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10 May 2006
International Development Committee Inquiry into Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters British Red Cross responseSummary of British Red Cross Response1. Ensuring that NEGLECTED EMERGENCIES remain high on the humanitarian agenda of governments and the media is a challenge. We welcome the attention DFID tries to give to such forgotten crises and urge that this continues. Instruments for quick resource allocation like the UN's Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) and the Federation's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) are crucial for emergency responses (11.4; 14.3), but resources are often lacking for longer-term recovery programmes (17.3). 2. The role of governments in ensuring understanding of and support for NEUTRAL INDEPENDENT HUMANITARIAN ACTION is paramount, particularly in complex emergencies where areas of conflict and natural disasters fall together such as seen during the Pakistan earthquake, the tsunami, and ongoing in Darfur (16.1; 16.2). 3. IMPLEMENTING THE LESSONS LEARNT FROM EVALUATIONS in disaster response remains a challenge (12.8). Lessons drawn from evaluations have enabled some significant improvements in humanitarian responses, particularly around the assessment of humanitarian needs and the timeliness and quality of disaster response for rapid onset disasters such as earthquakes. However, identification and implementation of lessons has been less effective in slow onset disasters such as food crises. 4. Ongoing efforts to REFORM the INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM must prioritise enabling an effective response at the local level not least by strengthening mechanisms and capacities for good cooperation and coordination. There is a risk that much of the effort concentrates at the capital city level, and that funds are channelled mainly through the UN system, yet the other 'pillars' of the humanitarian system (NGOs and RC/RC Movement) are key elements for the delivery of humanitarian aid. There is a risk that prioritisation of the CERF may lead to their marginalisation at local level (14.2). 5. We observe a trend towards increasing USE OF MILITARY ASSETS in response to natural disasters. While recognising that is appropriate in particular circumstances to reinforce the humanitarian capacity, we have concerns over the use of military assets becoming a 'default' position. We urge that this should be exceptional and a last resort (15.1). 6. We stress the importance of donors and agencies investing into both PREPAREDNESS for response and PREVENTION of disasters. We are pleased to see DFID commitment to providing up to 10% of its funding for disaster risk reduction (see 11.5 and 18.1). There is growing evidence that disaster preparedness at local level pays off (17.1). 7. DFID plays an important and influential role amongst the humanitarian community which we welcome. In particular, its leadership in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHD) has certainly contributed to the progress of that important initiative. However, it is still difficult to gauge the impact of GHD as many of the commitments made at the Stockholm meeting in 2003 have not yet translated into routine concrete changes at the field level (12.9).
AcronymsBRC British Red Cross CERF Central Emergency Revolving Fund DEC Disaster Emergency Committee DDR Disaster Risk Reduction DREF Disaster Relief Emergency Fund EWS Early Warning System GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship HRR Humanitarian Response Review INGOs International Non Governmental Organisations ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross NGOs Non Governmental Organisations UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Background on the British Red Cross8. The British Red Cross helps people in crisis, whoever and wherever they are. We are part of a global network of volunteer based organisations that respond to conflicts, natural disasters and individual emergencies. We enable vulnerable people in the UK and abroad to prepare for and withstand emergencies in their own communities. And when the crisis is over, we help them to recover and move on with their lives.
9. The British Red Cross (BRC) is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the RC/RC Movement), which comprises: 9.1. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 9.2. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (the Federation), and 9.3. More than 183 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies worldwide
10. The British Red Cross is pleased to have the opportunity to provide this written statement to the Inquiry Into Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters. We are responding to this inquiry as the British Red Cross, but we refer throughout to work conducted with, or by, other parts of the Movement. Response of the British Red Cross to the Inquiry
Initial disaster response and the international humanitarian system
11. How do INGOs, national NGOs, the media, parliamentarians and the public influence DFID's decision-making and responses to natural disasters?
