities in northern Uganda, both
directly and through the work of local partner organisations,
and from working with different arms of the British Government,
in Kampala, London and New York. It, therefore, relates directly
to the International Development Committee trip to Uganda, which
forms part of this inquiry.
1.2 The Northern Uganda Advocacy Partnership
for Peace (NUAPP) is a coalition of six NGOs advocating for a
peaceful solution to the conflict in northern Uganda. Member agencies
support a number of peacebuilding initiatives in northern Uganda.
1.3 We understand peacebuilding to mean
all efforts to create, support and strengthen structures, relationships
and processes that contribute to the establishment of a "positive
peace". Peacebuilding must not be viewed as a post-conflict
activity, but rather as an intervention appropriate before, during
and after violent conflict. The transition from conflict to peace
is neither well understood nor simple but it is recognised that
peacebuilding should not simply be targeted at internalising a
peace agreement in the affected regions and communities, but that
this process can work in reverse—where peacebuilding in
the affected communities during a conflict contributes to a "peace
agreement"—and that the peace resulting from this will
naturally be of a more sustainable nature.
1.4 Peacebuilding during the current ongoing
violence in northern Uganda is essential to help create the space
for talks or other processes aimed at creating a negotiated settlement
to the conflict. Particularly important are reintegration and
reconciliation programmes for former members of the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA).
1.5 Peacebuilding requires engagement on
multiple issues at multiple levels, so that it deals with the
resolution of the immediate conflict, the root causes of the conflict
and the community-level conflicts that result from the poverty
and displacement caused by the conflict. There is an iterative
relationship between these different aspects of the conflict.
1.6 Peacebuilding requires coherence between
the different actors, to build on the potential opportunities
provided by an increased understanding of the importance of peace
and security for poverty reduction. Coherence also refers to complementarity
of actions and approaches between different departments of the
same actors.
1.7 Peacebuilding must be culturally appropriate
and rooted in local understandings of conflict and its transformation
and resolution. In the context of northern Uganda, it is particularly
important that local perceptions of justice are integrated into
any peacebuilding activities, specifically the ongoing International
Criminal Court intervention.
1.8 Recommendations for the International
Development Committee:
We would expect the British Government:
— To ensure that the apparent thinking
within DFID Uganda regarding the importance of supporting peacebuilding
initiatives that contribute towards a sustainable peace is replicated
throughout other appropriate organs of the British Government,
and strengthened through increased funding.
— To ensure that its bilateral and
multilateral dealings with the Government of Uganda complement
its support of community-level peacebuilding initiatives, by regarding
the conflict as symptomatic of a failure of good national governance
and adapting its policies and practices accordingly.
— To use its influence and expertise
to coordinate peacebuilding initiatives amongst local, national
and international actors and international donors.
— To use its influence and expertise
to reconcile the judicial demands of the international community
(demonstrated through the ICC) and those of the conflict-affected
population (demonstrated primarily through the Acholi legal institutions).
2. BACKGROUND
TO THE
NORTHERN UGANDA
ADVOCACY PARTNERSHIP
FOR PEACE
(NUAPP)
2.1 This evidence is primarily drawn from
the long experience of NUAPP members in working in peacebuilding
activities in northern Uganda, both directly and through the work
of local partner organisations. It is also drawn from more recent
experience, particularly over the last year, of working with different
arms of the British Government, in Kampala, London and New York.
Whereas the evidence on "Peacebuilding and its role in Resolving
Conflict" (Section 3) is applicable to all conflicts, the
majority of this evidence is applicable to the situation in northern
Uganda, given the British Government's historic and current influence
in Uganda and the International Development Committee trip to
Uganda, which forms part of this inquiry.
2.2 The Northern Uganda Advocacy Partnership
for Peace (NUAPP) was formed in January 2005, and comprises Christian
Aid, the Church Mission Society, Conciliation Resources, Quaker
Peace and Social Witness, Tearfund and World Vision UK. Our aim
is "to enable more effective advocacy, primarily in the UK,
to effect a positive peace in Northern Uganda, informed by civil
society organisations and networks in Uganda".
