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UK Government Response to questions submitted by the International Development Committee
Darfur: The responsibility to protect
Tracking/follow-up questions put by the Committee to HMG in relation to the report (Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect, 5th Report of Session 2004-05, HC 67-I). The numbers refer to the paragraph numbers used by HMG in its response to the Committee [CM 6576]
4. The international community chose to ignore the early warnings of NGOs and senior UN officials. Other factors - poor access, continuing insecurity, a flawed humanitarian system, and an unfavourable political context - played a part too, but by ignoring the warnings, the international community helped to ensure that the initial humanitarian response to Darfur was, as Médecins Sans Frontières put it, "a staggering failure". (Paragraph 15)
We agree that the international community was too slow. It is important to learn lessons from Darfur to improve the response there now and to future crises. In August 2004, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland, in a joint effort with agencies of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, commissioned a real-time evaluation to strengthen the humanitarian response in Darfur and future crises of a similar nature. We have looked, and will continue to look carefully at the recommendations made by the evaluation, and their implementation. The crisis and response in Darfur prompted the Secretary of State for International Development's proposals for reform of the humanitarian system. These were launched in December 2004, and will be a key part of our Presidencies of the G8 and the EU this year.
What mechanisms have been put in place, by the UK and others, to ensure that the lessons of Darfur are learnt and applied in future crises? What recommendations did the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's evaluation make? When will these recommendations be implemented? Can the IDC be provided with a copy of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Report? What progress has been made with reforming the international humanitarian system?
As demonstrated in Darfur, the humanitarian community can only offer limited protection to civilians. The primary responsibility for the protection of vulnerable populations lies with the government. Where governments are unwilling or unable to exercise their responsibility, the international community should act to prevent or stop the worst atrocities. The 2005 Millennium Review Summit endorsed this concept, and for the first time world leaders agreed that they were prepared to take collective action. This includes using political and diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and, should peaceful means be inadequate, military action through the Security Council. This agreement is not an end in itself, but gives the international community another tool for tackling gross human rights violations.
It was the crisis and response in Darfur, and the need to learn lessons and apply them in future crises that prompted the Secretary of State for International Development to propose reforms of the humanitarian system.
· Darfur demonstrated that UN agencies need access to rapid funding.
- The Millennium Review Summit in September confirmed the transformation of the UN Central Emergency Revolving Fund from a $50 million loan facility to a more substantial grant facility to which $160 million has been pledged so far - including $70 million by the UK. This fund will enable UN humanitarian agencies to respond quickly to breaking crises. - Pilots to channel pooled donor funding through the UN Humanitarian Coordinator are being developed in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Please see the Government's response to recommendation 27 below for further details.
· It was clear from Darfur that better coordination of humanitarian assistance is required.
- The Humanitarian Response Review will lead to improvement of sector coordination. Please see the Government's response to recommendation 16 below for further details. - DFID is also working with the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Development Group to improve the quality, recruitment, training and retention of UN Humanitarian Coordinators. Proposals on this will be made to the December meeting of the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC).
· Lack of data hindered the humanitarian response in Darfur.
- DFID is supporting work by the World Health Organisation and OCHA to improve tracking of key humanitarian outcomes, particularly mortality and nutrition trends. These will be critical to enable improved needs assessment, coverage and monitoring and evaluation. The work will be presented at a major DFID-funded international meeting in Geneva in December.
The IASC real-time evaluation has produced three reports over the last year. Copies of all three reports are attached for the IDC. The reports make a large number of recommendations. In particular, DFID has followed up on the performance and staffing of the UN Department of Safety and Security, the nutrition and health surveillance system, and clarifying roles and responsibilities of different UN agencies for protection of IDPs. Improvements are being made in these areas. 5. The UK Government deserves credit for its speedy and generous response to the crisis in Darfur. The EC/ECHO and the USA deserve praise too. Particularly noteworthy is the EC's early support for the AU's work in Darfur. Other donors, including other European countries, should have done more. Arab countries have donated 2.5 percent of the total, mainly through in-kind bilateral humanitarian aid. This is disappointing. The donor response to Darfur has, after a slow start, been very good. But huge needs remain across Sudan and elsewhere. (Paragraph 16)
We welcome the IDC's recognition of the role the UK has played in responding to the crisis. We agree that, despite the UK's efforts to increase the international community's response, many other donors could have done more. There are still big gaps - the UN 2005 Workplan is now 40% funded, with US$617 million of the required US$1.6 billion pledged or received so far. There were some successes however, and the UK was instrumental in securing EUR92 million from the EU's Peace Facility for the AU. The 11-12 April Oslo Donor's conference for Sudan was highly successful with US$4.5 billion of new funding pledged by donors over the next 2-3 years. Although we await final result, pledges made at the Oslo Conference could raise UN 2005 Workplan funding to US$1-1.1 billion.
What is the funding situation now, for Darfur, and for the South of Sudan? Have commitments been delivered? Which countries are failing to deliver what they promised?
