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Memorandum submitted by The Senlis Council
INTRODUCTION 1. The Senlis Council is an international drug policy think tank which was established in 2002 by the Network of European Foundations to gather expertise and facilitate new initiatives on global drug policy.
2. In response to the security and development crises facing Afghanistan, The Senlis Council launched its policy initiatives with respect to opium production and drug addiction. The Council has commissioned a Feasibility Study to examine the implications of opium licensing in Afghanistan for the production of opium-based medicines[1]. The Feasibility Study spelled out a series of conclusions and recommendations which are provided in the annex of this written evidence. More recently, The Council has launched an addiction treatment advocacy initiative aiming to address the link between drug use and health in Afghanistan.
ADDRESS THE NEED TO ASSOCIATE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 3. The Senlis Council commends the UK on its significant contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and, particularly, on assuming the leading role on counter-narcotics activities in the country. In view of the persistent development and security crises facing Afghanistan, it is vital the international community ensures that the appropriate, balanced strategies are in place.
4. Security and development are two inseparable sides of the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. And opium lies at the core of the Afghan reconstruction nexus. There can be no sustainable development without the establishment of the rule of law. At the same time, however, security at the expense of development will only be ephemeral, as economic development is essential to long-term political stability.
5. Recommendation: The UK departments' efforts in counter narcotics must balance the two objectives of development and security. This is a pre-requisite to solving the problem of illegal opium production without undermining the establishment of the rule of law and farmers' livelihood.
OPIUM: TURNING A THREAT INTO AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS 6. Opium-based activities have penetrated the social, economic and political fabric of Afghanistan. According to the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005, opium accounts for approximately 52% of the country's Gross Domestic Product with record cultivation levels being reported for nine provinces and the net income from opium exports remaining at US$2.7 billion. Illegal opium fuels a wild-fire economic development, and the illegal opium economy does not lead to the long-term accumulation of capital. With opium resources channelled into the criminal sector, insurgent and terrorist groups are strengthened, creating a growing threat to the development of the rule of law. In this light, opium can no longer be regarded and treated as a pure narcotic problem.
7. As a conflict commodity, if brought under an effective economic control system, opium can become a driver for development. By bringing opium farmers in the formal economy, an opium licensing system for the production of morphine will also create the conditions needed for the establishment of the rule of law.
8. Recommendation: The UK, as the coordinator of the international counter narcotics activities in Afghanistan, should pursue a comprehensive and pragmatic strategy to turn the opium problem into a driver for reconstruction in Afghanistan. Such strategy can be achieved through a mix of control and economic mechanisms that brings farmers within the rule of law, whilst securing their livelihood.
EMPOWER THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT IN ITS RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS 9. The Council salutes the aid commitment of the United Kingdom to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Most particularly, The Council commends the Department for International Development and other government departments including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence on their commitment to provide more than £270 million over the next three years for Afghan counter narcotics activities.
10. Today, however, the donor aid framework reduces the policy autonomy of the Government of Afghanistan. This is especially true in the area of counter-narcotics where policies pursued have proven to be ill-adapted to the conditions and needs of local communities. More than half of the international aid to address the opium crisis in Afghanistan is poured into aggressive strategies such as crop eradication. Such interventions primarily affect the most vulnerable actors of the opium economy - the farmers - destroying their livelihoods and fuelling volatility. Alternative development measures usually come after, striving to mend the damage caused by military and aggressive measures.
11. Recommendation: The UK must participate in policy evolution to allow the Afghan Government to have ownership of its policy towards opium.
GENERATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 12. The international community and the Afghan Government are faced with the difficult task of building law enforcement capability and institution building in Afghanistan.
13. Current efforts to build an enforcement capacity in the country are often associated to aggressive interventions, such as crop eradication, thus spurring discontent with the government and impeding the establishment of the rule of law mainly in the rural areas. Such aggressive interventions not only fail to make a significant dent in the highly mobile illegal opium activities but also compromise the very conditions necessary for the establishment of the rule of law.
