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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE INQUIRY: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE IDC BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID)
Summary of Contents
Memorandum DFID's Humanitarian Spending; DFID's Humanitarian Response Expertise; DFID's Humanitarian Principles; DFID's Humanitarian Policy; DFID's Answers to the Committee's specific advance Questions
Annex 1 DFID's Response to Humanitarian Crises in Africa
Annex 2 Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship
Annex 3 DFID's step by step immediate response to the Pakistan earthquake
Annex 4 DFID's major humanitarian responses since 1992
Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department DFID
May 2006
MEMORANDUM
SUMMARY
1. This memorandum gives an overview of DFID's spending on humanitarian relief; affirms DFID's commitment to internationally agreed humanitarian principles; sets out DFID's new DFID humanitarian policy and disaster preparedness plans; and answers the Committee's specific questions.
2. DFID is the world's second largest bilateral humanitarian donor, and has strong in-house expertise. The Secretary of State for International Development has played an energetic role in promoting improvements to the humanitarian system, including the establishment of the new UN Central Emergency Response Fund. DFID's humanitarian relief efforts have been favourably reviewed by the NAO and the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. DFID attaches high priority to ensuring effective international responses to crises and will continue to be a substantial funder of the humanitarian system and a leading voice in the debate about humanitarian policy.
DETAIL
DFID'S HUMANITARIAN SPENDING
Humanitarian spending in last 3 years
DFID'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE EXPERTISE
10. DFID also manages a stockpile of emergency relief and support items such as tents, blankets, vehicles, radios, UN field coordination equipment, and modules to support humanitarian staff for up to a month in the field. These are located in warehouses with close access to regions prone to rapid onset disasters.
11. Most DFID humanitarian assistance is channelled through the UN, Red Cross Movement and NGOs, based on the best available evidence of need and impact. It includes medical/nutritional assistance, water and sanitation, support to destitute communities, and some initial livelihood support and recovery. DFID also supports common services to increase the effectiveness of the relief effort more broadly - co-ordination, logistics, security and information. 12. The NAO praised the speed and quality of DFID's response to rapid onset disasters in a 2003 report, and DFID has been recognised for its ability to translate pledges of support into delivery. DFID maintains humanitarian advisory and programme support services, including call-down contracts for search and rescue, specialist emergency personnel, air brokerage and logistics, so ensuring capability to respond immediately to crises at any time.
DFID'S HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES
Commitment to the Principles and Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship
13. The UK is fully committed to the Principles and Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) defined in Stockholm in 2003. (Attached at Annex 2).
14. The UK is an active member of GHD and, in July 2005, took the Chair. DFID has produced an implementation plan for GHD and intends to publish a revised humanitarian policy statement in spring 2006 which will draw on GHD principles. The UK allocates its humanitarian aid on the basis of need.
15. DFID's contribution to sustainable poverty alleviation includes a strong commitment to prevention through support for integrating disaster risk reduction (DRR) into development programming. DFID's policy paper on Disaster Risk Reduction was published in March 2006.
DFID'S HUMANITARIAN POLICY
Background
16. DFID's previous humanitarian policy statement dated back to 1998. Since then new international norms have been developed and DFID's own thinking has advanced significantly. In spring 2006 DFID will launch a new policy paper to help put into practice DFID's corporate commitment to the humanitarian principles set out above.
17. The new paper will argue that humanitarian need is likely to increase because of the increasing vulnerability of large populations to natural hazards as a result of climate and demographic changes. In fragile states - particularly the least able and willing - humanitarian assistance will remain a key instrument for meeting the basic needs of the most vulnerable, especially when it is not possible to work through governments.
18. The paper will set out three main policy goals, and how DFID proposes to deliver in each.
19. First, to improve the effectiveness of response to disasters. Humanitarian reform initiatives have emphasised the importance of improved coordination, evidence-based decision-making and accountability. The new policy will identify a number of priorities for DFID, notably: strengthening the evidence base for humanitarian action, by working with partner agencies to provide better needs assessment; improving field level coordination, in particular the role of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator; getting greater NGO participation into country level planning and resource mobilisation exercises; and encouraging partner agencies to define clearly the standards to which they aspire and an ability to demonstrate progress in achieving them.