2.3 We have formed strong links with other
coalitions based in Uganda (Civil Society Organisations for Peace
in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU)) and in New York (the New York Working
Group), and our members support a variety of peacebuilding initiatives
in northern Uganda.
2.4 We understand peacebuilding to mean
all efforts to create, support and strengthen structures, relationships
and processes that contribute to the establishment of a "positive
peace". A "positive peace" encompasses not only
the absence of direct physical violence, but also means a society
built upon social justice, tolerance and appreciation of diversity,
and an equitable distribution of power and resources. When the
word "peace" is used in the following paragraphs, it
is this definition of a "positive peace" to which we
refer.
2.5 Peacebuilding is a process that has
a transformative effect on the structures and relationships that
it seeks to address, and also on the individuals involved in it.
It means empowering people and organisations to engage in processes
of non-violent change.
3. PEACEBUILDING
AND ITS
ROLE IN
RESOLVING CONFLICT
3.1 Peacebuilding must not be viewed as
a post-conflict activity, but rather as an intervention appropriate
before, during and after violent conflict. This definition does
not appear to be generally accepted, with the common usage of
"peacebuilding" referring to post-conflict activity.
See for example DFID's 2005 paper Fighting Poverty to Build a
Safer World, in which peacekeeping refers to post-conflict interventions
designed to prevent a relapse into conflict.[85]
A similar viewpoint appears to be shared by the United Nations
Peacebuilding Commission, whose role is to "ensure that peace
agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner
. . . in the immediate aftermath of war"[86]
3.2 Although the Department for International
Development (DFID) and the United Nations (UN) place importance
on activities that we would refer to as in-conflict peacebuilding
(and which the United Nations refers to as "peacemaking"),
this division threatens to be more than simply semantic. The transition
from conflict to peace is neither well understood nor simple.
Marking the shift between these two states by the signing of a
"peace agreement" focuses on a notional peace at a governmental
level—usually the absence of fighting—without taking
into account the importance of that peace being realised at an
individual, community or regional level. It also implies that
the focus of diplomatic or conflict resolution efforts should
be at the creation of such an agreement, and that, following this,
peacebuilding should be targeted at internalising this peace in
the affected regions and communities. This does not take into
account the situation where this process works in reverse: where
peacebuilding in the affected communities contributes to a "peace
agreement", which will naturally be of a more sustainable
nature.
4. PEACEBUILDING
AND ITS
ROLE IN
RESOLVING CONFLICT
IN NORTHERN
UGANDA
4.1 Peacebuilding during the current ongoing
violence in northern Uganda is essential to help create the space
for talks or other processes aimed at creating a negotiated settlement
to the conflict.
4.1.1 Particularly important are successful
reintegration and reconciliation programmes for former members
of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). These have a number of functions,
all of which are vital to bring about a sustainable peace. Well-funded
and well-communicated programmes encourage further voluntary return,
which diminishes the military strength of the LRA. The gradual
reintegration of former combatants into their communities and
into viable livelihoods is a less difficult process than a large-scale
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme,
in which communities are forced to reintegrate a large number
of former combatants, many of whom may not be reintegrating voluntarily,
in a short space of time. Furthermore, if owned and funded by
local communities and the local and national government, these
programmes will build trust between both sides, building confidence
in a mediation process amongst those still engaged in the conflict.
4.1.2 Eighteen out of twenty-six former
LRA commanders interviewed by QPSW named the clear and demonstrated
possibility of a better life, particularly economically, after
their return, as a highly significant factor influencing their
decision to leave the LRA.
QPSW/Conciliation Resources research, Dec
2005
4.1.3 During a conflict, particularly one
as long-lasting and involving displacement on such a scale as
northern Uganda, it will not be possible for the implementation
of all aspects of programmes addressing issues such as justice,
reconciliation, economic development and governance, which are
vital for a sustainable peace. However, implementation to an appropriate
level should take place. This instils hope in the affected population,
which contributes to a negotiated end to violence, and ensures
that such a settlement addresses the needs of all the war-affected
population and thus minimises the threat of a return to violence.