11.1. We suggest that the following are key factors that influence whether or not DFID responds to natural disasters: 11.1.1. The quality, accuracy and speed of assessments on the ground provided by key actors, including the RC/RC Movement. Quality information in principle allows donors like DFID to allocate resources on the basis of priority needs. The balance between speed and meeting humanitarian needs can be a difficult one to ensure especially in a rapid onset emergency and occasionally even in a slow onset emergency. Reasons for this include significant security constraints or the complexity of the crisis; for example in 2002/3 in Southern Africa where the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic upon household economic security demanded new approaches of assessments. 11.1.2. The attention the media gives to a disaster. Arguably the intense coverage of the tsunami, the crisis in Niger and the Pakistan earthquake played a strong role in both the generosity of the response of the British public as well as the British government. We respect the fact that this is not the only factor in DFID's decision-making. For example, despite low media coverage of the current East Africa food crisis, DFID has been very engaged and sought to contribute appropriately. 11.1.3. National/global politics: Examples include consideration of big diaspora groups (the example of the Gujarat earthquake) or - arguably - the response to the Pakistan earthquake for reasons of global politics 11.1.4. Good collaboration among the major players. In this respect the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) plays an important role in not only coordinating the fundraising efforts of its member agencies but also in building up some momentum if not pressure towards a response from government. During the tsunami a number of governments - including the British government - appeared to be scaling up their initial contribution in response to perceived public pressure, the generosity of the public and the efforts of NGOs and the Red Cross, rather than on the basis of an assessment of needs. 11.2. Information on disasters from independent sources like the RC/RC Movement is particularly important in situations where DFID does not have its own direct field presence or access. Examples include the 2005 South Asian earthquake, where DFID benefited from information provided by the ICRC on areas where DFID had no access, as well as similar quality information following the 2003 Bam earthquake in Iran.
11.3. There are also a few examples where the availability of quality information on natural disasters indicates no requirement for international resources to be mobilised. An example is the timely Red Cross information provided on the 2006 mud slides in the Philippines. In this case the response had been sufficiently covered at the national level, and there was no need for DFID or other donors working internationally to release funds. There are also occasions when we think that DFID should have responded but decided not to, for example the 2004 Eritrea emergency drought appeal where we believe that there was a good assessment of needs and an appropriate/robust intervention being proposed. Sometimes, DFID may decide not to support small scale disasters, as was the case recently with the floods in Romania. We recognise the bureaucracy required by DFID to support small scale disaster responses, however, such funding is critical and we believe DFID should maintain appropriate levels of funding for small scale as well as large scale disasters, particularly when funding from other donors is not forthcoming. Therefore, as mentioned elsewhere in this paper, we would encourage DFID to maintain and even increase support to the Federation's DREF.
11.4. Given the important role media coverage plays in attracting resources for disaster response, the humanitarian system has a huge challenge in responding to neglected or forgotten emergencies such as the ones in DR Congo or Northern Uganda. We welcome the attention DFID is trying to give to such forgotten crises and urge that this continues to be supported. One instrument available for responding fast, at least initially to low media profile disasters are central funds such as the UN's new Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). The Federation has for several years managed the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF), the basic model of which is the same as the CERF and exists to ensure that National Societies are able to respond immediately. DREF has been and should continue to be supported with DFID funds especially given positive recent evaluation findings with regard to its effectiveness.
11.5. The RC/RC Movement has consistently engaged in a humanitarian policy dialogue with DFID, and in particular around the importance of disaster preparedness and risk reduction which is consistently highlighted by independent and multi-agency evaluations and reviews. We are therefore very pleased to see DFID's recent commitment to providing up to 10% of its funding for disaster risk reduction.
12. Are lessons drawn from evaluations applied during later responses? What impact has the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative had on practices?
12.1. We have seen evaluation practice improve in recent years and most particularly since the 1996 Joint Evaluation of the Emergency Assistance to Rwanda drew public attention to recurring issues. There are several positive examples where lessons from evaluations have been clearly applied in later responses as documented in the series of DEC multi-agency evaluations.
12.2. A regular finding from evaluations is the weakness of needs assessment practice. These findings have been taken on board by the Federation, which, with support from the British Red Cross, has developed practical guidelines that are now being used more systematically in disaster situations. We have, for example, seen more systematic Federation needs assessments and more rapid communication of data and analysis during the 2003 Bam and 2005 Pakistan earthquake response operations.
12.3. Another issue that is frequently highlighted in evaluations is the need for better coordination. We have seen better coordination among parts of the RC/RC Movement during recent operations such as the Pakistan earthquake response both internally within the RC/RC Movement and externally with the responsible Government actors, other humanitarian organisations and Donors. Moreover, UNOCHA under the leadership of Jan Egeland has been making credible efforts to strengthen coordination mechanisms, especially among governmental actors and donors. Of particular importance is the need to establish clear agreements and mechanisms for in-country coordination. Governments should continue to support UNOCHA efforts in this regard. The RC/RC Movement is willing to participate in such coordination mechanisms, while insisting that its neutrality and independence must be acknowledged and respected.