20. Second, to be a better donor. Globally, the financing of humanitarian work is highly fragmented and volatile, and there is weak coordination between donors, and between them and the operational agencies. There is also evidence to suggest that the global funding pot is too small. The implications of this analysis are that: DFID's humanitarian assistance is likely to increase in future years, so long as there is proven need; field level coordination between donors needs to be strengthened; DFID will continue to invest with others to find more efficient humanitarian funding instruments, such as the CERF and country level pooled funds as being trialled in Sudan and DRC.
21. Finally, to reduce risk and extreme vulnerability. The links between humanitarian assistance and DFID's work on safety nets, social protection and fragile states are important. The need to strengthen the protection of civilians is also emphasised.
Main Elements of DFID's new policy
22. Every year, some 300 million people are affected by natural and man-made calamities, jeopardising their lives and livelihoods. New challenges arising from climate change, rapid urbanisation, pandemics and state fragility will continue to emerge, threatening populations still further, and compromising achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.
23. Humanitarian assistance remains the primary tool available to the international community to support individuals, communities and governments when disaster strikes, and when people's lives are threatened by conflict.
24. DFID leads the UK's response to humanitarian crises and in disaster prevention and risk reduction. Its humanitarian work aims to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity in the face of man-made crises and natural disasters. DFID is a major donor to the international humanitarian system and has proved a strong advocate for humanitarian reform.
25. DFID recognises the many achievements of humanitarian action, but also the depth of the challenges facing the international humanitarian system. Humanitarian operations remain characterised by a weak evidence base, poor coordination and limited capacity. The financing of humanitarian action by official donors and others has evolved in a fragmented and uncoordinated manner.
26. As well as challenges, there are opportunities. Major donors have agreed the principles and goals that must inform their humanitarian assistance. There is renewed consensus around the importance of needs-based, independent humanitarian action, and agreement on the international responsibility to protect people from the worst kinds of violence and abuse.
27. DFID has three main goals for its humanitarian work:
28. Policy Goal 1: Improve the effectiveness of humanitarian responses. DFID will increase the quality of humanitarian response so that, when a disaster happens, we can respond in the right way, at the right time, with the right kind of help.
29. DFID will work with other government departments to reinforce the pre-eminent importance of respect for international humanitarian and refugee law and principles by the UK Government and internationally.
30. Policy Goal 2: Be a better donor. DFID will follow Good Humanitarian Donorship principles and deliver adequate, predictable and flexible finance where it is most needed, and encourage other donors to do likewise.
31. By 2010 we should not be speaking of 'forgotten emergencies' as we are today. As the UK aid programme increases, so will the volume of DFID's humanitarian assistance, so helping to bridge the funding gap that characterises many crises. DFID will also work to increase the predictability of humanitarian funding through improved budgeting, early pledging, and support for the CERF and Common Funds.
32. Policy Goal 3: Reduce risk and extreme vulnerability. DFID will engage earlier and more effectively to reduce risk and to provide political and economic security.
33. Humanitarian crises are not isolated, exceptional events; in many ways they are symptomatic of the failure of development and of politics. For those living in extreme poverty it is a particularly small step from daily deprivation to life-threatening crisis. Long-term investment is needed to enable individuals, communities and governments to resist and cope with threats to their wellbeing.
34. Rather than relying exclusively on emergency relief, where possible, DFID will seek to assist governments to put in place effective risk management strategies. These should include national systems of social security to improve the well-being of the most vulnerable, and to provide a safety net in times of crisis. Where governments are not willing to back a pro-poor agenda[1], other options for delivering social welfare will be explored, including humanitarian aid.
35. Poverty alone does not define people's vulnerability. Some people are vulnerable by virtue of their ethnicity, gender, age, race or religion. In these environments of political violence and mass violations of human rights, even the most effective relief programme will not stop people from dying. Averting humanitarian crises is also, therefore, unavoidably a question of political action. DFID will work across the UK Government, with international agencies, and in the world at large to secure humanitarian outcomes and uphold respect for international law.
DFID'S ANSWERS TO THE COMMITTEE'S SPECIFIC QUESTIONS IN ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE
Q. How do International Non-Government Organisations, national Non-Government Organisations, the media, parliamentarians and the public influence DFID's decision making and responses to natural disasters?
36. International and national Non-Government Organisations -
DFID has developed close relationships over the last ten years with International Organisations (IOs) such as the ICRC and the UN relief agencies; with international NGOs (INGOs) such as Oxfam and Save the Children; and with national NGOs (NGOs).
