Clerk of the House of Commons (M 28)
INTRODUCTION
1. Scrutinising, amending and passing Bills,
is a primary function of Parliament. Most legislation which is
successfully passed into law originates from the Government of
the day; but the procedures for its consideration have to be applicable
also to the limited number of Private Members' Bills which make
progress[1].
By its nature legislation tends to be complex in both content
and form. The procedures of the House aim at giving Members of
the House maximum flexibility in carrying out their duty to scrutinise
it; but if the legislative propositions under consideration are
complex (and they have tended to become more so in recent years
as the size of the statute book has grown), procedures alone can
do little to reduce the complexity.
2. Legislative procedure has been exhaustively
reviewed by bodies inside and outside the House both before and
since the report of the Modernisation Committee of 1997-98. [2]As
a result it is difficult to come up with ideas which are significantly
novel; this memorandum does not attempt to do so, nor to provide
an exhaustive summary of previous inquiries and reports. The three
innovations which have successfully established themselves in
the mainstream of the House's procedures as a result of the work
of the Modernisation Committee in the 1997-2001 Parliament are:
the routine use of programming (Standing
Orders Nos. 83 A-I) to timetable proceedings on Government Bills;
the publication of Explanatory Notes
for Government bills, published by the House but prepared by the
responsible Department;
the regular publication of draft
bills for pre-legislative scrutiny by Select or ad hoc Joint Committees.
3. Other innovations from earlier Parliaments,
which were intended to enable more thorough scrutiny at different
stages of the consideration of a bill, remain in the Standing
Orders but languish largely unused. They highlight the principal
difficulty which faces many proposals which have been or might
be made for the reform of the legislative process, namely that
they would tend to result in Bills taking longer to get through
Parliament. In principle that might not be a bad thing: there
is frequent criticism that Bills are produced too quickly to get
the policy and drafting right and (by the courts) that the law
enacted shows signs of hasty passage through Parliament. But there
is no point in recommending or introducing new procedures which
are not in practice likely to be operated by Government business
managers faced with the task of handling an ever-growing volume
of legislation. (The extent of this growth is shown in the attached
figures)[3].
COMMUNICATING WITH
THE PUBLIC
4. Communicating with the public is an important
task, now much in the focus of Parliament corporately. The Committee
will be aware that the House is investing increased effort and
resources in what has been a neglected part of parliamentary activity
in the past.
5. So far as Bills are concerned, there
are two principal sources of information for the public. The first
is that of Explanatory Notes, already mentioned above, which provide
a clause by clause explanation of each Government Bill. These
notes tend to be quite full and technical in nature. Although
they usually contain a summary of the Bill and an indication of
the relevant policy background, they seldom set out clearly and
concisely in their introductory sections what the purposes or
objectives of legislation are intended to be. In addition, the
House of Commons Library produces research notes on individual
Bills, explaining their policy background, for general use.
6. So there is already a good deal of information,
of an explanatory nature about legislation, in the public domain
and available on the internet. Nevertheless, it is detailed, sometimes
dense stuff. The Library's Research Notes on the current Work
and Families Bill, for instance, run to 64 pages and the Explanatory
Notes to 19. There may be a case for the production of a simpler
description of Bills for the use both of Parliament itself and
of the general public. Such a description might set out a Bill's
main provisions in as non-technical language as possible, linking
them to its intended purposes and objectives. The Committee will
appreciate that this task is complicated by the increasing tendency
to legislate by reference to Acts already on the statute book.
Explaining in simple terms what a Bill does when it is amending
a web of complex legislation already enacted would not be an easy
task; the example of almost any recent Finance Bill would illustrate
that point graphically.
7. However, if the Committee considers that
summaries would be useful, the next question would be: who should
produce them? The view taken by your predecessor Committee in
1997 and in the more recent report from the Lords Select Committee
on the Constitution was that this was best done by the Government
Department which is, in the end, responsible for the Bill[4].
An alternative might be for this to be done by the House administration
as part of its information service for the public. There would
of course be resource implications if such a course were to be
decided on. Another potential problem is that it might be difficult
for a politically impartial House service to provide a short and
accessible summary of a Bill's intended objectives without risking
cutting across the messages being put out by the responsible Minister
or Department.
PRE-LEGISLATIVE
SCRUTINY
8. Pre-legislative scrutiny is generally
acknowledged to have been a successful innovation: much has happened
since the Modernisation Committee first drew attention to the
need for systematic consideration of draft Bills in its first
report on the Legislative Process. [5]Over
the past few years scrutiny of Bills in draft, which is usually
but not invariably a joint exercise of both Houses, has been widely
considered as a valuable addition to Parliament's overall scrutiny
of legislation. [6]That
is particularly the case because it occurs at a formative stage
in the development of what will become the law.