12.4. We suggest that important progress has been made in the humanitarian sector in recent years. Greater concern for quality and accountability has had an overall benefit for humanitarian responses. In the case of the RC/RC Movement, we see significant improvements in the quality of disaster response, as documented in various evaluation reports such as the 1998 Hurricane Mitch response, the 2005 World Disasters Report - which says that by end January 2005 the humanitarian system had ensured that all affected persons had received immediate assistance - and the British Red Cross Society's Tsunami learning review which emphasises progress since Bam.
12.5. However, there is still much that could be done to systematically review and implement the learning of lessons from one response to another and donors need to be prepared to support agencies in this learning. DFID sets a good example for other donors in this regard, and has consistently offered support to quality and accountability initiatives. These include the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership-International (HAP-I), promoting accountability to the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance through self-regulation mechanisms, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), a sector-wide network which aims to promote a culture of learning across the humanitarian sector in order to improve performance, and the Sphere Project setting out the Humanitarian Charter, which describes the rights of people affected by disasters, and the minimum standards and key indicators for humanitarian response, developed through an extensive collaboration.
12.6. A particular challenge is to demonstrate learning during an ongoing response. Our experience is that real time evaluations that provide feedback to the concerned implementers as they manage a response are a useful tool for learning and improving practice. We thus recommend increasing usage of this tool provided that it is understood and used appropriately by professionals with demonstrated skill. Another challenge, particularly important with real-time evaluations, is to communicate to the media and the public complex messages from evaluations in an accurate and intelligible manner, and to ensure that these messages are not deformed, oversimplified, or used out of context by the media.
12.7. A specific lesson learnt - and an area where operational practice needs to improve - is the importance of involvement of and accountability towards beneficiaries. The World Disasters Report 2005 gives a much-quoted example of some beneficiaries receiving twelve cooking pots as a result of inadequate consultation with beneficiaries in fast moving situations as well as too little coordination amongst the involved agencies. These situations happen too often in disaster responses. Despite progresses made by humanitarian agencies, including the BRC, we recognise that there is still much to be done in practice. We are encouraged by DFID's commitments in that respect and hope to see DFID and other donors providing support to agencies wishing to develop tools and training.
12.8. Ensuring improvement of humanitarian response has been more straightforward and more effective in situations of rapid onset disasters such as earthquakes than in situations of slow onset disasters such as food crises caused by factors such as drought but is often not just a product of one such factor. It is more difficult to assess needs and vulnerabilities in such slow onset situations: these scenarios can not be understood through "snapshot assessments"; they require more sophisticated and multi-layered analyses reflecting on causes from household to National Government level and the response should be both to short-term as well as longer-term needs and vulnerabilities. We are seeing this currently in the African food security crises where all humanitarian actors are engaged in a complex analysis of the causal factors and struggling to translate this into meaningful appeals for funding and into actual humanitarian action. This includes the difficulties of ensuring that the humanitarian community speaks with one voice with regard to the severity of the situation as was illustrated in the divergent analyses of the level of needs in the case of the 2005 Niger food crisis. We recognise the challenges faced by donors that are required to make funding decisions in the midst of such complexity. We do not see quick fixes in this context, and encourage donors to take the necessary time and make use of professional expertise to better understand and define an evolving response to such situations.
12.9. The Good Humanitarian Donor (GHD) Initiative is an important endeavour on the part of donor governments as it clearly articulates the commitments made by donors regarding the funding of humanitarian aid, and in particular their commitment to adhere to humanitarian principles. The RC/RC Movement has been consistently supportive of the GHD and, though we see little new in the avowed Principles and Practice, have been pleased by their reaffirmation at Donor level and most particularly to the commitments with regard to independent humanitarian space. However, it is still difficult to gauge the impact of GHD as many of the commitments made at the Stockholm meeting in 2003 have not yet translated into routine concrete changes at the field level as most are still being piloted in the 2005/6 work plan. Importantly the Red Cross has benefited from DFID's commitment to the coordinated and harmonised reporting practices during the last year and hope that the commitment expressed by DFID and other donors in Stockholm can be pursued and maintained. We look forward to seeing similar visible progress on the other commitments and feel that DFID pursued these actively as the recent Chair of GHD.