4.1.4 Our reintegration and reconciliation
programmes [that focus on relationship-building] are good, but
they need to be supported by income-generating activities and
small-scale development programmes. Helping the returnees and
community members come together in support groups has enabled
them to access funds for the development of small businesses and
enterprises. For them, this makes the reconciliation work more
meaningful.
Members of Empowering Hands, a women's community
group
4.1.5 Post-conflict recovery programmes
should be grass-roots driven, where the people are consulted.
The programme must take into consideration the community's interests
rather than being Government driven, like the Northern Uganda
Reconstruction Programme or the current Northern Uganda Social
Action Fund, which were imposed on the people rather than contributing
to the alleviation of poverty. Post-conflict programme should
be coherent with people's needs rather than government driven.
James Odong, World Vision Uganda
4.1.6 Careful advocacy programmes, both
nationally and internationally, ensure sustained pressure on both
sides to engage meaningfully in efforts to end the conflict. Although
these shifts are by no means complete, advocacy programmes regarding
northern Uganda have helped to shift national opinion away from
the sense that the conflict is a "northern" or "Acholi"
problem, and international opinion away from the sense that the
conflict is an internal problem.
4.1.7 Advocacy is an important approach
for us. It helps reinforce the need for a peaceful resolution
of the conflict and the role of amnesty in bringing peace. It
is instrumental in reminding the government of Uganda of its responsibility
to protect its citizens, and in providing alternative approaches
to resolving the conflict.
Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative
(ARLPI)
4.2 Peacebuilding requires engagement on
multiple issues at multiple levels
4.2.1 In northern Uganda, efforts must be
made to end the armed conflict between the LRA and the Government
of Uganda. Looking upwards from this violence, it can be seen
that this conflict is rooted in tensions between the north and
the south of Uganda. Looking downwards, it can be seen that this
conflict creates socio-economic conditions (particularly poverty
and displacement) that lead to new community-level conflicts.
For a sustainable peace, it is vital that these issues are all
addressed through a comprehensive approach that seeks to resolve
the conflict in its wider context - both the causes and the effects
of the current conflict. An iterative process is in effect, such
that historical causes drive the current conflict, which drives
new community-level conflicts. These, in turn, hinder the resolution
of the current conflict and thus of the historical causes.
4.2.2 Ever since the overthrow of the regimes
of Obote II and Tito Okello by the NRM [National Resistance Movement,
which Museveni led to power in 1986], the North has not been able
to trust the government, and the majority have an attitude that
this government is all out to revenge on the North. This is because
there has been no attempt toward a government led national reconciliation
amongst the various ethnic tribes or region. As long as this mistrust
exists, some elements of the population will continue with subversive
activities.
Concerned Parents' Association
4.2.3 Justice is a key element of this aspect
of peacebuilding. On an immediate level, this will pertain to
atrocities committed by both sides to the conflict. This is essential
to building the trust that is an integral part of a positive peace,
but it must find ways of engaging with the difficult issues of
truth and past events, to deal with the historical causes of the
conflict. At the community-level, reintegration packages are seen
as a vital ingredient in the resolution of the conflict (see above).
These, however, raise questions of economic justice, which must
be considered both at the community-level and the national-level.
If a cause of the conflict in northern Uganda is the economic
and political marginalisation of the north, addressing these issues
is key. Also of paramount importance is the way in which these
issues are addressed. If the impoverished population of northern
Uganda regard the World Food Programme (WFP) as their "government",
as research has shown, because of its role in distributing humanitarian
assistance, trust will not be built between the population and
the Government of Uganda, with its consequent effect on resolving
the conflict's historical causes, as would be the case if the
Government of Uganda undertook this activity.
4.2.4 At the highest level, peacebuilding
involves addressing issues of power. On a governmental level in
particular, it thus requires coherence between developmental and
more political responses to conflict. Locally based efforts focusing
on reconciliation, human rights monitoring or civil society engagement
will achieve little in a conflict where powerful vested interests
favour the maintenance of the status quo, unless they are supported
and supplemented by parallel efforts to address questions of power
and commitment, particularly at the level of the national government
and armed forces.