9. Some draft bills have been scrutinized
by joint committees and others by departmental select committees
in the Commons. The allocation to committees has been determined
through the usual channels. The Commons staffing of joint committees
has been from the Scrutiny Unit of the Committee Office, which
has also assisted departmental select committees considering draft
bills.
10. The most obvious measure of the impact
of pre-legislative scrutiny is the number or proportion of recommendations
accepted; but recommendations vary in their significance, and
they may be accepted only in part or give rise to other changes
to the Bill or to regulations or guidance intended to meet the
same aim in a different way. One of the influences on the Government's
response is the extent to which the scrutinising committee examined
policy as well as implementation.
11. The impact of pre-legislative scrutiny
is not confined to the scrutiny stage, since Members may use the
knowledge gained or evidence gathered during pre-legislative scrutiny
after the bill is published. Recommendations made during pre-legislative
scrutiny have sometimes been pursued at later stages and given
rise to amendments to the bill itself, as in the case of the Civil
Contingencies Bill and the Disability Discrimination Bill. In
one case, the draft Corruption Bill of 2002-03, an adverse report
from a Joint Committee[7]
appears to have persuaded the Government to reconsider the whole
basis of the proposed legislation.
12. Some aspects which the Committee might
find it worthwhile to examine in more detail could include the
selection of Bills for publication in draft, the allocation to
Committees, the time allowed for pre-legislative scrutiny, the
different ways in which committees have approached the task of
scrutinising a draft bill (eg by considering policy as well as
implementation), the effectiveness of committees in engaging public
interest (including the use of e-consultation), and variations
in the Government's response to committees' recommendations. My
colleagues in charge of pre-legislative scrutiny will be pleased
to supply evidence on these topics if it is required.
13. An important fact to be borne in mind,
however, is that the Government inevitably controls the process
because it alone is in the position to decide which Bills should
be considered in draft and to instruct Parliamentary Counsel accordingly.
It is unlikely that any Government would subject a large part
of its programme to the delay entailed in putting major manifesto
commitments through the pre-legislative scrutiny process. The
figures show that the number of draft Bills referred by Government
has dropped off significantly since its peak in sessions 2002-03
and 2003-4. [8]
COMMITTEE STAGE:
STANDING COMMITTEES
14. The principal function of Committees
on Bills after a Bill has had its Second Reading is to go through
the text of a Bill, clause by clause, considering it in detail
and, if agreed, amending it. In most cases this is done in Standing
Committees, away from the Floor of the House, but Bills deemed
of particular importance are kept on the Floor of the House, enabling
all Members to participate without having to be appointed to a
Committee to do so. [9]Standing
Order No 63 provides for the possibility of taking part of a Bill
in Standing Committee and part on the Floor of the House. This
procedure is regularly used in the case of Finance Bills.
15. The criticism often levelled at Standing
Committees is that their procedure is overly formal and they do
not have the opportunity to scrutinize Government policy in depth
so as to inform Members' consideration of the substance and intent
of the legislation rather than merely its wording. I shall return
to a mechanism whereby this can already be done (in Special Standing
Committees) but, for the moment, I should like to consider ways
in which regular Standing Committees' scrutiny might be improved.
16. One of the difficulties which now makes
the Committee stage less effective than it might be arises from
timing. Although two weekends are still customarily left between
publication of a Bill when first introduced and second reading,
the Committee stage is often programmed to begin barely a week
after second reading and to proceed immediately to a pattern of
four sittings a week. That interval is often insufficient for
outside interests groups to get to grips with the text of a Bill
and make representations to the Members appointed to serve on
Standing Committee. The result is that Members are not as well
briefed as they could be if the interval between second reading
and the beginning of committee proceedings were to be longer.
It also means that Parliament is failing in what is an important
aspect of communicating with the public, which needs to be a two-way
process.
17. The process of going through a Bill
offering amendments to any part of the text is never going to
be a simple matter and it is hardly surprising that new Members,
as well as members of the public, find proceedings difficult to
follow. The basic rule is that amendments are taken in the order
they appear in the text of the Bill. Only one question is before
the Committee at any one time but, to facilitate discussion, amendments
are grouped by subject for debate. In the past, on the Chairman's
selection list these groups of amendments have just appeared as
a row of numbers without any indication of subject. It might make
the selection list easier to understand if each group were topped
by a brief heading, as it is on Report Stage, making clear what
the subject of debate is intended to be. I attach a selection
list showing the existing format and the proposed format. [10]Further
refinements identifying Members tabling amendments could be devised
but they would add to the complexity of the appearance of selection
lists. There would also need to be more time for their preparation.