37. DFID's partnerships with these organisations take two forms. With the IOs, DFID has institutional strategies (ISs) - with the UN agencies (UN OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, WFP and UNDP); and with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Their purpose is to improve international crisis response capacity, for which DFID provides substantial funding to the IOs on a regular basis, totalling £70 million a year.
38. DFID also has regular dialogue and co-operation with INGOs and NGOs. This year we have launched a new Conflict and Humanitarian Fund (CHF), through which they have access to more regular DFID funding.
39. These partnerships are important background to how IOs, INGOs and NGOs influence DFID's decisions in responses to disasters. Because we are already working together, we work better together in specific crises. We often conduct joint evaluations and lesson-learning from each disaster, feeding in to policy development.
40. At the operational level, IOs, INGOs and NGOs influence DFID's response to disasters. DFID has its own operational field capacity, but this is not a mechanism for managing disaster relief directly on the ground. IOs, INGOs and NGOs have a presence on the ground that DFID often lacks, and their reports and assessments play an essential role in informing DFID's picture of the needs. In a large scale disaster and instances where field-based reports are confused, DFID deploys a team of humanitarian experts to gather information and develop a strategy for DFID intervention. Our contact with host governments as well as partners on the ground is critical to developing an informed DFID approach. 41. We rely on UN agencies; the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and INGOs and NGOs for disbursing relief funds and for project management. Our decision-making and response is dependent not only on the type and quality of project proposals submitted to DFID for funding, but also on the capacities of agencies on the ground to assess needs, develop needs-based proposals and appeals, and implement these programmes.
42. DFID country offices maintain direct contacts with national NGOs. DFID's calls for proposals are open to national NGOs, and DFID sometimes supports them directly, such as in India after the 2004 tsunami and in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake. Most UN agencies, IOs and INGOs work in close partnership with national NGOs so that the local knowledge of these NGOs feeds into the assessments, project formulation and funding proposals that are sent to DFID.
43. Some of DFID's partners exert influence through political campaigning and lobbying. This can be useful in ensuring that lower-profile emergencies are not overlooked, such as the Niger crisis in 2005 where DFID was encouraged to revisit an initial assessment after advocacy from INGOs, NGOs and the UN. In Malawi, advocacy from INGOs and NGOs acted as an early alert to DFID as the Southern Africa food crisis unfolded in 2002. IOs also alerted DFID to prepare to scale up humanitarian programmes, as renewed fighting in Macedonia in 2002 threatened to cause a new movement of populations into Kosovo.
44. Parliamentarians, the Public and Media - DFID is answerable to Parliament and the public. In major crises, such as the Tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake Ministers provide regular briefing to Parliament and the media, and give priority to answering letters. The media can also provide early warnings of crises to donors, ensuring wider awareness of emerging humanitarian needs and new hotspots.
Q: Does the relative success of different funding appeals determine the priority afforded to different natural disasters by humanitarian actors?
45. It is true that if an NGO is able to raise more money through appeal for one disaster than for another then it will be able to do more in the better funded disaster.
46. DFID has more flexibility, through Government funding, to respond to a wider range of disasters, including under-funded disasters. In all its humanitarian responses DFID follows the internationally agreed principles of prioritising according to need, impartially and neutrally. As a leading donor DFID will mount a response to most natural disasters in developing countries if otherwise some humanitarian needs would be unmet.
47. Conversely, DFID will not respond to all disasters, for example where the afflicted country and/or other donors are better placed to meet the needs, e.g. this year in the Philippines mudslide and the Ecuador floods. And DFID is flexible, open to changing its response if necessary. For instance DFID stopped short of programming the full £75 million pledged for tsunami relief in 2004, when it became clear that the funding provided by other national, public and private donors would fully meet the needs on the ground.
Q. Are evaluation mechanisms adequate to determine whether humanitarian responses to natural disasters are consistent with the principles of humanitarian action as agreed under the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative? Are lessons drawn from evaluations applied during later responses? What impact has the GHD initiative had on the practices of the actors which have committed to it?
48. DFID chairs the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative and has sought to promote compliance with GHD principles, both itself and internationally. Specifically:
49. Evaluation mechanisms and Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). The principles of GHD currently apply only to the 23 members of the OECD/DAC. For them DFID has led an international effort to make the GHD principles the official reference standard for humanitarian work. This was agreed in April 2006, when a commitment was also secured to maintain scrutiny of humanitarian assistance in DAC peer reviews. This should ensure greater scrutiny of the impact of donor behaviour in determining the effectiveness of humanitarian response. DFID also supports independent scrutiny of GHD through its partnerships with Development Initiatives and the Overseas Development Institute. GHD indicators are reflected in DFID's Public Service Agreement.