The UN 2005 Workplan for Sudan is now 50% funded. After revisions, the total required has risen to US$1.97 billion (£1.1 billion). US$988 million (£558 million) has been pledged or received so far, close to the level we expected following the Oslo Conference. Of this total, US$524 million (£296 million) has gone to Darfur, US$300 million (£169 million) to Southern Sudan, and the remainder to the rest of Sudan or national programmes. The Workplan does not cover all requirements. For example NGOs and the Red Cross have significant programmes that are funded outside the Workplan.
Pledges made at Oslo were for funding over 2-3 years, and we have not analysed the extent to which other countries have delivered on their promises. The UK is frontloading its disbursal of its pledge of £288.7 million over three years. £70 million has been disbursed so far, and we anticipate this figure will rise to over £110 million by the end of this first financial year.
Very large humanitarian needs will remain in Sudan through 2006. Ensuring sufficient funding levels will be a big challenge, and we will continue to work with other donors to ensure early and appropriate contributions are made.
10. All organisations tasked with the delivery of humanitarian supplies, including the WFP, must be well-supported by the donors at an early stage. If they are to deliver adequate supplies at the right time, then this is essential. In return for donor support, the organisations must deliver. The WFP must do all it can to ensure that adequate food supplies are in place before demand peaks in August this year. (Paragraph 23)
We welcome this recommendation. As of 25 April, the 2005 WFP Emergency Operation for Darfur was 60% funded, facing a shortfall of US$186 million. WFP have made progress pre-positioning food in advance of the rainy season, and had some 26,000 MT of food pre-positioned in West Darfur by the end of April. However WFP are preparing to provide emergency food assistance for over 3 million people at the peak of the hunger period from July to October - up from 2.1 million target beneficiaries in April. The UK has provided around £11 million to WFP this year for both food aid and logistics as part of its £45 million contribution to humanitarian components of the UN Workplan.
What is the UK's assessment of WFP's performance during the 2005 rainy season? Has WFP been provided with sufficient resources?
WFP has performed well during the rainy season. Despite logistical constraints (including fuel shortages) and insecurity, WFP has established effective supply lines, scaled up its capacity to move and distribute adequate food, and has stockpiled food in predetermined areas. WFP distributed food to 2.5 million beneficiaries in September 2005 compared with 1.3 million in September 2004.
Fieldwork for the second annual interagency Food Security and Nutritional Assessment for Darfur has been completed. Preliminary results indicate a major improvement in the nutrition situation in Darfur. Global Acute Malnutrition was found to be 11.9%, compared with 21.8% in 2004. Severe Acute Malnutrition stands at 1.4%, compared with 3.9% last year. These improvements can be accounted for in part by the improved WFP beneficiary rates.
The budget for WFP's 2005 Darfur Emergency Operations Programme is US$562 million (£317 million). WFP has so far received US$414 million (£233 million), and has taken an additional US$15 million (£8 million) internal loan. While this is still some way short of WFP's original budget, it has enabled WFP to operate effectively in Darfur. We are concerned however, that the loans WFP have taken could have knock-on effects for funding next year. We are working with WFP to maintain donor funding for its operations in Sudan next year.
14. Donors, NGOs and UN agencies should give serious consideration to investing more in training and skills development for humanitarian staff from the developing world, so that the capacity of the humanitarian system can be enhanced. (Paragraph 29)
We agree with the recommendation. We are open to proposals that DFID can support in this regard, and are ready to work with others to take this forward. We also look forward to the Humanitarian Response Review, commissioned by the UN Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, which will look at improvements in humanitarian response capacity, and which we are co-funding.
Has DFID received any proposals - and supportable proposals - along the lines mentioned? What work has DFID done with others to take this forward? Has the Humanitarian Response Review concluded? What did it recommend? When will its recommendations be implemented? Can the IDC be provided with a copy of the Humanitarian Response Review?
This year DFID has established a Conflict and Humanitarian Fund to support NGOs working in the conflict and humanitarian sectors. Through this fund, DFID is providing £2.5 million core funding over five years to the NGO RedR, whose work includes training humanitarian staff from the developing world. RedR is currently training NGO staff in Sudan, for which we are providing over £500,000 additional funding. We have not received any other proposals to fund training of humanitarian staff, but would consider applications to the fund for such work.
The Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) report was issued in August 2005. The report identifies a number of significant gaps in the international humanitarian response system. It notes that a number of initiatives are underway to address these gaps, and is broadly consistent with the Secretary of State's proposals for humanitarian reform (please see the Government's response to recommendation 4 above for further details). The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is taking forward the HRR report's recommendations. The most significant recommendation is that individual agencies will take responsibility for delivery in certain key sectors. Please see the Government's response to recommendation 16 below for the division of responsibility amongst agencies. Lead agencies are now developing plans to strengthen human resource capacity in their sectors.
Other key recommendations of the report cover humanitarian response performance benchmarks, assessment of response capacities by sector, strengthening UN Humanitarian Coordinators, and improved timeliness and predictability of humanitarian funding.