13. How useful have recent reviews of the capacity, effectiveness and flexibility of the international humanitarian system been?
13.1. We are supportive of the recent reviews of the international humanitarian system, and feels that it is appropriate that DFID continues to follow this process. Much of the focus of discussion since the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) has been largely on the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the Cluster system. Other recommendations from the HRR need to be followed through. We are in particular concerned about paying more attention to the need for strong country level coordination of humanitarian response and about addressing coordination and implementation weaknesses in situations where host governments may be weak and or unwilling to cooperate.
13.2. The 2005 Report on Integrated Missions[1], an independent study commissioned by the UN expanded Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Core Group has highlighted some of the challenges associated with integrated missions. While recognising that integrated missions promote stronger coordination and dialogue amongst different actors, the RC/RC Movement is concerned with the uncritical use of this model in a growing number of contexts. There is a particular 'humanitarian dilemma' inherent to most integrated missions, whereby the subordination of humanitarian action to political or military goals means that populations may perceive the humanitarian agencies as instruments of foreign policy agendas. This translates into security risks for personnel working in international organisations, and is against the fundamental principles of impartial and independent humanitarian aid. This is particularly the case in countries with ongoing conflicts or violence, such as Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo.
14. Are proposals (including those from HMG) for the reform of the international humanitarian system realistic and comprehensive? Are they likely to affect the responsiveness of the public and government to future humanitarian funding appeals?
14.1. We believe that it is too early to gauge the success and effectiveness of the UN humanitarian reform as none of the proposed reforms have yet been fully tested. The Cluster approach was used in 2005 South Asian earthquake, but not during the first few weeks of the response, and therefore it is not possible to fully measure the effectiveness of the approach. However, we would like to highlight a few issues that we believe are important:
14.2. There is a risk that much of the effort concentrates at the capital city level rather than upon the actual field delivery of humanitarian aid with daily meetings of different cluster groups requiring key personnel present in the capital and inhibiting travel to the field. It also encourages a perception (as expressed by field staff in the Pakistan response) that donor accountability and information flow outwards should be prioritised over beneficiary accountability. There is a real concern about the overall capacity of the 'humanitarian system' to deliver and organisations are often stretched, particularly at times of major disasters. Ensuring that resources are not only used for reinforcing bureaucracies and taking full account of local capacities appear important in this context. Similarly, there are real concerns that funds are committed mainly through the UN system, and that the two other pillars (the NGOs and the RC/RC Movement) may not receive a timely and adequate flow of funds.
14.3. As mentioned earlier, we welcome DFID's sustained concern for forgotten emergencies. Supporting the CERF is a step in the right direction - however, it is only up to a third of CERF funds that may be dedicated to 'forgotten emergencies' and it represents a small portion of the overall humanitarian aid flows. In 2005, more than half the allocations from DREF were to fund response operations to small or minor emergencies for which no emergency appeal was launched, often in situations where donor interest is not forthcoming. The number of minor or silent emergencies funded through DREF rose from 29 to 61 in 2005. Support to DREF is vital, to allow the fund to continue supporting forgotten emergencies, as well as to start up immediate response.
15. What should be the role of the military and civil defence actors in humanitarian responses?
15.1. Hilary Benn's speech at the United Nations in New York in January 2006 on "Humanitarian and conflict reform - an emergency service for the world" refers to the vital role of military assets in the provision of humanitarian assistance after recent disasters. We are observing a trend towards increasing use of military assets in response to natural disasters, for instance in the responses to the Asian tsunami and the South Asian earthquake. While recognising that is appropriate in particular circumstances to reinforce the humanitarian capacity, we have concerns over the use of military assets becoming a 'default' position. We urge that this should be exceptional and a last resort, as stated in the IASC Reference Paper[2] and the OCHA "Oslo guidelines[3]". The most important danger we see is that the neutrality (or perception of neutrality) of humanitarian assistance may be compromised, and as a result, humanitarian access may be jeopardised. This is particularly true in situations of conflict or internal tension such as Afghanistan, where the provision of humanitarian assistance by some Provincial Reconstruction Teams may blur the distinction between humanitarian and military action.