But my suggestion that there should be a subject heading for groups
should at least make clearer to Members the principle on which
groups of amendments are being linked for debate in Committee.
18. Some of the public who attend Standing
Committees are of course experienced members of interest groups,
quite used to following proceedings; others are individuals who
may not have much knowledge of the way business is done. To help
the general public follow proceedings better, the Public Bill
Office has produced a series of explanatory leaflets on the various
types of standing committees. Copies are placed in the public
gallery at meetings.
COMMITTEE STAGE:
SPECIAL STANDING
COMMITTEES
19. There already exists, under Standing
Order No 91, provision for a less formalised style of committee
stage, in Special Standing Committees. Such a Committee has the
power to take written and oral evidence, in Select Committee mode,
during a period of 28 days after a Bill has been committed. Up
to three 3 hour sittings may be devoted to hearing oral evidence
which is customarily taken in public. Oral and written evidence
is printed with the Committee debates.
20. So Special Standing Committees have
the capacity to improve scrutiny and to open up the legislative
process more effectively to the public, somewhat in the same way
as pre-legislative scrutiny. However the procedure has been used
only nine times since its introduction in 1980-81, most recently
for the Adoption and Children Bill in 2001-02. The perception
has always been that the procedure has not been used more often
because it builds in delay; it has also been thought to be less
suitable for Bills which are controversial in a "party"
sense than for more specialist and technical Bills which are nonetheless
of public importance and interest. [11]There
has been some suggestion, in the past, that if there were greater
flexibility in the proceedings of Special Standing Committees
(ie a variance in the 28 days provision or the number of evidence
sessions) it might be used more by Government[12].
There is no procedural reason why these provisions could not be
varied.
REPORT STAGE
IN COMMITTEE
21. The principal problem at Report stage
is lack of time to consider all the amendments that are tabled,
particularly in the case of a controversial Bill. Programme motions
governing Report stage are quite often framed so as to protect
the most important parts of a Bill for debate. This is based on
agreement between the usual channels. But given that most Report
stage and Third Readings are confined to one day's debate up to
the moment of interruption, the process still leads to cutting
out discussion on many amendments, as the figures for Session
2004-05 clearly show[13].
Programming also tends to encourage the selection of amendments
for debate in fewer but larger groups, which some Members argue
weakens detailed line by line scrutiny. Complaints were made on
both these grounds by a number of Members, on all sides of the
House, in the recent debate on the Terrorism Bill.
22. Turning Report stage into a further
Committee stagefor example by sending a Bill back to the
Standing Committee that had already considered itwould
deprive Members not on the Committee from taking part in any detailed
proceedings on a Bill. Although the procedure could work for non-controversial
Bills, it would not be acceptable to opponents in the case of
a controversial Bill, so some mechanism for distinguishing which
Bills were suitable for a Report stage Committee would need to
be devised. [14]
23. In the case of uncontroversial Bills,
Standing Order No 92 already provides for Bills which have been
debated in Second Reading committees (rather than on the Floor
of the House) to be taken in Committee at Report stage. The Committee
reports that it has considered the Bill, with or without amendment,
and the Bill then proceeds to Third Reading on the Floor of the
House. This procedure has only been used once and Second Reading
Committees themselves are now very rare.
LORDS MESSAGES
24. Exchanges between the Houses on Amendments
to Bills (commonly known as "ping-pong") can continue
until one House backs off by accepting the amendments of the other
House. Until the past few years it was an exceptional practice
for Lords Amendments to be considered at the same sitting as they
were received from the House of Lords. [15]This
was conditioned partly by technical considerationsan overnight
delay used to be necessary to enable the requisite papers to be
prepared for the House's consideration; and partly by considerations
of principleMembers and the Government needed time to reflect
on their response to the Lords propositions and (sometimes) to
undertake informal discussions about possible compromises. Technical
advances in recent years have largely overcome the former obstacles,
but they have not eliminated the risks inherent in taking crucial
decisions on the detail of important legislation without proper
time for reflection and consultation. Furthermore, the speed with
which the Houses can handle these matters may contribute to serious
political decisions being put off rather than being taken at an
earlier stage in the exchanges. An example of a series of exchanges
on the Prevention of Terrorism Bill in March 2005 is set out in
Appendix 5 Part I. Although it proved to be a long day for both
Houses, Members will see that the Bill went back and forth between
the Houses eight times in the space of thirty hours or so. Each
of the sittings involved the preparation of new sets of business
papers, both the propositions (Amendments and reasons for disagreement
or insistence) which one House was sending to another and also
the propositions which the Government was putting to the House
(agreeing, disagreeing, insisting or amending propositions sent
from the other House.) [16]
25. It must also be borne in mind that the
decision-makingwhich is principally a matter for Government
but also involves opposition parties or groupswill sometimes
be conducted in a highly charged political atmosphere in the case
of controversial Bills. Government will be tempted to try a few
times to get its way by alternatives and compromises before wanting
to insist. Parties or groups of Members opposing the Government
will employ the same tactic.