50. Evaluating DFID's response to natural disasters. In line with GHD principles, DFID works to promote adherence to Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles for humanitarian action. Adherence to these principles is a prerequisite for all agencies accessing DFID humanitarian funds, and DFID aims to ensure that monitoring and evaluation of all funded projects assesses this.
51. Adequacy of evaluations of natural disaster response. GHD principles are not the only criteria that are used to evaluate humanitarian action, since they apply only to donor behaviour. The DAC/OECD have produced guidance on humanitarian evaluations. The quality of evaluations of humanitarian response remains uneven. The scope for large, inter-agency evaluations is limited because of their high management burden and cost. They tend to say little about the impact of humanitarian assistance because of the lack of robust baselines against which to measure progress. For this reason DFID also supports work to strengthen the collection of data on mortality and malnutrition, to provide a stronger baseline against which progress can be measured. DFID is also pressing for the new cluster approach to emphasise the definition and monitoring of benchmarks against which progress can be measured in core sectors. 52. Evaluations: do they make a difference? DFID has drawn considerably on the lessons learned from many crises. For example, in Southern Africa it is now well established that DFID's response must be grounded in a long-term, developmental perspective, as well as an ability to respond to acute need. More broadly, evaluations are one part of much broader accountability and learning that includes monitoring, training and capacity building. A major challenge for humanitarian evaluations is ensuring follow up on recommendations. DFID would like to see both greater authority and responsibility being given to UN OCHA, Humanitarian Coordinators and Cluster lead agencies to measure the impact of humanitarian operations. DFID would also like more planned follow up in the terms of reference of major evaluations.
53. Impact of GHD. As accountability initiatives go, GHD remains relatively 'young'. In terms of its impact within the UK, the principles of GHD have been used to inform DFID's new humanitarian policy statement, as well as work on redrafting guidance for working with NGOs and multilateral partners. More broadly, GHD has provided a framework for donors to agree basic norms, a set of standards against which their performance can be measured, and a forum for discussion of issues of shared concern. There remain areas where more effort is needed, particularly strengthening donor coordination at field level, promoting needs based resource allocation and stronger dialogue on key aspects of humanitarian reform. DFID is working to progress this through its chairmanship.
Q. How useful have recent reviews of the capacity, effectiveness and flexibility of the international humanitarian system been? Do we fully understand what the key constraints on the humanitarian system are? How significant are funding (including "core" funding), needs assessment and political processes?
54. The most recent review of the capacity, effectiveness and flexibility of the international humanitarian system was the UN OCHA commissioned 'Humanitarian Response Review' (HRR) led by former Head of ECHO Costanza Adinolfi, and presented in autumn 2005.
55. The review introduced the concept of 'accountable sectoral leadership' which has developed into what is now termed the 'cluster' approach. The IASC has agreed that specific agencies will take lead responsibility for ensuring more effective delivery in clusters of humanitarian response. Nine such clusters have been identified. Agencies have been identified to lead multi-agency teams to develop plans for how work in these sectors can be delivered more effectively; to be accountable for such delivery and to accept responsibility for being providers of last resort if no one else is delivering. The new cluster approach is being piloted in Liberia, Uganda and the DRC.
56. The HRR also broadly supported the International Development Secretary's December 2004 humanitarian reform initiatives and specifically backed the proposal for a global humanitarian fund through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).
57. Funding, needs assessment and political processes are constraints and opportunities in improving the humanitarian system. In terms of funding there is general consensus that more predictable, flexible and larger aid flows could all improve outcomes.
58. We need to strengthen the evidence base for humanitarian action by working with partner agencies to provide better needs assessment.
59. Political processes through the UN's 5th Committee play a large role in setting the boundaries of potential reform and changes within the UN.
Q. Are proposals for reform of the international humanitarian system realistic and comprehensive? What has been HMG's role in promoting these? Are they likely to affect the responsiveness of the public and governments to future humanitarian funding appeals?
60. The UK has been at the forefront of efforts to improve the international humanitarian system. On 15 December 2004 in a speech at the ODI the International Development Secretary put forward a number of proposals:
61. As a result: i) a new global humanitarian fund, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was launched on 9 March 2006; ii) the Inter-Agency Standing Committee is taking forward reform and strengthening of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system; iii) the UK and 7 like-minded donors are trialling the pooling of funds behind the HCs in Sudan and DRC; iv) WHO has begun work on developing global benchmarks for mortality and malnutrition; and v) Disaster Risk Reduction is being given new impetus.