4.3 Peacebuilding requires coherence between
the different actors
4.3.1 The globalisation of peacebuilding
initiatives, and the growing realisation of the importance of
peace and security as pre-requisites for development and poverty
reduction, bring potential benefits connected with increased awareness,
research and funding, but potential challenges connected with
the importance of coordination and the avoidance of cultural imperialism
(see Section 4.4).
4.3.2 Coherence also refers to complementarity
of actions and approaches between different departments of the
same actors, for example, the United Nations or the British Government.
4.4 Peacebuilding must be culturally appropriate
and rooted in local understandings of conflict and its transformation
and resolution
4.4.1 The focus of the efforts by the international
community and of the Government of Uganda on delivering justice
in northern Uganda is the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation.
However, in northern Uganda, many people feel that efforts to
prosecute members of the LRA through the ICC fail to adequately
consider local justice and reconciliation mechanisms, and local
preferences for addressing the perpetrators of atrocities. Although
we have found that many of the core concepts at the heart of reconciliation
are shared cross-culturally, in particular the components of truth,
justice, mercy, forgiveness and peace, differences have arisen
when considering how these goals can best be achieved.
4.4.2 In a workshop with Acholi traditional
leaders, we discovered that there are at least four ways of translating
the word "reconciliation" into Acholi.
Acholi elders and chiefs who were participating
identified the following as essential elements of a reconciliation
process:
— Cessation of hostilities
— Apology & acknowledgement of
wrong
Workshop on Reconciliation. QPSW & Ker
Kwaro Acholi, May 2005
4.4.3 Justice has to be delivered in such
a way so that those for whom justice is being delivered regard
it as justice. It is not yet clear whether the ICC process in
Uganda will do this, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the trials
of those indicted by the ICC are planned to take place in The
Hague. Although these will be communicated in some way to the
population in the north, it is not clear what the mechanisms for
doing this will be, nor how effective they will be. Secondly,
international justice places a greater emphasis on producing a
punishment to fit the crime than on "putting things right".
The Acholi concepts of justice reverse this emphasis.
4.4.4 Traditional [Acholi] justice demands
of a criminal his own moral and spiritual apology, and his own
participation in a process of reconciliation and reparations.
Let Kony admit his own guilt and participate in the restoration
of what he has destroyed. This uproots the whole LRA philosophy
of destruction. Western approaches to justice may scorch the snake
but they do not kill it. By failing to deal with the whole of
the problem, they cannot guarantee that another Kony will not
rise. Traditional approaches to justice aim to destroy the whole
system that produces violence and not just the individual who
heads that system.
Latim Geresome, Elder & General Secretary
to the Acholi Cultural Institution
4.4.5 Thirdly, although there will be a
measure of truth-telling during the trials, the ICC process is
not designed to deal with the root causes of the conflict, or
with "institutional crimes". The ICC selects its cases
on the basis of gravity, which it measures primarily in terms
of number of deaths, and will investigate individual crimes that
have taken place since July 2002. For this reason, it will address
raids on displaced people's camps ordered and carried out by LRA
commanders, but is unlikely to address crimes committed by the
Ugandan armed forces (the UPDF—Ugandan People's Defence
Force), as these are of a less "grave" nature, although
they contribute greatly to the lack of trust between the affected
population and the Government of Uganda.
5. AN ANALYSIS
OF UK SUPPORT
FOR PEACEBUILDING
INITIATIVES IN
NORTHERN UGANDA
5.1 Peacebuilding during the current ongoing
violence in northern Uganda is essential to help create the space
for talks or other processes aimed at creating a negotiated settlement
to the conflict.
5.1.1 The role of peacebuilding during armed
conflict, and as a preventive measure, is acknowledged in the
two goals of DFID Uganda's conflict reduction and peacebuilding
programme.[87]
It has been successfully demonstrated through the variety of interventions
supported by the UK during an ongoing conflict, including a community
radio station (Mega FM), a peace initiative headed by religious
leaders (ARLPI—the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative),
an advocacy coalition (CSOPNU—Civil Society Organisations
for Peace in Northern Uganda), the Amnesty Commission, and a mediation
process led by Betty Bigombe.