26. The process by which the Amendments
are brought before each House is complicated because what the
Houses are doing is complicated. What the description of the process
set out in the second part of Appendix 5 shows, is that the production
and distribution of papers is in fact an efficient and speedy
process. It is fully electronic apart from the physical making
up of House Bills, which is an important check on the textual
validity of what may shortly be enshrined in the law of the land.
The two principal factors in delay arise from the volume of new
material being considered and the need for Government and their
advisers to consider how to respond to proposals and alternatives
as the exchanges go on. The actual physical transfer of the Bills
between the Houses is normally a minor aspect of the whole process.
LORDS AMENDMENTS
IN COMMITTEE
27. I understand that the Committee has
considered the possibility that some Lords Amendments might be
dealt with in Standing Committee so as to minimise the time taken
up on the floor of the House. This proposal would be likely, in
practice, to give rise to the same sort of problems as have led
to report stage standing committees falling into disuse (see paragraphs
22 and 23 above); and there is the further complication that decisions
at the final stage of the legislative process ought to be endorsed
by the House itself. There is the additional difficulty, as the
illustration in Appendix 5 shows, that Lords Amendments are now
routinely considered forthwith which a Standing Committee could
hardly do. The result could therefore be to make "ping-pong"
a more extended process than it is now.
SEPARATING DIVISIONS
FROM DEBATE
28. Programming has gone a long way towards
making the timing of divisions more predictable and, under the
deferred divisions procedure, votes are taken at a particular
time on certain business. But I would argue against decoupling
divisions on legislation from the debate, since the result of
one division sometimes colours subsequent debate (eg the effect
of the Government majority of one on the Terrorism Bill debate
in Committee). There are also potential technical procedural problems
if, in a run of divisions taken separately at a fixed point, one
division produces an unexpected result.
29. It should be noted that in the Scottish
Parliament there is some separation of the vote on a motion from
the debate on it (in what they call "Time for Decision"),
but because of the technical difficulty I have mentioned in the
previous paragraph, Bills themselves are treated differently,
votes taking place immediately at the conclusion of debate. [17]
CARRY-OVER
OF BILLS
30. As I mentioned in the introductory section
of this memorandum, proposals to increase the effectiveness and
thoroughness of the House's examination of Bills have tended to
founder because they generally (and unsurprisingly) entail some
overall extension in the time required for consideration by the
House and so prove unacceptable to Government business managers
who have the responsibility for securing the passage of each year's
legislative programme before the close of the parliamentary session.
One piece of machinery which has been introduced with a view to
easing this difficulty, and incidentally enabling the burden of
legislation to be spread more evenly over a session and indeed
over the lifetime of a Parliament, is that of "carry-over".
This is a procedure which enables a bill which has not completed
its passage through Parliament when a session is prorogued to
be resumed in the next session at the stage it had previously
reached. It was first operated, on an ad hoc basis, in the case
of the Financial Services and Markets Bill in 1998-99, was introduced
as a temporary standing order in 2002, and was made a permanent
standing order (No 80A) in October 2004.
31. Following the House's adoption of the
permanent standing order, three bills were carried over from session
2003-04 to session 2004-05[18].
One bill, the Constitutional Reform Bill [Lords], was similarly
carried over in the House of Lords, on an ad hoc basis. In general,
however, there has been some resistance in the House of Lords
to the development of this procedure; and it is not yet clear
whether it will become a routine feature of Parliament's proceedings,
enabling the Government's legislative programme to be planned
in new and more flexible ways. If this were to be the case, the
range of options which it would be worthwhile for the Modernisation
Committee to consider during its review of legislative process
would increase.
POST-LEGISLATIVE
SCRUTINY
32. I am aware that the Law Commission is
conducting an enquiry into post-legislative scrutiny, following
recommendations made by the Lords Select Committee on the Constitution.
[19]In
principle reviewing how effective something has worked out sometime
later is a good idea, and is practised in all business contexts,
public and private, after the completion of projects. How far
Parliament itself should, or could, review the effectiveness of
all the Bills it passes, is another matter. Bills vary in importance
and type; some are of a highly technical nature. It is unlikely
that one body would be able to review all types of bills effectively
or that a single form of procedure would be suitable for all circumstances.