A copy of the Humanitarian Response Review report is attached for the IDC.
16. If the international community is to be able to fulfil its responsibility to protect, it must act now to ensure that it is able to deal effectively with crises involving IDPs. Ad hoc arrangements will not see duties adequately fulfilled. To respond to IDPs' needs with excuses about institutional mandates would be laughable if it did not have such tragic human consequences. (Paragraph 32)
It is clear that we need to find a better way of assisting and protecting IDPs than we have collectively achieved in Darfur, where the lack of clear responsibility has led to confusion and poor delivery. The key issue must be effective provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs, not the official mandate of any particular organisation. The international community must be able to provide coordinated humanitarian assistance tailored to people's needs, irrespective of whether they are refugees, IDPs or residents. The international community has agreed that a coordinated, collaborative approach where different agencies and NGOs work together under an OCHA lead (see below) is the most suitable way of dealing with IDP situations. We are working with the UN and others on how to make this approach more effective, and will monitor its effectiveness closely to see where additional work needs to be done. We cannot afford the same sort of incoherent and slow response we have seen in Darfur to happen elsewhere. OCHA's Internal Displacement Division and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator should lead the overall coordination of a collaborative response for IDPs. We are working with OCHA to improve their capacity to provide this coordination role. We are also funding the UN Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs, and the Global IDP Project, which provides information on IDPs across the world. These should contribute to a better understanding of the needs of IDPs, and how these needs should be met.
The UK's humanitarian reform initiative will lead to a more effective collaborative approach through promoting stronger leadership and coordination, and providing more ready access to funding. We will continue to monitor how the collaborative approach evolves, and to keep the need for more radical change under close review.
What progress has been made with improving the way in which the international humanitarian system addresses the needs of IDPs?
Following the Humanitarian Response Review, UN agencies have agreed - subject to approval by their governing bodies - to take lead responsibility for particular clusters of work. While lead agencies will not necessarily implement the work themselves, they will be responsible and accountable to the UN humanitarian system for ensuring that the work is done. The list of lead agencies is as follows:
This division of lead responsibilities amongst UN agencies is positive and significant step towards better-coordinated and more accountable support to IDPs. 17. The UK Government should - on behalf of the UK taxpayers who help to fund the agencies - find out why UNHCR and UNICEF were unwilling to take on the responsibility for the management of IDP camps in Darfur. (Paragraph 33)
We agree with the Committee's recommendation and are following up with UNHCR and UNICEF. The proposals we have put forward for reform of the humanitarian system would help to address this.
What response did HMG get from UNHCR and UNICEF?
When UNHCR increased its presence in Darfur in August 2004, many agencies were already managing IDP camps. UNHCR therefore opted to focus its work on filling protection gaps affecting IDPs inside and outside of camps. It said that while camp management is a necessary temporary measure, protection and assistance are even more important, particularly for IDPs who are outside camps, residents hosting IDPs, and the few refugees returning from Chad. UNHCR's approach is to try to reduce the levels of displacement, to look for a durable solution, and to help avoid the long-term dependency on camps. However, since July 2005, UNHCR has increased its operations in IDP camps in West Darfur, and has taken on joint responsibility of camp coordination with OCHA.
UNICEF is the technical lead in four sectors: child protection, nutrition, education and water and sanitation. Effectiveness of camp management depends in a large part on how well these sectors are coordinated. However, UNICEF's performance, particularly in water and sanitation, has been poor. It does not have the technical competency, capacity or experience for camp management, and we would not want UNICEF to take on the additional burden. We are working closely with UNICEF to improve its performance in the sectors where it does lead.
20. Security and progress on the political front are the pre-requisites for voluntary return. Agreements on Voluntary Return will not in themselves bring it about. Nevertheless, the international community must ensure that the Sudanese government sticks to the agreements it has reached and stops its practice of forcing IDPs to return home or to move to other camps. Rather than waiting for security to improve, the UN should be putting plans in place now, for the informed and voluntary return of IDPs to their homes over the next year. (Paragraph 38).
In North and South Darfur, returns protocols that bind the GoS are set out in the Management and Coordination Mechanism, drafted by the International Organisation on Migration. In West Darfur a Letter of Understanding between UNHCR and the GoS sets out responsibilities. These have improved communication between the various organisations involved in the movement of IDPs. The GoS continues to act in violation of both agreements, though there are no recent examples of forced movement of large numbers of IDPs. This issue was raised at the most recent Joint Implementation Mechanism meeting in Khartoum, and a joint GoS and UN mission will visit South Darfur to address it. We agree that the UN should have an integrated plan for returns. They are working on this, and should also have a new head of Returns and Reintegration in place by the end of this month. We expect the new personnel will lead to a more vigorous and transparent approach to planning for returns.
Does the UN now have an integrated plan for returns, and a new head of Returns and Reintegration?
Robert Turner is now in place as the UN Director of Return, Reintegration and Recovery for the whole of Sudan.