5.1.2 Whilst this is to be applauded, it
is not clear whether this apparent view that peacebuilding is
required throughout the continuum of conflict and peace is shared
by DFID in London. It is also not clear the value placed by the
British Government on the support of such measures. Considerably
more is given to help relieve the humanitarian crisis in northern
Uganda, through, for example, support to the WFP, than is given
to conflict reduction and peacebuilding activities. See, for example,
the comments below on the redeployment of £15 million of
British Government aid to WFP, UNICEF, WHO and UNFPA.
5.2 Peacebuilding requires engagement on
multiple issues at multiple levels
5.2.1 Programmes supported by DFID in Uganda
clearly recognise the interconnectedness of many aspects of the
conflict, supporting as they do a wide range of interventions.
The support given to Mega FM and the Amnesty Commission, which
encourage the voluntary return of LRA combatants, has bolstered
peacebuilding efforts at the community-level. The support given
to the Bigombe initiative, as one of a troika of governments,
sought to contribute to peacebuilding at the level of resolution
of the immediate conflict.
5.2.2 At the national level, UK support
of peacebuilding initiatives has not been so effective at influencing
the behaviour of the key players in this conflict—the LRA,
the UPDF and the Government of Uganda. The DFID-funded Defence
Review helped address some issues around the role of the UPDF,
but there are clearly outstanding areas of concern, as evidenced
by the recent killing of seven civilians by the UPDF following
a protest over the killing of another civilian suspected to be
a member of the LRA, and the involvement of the military in the
arrest and imprisonment of Kizza Besigye, a prominent opposition
politician. A stated policy action of Uganda's Poverty Eradication
Action Plan is the implementation of the Defence Review recommendations.
Although recognising that implementing defence reviews is a lengthy
process, keeping the Government of Uganda to account over this
is an important part of the British Government's peacebuilding
in Uganda.
5.2.3 Although the British Government cannot
be expected to play a major role in influencing the behaviour
of the LRA—a joint statement issued in August 2005 by a
number of governments, including the British, urging the LRA to
re-establish contact with the Government of Uganda, is to be applauded—the
same cannot be said for the Government's influence on the Government
of Uganda. Of greatest concern in the British Government's dealing
with the Government of Uganda in the resolution of the conflict
in northern Uganda, has been its failure to adequately recognise
that the conflict is symptomatic of a failure of good national
governance, despite being willing to recognise this failing in
other aspects of Government of Uganda policy and practice.
5.2.4 £5 million of the £40 million
allocated to the Government of Uganda by the British Government
in 2005-06 budget was withheld in May 2005 because "insufficient
progress had been made towards establishing a fair basis for a
multi-party system". In December 2005, as a result of "concerns
about: delays in putting in place the legal basis for multi-party
elections; the continuation of state financing for the Movement
system in a new era of multi-party politics; and particularly
worryingly, about issues associated with the arrest and trial
of the leader of the Forum for Democratic Change [Kizza Besigye],
one of the main parties that plans to contest the election",
£15 million from its total 2006-07 budget of £50 million
was reallocated to aid agencies working in northern Uganda, and
£5 million was held back until after the elections in February.
5.2.5 While it is to be welcomed that the
British Government has used its leverage with the Government of
Uganda in this way—albeit through using the necessarily
blunt instrument of, in effect, economic sanctions—concern
is raised about the means in which is was done. As has been mentioned
above, the failure of the Government of Uganda to provide even
the basic structures for supporting life and livelihoods in the
north—through humanitarian aid, or a protection strategy
that enables greater access to farmland and markets—has
diminished the levels of trust between the government and the
population of northern Uganda, and added to the sense of marginalisation
it feels. As with any relief operation, on a small or large scale,
there is clearly a tension between keeping people alive and encouraging
them to meet their own needs (or, in this case, encouraging the
Government of Uganda to fulfil its duty of meeting its population's
needs), but a more nuanced and strategic approach to this redeployment
of aid could have been taken.