62. Other international humanitarian reform initiatives include the IASC led 'clusters' proposal to improve coordination and meet unmet needs (especially for Internally Displaced People IDPs).
63. All of the above proposals are realistic. Some have come to fruition (eg CERF, country level pooled funds, strengthening HCs) and are improving the system and helping beneficiaries. Others remain realistic but due to their complexity will take longer to achieve (eg benchmarks).
64. The International Development Secretary put forward further reform ideas in his 23 January 2006 speech. He highlighted: i) improving UN flash appeals, making them quicker and more focused; ii) clearer agreements on the use of military assets; and iii) humanitarian community needs to be more accountable.
65. HMG has been a leading proponent in humanitarian reform, and has been highly active in: analysing and developing proposals, convening meetings, funding consultancy work, lobbying and generally pushing for improvement.
66. Successful initiatives to make the humanitarian system more effective should give the public and governments greater confidence to contribute to humanitarian funding appeals. Some initiatives such as the CERF make it easier for governments with small but growing humanitarian budgets to contribute to humanitarian efforts without having to set up costly systems themselves.
Q. What should be the role of the military and civil defence actors in humanitarian responses, including national military forces, the EU and NATO?
67. Military resources have advantages in that they are capable of deploying rapidly, are well-organised and disciplined and are focused in their efforts. This was shown to good effect, both in the tsunami, where military helicopters played a huge role in distributing relief, and in Pakistan, where the tasking of RAF helicopters by the UN was credited with having convinced the US and Germany to make their helicopters available in the same way. The use of under-slung loads got the maximum aid to victims as quickly as possible. UK military engineers were a valuable contribution to the NATO contingent, with specialist skills which allowed for high quality inputs while maintaining a low profile.
68. DFID supports compliance with the UN OCHA guidelines on the use of military assets in natural disaster response (the "Oslo Guidelines"). It is important that when the military undertake tasks with humanitarian objectives their activities adhere to the principles of humanity and impartiality and are judged primarily on the effectiveness of the contribution to addressing victims' needs. Other humanitarian principles such as neutrality and independence cannot normally be applied to military forces, as instruments of state power; constraining the scope for military support to humanitarian activity in conflict situations.
69. DFID is working with MOD to improve the predictability of collaboration in the immediate aftermath of a major natural disaster, to allow for rapid assessment and decision-making to maximise the benefits which UK military capabilities can bring to the crucial early days of a response. DFID will not draw on military assets for every response. Reflecting internationally agreed UN guidelines, DFID will use civilian assets whenever possible, in accordance with humanitarian principles. DFID will request UK military assets where in DFID's judgement such assets would form a necessary and cost-effective part of DFID's response.
Q. How can the recipients of humanitarian assistance, including DFID's local partner organisations, contribute to DFID's decision making process regarding humanitarian assistance? In what ways can they hold DFID accountable for its humanitarian aid provision?
70. As we do not have a presence on the ground in all locations where we provide humanitarian assistance we rely on agency knowledge. Recipients of humanitarian assistance, including local organisations, feed their views into DFID's decision-making process through the funding proposals and needs assessments of the larger international NGOs and UN agencies, who work in partnership with local organisations to assess needs, develop projects and deliver assistance. Field monitoring missions, including DFID's, would also aim to hold discussions directly with beneficiaries.
71. DFID supports the work of several organisations concerned with accountability. We support the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I), which develops processes and standards for agency use for consultation with beneficiaries; and ALNAP, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, which focuses on supporting learning by humanitarian organisations. But we recognise that there remains a need to improve how existing standards are applied and monitored, and to find better ways of enabling beneficiaries to contribute and hold humanitarian actors responsible.
Q. How do DFID and other development actors assess the vulnerabilities of the recipients of development assistance to natural disasters? Are development interventions designed to reduce vulnerabilities to natural disasters?
72. The potential for a hazard to become a disaster depends on a population's vulnerability or coping capacity. The poor, women, children, the elderly or disabled are often most vulnerable and therefore the worst affected. It is often the very poor who live in marginal, disaster-prone locations.