The UN has only recently developed a framework for the movement phase of spontaneous returns to Southern Sudan, following pressure from donors and the governments in Khartoum and the south. However, the UN lacks a coherent reintegration plan for resettlement and immediate recovery. During the coming dry season it will be particularly important that the UN prioritises and targets areas where the pressures of returns could result in a worsened humanitarian situation and possible re-displacement. We are pressing them to do so. There are indications (though no confirmed figures) that re-displacement has already occurred.
In Darfur, planning for returns is underway in West Darfur. The UN has mobile teams and satellite offices scattered across the State, and is monitoring return movements. It is starting to provide small-scale community based reintegration and rehabilitation projects in areas of return. Such a process is also getting started in North and South Darfur. 24. There is strong case for initiating an inter-governmental review of the humanitarian response, along the lines of that which took place after Rwanda, led perhaps by an African country. The UK Government should consider supporting such a review. (Paragraph 43)
There have been two key reviews of the humanitarian response so far: the Inter-Agency Standing Committee real-time evaluation, which was commissioned in August 2004 by Jan Egeland to strengthen the humanitarian response in Darfur and future crises of a similar nature, and is still ongoing; and the Joint UNICEF-DFID evaluation of UNICEF preparedness and early response to the Darfur emergency. We are still following up on the findings of these reviews, and will consider in due course whether any additional reviews, such as an inter-governmental review as suggested by the Committee, would be appropriate.
Has HMG considered whether an inter-governmental review would be appropriate? What was the decision and why?
We agree with the Committee that this would be appropriate, and we would support a proposal to conduct an inter-governmental review of the humanitarian response in Darfur.
27. We endorse strongly the suggestions made by the Secretary of State for International Development for reforming the international humanitarian system, particularly as regards funding and giving UN-OCHA a stronger role in coordination. More broadly, we share his concern that there are no clear means of holding humanitarian donors and agencies to account. In the absence of accountability, the provision of humanitarian relief will be slow to improve (Paragraph 46).
We welcome the Committee's comments, and are piloting this approach in Sudan this year. In order to empower the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (UNHC) in Khartoum, DFID has provided an un-earmarked £45 million contribution for humanitarian components of the UN Workplan. The UNHC has allocated this money to activities in the Workplan and it is being disbursed to operational agencies and NGOs. For the 2006 Workplan we are looking to establish a funding mechanism though which all donors can contribute, and where the UNHC would both allocate and disburse to UN agencies and, if they are included in the Workplan, NGOs. DFID is also considering whether a similar approach could be taken in the Democratic Republic of Congo and possibly also Ethiopia.
How has the piloting in Sudan of the new funding approach gone?
DFID's £45 million un-earmarked contribution for humanitarian components of the UN Workplan was allocated and disbursed to operational agencies and NGOs in the first half of 2006. The Humanitarian Coordinator allocated around £23 million of the contribution to projects in Southern Sudan; £17 million went to Darfur and the remainder to other parts of Sudan and national programmes. This distribution of funds reflects the relative lack of donor interest in Southern Sudan compared to Darfur, even though in Southern Sudan humanitarian indicators are in places commensurate with or worse than Darfur. The Humanitarian Coordinator's ability to address this and channel funds to where they are most needed represents a big advantage of this approach.
DFID is now working with the Humanitarian Coordinator in Khartoum to put a common funding mechanism in place for the 2006 Workplan. This would allow the Humanitarian Coordinator to both allocate and disburse funds to operational agencies and NGOs in the Workplan. We expect the fund will be in place by December, and that several other donors will join the UK and use it to channel their contributions to the 2006 Workplan. A similar mechanism is being established in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
We will undertake rigorous monitoring and evaluation of both the Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo pilots over the course of 2006.
36. We believe that the UK Government has had honourable intentions throughout; but mistakes were made. Strategies for dealing with governments to move dual peace processes forward will be needed again. Lessons must be learnt. In its response to our report, we invite the Government - not solely DFID - to outline the lessons, which have been learnt about sequencing and prioritisation as a result of the experience of Darfur. (Paragraph 58)
There are always lessons to be learned following any crisis. We have not yet done a formal lessons learned exercise in terms of two peace processes in one country or Sudan in particular, but agree that this is something we should consider. Reviews of the humanitarian response are being carried out. Please see the response to recommendation 24 for further details.
Has HMG considered and conducted a lessons-learned exercise relating to dual peace processes in one country and the implications of such situations for the practice of international diplomacy?
We agree that a lessons-learned exercise would be valuable, and will explore how best to do it. We will keep the Committee informed of how we take this forward.