15.2. An argument sometimes used to justify the use of military in relief operations is that of cost effectiveness. There is to date no supportive evidence that demonstrates that aid by the militaries is more cost-effective than by humanitarian agencies. This is a matter that has been repeatedly documented in the NGO Military Contact Group, hosted and chaired by the BRC, and we have asked HMG to provide such evidence, but no data has been made available so far.
Vulnerability and disaster preparedness
16. How do donors ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered equitably (in terms of gender, ethnicity, caste etc.), and does not exacerbate existing inequalities?
16.1. Impartiality is a fundamental principle of the RC/RC Movement. It is clearly stated in the Code of Conduct and in the Humanitarian Charter. This principle entails that aid "be given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind" (as stated in the Code of Conduct), i.e. without discrimination. Similarly, the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative commits donor governments to adhere to the humanitarian core principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. It is the responsibility of both humanitarian aid agencies and donors to ensure that these principles are adhered to in practice. We support the use of the Code of Conduct as a reference framework in recent DEC evaluations.
16.2. Humanitarian assistance has been criticised for exacerbating inequalities, and sometimes conflict, and for 'doing more harm than good'. The RC/RC Movement has developed the Better Programming Initiative tool, inspired by Mary Anderson's "Do no Harm" work, to analyse the potential impact of programming interventions on social cohesion. This tool has been applied in local programming in a number of contexts including Nepal and Bangladesh. The "Securing Safe Access framework" developed by the ICRC is also used in conflict-affected areas to analyse how the Red Cross is perceived by various groups, and the independence and neutrality of the assistance it provides in order to ensure that national Red Cross societies can secure and maintain access to those affected by conflict.
17. How can donors deliver humanitarian assistance in ways which support the disaster response capacity of recipient country governments?
17.1. Humanitarian organisations often overlook the importance of the local responses, particularly in the case of sudden onset disasters, as discussed in the World Disasters Report 2004. In most cases, local populations, organisations and/or local government are the first to respond to situation of natural disasters. It is therefore very important to emphasise the need and challenge of disaster preparedness at the local level. The 183 Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies around the world are key players in strengthening the local response capacity. There are several success stories that demonstrate that mitigation and preparedness pay, as documented in the 2002 World Disaster Report: in four drought-affected Indian states, the building and restoration of rainwater-harvesting structures (check dams, and community and household tanks) has rejuvenated local water courses and helped an estimated 20,000 villages to grow crops and maintain water supplies; the Bangladesh cyclone preparedness programmes have successfully reduced the number of victims as detailed below under 12.2; and in the 1999 floods in Viet Nam, only one out of 2,450 flood- and typhoon-resistant homes, built by the Red Cross, succumbed (WDR 2002 p. 15). The 2005 IFRC South Asia Floods Participatory Action learning Study showed that in Nepal, in villages supported by the Nepalese Red Cross Society with community-based disaster preparedness, community disaster funds were used to purchase food for up to two weeks for those affected, which lasted until outside help could reach the stranded villages; the same study showed that in India, investments in stocks of basic household items and regional warehouses allowed rapid despatch to 40,000 families in Assam and Bihar states.
17.2. It is recognised that inappropriate humanitarian responses may negatively affect people's capacity to cope with future disasters. For example, people are exposed to risks if they are re-housed in unsafe places like flood planes instead of more appropriate locations. Customarily funds come in two tranches (relief/recovery). We believe that donors such as DFID should plan for funding in three tranches (relief/stabilisation/recovery) to ensure that recovery properly planned in consultation with beneficiaries and national government and to ensure that issues such as land rights properly addressed.
17.3. We believe that resource allocations from the international humanitarian aid system tend to favour emergency responses, sometimes to the detriment of longer-term recovery needs. This may reduce people's capacity to cope with future disasters. Both Donors and agencies need to demonstrate longer term commitment to recovery and appropriate exit strategies.
18. Has an appropriate balance been found between investment in disaster preparedness and disaster response?
18.1. We welcome DFID's commitment to mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in DFID development assistance as outlined in the recently launched Disaster Risk Reduction Policy paper. In particular we welcome DFID's commitment to provide 10% of its funding to disaster preparedness/risk reduction post-disaster Currently, much more funding goes into disaster response, while only an estimated 5% is spent on preparedness.
18.2. In particular, we recommend that DFID provides support to strengthen international and national capacity to mainstream DRR as well as sustain and increase support to civil society organisations that are supporting local disaster resilience.