As the Lords Select Committee recognised, Departmental Select
Committees in the Commons already have the power to enquire into
existing legislation within their remit of monitoring Government
departments. [20]The
Committee on the Lord Chancellor's Department and its successor,
the Constitutional Affairs Committee, for example, have published
reports critical of the entire mechanism of the Children's and
Family Court Advisory and Support Service brought in by the Criminal
Justice and Court Services Act 2000. [21]But
at what point reviews should take place, given the fast-changing
pace of legislation in, for example, areas of criminal law or
anti-social behaviour, is not easy to determine. Whereas pre-legislative
scrutiny can properly be regarded as an integral part of the legislative
process, because the presentation of a draft bill and the presentation
of an actual bill are normally separated by no more than a few
months, post-legislative scrutiny is, I would suggest, best regarded
as part of Parliament's wider and ongoing task of scrutinising
the activities of the executive. It is sometimes many years before
the consequences of a new piece of legislation can be evaluated
fully; and often the success or failure of a statute depends on
issues of administration, funding and detailed implementation
rather than on the drafting of the clauses which Parliament approved.
CONCLUSION
33. There is no indication that Government
business managers are likely to be willing to relax the degree
of control which they exert over the legislative process and its
scheduling. The tight scheduling which currently tends to apply
to the passage of Government legislation through the Commons is
a consequence partly of the historically high volume of legislation
being introduced (see Appendix 1), and partly to the need to allow
adequate time for the somewhat different process of consideration
in the House of Lords. The introduction of procedures which might
significantly improve the depth and quality of the House's scrutiny
of legislation and increase the amount of public involvement in
the legislative process is almost certain to require additional
time. More systematic use of carry-over might help; but significant
additional time in the Commons is only likely to become available
if there is a reduction in the volume of legislation introduced,
or a rebalancing of the legislative timetable between the two
Houses.
Roger Sands
December 2005
1 This paper deals only with Public Bills which is
the subject of the Committee's press release, though Private Bills,
promoted by outside parties, are also part of Parliament's legislative
work. Back
2
First Report from Select Committee on Modernisation: The Legislative
Process HC 190 (1997-98). Back
3
See Appendix I: Volume of Legislation. Back
4
First Report from the Select Committee on Modernisation The
Legislative Process HC 190 (1997-98) ix; 14th Report from
the Select Committee on the Constitution Parliament and the
Legislative Process HL 173-I (2003-04) para 87. Back
5
First Report from the Select Committee on Modernisation The
Legislative Process HC 190 (1997-98) viii; 14th Report from
the Select Committee on the Constitution Parliament and the
Legislative Process HL 173-I (2003-04), paras 20-30. Back
6
eg Described as "an extremely positive development"
by the Hansard Society. Issues in Law Making, 5, Pre-legislative
Scrutiny Hansard Society (London 2004) p5. Back
7
HL 157, HC 705 (2002-03). Back
8
See Appendix 2: Number of draft Bills. Back
9
Historically all Bills were committed to a Committee of the whole
House. The first reference is in 1571, J Redlich The Procedure
of the House of Commons 2 vols (London, 1908) 2: p204. Standing
Committees were first nominated in 1882. Back
10
See Appendix 4. Back
11
For example, professional disagreements about medical treatment.
See Second Report from Procedure Committee HC 49 II(1984-85) Evidence
p.111 ff. Back
12
First Report of Modernisation Committee (1997-98) The Legislative
Process HC 190 paras 44 and Evidence p2, para 12. Back
13
See Appendix 3: Operation of Programme Orders. Back
14
In the case of reference of Bills to Second Reading Committees,
motions to refer can be blocked if twenty Members indicate objection.
See Standing Order No 90 (1). Back
15
This is still reflected in the text of Erskine May's Parliamentary
Practice (23rd edition, pp 630-1), which states that the procedure
of consideration forthwith under Standing Order No. 78(1) "is
generally reserved for amendments which are not material". Back
16
Appendix 5 Part I. Back
17
Rule 11.3, Standing Orders of The Scottish Parliament (6th
Revision, May 2005). Back
18
Mental Capacity Bill, Gambling Bill and School Transport Bill. Back
19
See Report from the Select Committee on the Constitution: Parliament
and the Legislative Process HL173-1 (2003-04) paras 165-193. Back
20
Ibid para 167. Back
21
See Third Report of the Committee on the Lord Chancellor's Department
2002-03 HC 614-I (2002-03) Fourth Report of the Constitutional
Affairs Committee 2004-05 HC 116-I (2004-05). Back
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