42. Decisions about mandate are for the AU's Peace and Security Council to make, in consultation with the wider international community. However, if security does not improve in Darfur within weeks, and if large-scale killing continues, then the mandate of the AU must be revised to enable it to use force to protect civilians, and to disarm militias. As a first next-step, the AU should do more pro-actively to police the no-fly zone, agreed to by the parties as part of the 9 November Security Protocol. The AU must also be provided with the logistical and technical support to enable it to fulfil its mandate. (Paragraph 67)
Response to recommendations 41 and 42. We agree that it is for the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to decide the mandate of its mission. The current mandate requires the mission to carry out "proactive monitoring" and to "contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief." It is also mandated to "protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability". A recent AU-led assessment mission, including UN, UK, EU and US military representatives, unanimously agreed that the mandate was sufficiently broad, but that greater numbers were needed to implement it effectively. The AU PSC subsequently decided to expand the number of military personnel to 7,731 by the end of September. The AU is currently in discussions with the international community over support for its expansion. This is likely to include both further logistical and technical support, and the UK will play its part. In February 2005 the Sudanese Foreign Minister told the Secretary of State for International Development that the Government would withdraw all its Antonov aircraft from Darfur. This has been done and, although helicopter gunships remain in Darfur, the UN Secretary General reports that there have been no hostile military flights since this commitment was made.
Has the deployment of the additional AU troops and civilian police been completed? What delays have there been and why? Have there been any GoS hostile military flights since April? When there have been hostile military flights, what sanctions have been imposed, or pressure brought to bear, on the GoS?
The deployment of the expanded AU mission has continued. There are now approximately 6,440 military and civilian personnel in Darfur - still short of the 7,731 total. It is likely that South Africa will now be unable to provide a military battalion, and it has proven difficult to generate appropriately qualified civilian police. There was a three-week delay in deployment in September for infrastructure improvements to be made, and due to Sudan-wide fuel shortages.
When the Secretary of State for International Development met rebel commanders in El Fasher in June this year, they confirmed that the GoS had stopped military flights. We are concerned however about recent reports of hostile GoS helicopter flights. The AU is investigating though has not yet substantiated the allegations.
We continue to put pressure on the Government of Sudan and the rebels. During its visit to Sudan earlier this month, the EU Troika - including Minister for Africa Lord Triesman - pressed the parties to make immediate improvements to the security situation in Darfur, and to rein in their fighters and act with restraint.
46. Helping the AU Mission, and bringing pressure to bear on the Government of the Sudan, to improve policing, is a matter of considerable urgency; the UK and the EU must do more to provide support, more quickly. As discussions continue, and action follows, attention must also be given to ensuring that there are sufficient numbers of women police officers and civilian specialists so that reports of violence against women and girls can be dealt with appropriately.(Paragraph 71).
Improving the rule of law in Darfur through better policing is important in finding a sustainable solution to the continued insecurity. We welcome the recent decision by the AU PSC to expand the number of its police in Darfur, and the emphasis it placed on the importance of policing, including recruiting more women police officers, for the longer-term security of Darfur. The UK is supporting the AU policing mission through the provision of vehicles as well as providing advice on AU policing matters to the Darfur Integrated Task Force (the Addis Ababa-based AU management team) Police Commissioner and the Darfur Commissioner. We have also provided funding to UNDP for their human rights training programme for GoS police. Within the EU, we have also been pressing for support to AU policing and for the EU to look at possible direct support to improve GoS policing. The EU is currently considering how it may best do this.
What conclusions did the EU reach about possible direct support to improve GoS policing, and what action followed?
The EU has agreed to provide civilian police support to the AU. It is seconding police advisors and trainers to work with the AMIS II Police Chain of Command and to train AMIS's own police trainers. The initial deployment of police experts started on 15 August. The UK is filling seven positions, including Police Head of Mission, and we are looking to see what further contributions the UK could provide.
49. The UK and the EU have been particularly generous with financial support for the AU, but as Hilary Benn acknowledged - and the Commission for Africa reiterated in its recommendation that donors provide fifty percent of the AU's peacekeeping requirements - there is a need to find a mechanism that will allow funding to support AU peace support operations on a more consistent and long-term basis. (Paragraph 74)
We agree with the Committee's recommendation. We fully support the AU and recognise the need for both predictable and flexible funding for the AU's peace support operations. The UK is working with the EU and other partners to identify funding mechanisms that will meet this need. In addition EU programmes have already begun to build financial management capacity at the AU. We anticipate this will encourage more donors to provide direct funding to the AU.
Have the UK, the EU and other partners identified funding mechanisms for the AU which will provide for predictability and flexibility for peace support operations?