18.3. In many countries, the RC/RC Movement is very active in community-based disaster risk reduction work through its networks and activities at the community level. The World Disasters Report of 2002 references initiatives in Bangladesh, Nepal, Guatemala, Mozambique, the Pacific islands, Vietnam and Iceland through a range of mechanisms including early warning, appropriate housing, mangrove planting and first aid and with a range of partners including communities, community based organisations and local government. The sustaining of such initiatives is a constant challenge and requires continuing support from Donors.
19. Have early warning mechanisms effectively informed decisions about intervention?
19.1. Great progress has been made over the past few decades in national and regional early warning systems (EWS) for food crises, including Fewsnet and VAM. Generally accurate predictions of impending crises at national and district levels are translated in to increasingly accurate recommendations for appropriate preparedness measures and response interventions in times of crisis. However, our experience is that early warning mechanisms generally fail to trigger appropriate and timely humanitarian responses, particularly in the case of slow onset disasters. As experienced in the 2005 Niger food crisis, the response was not informed by the early warning mechanisms or available information in place (the locust invasion followed by a high food insecurity situation gave early sign of a degradation) but by increased media attention.
19.2. This relative failure of early warning mechanisms is due in part to the quality and type of information (often macro-information that does not capture the specificity of particular sub-national areas, or does not capture the complexity of livelihood systems), and in part to the lack of willingness from the international community to react in a timely and appropriate manner in some parts of the world. It is also often related to the emergence of new factors, such as HIV/AIDS in the 2002/3 Southern Africa Crisis, which can complicate the analysis and lead to hesitation about what an appropriate humanitarian response should be. This is further complicated by the complexity of the international system with a lack of shared understanding as to where the ultimate responsibility for lack of timely response lies.
19.3. However, EWS are not only meant to trigger donor response. They prove very useful in some circumstances to warn populations of potential natural disasters. In the Caribbean forecasting by meteorological offices for hurricane strikes is well developed. In many cases this is well connected to national preparedness systems to disseminate the information to the local level and ensure that people are evacuated to safe places. For example during Hurricane George in Cuba in 1999, a Category 5 hurricane, there were only a handful of deaths due to a highly organised response led by the government at national and local level. In Bangladesh, deaths from cyclones have been drastically reduced mainly due to the joint government/Red Cross early warning system which links meteorological forecasts through an independent radio network to local level volunteers who spread the message "the last mile" to those affected and help them to evacuate. Deaths have fallen from 500,000 in 1970 to 140,000 in 1991 and a few thousand during the 1997 cyclone.
Development and Humanitarian Assistance
20. How appropriate is the balance between donor spending on immediate relief work and longer-term reconstruction and development? How successfully are transitions between relief, reconstruction and development managed?
20.1. Generally, we believe that significant improvements have been made in terms of responding to immediate needs, with live saving responses, partly as a result of better and more systematic assessment of immediate needs and as a result of better technical response and logistics. We now intend to apply the same concentration to improving the quality of recovery assessments, consultations and response through capturing and communication lessons learnt in real time in Bam, the Tsunami and Pakistan. Recent trends in funding have allowed agencies more flexibility in recovery response and will facilitate an increased quality of response. In neglected emergencies the transition to recovery can prove challenging for agencies as new partners with the required skills and experience fail to arrive and the appropriate funding streams with the required flexibility do not come on time or at all.
20.2. Donors are often constrained through their budget lines and there is little room for flexibility to support recovery work. Innovative financial models for resource allocation, with budgets going beyond the constraints of financial years, would be a useful way to give greater flexibility to the humanitarian response in transitional phases. Often, there is not sufficient flexibility in terms of allowing sufficient time for transition: for instance, reconstruction work takes minimum of three years, as experienced in the Asian tsunami response. The DEC Tsunami evaluation noted that we ought to think of three phases, with greater emphasis on recovery/reconstruction phase.
21. For any queries about this submission, or for further information please contact Moira Reddick, Head of International Programme Advisory and Development, on 020 7877 7196 or at MReddick@redcross.org.uk or Corinne Evans, Public Affairs Adviser, on 020 7877 7051 or at CorinneEvans@redcross.org.uk
[1] Eide E B, Kaspersen A T, Kent R, von Hippel K, 2005, "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group" [2] "Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies - an IASC Reference Paper", 28 June 2004. [3] "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief", United Nations, DHA Geneva, May 1994 |