73. The assessment by DFID and other donors of the vulnerabilities of recipients of development assistance and the design of development programmes to reduce vulnerabilities to natural disasters is improving. Important donors including the UN and the World Bank are prioritising this by employing Disaster Risk Reduction advisers in disaster-prone developing countries and promoting disaster risk reduction measures in Poverty Reduction Strategies. DFID is working with Governments in disaster-prone countries to develop vulnerability assessment methodologies within local Comprehensive Disaster Management Programmes.
74. DFID published its own new Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy in March 2006.
Q. How do donors ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered equitably? What can be done to ensure that humanitarian assistance is pro-poor and does not exacerbate inequalities?
75. DFID follows internationally agreed principles that humanitarian assistance must be delivered impartially and neutrally according to need. DFID applies these principles in its own humanitarian responses, including through its partnerships with and funding to IOs and NGOs. In addressing humanitarian needs DFID concentrates on the worst afflicted and most vulnerable, who generally are the poor, the young, the elderly and single-parent families.
76. To gain a clear view of the particular equity issues at play in each country DFID's humanitarian teams always work closely with the DFID country office on arrival to ensure a clear understanding. For instance, in Sri Lanka after the tsunami, an understanding of long-standing inequities, both real and perceived, between the three main ethnic groups was critical in order that humanitarian assistance should not endanger the fragile ceasefire situation or inflame local tensions. The local DFID office was instrumental in ensuring that both DFID and the wider humanitarian community adapted their tsunami responses to be sensitive to the conflict situation.
77. To ensure that this is what happens DFID does not simply hand over cash, but monitors the funding process closely from start to finish. DFID offers guidance to implementing agencies, through its "Red Book" of humanitarian funding guidelines, on the need to demonstrate proper consideration of issues such as gender equity and targeting of the most vulnerable in projects which they propose to DFID for funding. On gender, DFID would routinely expect to see within a proposal evidence of the participation of women in decision-making processes, and whether women have a voice in the local mechanisms for targeting assistance. DFID endeavours to assess whether funds have been applied accordingly through follow-up monitoring and evaluation.
Q. How can donors deliver humanitarian assistance in ways which, where appropriate, support rather than replace the natural disaster response capacity of recipient country governments?
78. As well as partnerships with IOs and NGOs it is important for donors to have working partnerships with the governments of disaster-affected countries, partnerships which respect and support local capacities rather than supplanting or cutting across them. There is a range of ways to ensure that this happens. As noted above, much of DFID's emergency response is channelled through the UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent system and through NGOs. The UN is active in most disaster prone countries, working on non-emergency, development programmes, usually in partnership with local governments or other local partners. In many countries DFID and other development donors will also already be present; and where DFID does not have a presence there will be UK Government representation through the UK Embassy or High Commission.
79. All this constitutes valuable in-country knowledge and expertise which DFID and other donors can use when it comes to disaster response. Agencies and NGOs already working on development in-country are well placed to handle emergency disaster response and to act as invaluable channels to the national government and to regional and local authorities. They can also ensure good links between emergency response and longer term development and sustainability.
80. For example, the Iranians channelled their national response to the 2003/4 earthquake in Bam largely through their own Iranian Red Crescent Society, as an organisation both well connected with the Government and, through its position within the international Red Cross/Crescent movement, with the international donor network. A substantial part of DFID's response was aimed at supporting the Iranian Red Crescent, as the lead response agency.
Q. To what extent do humanitarian responses to natural disasters undermine or enhance resilience and the ability of people to cope with future disasters?
81. Responses to natural disasters must avoid creating long-term dependency. This is a lesson particularly for the chronic (and all too often acute) climate-induced food insecurities afflicting parts of Africa. The World Food Programme and other agencies have a vital role to play in meeting emergency food needs. But such aid must not undermine indigenous food production or other survival mechanisms. It is now general practice to ensure that emergency, humanitarian aid is not managed in isolation but as the first part of a longer chain - the relief to development continuum, where emergency response aid is designed with longer term coping and developmental needs in view. For example, DFID's and the UN's response to the 2003/4 Iranian earthquake in Bam not only included emergency shelter, health, water and sanitation but assistance to protect and regenerate the important local date farming industry, so important to the area for livelihoods and economic recovery.
Q. Has an appropriate balance been found between the investment in preparedness for and response to natural disasters? What evidence is there that interventions based on natural disaster mitigation and social safety nets have reduced the vulnerability of populations to natural disasters?