The EU currently funds peace and support operations through the African Peace Facility, which provides a flexible and rapid response to AU requests for financial assistance. It is a major supporter of the AU mission with €92 million (£62 million) provided so far, and a further €70 million (47 million) soon to be made available. The Facility is drawing to a close and we are working in our capacity as Presidency of the EU to ensure that a long-term flexible and sufficient funding mechanism is secured for the future. 53. What concerns us most about the international community's delegation of responsibility to the AU is: first, that there seems little sense of urgency; and second, that the support which the international community provides to the AU Mission, does not seem to be based on a strategy in which the risks attendant to different options are assessed. Complex challenges are best tackled on the basis of a clear strategy; muddling through, or waiting and seeing, rarely works. Starting from the basis that protecting the people of Darfur, and holding the parties to account for ceasefire violations is the goal, we must have clear answers to the following questions:
* How is the effectiveness of the AU Mission being assessed, on what basis, and by whom? * What level of insecurity would signal that the AU Mission - working in a context largely beyond its control - was not being effective? * How many months does the AU Mission have to demonstrate its effectiveness? * If the AU Mission proves unable to fulfil its mandate effectively - monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire, and providing civilian protection - what are the next steps to ensure its success, who will ensure that they are taken, and when? (Paragraph 77)
Support to the AU must be determined by its needs. The UN, EU and NATO are all looking at what assistance they may be able to provide to the AU as it increases its presence further. The UN Secretary General recently reported that the UN should focus on logistics and technical support to improve management structures. This supports the recent findings of the AU-led assessment mission, which included UN, UK, US and EU representatives, to look at current performance of the mission, possible future expansion and how partners can best support the AU. The AU PSC recently endorsed the report and authorised an expansion in numbers to 6,171 military personnel, with an appropriate level of civilian support personnel, including 1,560 civilian police, by the end of September 2005. We fully support the findings and recommendations of this mission and have made clear that we will support the AU in achieving this. Further assessment missions are planned for the future to look at AU performance and donor support. The March assessment mission recommended a further review in September to consider the effectiveness of the AU mission against the situation then facing it, with a possible further expansion to around 12,000 should this be necessary.
How is the effectiveness of the AU Mission being assessed, on what basis, and by whom?
It is the responsibility of the AU to assess its mission including its fulfilment of its mandate, through its Peace and Security Council and Commission, including by examination of reports from the AU Chairman and Joint Assessment Missions. In addition, the UN Secretary General's monthly report on the situation in Darfur indicates any progress that has been made.
What level of insecurity would signal that the AU Mission - working in a context largely beyond its control - was not being effective?
The Committee is correct to note that the level of security in Darfur is not solely a function of AU mission performance: only a political solution in Darfur will result in lasting, improved security. This is why the UK remains closely engaged in the AU-mediated talks in Abuja. Meanwhile, the AU mission has made and continues to make a significant difference to security on the ground.
How many months does the AU Mission have to demonstrate its effectiveness?
The AU mission is doing a good job under demanding conditions. In our assessment it has already demonstrated its effectiveness. Until the most recent upsurge in violence in September, there had been three months of relative stability in Darfur - the AU mission contributed significantly to this.
If the AU Mission proves unable to fulfil its mandate effectively - monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire, and providing civilian protection - what are the next steps to ensure its success, who will ensure that they are taken, and when?
The AU mission does not bear primary responsibility for protection of civilians - this continues to rest with the Government of Sudan. The international community will continue to work with the AU to help it fulfil its mandate and achieve success, and would determine an appropriate response together with the AU, if any further steps were needed.
Have "further assessment missions" taken place? If so, what have they concluded? Is an expansion to 12,000 (or more) needed?
The UK and international partners have urged the AU to carry out a further assessment mission. We expect one will take place in the next few months, and should consider the future of the AU mission, including whether any further troop expansion might be needed. Such an assessment mission is for the AU to decide and announce.
58. It is a scandal that interests in oil and arms exports can prevent the Security Council from acting firmly on behalf of the international community to protect the people of Darfur. It shames those countries which, fuelling the crisis in Sudan, are happy to turn a blind-eye to crimes no less serious and heinous than genocide. And it demonstrates the impotence of the international community to act to prevent such crimes and to fulfil its responsibility to protect. (Paragraph 89)
We are firmly committed to the United Nations and to the role of the Security Council. It is essential that the international community works through the UN and the Security Council to confront threats to international peace and security. Working for consensus in the Security Council is the best way to achieve progress, particularly when negotiating on a set of issues as complex as this. However, it is the case that some UN Security Council members were unwilling to countenance Security Council action during the early stages of the crisis. The Security Council made good progress on Darfur, notably through the adoption on 29 March 2005 of Resolution 1593, which referred the situation in Sudan to the International Criminal Court. This should act as a deterrent for future atrocities. Resolution 1591 extends the Darfur arms embargo to cover the Government of Sudan. This followed the continued violations of the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the Abuja Protocols by governmental forces and Darfur rebels. Additionally, the resolution allows for the imposition of targeted sanctions on individuals who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in the Darfur region, commit violations of international humanitarian law or human rights law or other atrocities, violate the arms embargo or are responsible for offensive military overflights in and over the Darfur region. The Security Council also agreed on the creation of a UN Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts to monitor implementation and enforcement of the measures and make recommendations on individuals against whom sanctions should be targeted. It took the Security Council too long to reach these conclusions; we had been pressing for stronger Resolutions for many months. We believe it is important that permanent Security Council members use the veto with restraint and in a manner consistent with the principles of the Charter, as we have done ourselves. UN member states are presently discussing a range of reforms to the UN system, in part to overcome the divisions over Iraq. Heads of States and Governments will commit themselves to these reforms at the Millennium Review Summit in September. One of the issues presently on the agenda is the responsibility to protect, which the UK strongly supports. We believe that the international community has a responsibility to act when governments are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens against genocide or crimes against humanity.