14. Last year both the British and Afghan Governments rejected chemical spraying as an element in their eradication programmes. In the fragile context of post-conflict Afghanistan, chemical spraying was seen to represent a threat as great as opium itself. We urge the British government to re-iterate its opposition to chemical spraying and give precedence to an approach based on development initiatives, rather than to measures based on force.
15. Recommendation: All efforts to implement control and enforcement in the country must integrate the existing traditional and social control structures whilst securing the livelihoods of the rural communities. Only then will these efforts affect a shift in the perception of law enforcement agents by the rural communities, contributing to the improvement of relations with the Central Government. UNLOCK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF THE ILLEGAL OPIUM ECONOMY 16. According to UNODC figures, 309,000 households are involved in opium cultivation in 2005, representing 11.2% of the rural population. High levels of opium-denominated indebtedness pose a direct threat to the recovery of local rural communities; currently, the average amount of outstanding loans of farmers is equivalent to three times the per capita GDP, whilst new loans taken in 2005 per farmer is equivalent to two times the per capita GDP.
17. The alternative crops approach has critically failed to unlock the vicious circle of the illegal opium economy as none of these can compete with the profitability of poppy cultivation. Critically, opium remains the economic engine of rural development.
18. In the light of this, The Senlis Council examined the economic benefits received by licensed opium farmers compared to the benefits derived from illegal opium cultivation. The findings of the Feasibility Study indicate that opium licensing in Afghanistan is indeed an economically viable solution; the likely price structure of opium under a licensed system as seen against that of the current illegal industry would not constitute an economic disincentive for Afghan farmers to cultivate opium under a licensing system.
19. Recommendation: The UK, as the leading country in counter narcotics activities in Afghanistan, should consider re-directing a wealth-generating commodity such as the opium poppy into the formal rural economy through the implementation of an opium licensing system. Such strategy would result in liberating the social and economic forces which are currently locked in the vicious circle of the illegal opium economy hindering Afghanistan's recovery.
ANNEX: TEN RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FEASIBILITY STUDY ON OPIUM LICENSING IN AFGHANISTAN
Recommendation One: Develop a 'Fast Track System' for the controlled licensing of opium in Afghanistan for the production of medicines. Recommendation Two: Determine the optimal varieties of opium poppy for the implementation of a controlled opium industry in Afghanistan; explore application of biotechnology including developing varieties that are well suited to the production of medicines but cannot be converted into heroin, as well as examining means of visually identifying poppy flowers, such as colour coding, to indicate licensed fields. Recommendation Three: Develop an economic model of an opium production value-chain that benefits Afghan farmers and provides business and investment opportunities and Government revenues for Afghanistan. Recommendation Four: Investigate special market access and branding possibilities for Afghan morphine and codeine. Recommendation Five: Formulate preferential trade agreements between Afghanistan and target export countries using models presented by existing trade agreements between the US and India and Turkey. Recommendation Six: Establish effective control systems to prevent diversion into the illegal market; instigate a 'bottom-up' process based on Afghan legal traditions. Recommendation Seven: Develop Afghanistan's future by integrating the opium economy stakeholders into development through amnesty provisions. Recommendation Eight: Develop equitable and workable guidelines for the selection of farmers and fields. Recommendation Nine: Urge full disclosure by the INCB of the structure of existing actors in the licensed opium market. Recommendation Ten: Reorganise drug policy governance in Afghanistan, placing alternative livelihoods and development at the forefront and averting the increasing militarization of drug policy in Afghanistan.
December 2005 [1] The initial findings of the Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan for the Production of Morphine and Other Essential Medicines addressed the current global deficit in morphine and other essential medicines, and ascertained the effects of licensed opium production in Afghanistan and how such a system could be best implemented. Specialised contributions were given by The British Institute of International and Comparative Law; University of Calgary; University of Ghent; University of Kabul; University of Lisbon; University of Toronto; Wageningen University. 1st edition, September 2005; 2nd edition, November 2005. |