82. The potential benefits of investment in disaster risk reduction in general are becoming more widely appreciated. DFID has sought to increase the awareness and profile of disaster risk reduction. DFID's new Disaster Risk Reduction Policy reinforces these efforts. DFID is committed to use 10% of its humanitarian funding for large scale disasters with investment in future disaster risk reduction.
83. DFID has developed a stronger preparedness capacity itself, and built strategic partnerships with key international and regional agencies better to coordinate international operational preparedness.
84. DFID supports preparedness through partnerships with UN, Red Cross and NGO agencies that provide expertise and added value in disaster risk reduction. Additional investment is made in specific disaster management capacity building projects. One example is the flood early warning system and contingency planning which DFID helped the Government of Mozambique develop after the devastating 1999 floods. This system saved lives by enabling informed decisions about when to initiate evacuations and where to relocate vulnerable villages. Reducing the number of false alarms also saved scarce government resources and those of key responding agencies such as the Mozambique Red Cross.
85. Constraints to better preparedness are not necessarily financial. Investment in training, planning and well functioning networks can have a significant impact on preparedness from a relatively modest level of investment.
86. Clear evidence of vulnerability reduction as a result of natural disaster mitigation and social safety nets can be difficult to quantify in absolute terms of loss of life, property and development. DFID is planning to improve understanding of the economic impact of disasters. Through the research opportunities provided by its new Conflict and Humanitarian Fund DFID will support more research into the cost-benefit analysis of disaster risk reduction
Q. Where early warning mechanisms have been put in place, is there evidence that these are effectively informing decisions about intervention?
87. There are several global crisis monitoring systems which are used by DFID and other agencies for early identification of potential new emergencies. These include the World Food Programme (WFP) daily early warning report, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) quarterly early warning report, the monthly Crisis Watch from International Crisis Group, and various UN and private media sources, and several storm tracking systems and seismic alert services. In combination with more detailed reporting and lobbying from UN, Red Cross and NGO staff on the ground, these systems help to identify emergencies early and to inform international response. DFID uses these sources to produce daily and monthly monitoring reports and maintains a situation tracking chart on each emergency.
88. DFID invests in early warning capacity. After the 2004 Asian Tsunami DFID launched an Asia Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy in August 2005 supporting disaster risk reduction initiatives in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Nepal.
Q. What should be the aims of humanitarian assistance? Do humanitarian and development actors understand their respective roles and responsibilities in relation to disaster risk reduction and preparedness and to humanitarian assistance?
89. The aims of humanitarian assistance should be to save lives; reduce, alleviate and prevent suffering; and maintain human dignity - in accordance with the principles of need, impartiality and neutrality already noted.
90. Humanitarian and development actors are developing a stronger understanding of their respective roles. Often those actors are the same, as for example DFID, the UN agencies and many NGOs, combining humanitarian and development understanding and activity within the same actor.
91. DFID is careful to deploy humanitarian assistance in ways which are consistent with and complementary to both longer term development and future disaster preparedness and mitigation.
Q. How effectively do DFID and other development actors analyse the risks to their development programmes posed by natural disasters?
92. There are several global level databases, including the DFID-supported World Bank's Hotspots programme and the UNDP's Disaster Risk Index, which catalogue risks from natural hazards at the regional and national level.
93. Much data is collected or known at the local level, by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for example. But structures are not in place in many disaster-prone developing countries for centralised national data collection. More work is needed to collate and standardise disaster risk data to support development policy and programming.
94. DFID's new policy on Disaster Risk Reduction requires DFID staff in highly disaster-prone countries to take account of the risks of natural disasters in their work. DFID Country Assistance Programme (CAP) guidelines were revised in 2005 to require offices in disaster-prone countries to consider the disaster risks of the country they are working in and, where appropriate, incorporate risk assessments and ways to address risks into their workplans and wider development programming.
95. DFID's commitment to allocate 10% of the funding it provides in response to each natural disaster to prepare for and mitigate the impact of future disasters where this can be done effectively also requires DFID staff to address the impact that the disaster has had on development plans and prepare for and mitigate the impact of future disasters. For example, DFID Pakistan is currently developing a disaster risk reduction strategy to take forward following the earthquake in October 2005. And DFID Bangladesh is planning a climate change and disaster risk screening and assessment of its development portfolio in 2006.
96. Other donors, especially the UN and the World Bank, are now prioritising the assessment of risks posed by natural hazards in their work with developing countries. Progress is being made to include disaster risk reduction measures in Poverty Reduction Strategies in highly disaster-prone countries.