What progress is the International Criminal Court making with its investigations? How cooperative is the GoS being with the ICC?
Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1593, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court must report to the Security Council every six months. He presented his first report before the Security Council on 29 June and said that following a preliminary examination, he had determined there were sufficient grounds to open a formal investigation into the situation in Darfur.
The Court will carry out its investigations into Darfur independently, as with all other investigations. The timing of the indictments, like the names and numbers of those to be investigated or prosecuted, is solely within the Chief Prosecutor's discretion. The Chief Prosecutor is due to update the Security Council on the status of the investigation in December. He can use that opportunity to report any concerns in relation to co-operation between the Court and the Government of Sudan and other involved states and organisations.
Has the referral acted as a deterrent for subsequent atrocities?
In his August report, the UN Secretary General noted a decline in the level of violence. The ICC referral may have contributed to this in part. However, the situation has since deteriorated, and the level of violence in Darfur has increased.
Have targeted sanctions been imposed on anyone? If so, who, for what crimes/violations? Has the UN Sanctions Committee and Panel of Experts been established? What recommendations has it made?
The Sanctions Committee, composed of representatives of all UN Security Council members has met several times. It appointed a Panel of Experts on 30 June to assist the Committee's work. As yet, no individuals have been designated by the Committee. The UK comprehensively briefed the Panel of Experts when they travelled to the region.
The Panel of Experts submitted its interim report to the Security Council on 7 October. The interim report encouraged full information sharing with the African Union; noted that the Committee may wish to consider future modifications to the arms embargo; recommended that the Government of Sudan update its information in the UN Arms Registry on arms imports into Sudan; and recommended that the Sanction Committee consider designating individuals based on information from sources other than just the Panel of Experts. The Panel also made preliminary findings about ongoing breaches of the arms embargo.
The Panel of Experts will submit its final written report in early December 2005. We hope that this will include recommendations regarding sanctions against individuals. It will be important for the UN Security Council to take these recommendations forward promptly.
64 . Some simple guidelines for dealing with regimes like the Sudanese government are: do not trust what they say; demand hard evidence to back up what they say they have done; establish clear benchmarks and timetables against which their actions can be judged; and, specify what consequences will flow, and when, if the government fails to meet its commitments. Dealing with the rebels has its own problems too, with a lack of clarity as regards their organisation and their demands at the top of the list. Efforts must be made to engage with the rebels, not least to identify their demands. (Paragraph 95)
Bilaterally, and through the UN and EU, we continue to insist that both the Government of Sudan and the rebels abide by the commitments they have already made and engage in finding a political solution to the conflict. We were closely involved in the recent three UN Security Council Resolutions, which clearly set out the obligations placed on the Government of Sudan and the SLM/JEM, and the measures, including targeted sanctions, which will be taken should they fail to comply. We fully support the AU-mediated peace process for Darfur, and are pressing the parties to engage in the process at a suitably high level. The international community is also providing support, in the form of workshops, to the rebels to help them formulate a coherent and cohesive political position, ahead of the next round of talks. The Government of Sudan is aware of this support and recognises its benefit.
What support has the international community provided to the rebels to help them to formulate a coherent and cohesive political position? Why has this objective not been achieved?
The NGO Saint Egidio has run capacity building workshops with the rebel movements, and the UK has provided experts to the AU to run workshops to help all sides ahead of the sixth round of talks. These workshops helped the parties formulate their negotiation positions and approach the talks with greater clarity.
The greatest obstacles towards coherent and cohesive position have been the divisions within the SLM, and between the SLM and the JEM. We welcome the cooperation agreement between the SLM and the JEM of 13 September and the coordination demonstrated between them at the sixth round of talks. We have continued to press the rebels to ensure they co-ordinate their positions, and are supporting the meeting of the three main rebel leaders in an effort to resolve their difference ahead of the seventh round of talks. We will also provide experts for further AU workshops ahead of the resumption of negotiations, planned for 21 November.
69. We do not accept that there is a trade-off, or choice to be made, between justice and peace. If the aim is a sustainable peace, then justice and accountability are required. Political negotiations with those responsible for crimes against humanity are hardly a sound basis for a sustainable peace. (Paragraph 104)
We agree that accountability is essential to achieving long-term stability. This is one of the reasons we have promoted justice and the rule of law on the international agenda since September 2003. It is also the reason why the UK sponsored the Security Council resolution, which referred Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Should the ICC indict individuals for crimes against humanity or any other crimes within the Court's jurisdiction, those individuals must be brought before the Court.
Have any individuals been brought before the ICC? What discussions has HMG had with the USA regarding Salah Abdallah Gosh?