5.2.6 The British Government has not withheld
aid because of the Government of Uganda's conduct regarding the
conflict in northern Uganda. This is not the setting to explore
fully the role of the Government of Uganda in the beginning and
continuation of the conflict, but concerns surround its failure
to engage fully in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict;
its failure to protect its population from LRA raids, but rather
to pursue an aggressive military strategy which puts the abducted
children amongst the LRA ranks at greatest risk; its failure to
adequately respond to the humanitarian crisis amongst the displaced
population; its failure to fully support the process of reintegration
and reconciliation, through, for example, adequately supporting
the Amnesty Commission[88]
or engaging meaningfully with those advocating for a peaceful
solution; and, its failure to address the marginalisation and
under-representation of the Acholi population in the country as
a whole.
5.2.7 Concerning the conflict, the Donor
Democracy and Governance Group (DDGG),[89]
of which Britain is an influential member, expects the Government
of Uganda to:
— Demonstrate political support for
dialogue and reconciliation.
— Work with CSOs, faith based groups
and traditional leaders in conflict resolution and peace building
processes.
— Approve conflict resolution policy
and institutional framework.
— Strengthen capacity and provide adequate
resources for Amnesty Commission and other conflict resolution
institutions.
— Disseminate information about Amnesty
Act to all parts of the country and in cross-border areas.
— Strengthen diplomatic ties and cooperation
between Uganda and neighbouring countries, especially Sudan.
Accountability mechanisms already exist, therefore,
regarding the Government of Uganda's conduct in relation to the
conflict. If the DDGG placed greater significance on these actions,
it would enable it to create incentives for increased political
engagement on the part of the Government of Uganda to end the
conflict.
5.2.8 The DDGG does therefore link the conflict
to national governance, but the attitude of the British Government
seems to remain that summed up by Hilary Benn in March 2005, who,
whilst recognising the impact of the LRA on Northern Uganda stated
that "LRA activity has had minimal effect on the stability
of Uganda's central government".
5.2.9 A significant obstacle encountered
by NGOs with an interest and expertise in peacebuilding, including
NUAPP members, has been in persuading the British Government to
take a proactive role in pursuing the northern Ugandan conflict
at the UN Security Council. Failure to do so is perhaps indicative
both of a disconnect between London, New York and the programmes
within Uganda, and also of a more general failure by the UK to
use its substantial political weight to complement and enhance
its in-country peacebuilding programmes.
5.2.10 This process also raised questions
about the links between the FCO and DFID in both London and Kampala.
The traditional division between the two departments has to some
degree been addressed by the formation of the Africa Conflict
Prevention Pool (which also includes the Ministry of Defence)
but evidence of more effective joined-up action about the conflict
in Uganda would be welcomed. Withdrawing or withholding aid clearly
has implications on parties wider than those which were to be
served by the aid, not least on the relationship between the British
and Ugandan governments.
5.2.11 As long as the British Government
fails to acknowledge the conflict as a crisis affecting Uganda
as a whole, fails to see the conflict as symptomatic of poor national
governance in Uganda and fails to reproduce its community-level
peacebuilding activities at the national level through its bilateral
or multilateral dealings with the Government of Uganda, it will
not adequately engage with peacebuilding at multiple levels on
multiple issues.
5.3 Peacebuilding requires coherence between
the different actors
5.3.1 The formation of the "troika",
of which the UK government was one member, offering support to
the Bigombe process, was a good example of coherence and cooperation
between different governments and their missions in Uganda. However,
at least initially there was stiff competition between political
actors and some NGOs as to who should play a role in that process.
Although ultimately resolved, it appeared a little ugly at the
time, did not set a good example to the local and national political
elites, and it is not clear how those not eventually included
feel about it.
5.3.2 Although initially limiting membership
of the "Bigombe" group was probably justified, in the
long term this group failed to open up to other actors, and in
particular to Ugandan and Acholi civil society. This has proved
damaging to the long-term strength and viability of the process.