Q. In what planning is DFID engaging to take account of the key threats to their humanitarian programmes, including HIV/AIDS, avian flu and the extreme climatic events which are likely to occur with greater frequency as a result of climate change?
97. DFID contributed to international efforts to develop in-country government, UN, Red Cross and NGO safety net mechanisms during the Southern Africa food crisis 2002-03. This included food and HIV antiretroviral drug reserves in Malawi and across the region, in recognition of the connections between HIV treatment and nutrition. However there is much work to be done to in this area, particularly to ensure that this linkage is well understood.
98. DFID's UN, Conflict and Humanitarian Division took over DFID work on avian/pandemic flu in April 2006. At the Beijing pledging conference in January 2006 the UK committed to providing £20m from DFID through multilateral channels over the next three years to strengthen preparedness in developing countries against avian flu and a potential human pandemic; to consider reprioritisation of DFID country programmes to address avian/pandemic flu, if desired by Governments; and to be willing to provide technical support from other UK Government Departments. Discussions are underway with the World Bank, FAO and WHO on how the £20m might be spent. Funding towards the continued running of the UN System Influenza Co-ordinator unit (UNSIC), headed by Dr David Nabarro, has already been agreed. In addition, DFID contributes to planning within Whitehall, within the EU, within the international system and within the G8 process to strengthen preparedness for avian/pandemic flu in developing countries. DFID is also working within Whitehall on developing a specific disaster response procedure against the contingency of the emergence of a human-to-human strain, with the potential to trigger a pandemic. In January Nigeria was the first country in Africa to have a confirmed case of H5N1. DFID immediately provided 15,000 personal protection kits and a £550,000 grant to WHO to help the Nigerian Government to improve surveillance capacity, asses laboratory requirements and make provision for more equipment and drugs. Q. Can the interaction between development work and humanitarian assistance be improved? How can aid instruments be refined to reduce the binary nature of the relationship between development and humanitarian assistance?
99. There is no simple linear relationship between "humanitarian/emergency/relief" and "development". Reality often requires relief and development activities alongside each other.
100. Humanitarian relief is one of the principal instruments at our disposal to deliver basic social services to vulnerable people in fragile states where the government is unable or unwilling to fulfil this function.
101. Some donors' emergency programmes are run from their capitals as separate entities from their development programmes. In countries with chronic or predictable humanitarian need DFID explicitly wishes to avoid this separation, which is why our humanitarian programme in (e.g.) Uganda is run from Kampala, not from London. This enables us to take a more coherent view and to use resources more effectively than would be possible if the programmes were conceptually separate.
102. DFID recognises that this is an important question that requires more thought bilaterally and internationally. DFID plans to undertake more work over the next year to identify how to ensure that humanitarian action supports the future development of sustainable national capacity, and how best to use humanitarian and development tools together to deliver for poor people in fragile states.
Q. How appropriate is the balance between donor spending on immediate relief work and longer term reconstruction and development? How successfully are transitions between relief, reconstruction and development managed?
103. The average DFID spend on humanitarian response is approx 8% of its total budget but large responses in particular years alter this. DFID allocates funding between relief and development on a bottom-up country-led basis. DFID country teams determine how much of their annual budgets to spend on humanitarian aid and how much to spend on development assistance depending on an analysis of in-country needs and context and what other donors are doing.
104. The transition between relief and development is a long-standing area of concern for donor policy. Very often relief and development interventions are required simultaneously in complex contexts. It is important that donors and agencies provide humanitarian assistance in ways that will strengthen rather than inhibit the development of longer term state capacity to deliver services. Over the next year DFID will prioritise further policy work on the role of humanitarian assistance in fragile states and how humanitarian assistance can best be delivered in a way that is conducive to the longer term development of state capacity. DFID, May 2006 ANNEX 1
DFID'S RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES IN AFRICA Overview
DFID Humanitarian Spending in sub-Saharan Africa, 2000/01-04/05 (£ thousands)
Central and East Africa and the Horn
West Africa and the Sahel
Southern Africa
DFID May 2006 Annex 2
Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship
Endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003
Objectives and definition of humanitarian action
General principles
Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability
(a) Funding
(b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation
(c) Learning and accountability
Annex 3
Example of how DFID responds to a humanitarian crisis
THE FIRST 72 hours after the Pakistan Earthquake
DFID, May 2006
DFID's main humanitarian response activities since 1992
DFID May 2006 [1] Cross refer to fragile states policy |