The ICC is conducting an independent investigation into events in Darfur. We do not know whom it is investigating. As far as we are aware, it has issued no indictments, though we might not be informed if it had issued sealed indictments. Sallah Abdallah Gosh is the head of the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services. We have had occasional discussion with the US about him in this capacity.
73. Sudan's international partners, including the UK, must insist that all oil related transactions - payments by outside companies, as well as flows of finance within Sudan - are published in line with the highest international standards of transparency. Specifically, they should comply at least with the guidelines promoted by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and consult openly with civil society. A full, independent audit of the state oil company should also be carried out, and the results published. (Paragraph 112)
We agree that transparency on oil related transactions will be essential for the success of the CPA. The agreement recognises this by proposing to establish relevant institutions. Establishment of these institutions is ongoing and we will look to play a positive role where we can.
The UK, along with a number of other countries, called for Sudan to adopt Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in a recent discussion in the IMF. We will continue to do so bilaterally and in appropriate fora. The issue has also been raised with the Government of Sudan in the context of a World Bank Public Expenditure Review, in which the UK will participate. Representatives from the Government of Sudan and SPLM were invited to the EITI conference in London in March 2005, but did not attend. We hope that this issue will get more attention in coming months from both the Government of Sudan and SPLM.
Has Sudan signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative? Has the issue of transparency re oil revenues received more attention from the GoS and the SPLM?
Sudan has not yet signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The initiative remains on the workplan for the World Bank's Public Expenditure Review (PER) but substantive discussions have not yet begun, partly due to delays forming a Government of National Unity, and partly due to delays in the PER process. We will remain engaged with this work.
Interest has been expressed by the SPLM in EITI. In the last few weeks, some specific interest has been shown by GoS and we are following this up in Khartoum. Progress on EITI should link with actions taken by the commission to deal with petroleum issues, which is to be established under the CPA. This commission, like several others under the CPA, has yet to be established.
74. The UK Government should make its financial support to the Government of the Sudan conditional on a substantial and rapid decline in military spending, and encourage other donors to do likewise. (Paragraph 112)
It is important to commence development activities in Sudan quickly, so people can see the benefits of peace. In some cases, these will be best done with or through the Government of National Unity when it is established. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Northern Sudan will allow donors to scrutinise, in a joined-up way, the overall spending patterns of the Government and decide together on appropriate courses of action if the Government does not allocate acceptable levels of funding for poverty reduction. It is worth noting that the Government of Sudan has allocated $3.1bn of a total requirement of $4.3bn towards the reconstruction and development needs identified for the North in the Joint Assessment Mission report for the next two and a half years.
We are also supporting the World Bank to undertake a full Public Expenditure Review (PER) including an analysis of military and other spending. It is expected that the PER will provide analysis for improved allocation of public finances and accountability and transparency mechanisms.
What conditions has HMG attached to UK aid, including debt relief, to Sudan? Can you confirm that the Debt Support Group, mentioned in HMG response to para 117 of IDC report has not been established? Has the World Bank concluded its Public Expenditure Review? What were its findings, and how are the findings being acted upon?
Following the CPA, DFID is supporting initial work on the delivery of basic services, and reform of the justice and security sectors, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants. We have also talked to the Government of Sudan about future prospects for debt relief. We have, however, made clear that it will not be possible for us to engage in this area without a substantial improvement in the situation in Darfur. The Debt Support Group has not been established.
The World Bank Public Expenditure Review has started more slowly than we had anticipated. The Review comprises a series of sector-specific modules and will take several years to complete. The results from the first module on finances at the state level are not yet available.
75. The humanitarian response must be integrated with plans for longer-term development. Working with the new Government of the Sudan, donors including the UK should consider how Reconstruction and Development Funds, such as those provided for in the CPA, might be used to support the rebuilding of livelihoods in Darfur. And, whilst the focus of livelihood rehabilitation will be on agriculture and related activities, the looming threat of HIV/AIDS must not be forgotten. (Paragraph 114)
The UK's humanitarian and development work is fully integrated in the Sudan Unit, and will be integrated in a DFID office in Khartoum once established. One example is that we are working towards a pooled fund for contributions to the UN Workplan (mainly for humanitarian work), which will be complementary to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF - for reconstruction and development). The MDTF will allocate expenditure according to a needs assessment carried out by the SPLM, the Government of Sudan and international parties across both North and South Sudan; the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). Darfur was excluded from the JAM due to the security situation there; but planning is underway for a JAM in Darfur, to be undertaken as soon as the security situation allows. In the meantime, the current JAM budget sets aside a specific allocation for longer-term reconstruction in Darfur, although without going into specifics at this stage.
Has a Joint Assessment Mission in Darfur taken place? If not, when is it thought that one might be possible?
A Joint Assessment Mission to Darfur has not taken place. The UN and World Bank would need to be assured that security was sufficiently improved before any mission happened. It is difficult to predict when this might be, though it is unlikely to happen in the near future.
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