Local civil society actors were unable to offer their expertise
and experience in a manner that could have strengthened the process.
Failure to involve other actors has also meant that now that the
UK government and other governments have withdrawn their initial
substantial support, Bigombe and the process have been left significantly
weakened. Engaging a greater variety of actors earlier would have
strengthened the long-term sustainability of the approach as well
as helping contribute to a broader vision.
5.3.3 Donors in Uganda have been keen to
become associated with NGOs in northern Uganda that have demonstrated
apparent success in peacebuilding initiatives. As a result, several
NGOs and institutions have been swamped by too much support and
attention which has detracted from their key goals, and has at
times threatened to destroy the organisation. Although DFID has
generally proved to be well aware of this dynamic, it could do
more to influence less sensitive donors.
5.3.4 The involvement of staff from the
FCO, DFID and the MoD in supporting the Bigombe initiative was
a good example of a coherent approach in-country. However, this
document points out (Section 5.2) deficiencies in coordination
and coherence at other levels of the British Government.
5.4 Peacebuilding must be culturally appropriate
and rooted in local understandings of conflict and its transformation
and resolution
5.4.1 The British Government, like many
other actors, has struggled most with the question of cultural
appropriateness of engagement in its attitudes towards the ICC
intervention. Support to the Amnesty Commission, which pre-dates
the ICC intervention, is an excellent example of a process and
institution that grew out of the clearly articulated desires of
the Acholi population. However, DFID has never offered significant
support to the traditional institutions of the Acholi, whose approaches
to justice and reconciliation are potentially highly complementary
to that of the Amnesty Commission. Instead, the UK has found itself
in a difficult position regarding the ICC.
5.4.2 Some DFID staff with responsibility
for the north clearly understand how problematic and contentious
many aspects of the ICC intervention are in the current context.[90]
These complexities have led to the creation of a situation in
which peacebuilding has become more difficult. However, the FCO
in London, because of their strong support of the ICC as an institution,
aware of the importance of a "successful" outcome to
the case in Uganda, the ICC's first, and conscious of preserving
the independence of the ICC, has been less willing and able to
explore the risks and complexities of the ICC intervention.
5.4.3 Furthermore, the reaction of the British
Government has been stronger than that necessitated by the Rome
Statute.[91]
Despite differences in understanding between the ICC's Office
of the Prosecutor and those involved in the mediation of the conflict
regarding the pace and fragility of a "peace process",
the ICC has stated that its investigation should not prevent peace
initiatives. It is thought that the British Government has retracted
further than is necessary from, for example, the Bigombe initiatives,
as a result of fears that its position as a State Party to the
Rome Statute prevents it from supporting efforts to negotiate
a peace with indicted war criminals.
5.4.4 The British Government has also not
given sufficient attention to the vital issue of reconciling the
judicial demands of the international community (demonstrated
through the ICC) and those of the conflict-affected population
(demonstrated primarily through the Acholi legal institutions).
Its political and financial support of both sets of institutions
demonstrate a commitment to them both, and puts it in an ideal
position to be able to work with both sets of actors to create
a framework for justice that contributes significantly to peacebuilding
in Uganda.
January 2006
85 "Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World:
a Strategy for Security and Development", DFID March 2005. Back
86
"In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human
Rights for All", Report of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for decision by Heads of State and Government in September
2005. Back
87
A sustained reduction in the number of peoples' lives affected
by violent conflict; a reduction in the potential sources of future
conflict. Back
88
The Amnesty Commission has only a renewable six-month lifespan
and its DDR activities have not been adequately funded. Back
89
The Donor Democracy and Governance Group states its objectives
to be to "deepen democracy and facilitate the transition
towards greater political pluralism in the period leading up to
and during the 2006 elections" and to "promote human
rights and good governance". Back
90
See Section 3.3 for a brief analysis of the risks and complexities
of the ICC process in Uganda. Back
91
The Rome Statute is the treaty which established the International
Criminal Court (ICC). It entered into force on July 1, 2002. Back
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